89 found
Order:
See also
Peter Klein
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
  1.  32
    Belief, Truth and Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (2):225.
  2. Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:297-325.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   107 citations  
  3. Certainty, a Refutation of Scepticism.Peter David Klein - 1981 - University of Minnesota Press.
    Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  4. Useful False Beliefs.Peter D. Klein - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 25--63.
  5. Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.
    The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism—the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating—solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are tweaked. Then, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   58 citations  
  6. A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
  7. Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails.Peter Klein - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):213-236.
  8.  46
    Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):297-325.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   83 citations  
  9. What Price Coherence?Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):129 - 132.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  10. Useful False Beliefs.Peter Klein - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 25-63.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  11. The Virtues of Inconsistency.Peter Klein - 1985 - The Monist 68 (1):105-135.
    I "argue" that by knowingly accepting a set of propositions which is logically inconsistent, An epistemic agent need not violate any valid epistemic rule. Those types of logically inconsistent sets which it is permissible to accept are distinguished from those which may not be accepted. The results of the discussion are applied to the lottery paradox set of propositions and the preface paradox set. I also "suggest" that it may be an epistemic virtue to accept some inconsistent sets.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  12. Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of ReasonsMetaepistemology and Skepticism. [REVIEW]Peter Klein & Richard Fumerton - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919.
    In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his account of inferential justification.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  13. How to Be an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):25 - 29.
  14. When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious.Peter Klein - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718–729.
    I will argue for two main points. First, the regress imbedded in infinitism need not be subject to the Structural Objection; and second, the Structural Objection does not pose a real problem for any regress. I will not be arguing for the correctness of my proposal directly. That is, as will become apparent soon, my proposal rests on two principles of reasoning which together entail infinitism and I will not present my arguments for those principles here. The purpose of this (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  15. Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility.Peter D. Klein - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (20):792-812.
  16. Certainty.Peter D. Klein - 1998 - In Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  17. What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166-171.
    There are many things that could be wrong with foundationalism. For example, some have claimed that a so-called basic belief cannot be both 1) a reason for non-basic beliefs and 2) such that it cannot be provided with at least prima facie justification. If something is a reason, they say, then that something has to be a proposition and if it is a proposition, then it is the kind of thing that requires a reason in order to be even prima (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  18. Reply to Ginet.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  19.  1
    Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism.John Turri & Peter D. Klein (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume presents new work on infinitism, the view that there are no foundational reasons for beliefs--an ancient view in epistemology, now growing again in popularity. Leading epistemologists illuminate its strengths and weaknesses, and address questions new and old about justification, reasoning, responsibility, disagreement, and trust.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  20. Closure Matters: Academic Skepticism and Easy Knowledge.Peter Klein - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):165–184.
  21. How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2003 - In Luper Steven (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Ashgate Press. pp. 75--94.
  22.  9
    Epistemology.Peter D. Klein - 1998 - In Craig Edward (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1998.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  23. No Help for the Coherentist.Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):118–121.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  24.  32
    Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):108-116.
  25.  10
    When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious.Peter Klein - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718-729.
    I will argue for two main points. First, the regress imbedded in infinitism need not be subject to the Structural Objection; and second, the Structural Objection does not pose a real problem for any regress. I will not be arguing for the correctness of my proposal directly. That is, as will become apparent soon, my proposal rests on two principles of reasoning which together entail infinitism and I will not present my arguments for those principles here. The purpose of this (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  26. Why Not Infinitism?Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Epistemology 5:199-208.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  27.  40
    How to Get Certain Knowledge From Fallible Justification.Peter D. Klein - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):395-412.
    “Real knowledge,” as I use the term, is the most highly prized form of true belief sought by an epistemic agent. This paper argues that defeasible infinitism provides a good way to characterize real knowledge and it shows how real knowledge can arise from fallible justification. Then, I argue that there are two ways of interpreting Ernest Sosa's account of real knowledge as belief that is aptly formed and capable of being fully defended. On the one hand, if beliefs are (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28. Infinitism.Peter D. Klein - 2011 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 245-256.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  29. Misleading Evidence and the Restoration of Justification.Peter D. Klein - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 37 (1):81 - 89.
  30.  92
    Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):108 - 116.
  31. Contemporary Responses to Agrippa's Trilemma.Peter Klein - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
    This article discusses contemporary response to the epistemic regress problem or Agrippa's trilemma. The epistemic regress problem is considered the most crucial in the entire theory of knowledge and it is a major concern for many contemporary epistemologists. However, only two of the three alternative solutions have been developed in any detail, foundationalism and coherentism. Infinitism was not seriously considered as a solution because of the finite-mind objection. This article also provides a brief evaluation of foundationalism, emergent coherentism, and infinitism.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  32.  7
    What Price Coherence?Peter Klein & Alonso Church - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):129.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  33.  12
    Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem.Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter D. Klein (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    The 'Gettier Problem' has been central to epistemology since 1963, when Edmund Gettier presented a powerful challenge to the standard analysis of knowledge. Now twenty-six leading philosophers examine the issues that arise from Gettier's challenge, setting the agenda for future work on the central problem of epistemology.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  34.  87
    Infinitism's Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):153-172.
    O propósito deste artigo é mostrar como podem ser desenvolvidas explicações robustas de justificação e de certeza no interior do infinitismo. Primeiro, eu explico como a concepção infinitista de justificação epistêmica difere das concepções fundacionista e coerentista. Em segundo lugar, explico como o infinitista pode oferecer uma solução ao problema do regresso epistêmico. Em terceiro lugar, explico como o infinitismo, per se, é compatível com as teorias daqueles que sustentam 1) que o conhecimento requer certeza e que uma tal forma (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  35. Warrant, Proper Function, Reliabilism and Defeasibility.Peter D. Klein - 1996 - In Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  36. Misleading "Misleading Defeaters".Peter D. Klein - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (7):382-386.
  37. Radical Interpretation and Global Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1986 - In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  38. The Failures of Dogmatism and a New Pyrrhonism.Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Acta Analytica 15 (24):7-24.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  39. Infinitism is the Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  40.  43
    Why Not Infinitism?Peter D. Klein - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:199-208.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  41.  59
    Immune Belief Systems.Peter Klein - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (1):259-280.
  42.  53
    Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism.Peter D. Klein - 2011 - In Diego Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Springer.
  43. Useful Falsehoods.Peter Klein - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  44. Introduction to Infinitism.John Turri & Peter Klein - 2014 - In John Turri & Peter Klein (eds.), Ad infinitum: new essays on epistemological infinitism. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  45. Real Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1983 - Synthese 55 (2):143 - 164.
    Philosophers have sought to characterize a type of knowledge — what I call real knowledge — which is significantly different from the ordinary concept of knowledge. The concept of knowledge as true, justified belief — what I call knowledge simpliciter — failed to depict the sought after real knowledge because the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge simpliciter can be felicitously but accidentally fulfilled. Real knowledge is knowledge simpliciter plus a set of requirements which guarantee that the truth, belief (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  46. 30. There is No Good Reason to Be an Academic Skeptic.Peter D. Klein - 2003 - In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 299.
  47. Epistemic Compatibilism and Cannonical Beliefs.Peter D. Klein - 1990 - In Roth Michael & Ross Glenn (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspetcives on Scepticism. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  48. ``Closure Matters: Skepticism and Easy Knowledge".Peter Klein - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):165--184.
  49. Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson.Peter D. Klein - 1986 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
  50. What Makes Knowledge the Most Highly Prized Form of True Belief?Peter D. Klein - 2012 - In Tim Black & Kelly Becker (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology.
    This chapter provides grounds for thinking that it is the quality of the reasons for the propositional content of our belief-states with true propositional contents, rather than the etiology of those belief-states, that determines whether the belief-state qualifies as knowledge. Normative epistemology rather than naturalized epistemology holds the key to understanding knowledge. This chapter delineates some important features of epistemic luck. It explores the etiology view and presents reasons for concluding that it cannot adequately account for epistemic luck. The chapter (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 89