As the use of automated social media analysis tools surges, concerns over accuracy of analytics have increased. Some tentative evidence suggests that sarcasm alone could account for as much as a 50% drop in accuracy when automatically detecting sentiment. This paper assesses and outlines the prevalence of sarcastic and ironic language within social media posts. Several past studies proposed models for automatic sarcasm and irony detection for sentiment analysis; however, these approaches result in models trained on training data of highly (...) questionable quality, with little qualitative appreciation of the underlying data. To understand the issues and scale of the problem, we are the first to conduct and present results of a focused manual semantic annotation analysis of two datasets of Twitter messages, associated with; hashtags commonly employed in automated sarcasm and irony detection approaches, and tweets relating to 25 distinct events, including, scandals, product releases, cultural events, accidents, terror incidents, etc. We also highlight the contextualised use of multi-word hashtags in the communication of humour, sarcasm and irony, pointing out that many sentiment analysis tools simply fail to recognise such hashtag-based expressions. Our findings also offer indicative evidence regarding the quality of training data used for automated machine learning models in sarcasm, irony and sentiment detection. Worryingly only 15% of tweets labelled as sarcastic were truly sarcastic. We highlight the need for future research studies to rethink their approach to data preparation and a more careful interpretation of sentiment analysis. (shrink)

The notion of a "preferred format" for training is most fruitfully discussed within a context of what needs to be covered in order to begin to do Philosophy for Children in a responsible fashion. Attached is a form of "Training Manual" that is at the heart of the training that I do in Hawaii. This manual provides a framework that forms the basis of what I think teachers ultimately need to have an in-depth appreciation for, regardless of specific program, in (...) order to faithfully carry out the program. (shrink)

Focusing on the body as a visual and discursive platform across public space, this book explores marginalization as a sociocultural practice and hegemonic schema. The chapters center upon physical contexts, discursive spaces, and philosophical arenas to deconstruct seemingly intrinsic connections between body and behavior, whiteness, and normativity.

Competing schools of contemporary jurisprudence can be “internationalized” to elucidate special problems in interpreting obligations of multinational firms under emergent corporate and international codes. An “integrity” model proves superior to a relativist conception of international business precepts. An integrity jurisprudence provides a coherent vision of a globaI rule-of-law and ethics-of-principle for the world community’s rights correlative to MNC obligations while accomodating the indeterminate and contestable nature of interpretations of such textually-based directives.

With this special volume of Speculations, the editors wanted to challenge the contested term "speculative realism," offering scholars who have some involvement with it a space to voice their opinions of the network of ideas commonly associated with the name.

In this third volume of Speculations, a serial imprint created to explore post-continental philosophy and speculative realism, a wide range of topics are covered, from the philosophy of religion to psychoanalysis to the philosophy of science to gender studies, and in a wide variety of formats (articles, interviews, position pieces, translations, and review essays).

In this paper I will explore a phenomenology of the menstrual cycle, focusing on the cycle’s rhythm as a form of lived temporality. Drawing on the work of Henri Lefebvre and Thomas Fuchs I will outline a key connection between embodiment and rhythmic temporality more generally, before applying this analysis to the rhythm of the menstrual cycle specifically. I will consider the phenomenology of the experience of cycling through the phases of pre-ovulation, ovulation, pre-menstruation and menstruation as a pattern, (...) or specifically an embodied rhythm that constitutes a form of lived temporality. I will consider a way that the subject may potentially be alienated from this rhythm as a result of a dominant cultural narrative of “linear time”. I will argue further that this dissonance between the menstrual body and the contemporary world tends to be compounded by a lack of “menstrual literacy” in education and culture. (shrink)

The author, who has already published a book of English references and allusions to Thomas More in the period 1500-1640, continues his collection up to 1700, setting each citation in its context. He notes that English opinion regarding More in this period tended to be of a polemical nature.

I first became interested in De dialectica in 1966, while I was doing re search on Augustine's knowledge of logic. At the time I made a transla tion of the Maurist text and included it as an appendix to my doctoral dissertation (Yale, 1967). In 1971 I thoroughly revised the translation on the basis of the critical text of Wilhelm Crecelius (1857) and I have re cently revised it again to conform to Professor Jan Pinborg's new edition. The only previously (...) published translation of the whole of De dialectica. is N. H. Barreau's French translation in the Oeuvres completes de Saint Augustin (1873). Thomas Stanley translated parts of Chapters Six and Nine into English as part of the account of Stoic logic in his History of Philosophy (Pt. VIII, 1656). I offer De dialectica in English in the hope that it will be of some interest to historians of logic and of the liberal arts tradition and to students of the thought of Augustine. In translating I have for the most part been as literal as is consistent with English usage. Although inclusion of the Latin text might have justified a freer translation, for example, the use of modern technical terms, it seemed better to stay close to the Latin. One of the. values in studying a work such as De dialectica is to see familiar topics discussed in a terminology not so familiar. In the translation I follow these conventions. (shrink)

On the one hand they seem to be quite obviously truth conditionally equivalent, but on the other hand they seem to be about different things. Whereas (1) is about Jupiter and its moons, (2) is about numbers. In particular, the word ‘four’ appears in (1) in the position of an adjective or determiner, whereas it seems to be a name for a number in (2). Furthermore, (2) appears to be an identity statement claiming that what two number terms stand for (...) is the same thing. Several authors have proposed answers to this puzzle, including Frege, by either pinning the issue on the nature of numbers, pretense, fictionalism, or the nature of reference, but all these proposals agreed that (2) is an identity statement and that in it ‘four’ is a name for an object. In [Hofweber, 2007] I argued that (2) is not an identity statement and that ‘four’ in (2) is not a name for an object. The argument for it was this: When we look at what role (2) has in actual communication we can see that (2) has a focus effect on a discourse that arises from the syntax without special intonation. (shrink)

I adapt an old example of Frank Jackson's, in order to show that it is not only possible that actions with different individual agents are sub-optimal when each is not, but that they are impermissible when each is not, and blameworthy when each is not.

Pairs of sentences like the following pose a problem for ontology: (1) Jupiter has four moons. (2) The number of moons of Jupiter is four. (2) is intuitively a trivial paraphrase of (1). And yet while (1) seems ontologically innocent, (2) appears to imply the existence of numbers. Thomas Hofweber proposes that we can resolve the puzzle by recognizing that sentence (2) is syntactically derived from, and has the same meaning as, sentence (1). Despite appearances, the expressions ‘the number (...) of moons of Jupiter’ and ‘four’ do not function semantically as singular terms in (2). Hofweber’s primary evidence for this proposal concerns differences in the focus-related communicative functions of (1) and (2). In this paper I raise several serious problems for Hofweber’s proposal, and for his attempt to support it by appeal to focus-related phenomena. I conclude by offering independent evidence for an alternative, purely pragmatic resolution of the ontological puzzle. (shrink)

The term ‘continuous’ in real analysis wasn’t given an adequate formal definition until 1817. However, important theorems about continuity were proven long before that. How was this possible? In this paper, I introduce and refine a proposed answer to this question, derived from the work of Frank Jackson, David Lewis and other proponents of the ‘Canberra plan’. In brief, the proposal is that before 1817 the meaning of the term ‘continuous’ was determined by a number of ‘platitudes’ which had some (...) special epistemic status. (shrink)

This is a brief response to Thomas Hofweber's "Extraction, Displacement and Focus: A Reply to Balcerak Jackson" (Linguistics and Philosophy 37.3 (2014)), which was a reply to my "Defusing Easy Arguments for Numbers" (Linguistics and Philosophy 36.6 (2013)).

This paper elucidates the pragmatist elements of Thomas Reid's approach to the justification of first principles by reference to Charles S. Peirce. Peirce argues that first principles are justified by their surviving a process of ‘self-criticism’, in which we come to appreciate that we cannot bring ourselves to doubt these principles, in addition to the foundational role they play in inquiries. The evidence Reid allows first principles bears resemblance to surviving the process of self-criticism. I then argue that this (...) evidence allows Reid and Peirce a way out of the dilemma between dogmatism and skepticism regarding the justification of such principles, insofar as they are epistemically, and not solely practically, justified. (shrink)

In his foundational text The Twenty Years’ Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, E. H. Carr juxtaposes utopian and realist approaches to world politics. This dicho...

Do facts about water have a priori, transparent, reductive explanations in terms of microphysics? Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker hold that they do not. David Chalmers and Frank Jackson hold that they do. In this paper I argue that Chalmers.

The recent global financial crisis raises pressing issues that are not exclusively economic. The health of the economy, Kevin T. Jackson contends, reflects the moral health of the wider culture: ethics must be considered along with economics to understand world markets, especially now that globalization and other forces have increasingly complicated the regulation of transnational corporate conduct. Virtuosity in Business calls on businesspeople and ethicists to expand their thinking by stressing the profound relevance of philosophy to business and economics. Virtuosity (...) in Business shows that ethics has been the overriding problem for business and that it is the only enduring solution. Drawing on a variety of philosophical sources, including Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Jean-Paul Sartre, Jackson applies the concept of virtue to the competitive realm of the marketplace. Virtuosity, in all realms of human endeavor, is not merely a display of technical skill or adherence to conventional norms. The invisible law of virtuosity, which discourages misconduct and rewards good corporate citizenship, guides ethical firms and wise entrepreneurs toward greater success by playing a constructive part in the human enterprise. A pioneering work in the contemporary philosophy of business, Virtuosity in Business revivifies business ethics to address concerns arising from the global financial crisis, such as restoration of faith in the market, respect for human rights, and environmental sustainability. (shrink)

Some people believe that there is an “explanatory gap” between the facts of physics and certain other facts about the world—for example, facts about consciousness. The gap is presented as a challenge to any thoroughgoing naturalism or physicalism. We believe that advocates of the explanatory gap have some reasonable expectations that cannot be merely dismissed. We also believe that naturalistic thinkers have the resources to close the explanatory gap, but that they have not adequately explained how and why these resources (...) work. In this paper we isolate the legitimate explanatory demands in the gap reasoning, as it is defended by Chalmers and Jackson . We then argue that these demands can be met. Our solution involves a novel proposal for understanding the relationship between theories, explanations, and scientific identities. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes is famed for his adherence to the scientific method of his day. One of the central aspects of his science of politics is the thought-experiment of the state of nature. Like a perfect vacuum, it is an analytic concept. Some of its ramifications occupy these pages.

I defend in this essay the seemingly uncontroversial thesis that God is just. By highlighting the kenotic nature of God’s essential goodness, I rebut arguments by Marilyn Adams, Thomas Morris, and William Alston to the effect that God is too sublime to be bound by obligations to creatures. A straightforward acknowledgement that the God who is Love has freely chosen to be (not merely seem) just, is required by fidelity to Scripture as well as by religious experience. Thus is (...) Christianity’s incarnational faith unHellenized... again. (shrink)

Like all people, atheists contemplate issues of love, death, and morality, and in times of stress we long for solace and inspiration. A collection of uplifting quotations from some of mankind’s most important philosophers, scientists, writers, and even comedians, THE INSPIRATIONAL ATHEIST will be a treasured daily companion for the growing demographic of humanists who believe that life has meaning when we live it meaningfully, independent of the existence of a higher power. With words from Carl Sagan, D. H. Lawrence, (...) Julia Child, Douglas Adams, Charlotte Bronte, Bertrand Russell, Ralph Waldo Emerson, George Carlin, Joan Didion, Alfred Lord Tennyson, Thomas Jefferson and dozens of others on topics ranging from Love and Nature to Wisdom and Beauty, this book is a celebration of the sublime without the divine. (shrink)

The so called "Knowledge Argument" of Frank Jackson 1 claims to show that there is something about the human mind that must inevitably escape the grasp of physical science: "There are truths about . . . people which escape the physicalist story" . In effect, materialism is false, and science, as opposed to metaphysics, cannot hope to attain to an understanding of consciousness.

It may seem odd to review a New York social club's yearbook, with its list of members’ addresses and series of committee reports. But such books sometimes contain material of more general interest. The latest one from the Century Association, for example, devotes 250 of its 685 pages to “Century Memorials”—that is, biographical sketches of recently deceased members, written by other members. Among the well-known figures taken up in these eighty-three sketches are the artists Richard Anuszkiewicz and Robert Motherwell; the (...) architects Henry N. Cobb and Charles A. Platt; the newspaper editors Harold Evans and Whitelaw Reid; the historians Henry F. Graff and William McFeely; the translator and literary scholar Donald Keene; the collector of literary and musical manuscripts Frederick Koch; the popular writer on Russian history Robert K. Massie; the clergyman James Parks Morton; the financier Felix G. Rohatyn; the lawyers Whitney North Seymour Jr. and Isaac N. Phelps Stokes; the literary editor Elisabeth Sifton; the university president Michael Sovern; the museum director Evan H. Turner; and the broadcast journalist Sander Vanocur. The sketches are generally well written and often richly evocative: the writers include Louis Begley, Kenneth T. Jackson, D. T. Max, and Honor Moore.The long shelf of Century volumes like this one clearly constitutes a valuable contribution to prosopographical literature. And the Century is not the only institution with such a tradition (other examples are the British Academy and the American Philosophical Society); but their publications are a frequently overlooked source, one not always available in research libraries. Unfortunately, it is also a source that seems to be diminishing: the American Antiquarian Society and the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation are examples of organizations, each with a history of providing biographical information, that are no longer doing so. Of course, the great previous runs of the former's Proceedings and the latter's Reports remain (one hopes) on the shelves for those who know to look for them. A step in the opposite direction has recently been taken by the Grolier Club, which has not had such a tradition (except for two biographical volumes in 1959 and 2000): its Gazette now includes a section of memorials in each issue. This is a welcome move, but one has to regret that so little scholarly use is made of this whole body of biographical detail and reminiscence. (shrink)

James Bryson’s The Christian Platonism of Thomas Jackson offers the first comprehensive study of the Oxford Platonist Thomas Jackson. While Jackson is by no means unknown to early modern historians...

This paper outlines the views of two 17th century thinkers on the question of the metaphysics of resurrection. I show that Jackson and Locke each depart from central 17th century Scholastic convictions regarding resurrection and philosophical anthropology. Each holds that matter or material continuity is not a plausible principle of diachronic individuation for living bodies such as human beings. Despite their rejection of the traditional view, they each provide a defence of the possibility of a personal afterlife. I outline these (...) defences in sections III–IV. I then argue that it is likely either that Locke had read Jackson on the issue of resurrection or that the two were influenced by a common source. I argue that matter might provide a suitable principle of diachronic individuation in both everyday cases of living bodies and in the case of resurrection. (shrink)

What is the future of Philosophy of education? Or as many of scholars and thinkers in this final ‘future-focused’ collective piece from the philosophy of education in a new key Series put it, what are the futures—plural and multiple—of the intersections of ‘philosophy’ and ‘education?’ What is ‘Philosophy’; and what is ‘Education’, and what role may ‘enquiry’ play? Is the future of education and philosophy embracing—or at least taking seriously—and thinking with Indigenous ethicoontoepistemologies? And, perhaps most importantly, what is that (...) ‘Future’? These debates have been located in the work of diverse scholars: from the West, from Global South, from indigenous thinkers. In this collective piece, we purposefully juxtapose diverse takes on the future of these intersections. We have given up the urge to organise, place together, separate with subheadings or connect the paragraphs that follow. Instead, we let these philosophers of education and thinkers who use philosophical texts and ideas to sit together in one long read as potentially ‘strange and unusual bedfellows’. This text urges us to understand how these scholars and thinkers perceive our educational philosophical futures, and how the work and thinking they have done on thinking about what the future of that new key in philosophy of education may look like is embedded in a much deeper and richer literature, and personal experience. (shrink)

Much of the literature on the relationship between belief and credence has focused on the reduction question: that is, whether either belief or credence reduces to the other. This debate, while important, only scratches the surface of the belief-credence connection. Even on the anti-reductive dualist view, belief and credence could still be very tightly connected. Here, I explore questions about the belief-credence connection that go beyond reduction. This paper is dedicated to what I call the independence question: just how independent (...) are belief and credence? I look at this question from two angles: a descriptive one (as a psychological matter, how much can belief and credence come apart?) and a normative one (for a rational person, how closely connected are belief and credence?) Ultimately, I suggest that the two attitudes are more independent than one might think. (shrink)