Philosophical Issues (forthcoming)

Authors
Elizabeth Jackson
Ryerson University
Abstract
Much of the literature on the relationship between belief and credence has focused on the reduction question: that is, whether either belief or credence reduces to the other. This debate, while important, only scratches the surface of the belief-credence connection. Even on the anti-reductive dualist view, belief and credence could still be very tightly connected. Here, I explore questions about the belief-credence connection that go beyond reduction. This paper is dedicated to what I call the independence question: just how independent are belief and credence? I look at this question from two angles: a descriptive one (as a psychological matter, how much can belief and credence come apart?) and a normative one (for a rational person, how closely connected are belief and credence?) Ultimately, I suggest that the two attitudes are more independent than one might think.
Keywords Belief  Credence  Agnosticism  Belief-Credence Dualism  Independence  Epistemic Rationality  Doublemindedness  Credal Reductivism  Lockean Thesis
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford University Press.
Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Wesleyan University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Risky Belief.Martin Smith - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
I Hear You Feel Confident.Adam Michael Bricker - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.

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