In this paper, I argue against John Beatty’s position in his paper “The Evolutionary Contingency Thesis” by counterexample. Beatty argues that there are no distinctly biological laws because the outcomes of the evolutionary processes are contingent. I argue that the heart of the Caspar–Klug theory of virus structure—that spherical virus capsids consist of 60T subunits (where T = k 2 + hk + h 2 and h and k are integers)—is a distinctly biological law even if the existence of spherical (...) viruses is evolutionarily contingent. (shrink)

T. H. Morgan (1866–1945), the founder of the Drosophila research group in genetics that established the chromosome theory of Mendelian inheritance, has been described as a radical empiricist in the historical literature. His empiricism, furthermore, is supposed to have prejudiced him against certain scientific conclusions. This paper aims to show two things: first, that the sense in which the term empiricism has been used by scholars is too weak to be illuminating. It is necessary to distinguish between empiricism as (...) an epistemological position and the so-called methodological empiricism. I will argue that the way the latter has been presented cannot distinguish an empiricist methodology from a non-empiricist one. Second, I will show that T. H. Morgan was not an epistemological empiricist as this term is usually defined in philosophy. The reason is that he believed in the existence of genes as material entities when they were unobservable entities when they were unobservable entities introduced to account for the phenotypic ratios found in breeding experiments. These two points, of course, are interrelated. If we were to water down the meaning of empiricis, perhaps we could call Morgan an empiricist. But then we would also fail to distinguish empiricism from realism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 121 her hermeneutical enterprise. I agree that the Hippolytean interpretation is interesting (how could any interpretation of Heraclitus be without interest?) but I am not convinced that it is new. Here I must be brief: as early as Plato a case can be made for awareness of the moral implications of Heraclitus's cosmological views. The interconnection which Plato sees between Protagorean relativism (moral as well as epistemological (...) ) and Heraclitean (cosmic) flux in the first part of the Theaetetus is indicative of this 052d-e, 16od-e with 172a-b; and for some suggestive commentary see T. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory [Oxford University Press, 1977], x48-53 ). And given this normative gloss on Heraclitus's cosmological views, based as it is on pre-Hippolytean evidence, I conclude that the new methodology which Osborne proposes is not likely to change our picture of the Presocratics. DANIEL H. FRANK University of Kentucky G. R. F. Ferrari. Listening to the Cicadas:A Study of Plato's "Phaedrus." Cambridge Classical Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, t987. Pp. xiii + 293. $39.5o. Plato's conception of the philosophical life acknowledges as centrally important a transcendent aspiration. It also incorporates an appreciation for the philosopher's worldly and contingent biography. In the Symposium Plato portrays the stages of philosophical development and how they transcend worldly beauty only to issue, in the end, in a demand for reshaping the world in terms of the soul's ultimate vision and understanding. In the Republic Plato sketches the psychological, moral, and cognitive itinerary of philosophical education and training. Moreover, Plato emphasizes the necessity that directs the philosopher to return to the world, to organize and maintain social-political life, and to cultivate friendship, justice, and psychological health. In the Phaedrus Plato turns to the domain of interpersonal relations, the sphere of love, and there he charts the way in which the philosophical life arises out of the encounter between lover and beloved and then gives shape to that relationship. This confrontation between the philosophical lover and the contingency of his embodiment is one of the central themes of Professor Ferrari's study of the Phaedrus. That theme concerns the domain of "goods which, although external to the philosophic life, nevertheless belong to it more than just accidentally [and] which result from the realisation~0f the philosophic impulse in our actual lives" (a 28). There are a host of scholarly cruxes in the Phaedrus that Ferrari discusses: the role of the dialogue's pastoral setting; the relation between the dialogue's two parts; the relations among philosophy, poetry, and prophecy; the precise character of Plato's psychology in the Phaedrus; the nature of philosophical madness; whether Plato's famous remark on writing is the theme of the dialogue or a mere epilogue to it; the Platonic use of myth; and so forth. But Ferrari does not approach the dialogue through these cruxes; nor does he enter the Phaedrus through Plato's moral philosophy, his epistemology, or his psychology. Rather he engages the dialogue as it presents itself, as a literary document written with care and discipline, and as an attempt 122 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28:1 JANUARY 1990 on Plato's part to show something important about the philosophical life. The key word here is 'show', for it is Ferrari's conviction that in the Phaedrus Plato exploits the distinctions between what can be told and what can be shown and between background and foreground in order to exhibit two things: how philosophy and rhetoric are interrelated and hence what the philosophical art is, on the one hand, and how the philosophical life is stimulated by and enriches the experience of interpersonal love, on the other. In the Phaedrus Plato develops a rhetorical strategy for showing the philosophical life by juxtaposing it with alternative lives and by exhibiting it and these alternatives against a carefully articulated background. This is why the portraits of Socrates, Lysias, and Phaedrus are given so vividly and in part why Plato turns to myth, as a philosophical strategy for presenting philosophical love. Philosophy, then, must be rhetorical. But also, rhetoric, to be genuine, must be philosophical. Part of what... (shrink)

On the centennial of the death of William James (1842-1910), I approached faculty members at eighteen major theological centers of learning requesting them to identify the twelve most important books in the field of the psychology of religion written between James' 1902 classic The Varieties of Religious Experience up to Peter Homan's 1970 Theology After Freud. The request was for each faculty member (by agreement to remain anonymous) to identify the twelve books during that time period (1902-1970) which, in their (...) opinion, constituted major contributions to the development of the discipline of psychology of religion. By mutual agreement, James was credited with being the purported founder of the psychology of religion and Homans the quintessential culmination of the discipline's respectability. Though obviously subjective, the survey did register a consensus of scholars teaching in the field and what follows is a critical assessment of the merits of those books which they selected. (shrink)

The following exploration of the fundamentals of the Religious Society of Friends called Quakers will focus upon a lesser known tradition of the Quakers, namely that of the "Free Friends of Philadelphia" and their modern progeny, the Free Quakers of Indiana These Free Quakers, as they are called, are those who chose to exercise their free right to follow their conscience in all things, a tradition reaching back to the 18 th century in Philadelphia when a contingent of Friends chose (...) to support the war against Britain. A great deal is known about the programmed and unprogrammed traditions of the Religious Society of Friends, the former electing to have recorded ministers and formalized worship and the latter opting for no clergy and a preference for the mystical tradition of silent worship. Much less is known about the Free Quakers of Revolutionary Pennsylvania and the subsequent modern day Friends, their ideological progeny. In this brief essay, we intend to correct this common oversight in Quaker history. (shrink)

T H McLaughlin; Parental Rights and the Religious Upbringing of Children, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 75–83, http.

T H McLaughlin; Parental Rights and the Religious Upbringing of Children, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 75–83, http.

T H McLaughlin; Religion, Upbringing and Liberal Values: a rejoinder to Eamonn Callan, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Page.

T H McLaughlin; Religion, Upbringing and Liberal Values: a rejoinder to Eamonn Callan, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Page.

T H Mclaughlin; Peter Gardner on Religious Upbringing and the Liberal Ideal of Religious Autonomy, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 1, 30 Ma.

T H Mclaughlin; Peter Gardner on Religious Upbringing and the Liberal Ideal of Religious Autonomy, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 1, 30 Ma.

Table of contents for MONSTERS AND PHILOSOPHY, edited by Charles T. Wolfe (London 2005) -/- List of Contributors iii Acknowledgments vii List of Abbreviations ix -/- Introduction xi Charles T. Wolfe The Riddle of the Sphinx: Aristotle, Penelope, and 1 Empedocles Johannes Fritsche Science as a Cure for Fear: The Status of Monsters in 21 Lucretius Morgan Meis Nature and its Monsters During the Renaissance: 37 Montaigne and Vanini Tristan Dagron Conjoined Twins and the Limits of our Reason 61 (...) Annie Bitbol-Hespériès Degeneration and Hybridism in the Early Modern Species 109 Debate: Towards the Philosophical Roots of the Creation-Evolution Controversy Justin E. H. Smith Leibniz on the Unicorn and Various other Curiosities 131 Roger Ariew The Creativity of God and the Order of Nature: 153 Anatomizing Monsters in the Early Eighteenth Century Anita Guerrini The Status of Anomalies in the Philosophy of Diderot 169 Annie Ibrahim The Materialist Denial of Monsters 187 Charles T. Wolfe Cerebral Assymetry, Monstrosities and Hegel. 205 On the Situation of the Life Sciences in 1800 Michael Hagner The Lady Knight of the Perilous Place 217 Elfriede Jelinek Monster: More than a Word. . . From Portent to Anomaly, 231 the Extraordinary Career of Monsters Beate Ochsner Index 281 . (shrink)

ABSTRACT Rosalind Franklin is best known for her informative X-ray diffraction patterns of DNA that provided vital clues for James Watson and Francis Crick's double-stranded helical model. Her scientific career did not end when she left the DNA work at King's College, however. In 1953 Franklin moved to J. D. Bernal's crystallography laboratory at Birkbeck College, where she shifted her focus to the three-dimensional structure of viruses, obtaining diffraction patterns of Tobacco mosaic virus (TMV) of unprecedented detail and clarity. During (...) the next five years, while making significant headway on the structural determination of TMV, Franklin maintained an active correspondence with both Watson and Crick, who were also studying aspects of virus structure. Developments in TMV research during the 1950s illustrate the connections in the emerging field of molecular biology between structural studies of nucleic acids and of proteins and viruses. They also reveal how the protagonists of the “race for the double helix” continued to interact personally and professionally during the years when Watson and Crick's model for the double-helical structure of DNA was debated and confirmed. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Rosalind Franklin is best known for her informative X-ray diffraction patterns of DNA that provided vital clues for James Watson and Francis Crick's double-stranded helical model. Her scientific career did not end when she left the DNA work at King's College, however. In 1953 Franklin moved to J. D. Bernal's crystallography laboratory at Birkbeck College, where she shifted her focus to the three-dimensional structure of viruses, obtaining diffraction patterns of Tobacco mosaic virus (TMV) of unprecedented detail and clarity. During (...) the next five years, while making significant headway on the structural determination of TMV, Franklin maintained an active correspondence with both Watson and Crick, who were also studying aspects of virus structure. Developments in TMV research during the 1950s illustrate the connections in the emerging field of molecular biology between structural studies of nucleic acids and of proteins and viruses. They also reveal how the protagonists of the “race for the double helix” continued to interact personally and professionally during the years when Watson and Crick's model for the double-helical structure of DNA was debated and confirmed. (shrink)

To compare a novel to a work of philosophy is, admittedly, a risky exercise in analogy. When the novelist is Lawrence and the philosophical text is the ponderous and dialectical Being and Nothingness, such a comparison may seem willfully perverse and peculiarly open, insofar as it deals with Lawrence's great theme of sexuality, to his anathema of "sex in the head." Furthermore, modern criticism, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, has tended to be wary of critical approaches that lean on notions (...) that are not derived from literature itself - a tendency that is being reinforced these days by the structuralist insistence on the "literariness" of the Text. Now, despite its metaphorical statement as a form of dramatic "gesture," Sartre's book is very definitely not a work of literature. T.H. Adamowski, associate professor of English at Erindale College, the University of Toronto, has written articles on English, American, and French literature. This essay is part of a larger study on progress on Lawrence's "sexual poetics.". (shrink)

Both Plato and Aristotle have something to say about admiration. But in order to know where to look, and in order to appreciate the force of their remarks, we need to sketch a little of the ethical background that they presuppose. I begin, therefore, with ancient Greek ethics in the wider sense, and discuss the treatment of admiration and related attitudes by Homer, Herodotus, and other pre-Platonic sources. Then I turn to the views of Plato, Adam Smith, Aristotle and Cicero. (...) This order of discussion allows us to see why admiration is both morally significant and, in some respects, morally unreliable. (shrink)

Students of the history of ethics sometimes find themselves tempted by moderate or extreme versions of an approach that might roughly be called ‘historicist’. This temptation may result from the difficulties of approaching historical texts from a ‘narrowly philosophical’ point of view. We may begin, for instance, by wanting to know what Aristotle has to say about ‘the problems of ethics’, so that we can compare his views with those of Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Sidgwick, and Rawls, and then decide what (...) is true or false in each theorist's position. But this narrowly philosophical attitude soon runs into difficulties, and writers on the history of ethics often warn us against it. (shrink)