As one of the most important ethicists to emerge since the Second World War, Alan Gewirth continues to influence philosophical debates concerning morality. In this ground-breaking book, Gewirth's neo-Kantianism, and the communitarian problems discussed, form a dialogue on the foundation of moral theory. Themes of agent-centered constraints, the formal structure of theories, and the relationship between freedom and duty are examined along with such new perspectives as feminism, the Stoics, and Sartre. Gewirth offers a picture of the philosopher's theory and (...) its applications, providing a richer, more complete critical assessement than any which has occurred to date. (shrink)

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More widespread farming of species not typically used as livestock may be part of a sustainable approach for promoting human health and economic prosperity in a world with an increasing population; a current example is peccary farming in the Neotropics. Others have argued that species that are local to a region and which are usually not farmed should be considered for use as livestock. They may have a more desirable nutrient profile than species that are presently used as livestock. It (...) may also reduce the pressure from hunting on other wild species, and cause less environmental damage than exotic species. We propose a sentiocentric utilitarian framework that could be used to decide whether species that are local, but generally not used as livestock, should be farmed. To illustrate the use of our decision-making framework, we employ two contrasting neotropical case studies: the Spotted Paca (Cuniculus paca) and the Capybara (Hydrochoerus hydrochaeris). We argue that it may be acceptable to use non-sentient species that are typically not farmed as livestock. However, research should determine whether farming them offers human, environmental or sustainability benefits. In addition, we recommend that if invertebrate species are considered for farming, research should be conducted to determine the likelihood that they are sentient. Finally, given the ethical failings of current livestock farming practices, we argue that a high bar must be met if ‘new’ species that are sentient are to be farmed. (shrink)

In light of scientific advances such as genomics, predictive diagnostics, genetically engineered agriculture, nuclear transfer cloning, and the manipulation of stem cells, the idea that genes carry predetermined molecular programs or blueprints is pervasive. Yet new scientific discoveries—such as rna transcripts of single genes that can lead to the production of different compounds from the same pieces of dna—challenge the concept of the gene alone as the dominant factor in biological development. Increasingly aware of the tension between certain empirical results (...) and interpretations of those results based on the orthodox view of genetic determinism, a growing number of scientists urge a rethinking of what a gene is and how it works. In this collection, a group of internationally renowned scientists present some prominent alternative approaches to understanding the role of dna in the construction and function of biological organisms. Contributors discuss alternatives to the programmatic view of dna, including the developmental systems approach, methodical culturalism, the molecular process concept of the gene, the hermeneutic theory of description, and process structuralist biology. None of the approaches cast doubt on the notion that dna is tremendously important to biological life on earth; rather, contributors examine different ideas of how dna should be represented, evaluated, and explained. Just as ideas about genetic codes have reached far beyond the realm of science, the reconceptualizations of genetic theory in this volume have broad implications for ethics, philosophy, and the social sciences. Contributors. Thomas Bürglin, Brian C. Goodwin, James Griesemer, Paul Griffiths, Jesper Hoffmeyer, Evelyn Fox Keller, Gerd B. Müller, Eva M. Neumann-Held, Stuart A. Newman, Susan Oyama, Christoph Rehmann-Sutter, Sahotra Sarkar, Jackie Leach Scully, Gerry Webster, Ulrich Wolf. (shrink)

More widespread farming of species not typically used as livestock may be part of a sustainable approach for promoting human health and economic prosperity in a world with an increasing population; a current example is peccary farming in the Neotropics. Others have argued that species that are local to a region and which are usually not farmed should be considered for use as livestock. They may have a more desirable nutrient profile than species that are presently used as livestock. It (...) may also reduce the pressure from hunting on other wild species, and cause less environmental damage than exotic species. We propose a sentiocentric utilitarian framework that could be used to decide whether species that are local, but generally not used as livestock, should be farmed. To illustrate the use of our decision-making framework, we employ two contrasting neotropical case studies: the Spotted Paca (Cuniculus paca) and the Capybara (Hydrochoerus hydrochaeris). We argue that it may be acceptable to use non-sentient species that are typically not farmed as livestock. However, research should determine whether farming them offers human, environmental or sustainability benefits. In addition, we recommend that if invertebrate species are considered for farming, research should be conducted to determine the likelihood that they are sentient. Finally, given the ethical failings of current livestock farming practices, we argue that a high bar must be met if ‘new’ species that are sentient are to be farmed. (shrink)

Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno (Counterfactuals and Context, ANALYSIS 68 (2008): 39-46) argue that the standard Stalnaker-Lewis counterexamples to hypothetical syllogism, strengthening the antecedent, and contraposition trade on a failure to hold fixed the context in which truth values are determined for the premises and conclusion in each counterexample. I argue that no contextual fallacy is committed in the standard counterexamples, and I offer a different view of what it is for a fact to be held fixed by a (...) counterfactual antecedent. On my view, for a fact to be held fixed is an epistemological matter, not a semantic matter. (shrink)

A good number of therapists have tumed to the antirealism of postmodern theory in general, and postmodern literary theory in particular, to justify their antitheoretical preferences. Does this turn make sense? Given what drives the antitheoretical agenda - the aspiration to individualize therapeutic practice so as to optimize each client’s unique potential for change - the answer is no. More specifically, I argue that it is the composition (i.e., the completeness) of the theoretical system that guides therapeutic practice, rather than (...) the therapist’s epistemological leanings, that does have considerable bearing on the recalcitrant problem of individualizing practice, otherwise known as the nomothetic/idiographic problem.Bon nombre de thérapeutes se sont toumés vers I’antiréalisme de la théorie postmoderne, en particulier de la théorie littéraire postmoderne, pour justifier leurs positions antithéoriques. Qu’en est-il de ce choix? Si l’on considère le moteur de l’idéologie antithéorique - à savoir l’aspiration à individualiser la pratique thérapeutique afin d’optimiser le potentiel de changement propre à chaque patient - il faut admettre qu’elle ne tient pas. De façon plus spécifique, je soutiens que c’est la composition (c’est-à-dire la complétude) du système théorique qui guide la pratique thérapeutique, non pas les inclinations épistémologiques du thérapeute, lesquelles ont par ailleurs une incidence considérable sur le problème tenace de I’individualisation de la pratique, connu aussi en tant que problème nomothétique/idiographique. (shrink)

DO WE CHOOSE OUR EMOTIONS? Can we be held responsible for our anger? for feeling jealousy? for falling in love or succumbing to resentment or hatred? The suggestion sounds odd because emotions are typically considered occurrences that happen to us: emotions are taken to be the hallmark of the irrational and the disruptive. Controlling one’s emotion is supposed to be like the caging and taming of a wild beast, the suppression and sublimation of a Freudian "it.".

Higher-order thought theories maintain that consciousness involves the having of higher-order thoughts about mental states. In response to these theories of consciousness, an attempt is often made to illustrate that nonhuman animals possess said consciousness, overlooking an alarming consequence: attributing higher-order thought to nonhuman animals might entail that they should be held morally accountable for their actions. I argue that moral responsibility requires more than higher-order thought: moral agency requires a specific higher-order thought which concerns a belief about the (...) rightness or wrongness of affecting another’s mental states. This “moral thought” about the rightness or wrongness is not yet demonstrated in even the most intelligent nonhuman animals, thus we should suspend our judgments about the “rightness” or “wrongness” of their actions while further questioning the recent insistence on developing an animal morality. (shrink)

Papers Deriving from and Related to a Workshop on Testability and Explanation in Economics held at Virginia Polytechnics Institute and State University, April 1979.

What exactly is a genetic disease? For a phrase one hears on a daily basis, there has been surprisingly little analysis of the underlying concept. Medical doctors seem perfectly willing to admit that the etiology of disease is typically complex, with a great many factors interacting to bring about a given condition. On such a view, descriptions of diseases like cancer as genetic seem at best highly simplistic, and at worst philosophically indefensible. On the other hand, there is clearly some (...) practical value to be had by classifying diseases according to their predominant cause when this can be accomplished in a theoretically satisfactory manner. The question therefore becomes exactly how one should go about selecting a single causal factor among many to explain the presence of disease. When an attempt to defend such causal selection is made at all, the standard accounts offered (Koch's postulates, Hill's epidemiological criteria, manipulability) are all clearly inadequate. I propose, however, an epidemiological account of disease causation which walks the fine line between practical applicability and theoretical considerations of causal complexity and attempts to compromise between patientcentered and population-centered concepts of disease. The epidemiological account is the most basic framework consistent with our strongly held intuitions about the causal classification of disease, yet it avoids the difficulties encountered by its competitors. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A History of Scottish PhilosophyC. Jan SwearingenA History of Scottish Philosophy by Alexander Broadie Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. 400 pp. $120.00, cloth; $45.00, paper.Alexander Broadie’s prolific work on Scottish philosophy, particularly the Scottish Enlightenment’s roots in much earlier Scottish thought, deserves to be better known outside of Britain. While its relevance to rhetoric is more indirect than direct, A History of Scottish Philosophy illuminates several strands in (...) Scottish philosophies of the mind and will, doctrines of freedom and liberty, and assessments of moral sense and reason, culminating in a masterful appraisal of the commonsense philosophy that in the eighteenth century became widely associated with prominent Scottish thinkers who were also philosophers of rhetoric, among them Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and Thomas Reid. The innovative senior-level course in rhetoric and moral philosophy created by these thinkers crossed the Atlantic and had a profound influence, still much debated, on the rhetoric, language, and thought of the American founding era. Many Americans are unaware of the sensitivity within Britain that is still attached to the very notion of a Scottish Enlightenment, a fraught context Broadie addresses in his introduction, beginning with elegantly calm descriptions of the Scottishness of Scottish philosophy and the distinctive figures and ideas that converged in the Scottish Enlightenment. Contesting the commonly held view that the [End Page 186] Scottish Enlightenment fizzled out at the end of the eighteenth century, supplanted by a cultural decline into tartan kitsch and maudlin recherché romanticism, Broadie provides solid evidence of ongoing developments in Scottish moral philosophy and theology and of continued Scottish responses to post-Kantian German idealism.Because Kant rebuked Hume’s philosophy, later Scottish responses to Kant were part of a family of ideas that, Broadie explains, continued in conversation with their predecessors and with the influential German philosophers of the nineteenth century. Although Kant sees himself as refuting Hume’s skepticism, Broadie finds in Kant’s thinking a more sophisticated version of Hume’s ideas. He notes commonsense philosopher Thomas Reid’s view that a theory of ideas, the model of mental representations, always ends in skepticism, a view that led Reid and other commonsense philosophers to focus on commonsense perception and liberty: “an account of the relation between the knower and the known, a relationship between a cognitively active subject and an object located in the real world” (319). It need not be said how much these issues of language and mind relationships continue to be debated in philosophical and rhetorical theory. Today’s skepticism, like that of the eighteenth century, defends a profound doubt about the possibility of knowledge, the perception of reality by individuals and groups, the possibility of any communication or rhetorical interactions that are not “always already” spoken. Revisiting these debates in eighteenth-century Scottish thought, Broadie’s commentary provides a number of illuminating recognition scenes.Broadie’s larger point throughout the book is that the idea that liberty is simultaneously intellectual, volitional, moral, and political—that it represents a capacity for intellectual freedom as well as a civic duty to promote liberty—recurs in Scottish philosophy, self-consciously understood as such, from the time of Duns Scotus to the present. Broadie’s meticulous exposition of the self-understood Scottishness of Scottish philosophy and philosophers is a major achievement of the book. American readers will find particularly interesting the discussions of John Witherspoon in the eighteenth century and James McCosh in the nineteenth, who came from Scotland to become presidents of the College of New Jersey/Princeton. I would add to Broadie’s account that Witherspoon’s influence on the American founding era and his role as the only clergyman to sign the Declaration of Independence is substantially rhetorical. Alongside many other Scottish clergy professors in the colonies, he disseminated the Scottish [End Page 187] curriculum in rhetoric and moral philosophy and followed the practice of holding weekly moots and a senior-year matriculation oration that trained students in the practical arts of oral rhetorical composition. James Madison was a protégé among many others and sought Witherspoon’s as well as the Aberdonian James Wilson’s counsel while working on the much-debated... (shrink)

As everyone knows, since the end of the Second World War there has been a sensational revival of interest in the non-Christian religions particularly in the United States and in this country. The revival has taken two forms, the one popular, the other academic. The first of these has turned almost exclusively to Hindu and Buddhist mysticism and can be seen as an energetic reaction against the dogmatic and until very recently rigid structure of institutionalised Christianity and a search for (...) a lived experience of the freedom of the spirit which is held to be the true content of mysticism, obscured in Christianity by the basic dogma of a transcendent God, the ‘wholly Other’ of Rudolf Otto and his numerous followers, but wholly untrammelled by any such concept in the higher reaches of Vedanta and Buddhism, particularly in its Zen manifestation. On the academic side the picture is less clear. There is, of course, the claim that the study of religion, like any other academic study, must be subjected to and controlled by the same principles of ‘scientific’ objectivity to which the other ‘arts’ subjects have been subjected, to their own undoing. But even here there would seem to be a bias in favour of the religions of India and the Far East as against Islam, largely, one supposes, in response to popular demand. (shrink)

In philosophy of science two questions become central in the discussion of the nature of empirical science: 1) What is a theory, i.e. how is it built up, how does it work? And: 2) How does a theory relate to its corresponding experiential basis? To deal with these two questions modern philosophy of science has devised various ‘models’ on the nature and working of scientific theories. Some aspects of these models are widely held within the community of philosophers of (...) science, but others are still being discussed quite controversially. In this paper, we will consider both kinds of aspects. Particularly, we will analyze how the meaning of scientific concepts is determined; the axiomatic construction of a scientific theory; the idea of model building views as a bridge between theory and experience; the holistic semantic thesis of science; the question about the true of scientific theories; and, finally, the hierarchic structure of theories.En filosofía de la ciencia, dos cuestiones resultan centrales en la discusión acerca de la naturalezade la ciencia empírica: 1) ¿qué es una teoría ?, es decir, ¿cómo estáconstituida y cómo funciona? y 2) ¿cómo se relaciona una teoría con su correspondientebase experiencial? Para tratar estas dos cuestiones, la moderna filosofía de la ciencia ha desarrolladovarios “modelos” sobre la naturaleza y el funcionamiento de lasteorías científicas. Algunos aspectos de estos modelos son ampliamente aceptados por lacomunidad de filósofos de la ciencia, mientras que otros son todavía discutidos de manerabastante controvertida. En este trabajo, consideraremos ambos tipos de aspectos. En particular,analizaremos cómo se determina el significado de los conceptos teóricos, la construcción axiomática de una teoría científica, la idea de las concepciones sobre la construcción de modelos como puente entre la teoría y la experiencia, la tesis semántica holista de la ciencia, la cuestión acerca de la verdad de las teorías científicas y, finalmente, la estructura jerárquica de las teorías. (shrink)

This paper tries to show that there is an important virtue (with no generally recognized name) that could be called “accountability.” This virtue is a trait of a person who embraces being held accountable and consistently displays excellence in relations in which the person is held accountable. After describing the virtue in more detail, including its motivational profile, some core features of this virtue are described. Empirical implications and an agenda for future research are briefly discussed. Possible objections (...) to the virtue are considered and rebutted, and relations to other virtues, particularly the personal virtue of justice, are discussed. In conclusion, we suggest that though this virtue has not received the attention it deserves in contemporary society, it has been more clearly recognized in other cultures. Some of the reasons for the partial eclipse of the virtue are understandable and justifiable, but there are good reasons to think our society would be improved if we paid more attention to accountability from a virtue perspective. (shrink)

In this book, C. G. Prado addresses the difficult question of when and whether it is rational to end one's life in order to escape devastating terminal illness. He specifically considers this question in light of the impact of multiculturalism on perceptions and judgements about what is right and wrong, permissible and impermissible. Prado introduces the idea of a 'coincidental culture' to clarify the variety of values and commitments that influence decision. He also introduces the idea of a 'proxy premise' (...) to deal with reasoning issues that are raised by intractably held beliefs. Primarily intended for medical ethicists, this book will be of interest to anyone concerned about the ability of modern medicine to keep people alive, thereby forcing people to choose between living and dying. In addition, Prado calls upon medical ethicists and practitioners to appreciate the value of a theoretical basis for their work. (shrink)

This paper tries to show that there is an important virtue that could be called “accountability.” This virtue is a trait of a person who embraces being held accountable and consistently displays excellence in relations in which the person is held accountable. After describing the virtue in more detail, including its motivational profile, some core features of this virtue are described. Empirical implications and an agenda for future research are briefly discussed. Possible objections to the virtue are considered (...) and rebutted, and relations to other virtues, particularly the personal virtue of justice, are discussed. In conclusion, we suggest that though this virtue has not received the attention it deserves in contemporary society, it has been more clearly recognized in other cultures. Some of the reasons for the partial eclipse of the virtue are understandable and justifiable, but there are good reasons to think our society would be improved if we paid more attention to accountability from a virtue perspective. (shrink)

If by personal immortality one means that the soul is naturally eternal and passes as a substance through physical death to another life, then the answer to this question is a firm No . Both Alfred North Whitehead and his most famous student Charles Hartshorne disavowed such personal immortality as philosophically incompatible with the basic tenets of process thought. For Whitehead, and all philosophers who claim to follow him, process is the ultimate metaphysical generality describing how actual entities instantiate themselves (...) from the causality of entities in their past to then become objectified as they influence successor actual entities. To claim that there are multiple exceptions to the sway of universal process in the form of eternal souls introduces a radical and unacceptable philosophical incoherence into the Whiteheadian metaphysical system. Hartshorne held that a belief in eternal souls was not only incompatible with process thought but also compromised the philosophy of Berkeley, Descartes and Kant. In addition, he considered such belief bad religion and argued forcibly against it. (shrink)

Contrary to the widely held view that the Roman-Carthaginian naval encounter Polybios reports at 1.21.9-11 was separate from the one off Mylae (260 BC) told at length right afterwards (1.23), the battle at the ‘Cape of Italy’ is in fact - as suspected by some scholars long ago - identical with the one at Mylae. However, far from mistaking (as has been suggested) Philinos’ account of the latter for a separate engagement, Polybios knowingly and deliberately told the battle of (...) Mylae twice: first in a brief summary, stripped of all detail, to illustrate how the Roman commander Cn. Scipio Asina (cos. 260) and his Punic counterpart, Hannibal, were both guilty of equally inappropriate acts of recklessness; then for a second time in detail and in its proper chronological place. Compositional considerations prompted this approach: to wait with the moralizing parallel until after his full account of Mylae (preceded in turn by the long technical disquisition on the Roman boarding bridges) would spoil the effect, and Polybios chose to place it immediately after Asina’s capture. (shrink)

The Cratylus’ main concern is to outline and evaluate the competing views of language held by two characters, Hermogenes and Cratylus, who disagree about whether convention or nature (respectively) are the source of onomastic correctness. Hermogenes has been thought to hold two radically different views by different scholars, one extreme conventionalism whereby all names are correct relative to their speakers, and another modest conventionalism according to which distinct naming actions – establishment and employment – explain why some names are (...) correct and others are not, depending on the speaker. In this paper I argue that, though Hermogenes ultimately endorses a conventionalism of the latter kind, it is a mistake to assign him this position from the outset. Rather, to understand the structure of the conversation about conventionalism, we must view Hermogenes’ position, and Socrates’ understanding of it, as developing instead of settled. For it is only by discussing the matter that Hermogenes comes to express a moderate conventionalist view and Socrates comes to appreciate the position Hermogenes actually holds. (shrink)

In this article I shall concern myself with the question ‘Is some type of justification required in order for belief in God to be rational?’ Many philosophers and theologians in the past would have responded affirmatively to this question. However, in our own day, there are those who maintain that natural theology in any form is not necessary. This is because of the rise of a different understanding of the nature of religious belief. Unlike what most people in the past (...) thought, religious belief is not in any sense arrived at or inferred on the basis of other known propositions. On the contrary, belief in God is taken to be as basic as a person's belief in the existence of himself, of the chair in which he is sitting, or the past. The old view that there must be a justification of religious belief, whether known or unknown, is held to be mistaken. One of the most outspoken advocates of this view is Alvin Plantinga. According to Plantinga the mature theist ought not to accept belief in God as a conclusion from other things he believes. Rather, he should accept it as basic, as a part of the bedrock of his noetic structure. ‘The mature theist commits himself to belief in God; this means that he accepts belief in God as basic.’. (shrink)

Body integrity identity disorder is a very rare condition in which people experience long-standing anguish because there is a mismatch between their bodies and their internal image of how their bodies should be. Most typically, these people are deeply distressed by the presence of what they openly acknowledge as a perfectly normal leg. Some with the condition request that their limb be amputated. 1 We and others have argued that such requests should be acceded to in carefully selected patients.1–4 Consistent (...) with this view, a group at the University of Sydney is developing a programme to better understand and treat BIID and to offer amputation if appropriate. In a recent paper, Patrone argues that such amputations should be prohibited.5 He suggests that authors supporting amputation in BIID depend on analogies with more familiar conditions and then claim that the ‘the desires, choices and requests of BIID patients should be held to exactly the same standards and treated with exactly the same respect as the desires, choices and requests of any more conventional patient’.5 He believes that these analogies are invalid and that therefore the arguments for amputation are invalid.Patrone concentrates a great deal upon whether a decision to have a particular medical intervention is to be regarded as ‘rational’. Unfortunately, he makes no attempt to define what he …. (shrink)

Owing to the illegibility of parts of the Fronto palimpsest and the carelessness of its first editor, Cardinal Mai, it was impossible, even after the critical labours of Niebuhr and his colleagues, to come to any satisfactory conclusion as to the chronology of the Letters. But the edition of S. A. Naber in 1867, which had the advantage of a fresh collation of the MS. by G. N. Du Rieu, further reinforced subsequently by a new examination of the Codex due (...) to W. Studemund, held out a better prospect of success. The labours of C. Brakman in the same direction, published in 1902, have also thrown fresh light upon the subject. Yet the critical world has long been awaiting the appearance of the authoritative recension by Professor E. Hauler of Vienna, who has spent infinite pains over a further, and what may well be a final, inspection of the Codex. A great desideratum, which it is much to be hoped that the new edition will supply, is an exact indication, as far as may be, of the extent of each lacuna in pages, lines, words, or letters. A knowledge of how much is lost in each case is essential for the true understanding of the sequence of thought and time in what remains. (shrink)

I HAVE to correct a mistake in my article in the last number of the C.Q., on p. 195, n. 1. The sentence containing it runs; ‘Thus, for the consular provinces of 51–50, the Senate picked out the two senior ex-consuls who had not yet held consular governorships.’ But, to begin with, it is apparent from Caesar, B.C. I. 6, 5, that Cotta, who had been consul in 65, and was therefore senior to Cicero and Bibulus, had not (...) class='Hi'>held a consular province by 49. And secondly, as to what was done in determining who should have the consular provinces of 51–50, there seems to be no evidence. Cicero's statement in Ad Fam. III. 2, i, that praeter opinionem it had become necessary for him to go out to a province, may mean that he had counted on being unaffected by the regulations of 52, and that either a subsequent decree of the Senate or some arrangement made by a few senatorial leaders had upset his expectations. But of course praeter opinionem may refer to his not having expected before 52 that he would have to undertake a governorship. Nor can we tell whether his words, Vides ex senatus consulto provinciam esse habendam, refer to a decree prescribing who should draw lots for the consular provinces of 51–50, or merely to a decree which had the effect of obliging Appius to hand over Cilicia to a successor. However, the point that after 52 the Senate or its leaders had some power to determine what ex-magistrates should draw lots for provinces, seems to be sufficiently proved by Ad Fam. VIII. 8, 8, where praetorian provinces are concerned, and Caesar, B.C. I. 85, 9. (shrink)

Proof complexity is a rich subject drawing on methods from logic, combinatorics, algebra and computer science. This self-contained book presents the basic concepts, classical results, current state of the art and possible future directions in the field. It stresses a view of proof complexity as a whole entity rather than a collection of various topics held together loosely by a few notions, and it favors more generalizable statements. Lower bounds for lengths of proofs, often regarded as the key issue (...) in proof complexity, are of course covered in detail. However, upper bounds are not neglected: this book also explores the relations between bounded arithmetic theories and proof systems and how they can be used to prove upper bounds on lengths of proofs and simulations among proof systems. It goes on to discuss topics that transcend specific proof systems, allowing for deeper understanding of the fundamental problems of the subject. (shrink)

A little while ago I thought the ontological argument dead and buried beyond any possible hope of resurrection and no philosophical event has caused me much greater surprise than its revival by a member of the very linguistic school to whose line of thinking it seemed most alien and who were held to have given it its quietus once for all. I am tempted to welcome any relapse into metaphysics by a member of this school as being some sign (...) of grace, but on this issue I must for once take sides with the prevailing tradition against at least this kind of metaphysics. Let me make clear, however, what it is I am combating. The term ‘ontological argument’ has been used for arguments which its original supporters would certainly not have recognised as theirs. It has been used for instance to stand for the claim that it is an essential presupposition of thought that what we must think is true of the real, a claim which could not be used to prove the existence of God unless we had available another proof that we really must think that God exists. It has been used for kinds of ‘idealist’ arguments which I do not want to discuss here. It has been used for the argument that the idea of a perfect being cannot be explained as derived from any other idea and must therefore be explained as produced in us by a being who really is perfect, an argument which appears in Descartes side by side with the ontological argument but which he carefully distinguishes from it. (shrink)

A role of perirhinal cortex (PrC) in recognition memory for objects has been well established. Contributions of parahippocampal cortex (PhC) to this function, while documented, remain less well understood. Here, we used fMRI to examine whether the organization of item-based recognition memory signals across these two structures is shaped by object category, independent of any difference in representing episodic context. Guided by research suggesting that PhC plays a critical role in processing landmarks, we focused on three categories of objects that (...) differ from each other in their landmark suitability as confirmed with behavioral ratings (buildings > trees > aircraft). Participants made item-based recognition-memory decisions for novel and previously studied objects from these categories, which were matched in accuracy. Multi-voxel pattern classification revealed category-specific item-recognition memory signals along the long axis of PrC and PhC, with no sharp functional boundaries between these structures. Memory signals for buildings were observed in the mid to posterior extent of PhC, signals for trees in anterior to posterior segments of PhC, and signals for aircraft in mid to posterior aspects of PrC and the anterior extent of PhC. Notably, item-based memory signals for the category with highest landmark suitability ratings were observed only in those posterior segments of PhC that also allowed for classification of landmark suitability of objects when memory status was held constant. These findings provide new evidence in support of the notion that item-based memory signals for objects are not limited to PrC, and that the organization of these signals along the longitudinal axis that crosses PrC and PhC can be captured with reference to landmark suitability. (shrink)

Discussions on the concept of Marifatullah as the foundation of belief hold a significant place in theology. There are different opinions among schools of theology regarding whether those who do not receive divine messages must know God. The majority of scholars belonging to the Mu'tazila and Māturīdī schools, including Imam Māturīdī, state that human beings must know God. Although al-Ashʿarī accepts that the most prominent obligatory duties are the methods of reasoning that lead to marifatullah, he states that responsibility in (...) this matter is formed by transmission. However, we can say that whether the human mind is sufficient to reach the knowledge of God, the method of reasoning has reached a different dimension today from the sciences of psychology, genetics, and neurobiology. This study explored whether individuals can achieve marifatullah from a holistic perspective. Whether human beings can be held responsible for this issue has been evaluated through the sciences of psychology, genetics, and neurobiology, and the opinions of schools of theology on this issue have been criticized. When we think in terms of Marifatullah, we can say that man’s psychological sense of obligation to adapt to society leaves him intellectually under the influence of society. In terms of genetic determinism, human personality, behavior, and intellectual adventure are completely determined by genes. Therefore, it is impossible for men to reach marifatullah in the context of their mental abilities. From an epigenetic perspective, we see that human thought structure, behavior, and personality are formed as a result of interactions with the environment. Serious hesitation arises in this idea in terms of intellect being a source of responsibility. Humans are genetically influenced by the environment and society, and they have a suitable nature for this, revealing that their genetic structure is open to environmental influences. In terms of brain plasticity, factors such as the society, environment, and family in which people live can change their brains and enable them to live accordingly. Although life adventures appear to be within the framework of social harmony, there must also be intellectual and religious harmony within social harmony. This reinforces the idea that individuals tend to align more with the thoughts and beliefs instilled by culture given the adaptable nature of the human brain influenced by cultural factors. When the views of the schools of theology are considered considering these evaluations, it becomes clear that the Mu'tazilites and Māturīdīs' belief that the source of the wujūb of marifatullah is intellect is at a point that needs to be reconsidered in terms of human biology and psychology. Although the Asharites emphasize human beings attaining knowledge of God through intellect, their focus on prophethood indicates that a revelation offer appears more accurate concerning human nature in the context of Marifatullah. (shrink)

Can we be held morally responsible for our actions? Yes, says Daniel Dennett. No, says Gregg Caruso. Reader, you decide.

At Moore’s time, the main-stream ethical theory is the doctrine that pleasure alone is good as an end as held by the hedonistic utilitarianism. Moore, however, asserts that good, not composed of any parts, is a simple notion and indefinable, and naturalistic ethical theories, in particular hedonistic utilitarianism, interpret intrinsic good as a property of a single natural object---pleasure, which is also the sole end of life, thus violates naturalistic fallacy. Moore seems to believe that there exist things other (...) than pleasure that are also intrinsically good and has searched for them. But Moore has not clearly stated what these things are, nor has he given any justification for why they are intrinsically good. This paper discusses Moore’s arguments and difficulties of utilitarianism. With the subjectivistic utilitarian theory of value, Unified Utilitarian Theory (UTT) discards the classification of value into intrinsic and instrumental and proves to be exempt of all theexisting difficulties with utilitarianism related to pleasure, including naturalistic fallacy, vagueness of pleasure and sole end of life, double counting, etc. (shrink)

Using the example of the American motivational psychologist David C. McClelland, this article analyses how psychologists in the long 1960s acted as generous purveyors of knowledge in order to bring about far reaching social change, without having to enter the field of institutionalised politics. The article thus explores a supposedly passive form of activism beyond lobbying and consultating that was intended to encourage citizens to self-direct in order to bring about changes that were supposedly beyond the reach of structural planning (...) policy. Using two case studies, it is argued that the principle of self-direction often associated with neoliberalism developed in parallel with planning policy in the long 1960s, rather than as a consequence of its failure in the 1970s and 1980s. Since this was often done in an entrepreneurial way, it led to the emergence of the entrepreneurial scientist who ran science, educational training and social reform as a business. Unlike political influence through lobbying, this form of scientific political activism wasdirectin that it directly impacted individual social groups, but it was alsoprecariousin its chances of success, because whether those approached were willing to accept what was offered to them depended on conditions over which the scientists involved had no control. As early as the long 1960s, it is concluded, privately run programmes aimed at activating the individual were part of what we know as state-directed welfare policy. (shrink)

In recent years philosophers have given a good deal of attention to imperatives. They have concerned themselves mainly with the logical grammar of sentences of this kind, that is to say their relations to each other and to interrogative and indicative sentences. Very often this topic has been raised in terms of the problem ‘Is imperative inference possible, and if so, what kind of inference is it?’. Many philosophers have contended that there are logically valid inferences that involve imperative sentences. (...) Against this it has been argued that no such inferences are possible. It has even been held that there are no such things as imperatives at all – regarded, that is, as types of expression logically sui generis and independent of indicative sentences. (shrink)

The two-day workshop Children in distress: a global perspective, explored the physical, epidemiological and social dimension of the environment of children and their caretakers at home and in school, in both rural and urban settings. Through active dialogue the participants weighted the problems in the regions and countries of the world they represented, from their multiple disciplinary perspectives. They identified in the process some common trends and distinct emphases.