Autor preispituje Herovu tvrdnju o univerzalnom preskriptivizmu kao najadekvatnijoj etickoj teoriji u uzem smislu. Validnost tog stanovista odmerava se u odnosu na neke konkurentne koncepcije, i to preko uslova koji moraju da se ispune kako bi jedna eticka teorija mogla da se nazove adekvatnom.

Clanak sadrzi obrazlozenje teme kojom ce se autor baviti u okviru rada na projektu 'Mogucnost primene modernih filozofsko-politickih paradigmi na transformaciju drustva u Srbiji/Jugoslaviji' Instituta za filozofiju i drustvenu teoriju. U prvom delu izlaze se osnovna zamisao rada, te teorijska i prakticna relevantnost predlozene teme. U drugom delu ukratko se izlaze 'teorija dva nivoa' moralnog misljenja, koju je razradio utilitaristicki filozof Ricard Mervin Her. U trecem delu skicira se plan i sadrzina predstojeceg rada. Na kraju, data je osnovna i selektivna (...) bibliografija na koju ce se autor oslanjati u razradi predlozene teme. (shrink)

The author re-examines Hare's multiple ways of connecting his metaethical with his normative doctrine, which is in formal sense determined as "Kantian utilitarianism", and in substantive sense as "preference-utilitarianism". Critical references to both dimensions of utilitarian doctrine aim at indication on scopes and limits of Hare's ambitious redefinition of the doctrine. Further on he discusses about so-called "necessary ingredient" of moral reasoning under the name of "sympathetic imagination", which Hare grasps in his developed theory not only as a normative demand (...) but also as a logical thesis. Finally, he considers kinds of preferences that can or cannot be recognized as morally relevant. Autor preispituje Herove visestruke pokusaje povezivanja metaetickog i normativno-etickog ucenja, koje je u formalnom smislu odredjeno kao "kantijanski utilitarizam", a u supstantivnom kao "utilitarizam preferencija". Kriticki osvrti na obe dimenzije utilitaristicke doktrine ciljaju na to da ukazu na domete i granice Herove ambiciozne redefinicije ove teorije. Potom se raspravlja o tzv. "nuznom sastojku" moralnog rasudjivanja pod imenom "simpateticka imaginacija", koju Her u svojoj razvijenoj teoriji poima ne samo kao normativni zahtev vec i kao izvesnu logicku tezu. I najzad, razmatraju se vrste preferencija koje, uz pomoc odredjenog niza kriterijuma, mogu ili ne mogu biti priznate kao moralno relevantne. (shrink)

The author claims that we should differentiate the concept, the conception and the ideal of Bildung. Based on these differences, Bildung could be considered as a kind of attitude, project, or as specific - normative and optative - practice.. Autor smatra da treba praviti formalnu razliku izmedju pojma, koncepcije i ideala Bildung-a. Na osnovu tako utvrdjene razlike, Bildung bi se mogao poimati kao stav, projekt ili specificna, u isti mah i normativno i optativno intonirana, praksa..

The article contains an explanation of the topic to be dealt with by the author within the work on the project "Regional and European Aspects of Integration Processes in Serbia: Civilization Preconditions, Reality and Prospects for the Future" of the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory. A concern for the problem of Bildung reoccurs in social sciences. The author claims that we should elicit a dominated normative meaning from many senses of the concept of Bildung, in order to explain his (...) vitality and the possibility of his interdisciplinary application in more appropriate way. Clanak sadrzi obrazlozenje teme kojom ce se autor baviti u okviru rada na projektu "Regionalni i evropski aspekti integrativnih procesa u Srbiji civilizacijske pretpostavke, stvarnost i izgledi za buducnost" Instituta za filozofiju i drustvenu teoriju. U drustvenim naukama reaktualizovano je interesovanje za problem Bildunga. Autor tvrdi da bi iz viseznacnosti tog pojma trebalo izvuci njegovo dominantno normativno znacenje, kako bi se na adekvatniji nacin objasnila njegova vitalnost i mogucnost njegove interdisciplinarne primene. (shrink)

The author displays and reexamines Hare?s "two-level theory" of normative moral thinking, including goals that are intended by its establishing. Given Hare?s holism, the met ethical level, considered as fundamental or the "third" level, has notable effect on process of normative reasoning, especially if it is taken as one of the determinant of the critical moral thin king. Central part of the analysis is examination of utilitarian character of the theory. Autor izlaze i preispituje Herovu teoriju o dva nivoa normativnog (...) moralnog misljenja -"intuitivnog" i "kritickog", kao i ciljeve koji se zele postici njenim ustanovljenjem. Gledano iz perspektive Herovog holizma, metaeticki nivo, shvacen kao fundamentalni ili "treci" nivo, u znatnoj meri utice na proces normativnog rasudjivanja, pogotovo ukoliko se uzima kao jedna od determinanti kritickog moralnog misljenja. Centralni deo analize predstavlja ispitivanje utilitaristickog karaktera ove teorije. (shrink)

Autor nastoji da pokaze da je uobicajena podela na?hobsovsku? i?kantovsku? liniju misljenja u sklopu savremene recepcije tradicije drustvenog ugovora potpuno opravdana. U tekstu se takodje naglasava kako se ideja drustvenog kao?moralnog? ugovora, nasuprot izvornijem?politickom? ugovoru, artikulise tek u poznoj?evolucionoj? fazi te ideje, narocito u dvadesetom veku. Najposle, odbacuje se pokusaj redefinisanja kontraktualizma kao neke vrste?konstruktivizma?, buduci da u kontraktualizmu nema nikakvih elemenata?proceduralnog? rasudjivanja koje je, prema opstem uverenju, karakteristicno za?konstruktivisticku? misao. PR Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 43007.

Ovaj tekst nastoji da nijansira dihotomiju izmedju pojmova istorije i pravde koja je uobicajena u interpretaciji Hobzovog misljenja. Hobzov kriticki stav prema istoriji objasnjava se njegovom polemikom protiv nasledja klasicne antike, koja stoji u vezi s njegovim projektom stroge nauke o moralu i politici. Medjutim, Hobzovo shvatanje pravde ne moze se zasnovati bez izvesnih faktickih, empirijskih elemenata; ono se ne svodi na neku cisto racionalnu konstrukciju. Ovi elementi otvaraju Hobzovo misljenje prema problematici stvarne istorije; za Hobza, najvazniji predstavnici takve vrste (...) istorije su Tukidid i Tacit. Konacno, istorijska dimenzija Hobzovog misljenja dopusta nam da kod njega prepoznamo i jedan siri pojam pravde, koji probija granice pravde koja proizlazi iz ugovora. (shrink)

The idea of biotechnological enhancement of people for non-medical purposes is not unambiguous. A gap that may arise between the?cognitive? and so-called?moral? enhancement points precisely to this fact. This article shows that, contrary to the intentions of its supporters, the idea according to which moral enhancement has precedence over cognitive enhancement is essentially just a new form of undermining human freedom.

The question this paper is concerned with is: what if Immanuel Kant found a solution to the problem of the dualism of practical reason before Henry Sidgwick even came to formulate it? A comparison of Sidgwick?s and Kant?s approach to the problem of the dualism of practical reason is presented only in general terms, but the author concludes that this is sufficient for grasping the advantage of Kant?s solution to the problem.

The idea of biotechnological enhancement of people for non-medical purposes is not unambiguous. A gap that may arise between the?cognitive? and so-called?moral? enhancement points precisely to this fact. This article shows that, contrary to the intentions of its supporters, the idea according to which moral enhancement has precedence over cognitive enhancement is essentially just a new form of undermining human freedom.

Iako 'antroponomijsko pitanje' spada u najstarija filozofska pitanja, pojam 'antroponomija' u filozofiji nikada nije zaziveo. Ipak, s?ma antroponomija, kao teorija o tome sta/kakav covek treba ili moze da bude, nikada nije bila zapostavljena.U ovom radu autor se ogranicava na analize Kantovog, Niceovog i Sloterdajkovog antroponomijskog nacrta.

In this paper, the author discusses foreign reception of Jovan Babic?s works, which turns out to be very much alive and diverse. More precisely, the author limits himself to a short and very partial review of reception of only two Babic?s texts that, so far, attracted the most attention.

In this text I will try to explain the theoretical specificity of critique of political economy. I will primarily found my arguments on the texts of Michael Hein- rich and John Milios. To this I will firstly scatch the theoretical context of economic theories that exited at the time of emergence of critique of political economy. Than, I will present main differences in approach that we can find in Marx?s Capital with repsect to the concepts that are utilised and questions (...) that he tries to answer. In the end I will present the directions of development of the critique of political economy that are realted to this basic insight. nema. (shrink)

The author gentzenizes the positive fragmentsT + andR + of relevantT andR using formulas with, prefixes (subscripts). There are three main Gentzen formulations ofS +{T+,R +} calledW 1 S +,W 2 S + andG 2 S +. The first two have the rule of modus ponens. All of them have a weak rule DL for disjunction introduction on the left. DL is not admissible inS + but it is needed in the proof of a cut elimination theorem forG 2 S (...) +.W 1 S + has a weak rule of weakeningW 1 and it is not closed under a general transitivity rule. This allows the proof that A inS + iff A inW 1 S +. From the cut elimination theorem forG 2 S + it follows that if A inS +, then A inG 2 S +. In order to prove the converse,W 2 S + is needed. It contains modus ponens, transitivity, and a restricted weakening rule.G 2 S + is contained inW 2 S + and there is a proof that A inW 2 S + iff A inW 1 S +. (shrink)

The author gentzenizes the positive fragments T₊ and R₊ of relevant T and R using formulas with prefixes (subscripts). There are three main Gentzen formulations of $S_{+}\in \{T_{+},R_{+}\}$ called W₁ S₊, W₂ S₊ and G₂ S₊. The first two have the rule of modus ponens. All of them have a weak rule DL for disjunction introduction on the left. DL is not admissible in S₊ but it is needed in the proof of a cut elimination theorem for G₂ S₊. W₁ (...) S₊ has a weak rule of weakening W₁ and it is not closed under a general transitivity rule. This allows the proof that $\vdash A$ in S₊ iff $\vdash A$ in W₁ S₊. From the cut elimination theorem for G₂ S₊ it follows that if $\vdash A$ in S₊, then $\vdash A$ in G₂ S₊. In order to prove the converse, W₂ S₊ is needed. It contains modus ponens, transitivity, and a restricted weakening rule. G₂ S₊ is contained in W₂ S₊ and there is a proof that $\vdash A$ in W₂ S₊ iff $\vdash A$ in W₁ S₊. (shrink)

This paper is a study of four subscripted Gentzen systems G u R +, G u T +, G u RW + and G u TW +. [16] shows that the first three are equivalent to the semilattice relevant logics u R +, u T + and u RW + and conjectures that G u TW + is, equivalent to u TW +. Here we prove Cut Theorems for these systems, and then show that modus ponens is admissible — which (...) is not so trivial as one normally expects. Finally, we give decision procedures for the contractionless systems, G u TW + and G u RW +. (shrink)

This paper examines self-fashioning in Aleksandar Hemon’s “Everything,” a story about a Sarajevo teenager’s journey through ex-Yugoslavia to the Slovenian town of Murska Sobota. His aim? “[T]o buy a freezer chest for my family” (39). While in transit, the first-person narrator imagines himself a rogue of sorts; the fictional journey he takes, meanwhile, is clearly within the quest tradition. The paper argues that “Everything” is an unruly text because by the end of the story the reader must jettison the (...) conventional reading traditions the quest narrative evokes. What begins as a comic tale about a minor journey opens out, in the story’s final lines, into a story about larger historical concerns, namely, the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. By introducing contemporary history, Hemon points beyond the closed world of his short story, while rejecting the quest pattern he has established. (shrink)

At the very beginning of L’Homme-Machine, La Mettrie claims that Leibnizians with their monads have “rather spiritualized matter than materialized the soul”; a few years later Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, President of the Berlin Academy of Sciences and natural philosopher with a strong interest in the modes of transmission of ‘genetic’ information, conceived of living minima which he termed molecules, “endowed with desire, memory and intelligence,” in his Système de la nature ou Essai sur les corps organisés. This text first (...) appeared in Latin in 1751 under the title Dissertatio inauguralis metaphysica de universali naturae systemate, with the pseudonym Dr Baumann; it was translated by Maupertuis in 1754 as Essai sur la formation des corps organisés and was later included in his 1756 Œuvres under the title Système de la nature. Now, it is clear that Maupertuis was a kind of Leibnizian; and that his molecule possessed higher-level, ‘mental’ properties. In that sense he falls under the first category described by La Mettrie. But he was also involved in a debate on this issue with Diderot, who put forth a sustained critique of Maupertuis’ theory of the molecule in the additions to his 1753 Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature. Where Maupertuis attributes higher-level properties to his living minima, Diderot argues that these properties are ‘organizational’, i.e., they can only be properties of the whole. At issue here is the degree of commitment to a form of materialism. (shrink)

Ce livre étudie, à travers une série d'épisodes allant de la philosophie des Lumières à notre époque, le problème du matérialisme dans l'histoire de la philosophie et l’histoire des sciences. Comment comprendre les spécificités de l’histoire du matérialisme, des Lumières à nos jours, au sein de la grande histoire de la philosophie et de l’histoire des sciences ? Quelle est l’actualité de l’opposition classique entre le corps et l’esprit ? Qu’est-ce que le rire ou le rêve peuvent nous apprendre du (...) matérialisme ? En traversant l’histoire de ce concept jusqu’à l’émergence d’un « nouveau matérialisme » contemporain, l’ouvrage vise à revitaliser le matérialisme et sa lecture. -/- . (shrink)

J. Willard Gibbs derived the following equation to quantify the maximum work possible for a chemical reaction$${\text{Maximum work }} = \, - \Delta {\text{G}}_{{{\text{rxn}}}} = \, - \left( {\Delta {\text{H}}_{{{\text{rxn}}}} {-}{\text{ T}}\Delta {\text{S}}_{{{\text{rxn}}}} } \right) {\text{ constant T}},{\text{P}}$$ Maximum work = - Δ G rxn = - Δ H rxn - T Δ S rxn constant T, P ∆Hrxn is the enthalpy change of reaction as measured in a reaction calorimeter and ∆Grxn the change in Gibbs energy as measured, if (...) feasible, in an electrochemical cell by the voltage across the two half-cells. To Gibbs, reaction spontaneity corresponds to negative values of ∆Grxn. But what is T∆Srxn, absolute temperature times the change in entropy? Gibbs stated that this term quantifies the heating/cooling required to maintain constant temperature in an electrochemical cell. Seeking a deeper explanation than this, one involving the behaviors of atoms and molecules that cause these thermodynamic phenomena, I employed an “atoms first” approach to decipher the physical underpinning of T∆Srxn and, in so doing, developed the hypothesis that this term quantifies the change in “structural energy” of the system during a chemical reaction. This hypothesis now challenges me to similarly explain the physical underpinning of the Gibbs–Helmholtz equation$${\text{d}}\left( {\Delta {\text{G}}_{{{\text{rxn}}}} } \right)/{\text{dT}} = - \Delta {\text{S}}_{{{\text{rxn}}}} \left( {\text{constant P}} \right)$$ d Δ G rxn / dT = - Δ S rxn constant P While this equation illustrates a relationship between ∆Grxn and ∆Srxn, I don’t understand how this is so, especially since orbital electron energies that I hypothesize are responsible for ∆Grxn are not directly involved in the entropy determination of atoms and molecules that are responsible for ∆Srxn. I write this paper to both share my progress and also to seek help from any who can clarify this for me. (shrink)

Universities are expected to be places where knowledge is shared freely among academicians. However, the reality shows that knowledge sharing is barely present within universities these days. As Malaysia shifts towards building a knowledge-based society, academic institutions, particularly the public universities, now face ever-growing faculty demands for sharing quality resources and expertise. As a result, knowledge sharing in academia has become a rising concern. The purpose of this study, then, is to uncover the factors that propel knowledge sharing among academicians (...) in higher learning institutions of Malaysia. Using the Theory of Reasoned Action as the basis for this study’s research framework, data was gathered from 447 academicians in 10 public universities scattered throughout the country. Findings from the Partial Least Squares analysis revealed that extrinsic motivation, reciprocal relationships, sense of self-worth and subjective norm are vital determinants of an academician’s attitude towards knowledge sharing. In turn, this attitude that is formed will largely determine whether the academician engages in knowledge sharing behaviors or not. Besides having a positive effect on attitude, sense of self-worth also exhibited a positive impact on the subjective norm to share knowledge. Consequently, this subjective norm will have an impact upon knowledge sharing behavior. In addition, perceived behavioral control and organizational climate were discovered to have a direct influence on knowledge sharing behaviors. Implications, limitations as well as suggestions for future research are accordingly discussed in this paper. (shrink)

ABSTRACTRational agents have consistent beliefs. Bayesianism is a theory of consistency for partial belief states. Rational agents also respond appropriately to experience. Dogmatism is a theory of how to respond appropriately to experience. Hence, Dogmatism and Bayesianism are theories of two very different aspects of rationality. It's surprising, then, that in recent years it has become common to claim that Dogmatism and Bayesianism are jointly inconsistent: how can two independently consistent theories with distinct subject matter be jointly inconsistent? In this (...) essay I argue that Bayesianism and Dogmatism are inconsistent only with the addition of a specific hypothesis about how the appropriate responses to perceptual experience are to be incorporated into the formal models of the Bayesian. That hypothesis isn't essential either to Bayesianism or to Dogmatism, and so Bayesianism and Dogmatism are jointly consistent. That leaves the matter of how experiences and credences are related, a... (shrink)

The most pressing issues of the twenty-first century—climate change and persistent hunger in a world of food surpluses, to name only two—are not problems that can be solved from within individual disciplines, nation-states, or cultural perspectives. They are predicaments that can only be resolved by generating sustained and globally robust coordination across value systems. The scale of the problems and necessity for coordinated global solutions signal a world historical transit as momentous as the Industrial Revolution: a transition from the predominance (...) of technical knowledge to that of ethical deliberation. This volume brings together leading thinkers from around the world to deliberate on how best to correlate worth (value) with what is worthwhile (values), pairing human prosperity with personal, environmental, and spiritual flourishing in a world of differing visions of what constitutes a moral life. Especially in the aftermath of what is now being called the Great Recession, awareness has mounted of the imperative to question the modern divorce of economics from ethics. While the domains of economics and ethics were from antiquity through at least the eighteenth century understood in many cultures to be coterminous and mutually entailing, the modern assumption has been that the goal of maximizing human prosperity and the aim of justly enhancing our lives as persons and as communities were functionally and practically distinct. Working from a wide array of perspectives, the contributors to this volume offer a set of challenges to the assumed independence of the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of human and planetary well-being. Reflecting on the complex interrelationship among economics, justice, and equity, the book resists "one size fits all" approaches and struggles to revitalize the marriage of economics and ethics by activating cultural differences as the basis of mutual contribution to shared human flourishing. The publication of this important collection will stimulate or extend critical debates among scholars and students working in a number of disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, including philosophy, history, environmental studies, economics, and law. Contributors: Roger T. Ames, James Behuniak Jr., Steve Bein, Nalini Bhushan, Purushottama Bilimoria, Steven Burik, Amita Chatterjee, Baoyan Cheng, Gordon Davis, Jay L. Garfield, Steven F. Geisz, Peter D. Hershock, Larry A. Hickman, Kathleen M. Higgins, Heidi M. Hurd, Thomas P. Kasulis, Workineh Kelbessa, Lori Keleher, Oliver Leaman, James McRae, Jin Y. Park, James Peterman, Naoko Saito, May Sim, Robert Smid, Paul Standish, Kenneth W. Stikkers, Karsten J. Struhl, Meera Sushila Viswanathan, Wu Shiu- Ching, Xu Di, T. Yamauchi, Yang Liuxin. (shrink)

This is the introduction to the Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments.

While philosophers hold that it is patently absurd to blame robots or hold them morally responsible [1], a series of recent empirical studies suggest that people do ascribe blame to AI systems and robots in certain contexts [2]. This is disconcerting: Blame might be shifted from the owners, users or designers of AI systems to the systems themselves, leading to the diminished accountability of the responsible human agents [3]. In this paper, we explore one of the potential underlying reasons for (...) robot blame, namely the folk's willingness to ascribe inculpating mental states or "mens rea" to robots. In a vignette-based experiment (N=513), we presented participants with a situation in which an agent knowingly runs the risk of bringing about substantial harm. We manipulated agent type (human v. group agent v. AI-driven robot) and outcome (neutral v. bad), and measured both moral judgment (wrongness of the action and blameworthiness of the agent) and mental states attributed to the agent (recklessness and the desire to inflict harm). We found that (i) judgments of wrongness and blame were relatively similar across agent types, possibly because (ii) attributions of mental states were, as suspected, similar across agent types. This raised the question - also explored in the experiment - whether people attribute knowledge and desire to robots in a merely metaphorical way (e.g., the robot "knew" rather than really knew). However, (iii), according to our data people were unwilling to downgrade to mens rea in a merely metaphorical sense when given the chance. Finally, (iv), we report a surprising and novel finding, which we call the inverse outcome effect on robot blame: People were less willing to blame artificial agents for bad outcomes than for neutral outcomes. This suggests that they are implicitly aware of the dangers of overattributing blame to robots when harm comes to pass, such as inappropriately letting the responsible human agent off the moral hook. (shrink)