Since Darwin, the idea of psychological continuity between humans and other animals has dominated theory and research in investigating the minds of other species. Indeed, the field of comparative psychology was founded on two assumptions. First, it was assumed that introspection could provide humans with reliable knowledge about the causal connection between specific mental states and specific behaviors. Second, it was assumed that in those cases in which other species exhibited behaviors similar to our own, similar psychological causes were at (...) work. In this paper, we show how this argument by analogy is flawed with respect to the case of second‐order mental states. As a test case, we focus on the question of how other species conceive of visual attention, and in particular whether chimpanzees interpret seeing as a mentalistic event involving internal states of perception, attention, and belief. We conclude that chimpanzees do not reason about seeing in this manner, and indeed, there is considerable reason to suppose that they do not harbor representations of mental states in general. We propose a reinterpretation model in which the majority of the rich social behaviors that humans and other primates share in common emerged long before the human lineage evolved the psychological means of interpreting those behaviors in mentalistic terms. Although humans, chimpanzees, and most other species may be said to possess mental states, humans alone may have evolved a cognitive specialization for reasoning about such states. (shrink)

A major question for the relevant logics has been, “Under what conditions is Ackermann's ruleγ from -A ∨B andA to inferB, admissible for one of these logics?” For a large number of logics and theories, the question has led to an affirmative answer to theγ problem itself, so that such an answer has almost come to be expected for relevant logics worth taking seriously. We exhibit here, however, another large and interesting class of logics-roughly, the Boolean extensions of theW — (...) free relevant logics (and, precisely, the well-behaved subsystems of the 4-valued logicBN4) — for which γ fails. (shrink)

This paper presents completeness and conservative extension results for the boolean extensions of the relevant logic T of Ticket Entailment, and for the contractionless relevant logics TW and RW. Some surprising results are shown for adding the sentential constant t to these boolean relevant logics; specifically, the boolean extensions with t are conservative of the boolean extensions without t, but not of the original logics with t. The special treatment required for the semantic normality of T is also shown along (...) the way. (shrink)

This paper is a study of four subscripted Gentzen systems G u R +, G u T +, G u RW + and G u TW +. [16] shows that the first three are equivalent to the semilattice relevant logics u R +, u T + and u RW + and conjectures that G u TW + is, equivalent to u TW +. Here we prove Cut Theorems for these systems, and then show that modus ponens is admissible — which (...) is not so trivial as one normally expects. Finally, we give decision procedures for the contractionless systems, G u TW + and G u RW +. (shrink)

[10] offers two (cut-free) subscripted Gentzen systems, G 2 T + and G 2 R +, which are claimed to be equivalent in an appropriate sense to the positive relevant logics T + and R +, respectively. In this paper we show that that claim is false. We also show that the argument in [10] for the further claim that cut and/or modus ponens is admissible in two other subscripted Gentzen systems, G 1 T + and G 1 R +, (...) is unsound. (shrink)

Although the system T of ticket entailment is obviously related to its cousins E and R , it is motivated along quite distinctive lines in Anderson and Belnap [1975]. It would seem, accordingly, that T is more nearly akin to the system P W studied in Martin [1978] than to E and R. The result presented here, however, at least suggests the contrary.