In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Advocates, Not Problem ParentsAnonymous TwoNothing could have prepared us for the shock of hearing that our son had a brain tumor.Rob* was 13½, an active, healthy eighth grader, when he developed a headache so bad he couldn’t get out of bed in the morning. We saw the pediatrician three times over the next ten days. On the third visit, after ruling out problems at home, stress at school, strep (...) throat and mono, he sent us for an MRI. When the radiology tech handed me the films and told us to drive back to the pediatrician’s office, I knew we were in trouble. Sure enough, after all the other patients had left, our long–time doctor called us into his tiny office, shut the door and fumbled with the films as he pointed to a white spot that he said was a brain tumor.So began the experience that would change the course of our lives. We remember the diagnosis in detail and relive it in slow motion. We recall packing suitcases, driving to the hospital, waiting to be seen in the emergency room, and walking through doors marked “Pediatric Hematology/Oncology” for the first time.We date everything “BC” (Before Cancer) or “AD” (After Diagnosis). We are grateful every day that [End Page 13] our son is alive, but we know he is forever changed. We are changed: Our nuclear family, our extended family, everyone who knew us and supported us at the time was affected. A pediatric cancer diagnosis is a bomb that shatters your world without warning. If you’re lucky, you can pick up a lot of the pieces, maybe even most of them, but the world you re–enter is never the one you inhabited before.Our doctor delivered the diagnosis to Rob and me at the same time. I’ve thought about this many times and perhaps one day will ask him: Why did he choose to do it that way? Was it a conscious decision or just happenstance? Was it kinder, in the long run—like pulling off a band–aid quickly—or terribly risky? What if I had collapsed at the news? I asked to step into the hall to use the phone. In a state of numbness, I called my husband. He knew we had had an MRI a few hours earlier. “Come quickly,” I said. “There’s a mass.”We chose to go to a top-ranked major medical center and were admitted that evening. A couple of days later, the discovery of tumor markers in Rob’s cerebrospinal fluid and blood confirmed a central nervous system mixed germ cell tumor. We were told he would require six cycles of chemotherapy, followed by six weeks of radiation, and possibly second–look surgery and high-dose chemo with stem cell rescue on top of that. We were given a consent form listing a catalogue of short–and long–term side effects, among them the likelihood of infertility. We were urged to start treatment as soon as possible.By sheer coincidence I had just completed a project for a small, nonprofit organization that existed to inform young adult cancer patients about their fertility rights and options. I knew that infertility concerns were usually pushed aside at diagnosis to make way for other priorities, namely the urgency of starting treatment. And that’s exactly the kind of pressure we were facing.But my husband and I were not ready to sign away our son’s fertility in what felt like a no–confidence vote, a capitulation. We needed to believe that he would survive and put this horror behind him, that he would look forward to marriage and starting a family. We were willing to cede nothing to the disease at this early stage of the game. Was this rational, naive or selfish on our part? I don’t know.The medical team seemed surprised when we asked for a delay in treatment in order to collect sperm samples. They warned that our son’s condition could decline suddenly—and that postponing treatment by even several days might be dangerous. However, at our insistence, they agreed to the delay... (shrink)

A number of two-systems accounts have been proposed to explain the apparent discrepancy between infants’ early success in nonverbal mindreading tasks, on the one hand, and the failures of children younger than four to pass verbally-mediated false-belief tasks, on the other. Many of these accounts have not been empirically fruitful. This paper focuses, in contrast, on the two-systems proposal put forward by Ian Apperly and colleagues. This has issued in a number of new findings. The present paper shows (...) that the theoretical arguments offered in support of Apperly’s account are nevertheless unconvincing, and that the data can be explained in other terms. A better view is that there is just a single mindreading system that exists throughout, but which undergoes gradual conceptual enrichment through infancy and childhood. This system can be used in ways that do, or do not, draw on executive resources and/or working memory. (shrink)

A number of convergent recent findings with adults have been interpreted as evidence of the existence of two distinct systems for mindreading that draw on separate conceptual resources: one that is fast, automatic, and inflexible; and one that is slower, controlled, and flexible. The present article argues that these findings admit of a more parsimonious explanation. This is that there is a single set of concepts made available by a mindreading system that operates automatically where it can, but which (...) frequently needs to function together with domain-specific executive procedures as well as domain-general resources. This view, too, can be described as a two-systems account. But in this case one of the systems encompasses the other, and the conceptual resources available to each are the same. (shrink)

Apperly and Butterfill's (2009) hold that there are two cognitive mind-reading systems. System 1(S1) is fast, automatic and inflexible, whereas system 2 (S2) is reflective, flexible and slow. This paper presents and discusses two central assumptions of this theory: the independence of S1 and S2 and the encapsulation of S1. It is argued that findings on longitudinal trajectories in infancy on the false belief test and visual perspective taking undermine the two-system theory in three respects: (1) S1 is not (...) encapsulated, (2) S1 is not entirely automatic processing, and (3) S2 cognitive processes can be fast and efficient. The paper concludes that mindreading operates through different socio-cognitive processes that are gradually and continuously enriched during development, which eliminates the need for a two-system characterization. (shrink)

This paper attempts to reconstruct the views of the Stoic Posidonius on the emotions, especially as presented by Galen’s On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato. This is a well-studied area, and many views have been developed over the last few decades. It is also significant that the reliability of Galen’s account is openly at issue. Yet it is not clear that the interpretative possibilities have been fully demarcated. Here I develop Galen’s claim that Posidonius accepted a persistent, non-rational aspect (...) of the soul that he connects with the merely animal part of humans. The aim is to begin from this testimony in answering two questions: (1) How might the possession of a non-rational element of the soul operate alongside the hêgemonikon (leading-part of the soul) as a source of impulse for Posidonius. (2) How does this persistent animal aspect conform to the Stoic ontological classification found in their scala naturae? I shall argue in response to these that (a) Posidonius distinguished the merely cognitive aspects of the soul from those that are rational, and (b) that the hêgemonikon itself is not to be identified with what is rational. Accepting a persistent non-rational source of emotional impulses allows Posidonius a richer framework for explaining human affective responses and behaviours. I also briefly address Galen’s motivation for the account he offers. It is in view of Posidonius’ approach to Plato’s Timaeus that Galen’s discussion finds its most plausible interpretation. (shrink)

Distinctions have been proposed between systems of reasoning for centuries. This article distills properties shared by many of these distinctions and characterizes the resulting systems in light of recent findings and theoretical developments. One system is associative because its computations reflect similarity structure and relations of temporal contiguity. The other is "rule based" because it operates on symbolic structures that have logical content and variables and because its computations have the properties that are normally assigned to rules. The (...) systems serve complementary functions and can simultaneously generate different solutions to a reasoning problem. The rule-based system can suppress the associative system but not completely inhibit it. The article reviews evidence in favor of the distinction and its characterization. (shrink)

Considerable evidence supports the sequential two-system model of moral judgement, as proposed by Greene and others. We tested whether judgement speed and/or personal/impersonal moral dilemmas can predict the kind of moral judgements subjects make for each dilemma, and whether personal dilemmas create difficulty in moral judgements. Our results showed that neither personal/impersonal conditions nor spontaneous/thoughtful-reflection conditions were reliable predictors of utilitarian or deontological moral judgements. Yet, we found support for an alternative view, in which, when the two types of responses (...) are in conflict; the resolution of this conflict depends on both the subject and the dilemma. While thinking about this conflict, subjects sometimes change their minds in both directions, as suggested by the data from a mouse-tracking task. (shrink)

The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans’ capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Non-human animals also fail critical tests of belief reasoning but can show very complex social behaviour (e.g., (...) Call & Tomasello, 2005). Fluent social interaction in adult humans implies efficient processing of beliefs, yet direct tests suggest that belief reasoning is cognitively demanding, even for adults (e.g., Apperly, Samson & Humphreys, 2005). We interpret these findings by drawing an analogy with the domain of number cognition, where similarly contrasting results have been observed. We propose that the success of infants and non-human animals on some belief reasoning tasks may be best explained by a cognitively efficient but inflexible capacity for tracking belief-like states. In humans this capacity persists in parallel with later-developing, more flexible but more cognitively demanding theory of mind abilities. (shrink)

Each of the two major approaches to Aristotle--the unitarian, which understands his work as forming a single, unified system, and the developmentalist, which seeks a sequence of developing ideas--has inherent limitations. This book proposes a synthetic view of Aristotle that sees development as a change between systematic theories. Setting theories of the so-called logical works beside theories of the physical and metaphysical treatises, Graham shows that Aristotle's doctrines fall into two distinct systems of philosophies that are genetically related. This (...) study--the first major alternative to the unitarian approach since Jaeger pioneered the developmentalist method in 1923--provides a sweeping reappraisal of Aristotle's science and metaphysics and a new approach to the problem of substance presented in the Metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper presents two systems of natural deduction for the rejection of non-tautologies of classical propositional logic. The first system is sound and complete with respect to the body of all non-tautologies, the second system is sound and complete with respect to the body of all contradictions. The second system is a subsystem of the first. Starting with Jan Łukasiewicz's work, we describe the historical development of theories of rejection for classical propositional logic. Subsequently, we present the two (...) class='Hi'>systems of natural deduction and prove them to be sound and complete. We conclude with a ‘Theorem of Inversion’. (shrink)

Intuitively, choices seem to be intentional actions but it is difficult to see how they could be. If our choices are all about weighing up reasons then there seems no room for an additional intentional act of choice. Richard Holton has suggested a solution to this puzzle, which involves thinking of choices in a two systems of cognition framework. Holton’s suggestion does solve the puzzle, but has some unsatisfactory consequences. This paper wants to take over the important insights from (...) Holton on the phenomenology of choice and the possible explanation via a two systems framework, but wants to suggest an alternative more satisfactory account. This account is built around the idea that choices are what Pamela Hieronymi calls managerial acts. After developing the claim the paper then defends it against the objection that managerial control cannot be understood in a system1 context, by examining recent research on uncertainty monitoring and early forms of metacognition. (shrink)

According to the two-systems account of mindreading, our mature perspective-taking abilities are subserved by two distinct mindreading systems: a fast but inflexible, “implicit” system, and a flexible but slow “explicit” one. However, the currently available evidence on adult perspective-taking does not support this account. Specifically, both Level-1 and Level-2 perspective-taking show a combination of efficiency and flexibility that is deeply inconsistent with the two-systems architecture. This inconsistency also turns out to have serious consequences for the two-systems (...) framework as a whole, both as an account of our mature mindreading abilities and of the development of those abilities. What emerges from this critique is a conception of context-sensitive, spontaneous mindreading that may provide insight into how mindreading functions in complex social environments. This in turn offers a bulwark against skepticism about the role of mindreading in everyday social cognition. (shrink)

Illative combinatory logic consists of the theory of combinators or lambda calculus extended by extra constants (and corresponding axioms and rules) intended to capture inference. The paper considers 4 systems of illative combinatory logic that are sound for first-order propositional and predicate calculus. The interpretation from ordinary logic into the illative systems can be done in two ways: following the propositions-as-types paradigm, in which derivations become combinators, or in a more direct way, in which derivations are not translated. (...) Both translations are closely related in a canonical way. In a preceding paper, Barendregt, Bunder and Dekkers, 1993, we proved completeness of the two direct translations. In the present paper we prove completeness of the two indirect translations by showing that the corresponding illative systems are conservative over the two systems for the direct translations. In another version, DBB (1997), we shall give a more direct completeness proof. These papers fulfill the program of Church and Curry to base logic on a consistent system of $\lambda$ -terms or combinators. Hitherto this program had failed because systems of ICL were either too weak (to provide a sound interpretation) or too strong (sometimes even inconsistent). (shrink)

This is a spin-off paper to [3, 4] in which we carried out an extensive analysis of Andrzej Grzegorczyk’s point-free topology from [5]. In [1] Loredana Biacino and Giangiacomo Gerla presented an axiomatization which was inspired by the Grzegorczyk’s system, and which is its variation. Our aim is to compare the two approaches and show that they are slightly different. Except for pointing to dissimilarities, we also demonstrate that the theories coincide in presence of axiom stipulating non-existence of atoms.

This essay analyses the Historical Evolution of Hong Kong, from the colonial period to the return to China sovereignty in 1997, according to the political philosophy of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, and the principle “one country, two systems”, which means that Hong Kong is part of China and enjoys a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence policy, as stipulated by the Basic Law of The Hong Kong Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. The political (...) system implemented in HKSAR corresponds to the matrix of the People’s Republic of China, but its economic base and legal system remained untouched in essence; an extreme model of liberal capitalism, deregulated and functioning on the margins of international law, with deep social inequalities, millions of new poor (workers and students in a situation of necessity) and a serious problem of access to housing. This essay analyses the political nature of the conflict around the extraction laws, distinguishing internal causes, and external interferences. At least, this essay analyses the system of political representation of HKSAR, the government program to overcome crisis and the new legislation after crisis. Keywords: history, one country, two systems, paradox, HKSAR, fallacies. (shrink)

In this study, Daniel W. Graham addresses two major problems in interpreting Aristotle. First, should we reconcile the apparent inconsistencies of the corpus by assuming an underlying unity of doctrine, or by positing a sequence of developing ideas? Secondly,what is the relation between the so-called logical works on the one hand and the physical-metaphysical treatises on the other? Although the problems appear to be unrelated, Graham finds that the key to the first lies in the second, and in doing so (...) provides the first major alternative to theunitarian approach since Jaeger's pioneering developmental study of 1923. (shrink)

This reply to Oaksford and Chater’s ’s critical discussion of our use of logic programming to model and predict patterns of conditional reasoning will frame the dispute in terms of the semantics of the conditional. We begin by outlining some common features of LP and probabilistic conditionals in knowledge-rich reasoning over long-term memory knowledge bases. For both, context determines causal strength; there are inferences from the absence of certain evidence; and both have analogues of the Ramsey test. Some current work (...) shows how a combination of counting defeaters and statistics from network monitoring can provide the information for graded responses from LP reasoning. With this much introduction, we then respond to O&C’s specific criticisms and misunderstandings. (shrink)

The hypothesis of two separate reasoning systems, one subserving individual goals and the other our genes, is theoretically implausible and not supported by the data. As an alternative, I propose a single system for analytical reasoning backed up by simple mechanisms for the selection of relevant information. This system can generate normative behavior as well as systematic deviations from it.

The standard method of generating countable ordinals from uncountable ordinals can be replaced by a use of fixed point extractors available in the term calculus of Howard’s system. This gives a notion of the intrinsic complexity of an ordinal analogous to the intrinsic complexity of a function described in Gödel’s T.

��Disoriented 4-year-old children use a distinctive container to locate a hidden object, but do they reorient by this information? We addressed this question by testing children’s search for objects in a circular room containing one distinctive and two identical containers. Children’s search patterns provided evidence that the distinctive container served as a direct cue to a hidden object’s location, but not as a directional signal guiding reorientation. The findings suggest that disoriented children’s search behavior depends on two distinct processes: a (...) modular reorientation process attuned to the geometry of the surface layout and an associative process linking landmarks to specific locations. (shrink)

The idea of forming a new libertarian nation is an attractive one for two reasons: first, as an alternative to persuasion; second, as a tool of persuasion.

The provision of police services and the suppression of crime is one of the first functions of civil government. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights speaks of a right to “security of person.” “The term ‘police’ traditionally connoted social organization, civil authority, or formation of a political community—the control and regulation of affairs affecting the general order and welfare of society,” including the protection of public health. Civil dispute resolution is also an important part of a system (...) that moves people away from self-help and toward reliance on collectively constituted, peaceful channels for working out problems.A safe and secure environment is tied to health. Research in social epidemiology suggests that a shared sense of security from physical violence and interference with property can contribute to better community health. (shrink)

The provision of police services and the suppression of crime is one of the first functions of civil government. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights speaks of a right to “security of person.” “The term ‘police’ traditionally connoted social organization, civil authority, or formation of a political community—the control and regulation of affairs affecting the general order and welfare of society,” including the protection of public health. Civil dispute resolution is also an important part of a system (...) that moves people away from self-help and toward reliance on collectively constituted, peaceful channels for working out problems.A safe and secure environment is tied to health. Research in social epidemiology suggests that a shared sense of security from physical violence and interference with property can contribute to better community health. (shrink)

The provision of police services and the suppression of crime is one of the first functions of civil government. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights speaks of a right to “security of person.” “The term ‘police’ traditionally connoted social organization, civil authority, or formation of a political community—the control and regulation of affairs affecting the general order and welfare of society,” including the protection of public health. Civil dispute resolution is also an important part of a system (...) that moves people away from self-help and toward reliance on collectively constituted, peaceful channels for working out problems.A safe and secure environment is tied to health. Research in social epidemiology suggests that a shared sense of security from physical violence and interference with property can contribute to better community health. (shrink)

Nine years into the tumultuous life of Hong Kong as a special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, it has become clearer what role Hong Kong plays in China’s modernization. This paper argues that Hong Kong’s role is that of a transforming catalyst. In dealing with the affairs of this city, Beijing from time to time has to put aside its normal instincts. This creates opportunities with potentially far-reaching consequences for the nation as a whole even though questions (...) have often been raised as to whether “two systems” will survive as Hong Kong becomes more integrated into “one China.” Hong Kong’s plight is difficult and there are constant risks of being overwhelmed by the much larger mainland system. Nevertheless, just looking at what may be seen as Hong Kong’s losses in the process of integration will prevent a deeper examination of how the mainland has been affected at the same time. Hong Kong presents Beijing with many challenging issues as well that go to the core of party ideology and practices. This is not to say that Beijing intends Hong Kong to be a pacesetter for political reform on the mainland, but at least in one corner of the country where debates are in the open and where the people’s behavior is different, the result is that Hong Kong has a gradual transforming effect on China’s modernization by forcing deliberation, debate, and possibly even behavioral change on some of the most sensitive issues to the Chinese leadership. (shrink)

In this paper, I will explore ideas advanced by Bradshaw, Pence and others who have written on compassion in healthcare. I will attempt to see how and whether their assumptions about compassion can be justified, and explore the role compassion should play in a modern healthcare system. I will justify scepticism at the idea of attempting to incentivise compassion through metrics. The Francis Report raises important questions concerning the nature of a healthcare system that harms rather than helps patients. If (...) something is failing in modern healthcare, those in charge should naturally seek to remedy it. I will investigate whether this is due to the disappearance of compassion, and if so, what is it that is emerging to fill its place. I will consider whether we need to rehabilitate or enforce compassion in the system, or to acknowledge that our modern healthcare systems are incompatible with compassion and how we can make the best of what remains. (shrink)

A central exegetical problem in Aristotelian studies is deciding how best to deal with apparent inconsistencies in his writings. Early this century, Werner Jaeger, challenging unitarian approaches of the previous century, argued that conflicting views could be reconciled by relegating them to different stages of Aristotle's philosophical career. Although scholars have questioned some of Jaeger's specific proposals, genetic explanations of inconsistencies are still widely adopted.