This chapter argues that human and animal minds indeed depend on a collection of domain-specific, task-specific, and encapsulated cognitive systems: on a set of cognitive ‘modules’ in Fodor's sense. It also argues that human and animal minds are endowed with domain-general, central systems that orchestrate the information delivered by core knowledge systems. The chapter begins by reviewing the literature on spatial reorientation in animals and in young children, arguing that spatial reorientation bears the hallmarks of core knowledge and of modularity. (...) It then considers studies of older children and adults, arguing that human spatial representations change qualitatively over development and show capacities not found in any other species. Finally, it presents two new experiments that investigate the role of emerging spatial language in uniquely human navigation performance. (shrink)

We agree that the approximate number system truly represents number. We endorse the authors' conclusions on the arguments from confounds, congruency, and imprecision, although we disagree with many claims along the way. Here, we discuss some complications with the meanings that undergird theories in numerical cognition, and with the language we use to communicate those theories.

��Disoriented 4-year-old children use a distinctive container to locate a hidden object, but do they reorient by this information? We addressed this question by testing children’s search for objects in a circular room containing one distinctive and two identical containers. Children’s search patterns provided evidence that the distinctive container served as a direct cue to a hidden object’s location, but not as a directional signal guiding reorientation. The findings suggest that disoriented children’s search behavior depends on two distinct processes: a (...) modular reorientation process attuned to the geometry of the surface layout and an associative process linking landmarks to specific locations. (shrink)