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  1. Ignorance and Moral Judgment: Testing the Logical Priority of the Epistemic.Parker Crutchfield, Scott Scheall, Cristal Cardoso Sao Mateus, Hayley Dawn Brown & Mark Rzeszutek - forthcoming - Consciousness and Cognition.
    It has recently been argued that a person’s moral judgments (about both their own and others’ actions) are constrained by the nature and extent of their relevant ignorance and, thus, that such judgments are determined in the first instance by the person’s epistemic circumstances. It has been argued, in other words, that the epistemic is logically prior to other normative (e.g., ethical, prudential, pecuniary) considerations in human decision-making, that these other normative considerations figure in decision-making only after (logically and temporally) (...)
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  2. ODNI as an analytic ombudsman: Is Intelligence Community Directive 203 up to the task?Alexandru Marcoci, Ans Vercammen & Mark Burgman - forthcoming - Intelligence and National Security.
    In the wake of 9/11 and the assessment of Iraq's WMD, several inquiries placed the blame primarily on the Intelligence Community. Part of the reform that followed was a codification of analytic tradecraft standards into Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 and the appointment of an analytic ombudsman in the newly created Office of the Director of National Intelligence charged with monitoring the quality of analytic products from across the intelligence community. In this paper we identify three assumptions behind ICD203: (1) (...)
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  3. General-Purpose Institutional Decision-Making Heuristics: The Case of Decision-Making under Deep Uncertainty.David Thorstad - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Recent work in judgment and decisionmaking has stressed that institutions, like individuals, often rely on decisionmaking heuristics. But most of the institutional decisionmaking heuristics studied to date are highly firm- and industry-specific. This contrasts to the individual case, in which many heuristics are general-purpose rules suitable for a wide range of decision problems. Are there also general-purpose heuristics for institutional decisionmaking? In this paper, I argue that a number of methods recently developed for decisionmaking under deep uncertainty have a good (...)
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  4. Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?David Thorstad - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Bounded rationality gets a bad rap in epistemology. It is argued that theories of bounded rationality are overly context-sensitive; conventionalist; or dependent on ordinary language. In this paper, I have three aims. The first is to set out and motivate an approach to bounded rationality in epistemology inspired by traditional theories of bounded rationality in cognitive science. My second aim is to show how this approach can answer recent challenges raised for theories of bounded rationality. My third aim is to (...)
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  5. People's thinking plans adapt to the problem they're trying to solve.Joan Danielle K. Ongchoco, Joshua Knobe & Julian Jara-Ettinger - 2024 - Cognition 243 (C):105669.
    Much of our thinking focuses on deciding what to do in situations where the space of possible options is too large to evaluate exhaustively. Previous work has found that people do this by learning the general value of different behaviors, and prioritizing thinking about high-value options in new situations. Is this good-action bias always the best strategy, or can thinking about low-value options sometimes become more beneficial? Can people adapt their thinking accordingly based on the situation? And how do we (...)
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  6. The Logic of Framing Effects.Francesco Berto & Aybüke Özgün - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (3):939-962.
    _Framing effects_ concern the having of different attitudes towards logically or necessarily equivalent contents. Framing is of crucial importance for cognitive science, behavioral economics, decision theory, and the social sciences at large. We model a typical kind of framing, grounded in (i) the structural distinction between beliefs activated in working memory and beliefs left inactive in long term memory, and (ii) the topic- or subject matter-sensitivity of belief: a feature of propositional attitudes which is attracting growing research attention. We introduce (...)
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  7. Inter‐temporal rationality without temporal representation.Simon A. B. Brown - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (2):495-514.
    Recent influential accounts of temporal representation—the use of mental representations with explicit temporal contents, such as before and after relations and durations—sharply distinguish representation from mere sensitivity. A common, important picture of inter-temporal rationality is that it consists in maximizing total expected discounted utility across time. By analyzing reinforcement learning algorithms, this article shows that, given such notions of temporal representation and inter-temporal rationality, it would be possible for an agent to achieve inter-temporal rationality without temporal representation. It then explores (...)
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  8. Ignorance and moral judgment: Testing the logical priority of the epistemic.Parker Crutchfield, Scott Scheall, Mark Justin Rzeszutek, Hayley Dawn Brown & Cristal Cardoso Sao Mateus - 2023 - Consciousness and Cognition 108 (C):103472.
    It has recently been argued that a person’s moral judgments (about both their own and others’ actions) are constrained by the nature and extent of their relevant ignorance and, thus, that such judgments are determined in the first instance by the person’s epistemic circumstances. It has been argued, in other words, that the epistemic is logically prior to other normative (e.g., ethical, prudential, pecuniary) considerations in human decision-making, that these other normative considerations figure in decision-making only after (logically and temporally) (...)
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  9. Hot-cold empathy gaps and the grounds of authenticity.Grace Helton & Christopher Register - 2023 - Synthese 202 (5):1-24.
    Hot-cold empathy gaps are a pervasive phenomena wherein one’s predictions about others tend to skew ‘in the direction’ of one’s own current visceral states. For instance, when one predicts how hungry someone else is, one’s prediction will tend to reflect one’s own current hunger state. These gaps also obtain intrapersonally, when one attempts to predict what one oneself would do at a different time. In this paper, we do three things: We draw on empirical evidence to argue that so-called hot-cold (...)
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  10. Value certainty in drift-diffusion models of preferential choice.Douglas G. Lee & Marius Usher - 2023 - Psychological Review 130 (3):790-806.
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  11. Two paradoxes of bounded rationality.David Thorstad - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.
    My aim in this paper is to develop a unified solution to two paradoxes of bounded rationality. The first is the regress problem that incorporating cognitive bounds into models of rational decisionmaking generates a regress of higher-order decision problems. The second is the problem of rational irrationality: it sometimes seems rational for bounded agents to act irrationally on the basis of rational deliberation. I review two strategies which have been brought to bear on these problems: the way of weakening which (...)
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  12. Biopolitics & Probability: Agamben & Kierkegaard.Virgil W. Brower - 2021 - In Marcos Antonio Norris & Colby Dickinson (eds.), Agamben and the Existentialists. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press. pp. 46-64.
    This project retraces activations of Kierkegaard in the development of polit­ical theology. It suggests alternative modes of states of exception than those attributed to him by Schmitt, Taubes and Agamben. Several Kierkegaardian themes open themselves to 'something like pure potential' in Agamben, namely: living death, animality, criminality, auto-constitution, modification, liturgy, love and certain articulations of improbabilities. Attention is drawn to a modal ontology and auto-constitution at work in Kierkegaard's writings, as well as a complicated and indissociable operation between killing and (...)
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  13. The Priority of the Epistemic.Parker Crutchfield & Scott Scheall - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):726-737.
    Epistemic burdens – the nature and extent of our ignorance (that and how) with respect to various courses of action – serve to determine our incentive structures. Courses of action that seem to bear impossibly heavy epistemic burdens are typically not counted as options in an actor’s menu, while courses of action that seem to bear comparatively heavy epistemic burdens are systematically discounted in an actor’s menu relative to options that appear less epistemically burdensome. That ignorance serves to determine what (...)
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  14. Can Wittgenstein’s Philosophy account for Uncertainty in Introspection?Pablo Hubacher Haerle - 2021 - Wittgenstein-Studien 12 (1):145-163.
    What happens when we are uncertain about what we want, feel or whish for? How should we understand uncertainty in introspection? This paper reconstructs and critically assess two answers to this question frequently found in the secondary literature on Wittgenstein: indecision and self-deception (Hacker 1990, 2012; Glock 1995, 1996). Such approaches seek to explain uncertainty in introspection in a way which is completely distinct from uncertainty about the ‘outer world’. I argue that in doing so these readings fail to account (...)
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  15. The past of predicting the future: A review of the multidisciplinary history of affective forecasting.Maya A. Pilin - 2021 - History of the Human Sciences 34 (3-4):290-306.
    Affective forecasting refers to the ability to predict future emotions, a skill that is essential to making decisions on a daily basis. Studies of the concept have determined that individuals are often inaccurate in making such affective forecasts. However, the mechanisms of these errors are not yet clear. In order to better understand why affective forecasting errors occur, this article seeks to trace the theoretical roots of this theory with a focus on its multidisciplinary history. The roots of affective forecasting (...)
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  16. A Case Study in the Problem of Policymaker Ignorance: Political Responses to COVID-19.Scott Scheall & Parker Crutchfield - 2021 - Cosmos + Taxis: Studies in Emergent Order and Organization 9 (5 + 6):18-28.
    We apply the analysis that we have developed over the course of several publications on the significance of ignorance for decision-making, especially in surrogate (and, thus, in political) contexts, to political decision-making, such as it has been, during the COVID-19 pandemic (see Scheall 2019; Crutchfield and Scheall 2019; Scheall and Crutchfield 2020; Scheall 2020). Policy responses to the coronavirus constitute a case study of the problem of policymaker ignorance. We argue that political responses to the virus cannot be explained by (...)
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  17. Risk of Disease and Willingness to Vaccinate in the United State: A Population-Based Survey.Bert Baumgaertner, Benjamin J. Ridenhour, Florian Justwan, Juliet E. Carlisle & Craig R. Miller - 2020 - Plos Medicine 10 (17).
    Vaccination complacency occurs when perceived risks of vaccine-preventable diseases are sufficiently low so that vaccination is no longer perceived as a necessary precaution. Disease outbreaks can once again increase perceptions of risk, thereby decrease vaccine complacency, and in turn decrease vaccine hesitancy. It is not well understood, however, how change in perceived risk translates into change in vaccine hesitancy. -/- We advance the concept of vaccine propensity, which relates a change in willingness to vaccinate with a change in perceived risk (...)
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  18. Functionalism and the role of psychology in economics.Christopher Clarke - 2020 - Journal of Economic Methodology 27 (4):292-310.
    Should economics study the psychological basis of agents' choice behaviour? I show how this question is multifaceted and profoundly ambiguous. There is no sharp distinction between "mentalist'' answers to this question and rival "behavioural'' answers. What's more, clarifying this point raises problems for mentalists of the "functionalist'' variety (Dietrich and List, 2016). Firstly, functionalist hypotheses collapse into hypotheses about input--output dispositions, I show, unless one places some unwelcome restrictions on what counts as a cognitive variable. Secondly, functionalist hypotheses make some (...)
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  19. Epistemic Burdens, Moral Intimacy, and Surrogate Decision Making.Parker Crutchfield & Scott Scheall - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics 20 (2):59-61.
    Berger (forthcoming) states that moral intimacy is important in applying the best interests standard. But what he calls moral intimacy requires that someone has overcome epistemic burdens needed to represent the patient. We argue elsewhere that good surrogate decision-making is first and foremost a matter of overcoming epistemic burdens, or those obstacles that stand in the way of a surrogate decision-maker knowing what a patient wants and how to satisfy those preferences. Berger’s notion of moral intimacy depends on epistemic intimacy: (...)
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  20. Varieties of Risk.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):432-455.
    The notion of risk plays a central role in economics, finance, health, psychology, law and elsewhere, and is prevalent in managing challenges and resources in day-to-day life. In recent work, Duncan Pritchard (2015, 2016) has argued against the orthodox probabilistic conception of risk on which the risk of a hypothetical scenario is determined by how probable it is, and in favour of a modal conception on which the risk of a hypothetical scenario is determined by how modally close it is. (...)
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  21. Deciding without Intending.Alexandra M. Nolte, Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri - 2020 - Journal of Cognition 3 (1):12.
    According to a consensus view in philosophy, “deciding” and “intending” are synonymous expressions. Researchers have recently challenged this view with the discovery of a counterexample in which ordinary speakers attribute deciding without intending. The aim of this paper is to investigate the strengths and limits of this discovery. The result of this investigation revealed that the evidence challenging the consensus view is strong. We replicate the initial finding against consensus and extend it by utilizing several new measures, materials, and procedures. (...)
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  22. A Hyper-Relation Characterization of Weak Pseudo-Rationalizability.Rush T. Stewart - 2020 - Journal of Mathematical Psychology 99:1-5.
    I provide a characterization of weakly pseudo-rationalizable choice functions---that is, choice functions rationalizable by a set of acyclic relations---in terms of hyper-relations satisfying certain properties. For those hyper-relations Nehring calls extended preference relations, the central characterizing condition is weaker than (hyper-relation) transitivity but stronger than (hyper-relation) acyclicity. Furthermore, the relevant type of hyper-relation can be represented as the intersection of a certain class of its extensions. These results generalize known, analogous results for path independent choice functions.
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  23. Folk Psychology and the Interpretation of Decision Theory.Johanna Thoma - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7.
    Most philosophical decision theorists and philosophers of the social sciences believe that decision theory is and should be in the business of providing folk psychological explanations of choice behaviour, and that it can only do so if we understand the preferences, utilities and probabilities that feature in decision-theoretic models as ascriptions of mental states not reducible to choice. The behavioural interpretation of preference and related concepts, still common in economics, is consequently cast as misguided. This paper argues that even those (...)
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  24. Deliberation and pragmatic belief.Brad Armendt - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    To what extent do our beliefs, and how strongly we hold them, depend upon how they matter to us, on what we take to be at stake on them? The idea that beliefs are sometimes stake-sensitive (Armendt 2008, 2013) is further explored here, with a focus on whether beliefs may be stake-sensitive and rational. In contexts of extended deliberation about what to do, beliefs and assessments of options interact. In some deliberations, a belief about what you will do may rationally (...)
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  25. Epistemic burdens and the incentives of surrogate decision-makers.Parker Crutchfield & Scott Scheall - 2019 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 22 (4):613-621.
    We aim to establish the following claim: other factors held constant, the relative weights of the epistemic burdens of competing treatment options serve to determine the options that patient surrogates pursue. Simply put, surrogates confront an incentive, ceteris paribus, to pursue treatment options with respect to which their knowledge is most adequate to the requirements of the case. Regardless of what the patient would choose, options that require more knowledge than the surrogate possesses (or is likely to learn) will either (...)
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  26. Consequentialism, Rationality, and Kantian Respect.Tim Henning - 2019 - In Christian Seidel (ed.), Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems (Oxford Moral Theory). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 198-216.
    Arguments for moral consequentialism often appeal to an alleged structural similarity between consequentialist reasoning in ethics and rational decision-making in everyday life. Ordinary rational decision-making is seen as a paradigmatic case of goal-oriented, teleological decision-making, since it allegedly aims at maximizing the goal of preference satisfaction. This chapter describes and discusses a neglected type of preference change, “predictable preference accommodation.” This phenomenon leads to a number of critical cases in which the rationality of a particular choice does not depend on (...)
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  27. Measuring Belief and Risk Attitude.Sven Neth - 2019 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297:354–364.
    Ramsey (1926) sketches a proposal for measuring the subjective probabilities of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is an expected utility maximizer. I show how to extend the spirit of Ramsey's method to a strictly wider class of agents: risk-weighted expected utility maximizers (Buchak 2013). In particular, I show how we can measure the risk attitudes of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is a risk-weighted expected utility maximizer. Further, we can leverage (...)
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  28. Ivan Moscati, "Measuring Utility". [REVIEW]William Peden - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Review of Books 1:1.
    In late-nineteenth-century economics, there was an epoch-defining shift from the labour theory of value to the marginal utility theory of value. According to the latter, the economic value of some circumstance (obtaining some good, some service, and so on) is its subjective utility at the margin. Thus, while there is an absolute sense in which I prefer having water to having diamonds, at the present moment I value one more unit of diamonds more than I value one more unit of (...)
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  29. Choice set dependent performance and post-decision dissonance.Toru Suzuki - 2019 - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 163:24-42.
    A decision maker (DM) selects a project from a set of alternatives with uncertain productivity. After the choice, she observes a signal about productivity and decides how much effort to put in. This paper analyzes the optimal decision problem of the DM who rationally filters information to deal with her post-decision cognitive dissonance. It is shown that the optimal effort level for a project can be affected by unchosen projects in her choice set, and the nature of the choice set-dependence (...)
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  30. Compassion and Animals: How We Ought to Treat Animals in a World Without Justice.C. E. Abbate - 2018 - In Justin Caouette & Carolyn Price (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Compassion.
    The philosophy of animal rights is often characterized as an exclusively justice oriented approach to animal liberation that is unconcerned with, and moreover suspicious of, moral emotions, like sympathy, empathy, and compassion. I argue that the philosophy of animal rights can, and should, acknowledge that compassion plays an integral role in animal liberation discourse and theory. Because compassion motivates moral actors to relieve the serious injustices that other animals face, or, at the very least, compassion moves actors not to participate (...)
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  31. Risk attitudes in axiomatic decision theory: a conceptual perspective.Jean Baccelli - 2018 - Theory and Decision 84 (1):61-82.
    In this paper, I examine the decision-theoretic status of risk attitudes. I start by providing evidence showing that the risk attitude concepts do not play a major role in the axiomatic analysis of the classic models of decision-making under risk. This can be interpreted as reflecting the neutrality of these models between the possible risk attitudes. My central claim, however, is that such neutrality needs to be qualified and the axiomatic relevance of risk attitudes needs to be re-evaluated accordingly. Specifically, (...)
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  32. Fear as a Regulator of the Process of Making Life Decisions in the Period of Late Adolescence.Volodymyr Chernobrovkin & Maksym Starodub - 2018 - Psychology and Psychosocial Interventions 1:55-61.
    The article addresses the problem of making life decisions by people during the period of late adolescence; describes the specifics of the influence of various factors, in particular, the sense of life orientations, life position, impulsivity; the questions of the influence of fear on the process of making life decisions by young people; and the influence of various types of fears on this process. -/- The results of the research show that the influence of fears on the process of making (...)
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  33. Optimality bias in moral judgment.Julian De Freitas & Samuel G. B. Johnson - 2018 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 79:149-163.
    We often make decisions with incomplete knowledge of their consequences. Might people nonetheless expect others to make optimal choices, despite this ignorance? Here, we show that people are sensitive to moral optimality: that people hold moral agents accountable depending on whether they make optimal choices, even when there is no way that the agent could know which choice was optimal. This result held up whether the outcome was positive, negative, inevitable, or unknown, and across within-subjects and between-subjects designs. Participants consistently (...)
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  34. Armin Schulz, Efficient Cognition. [REVIEW]Zoe Drayson - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:online.
  35. PushediN: The Next Step in Social Media Marketing?Julian Friedland - 2018 - Sage Business Cases.
    This case takes place in the context of a small to medium-sized retail clothing firm. It examines the latest trends in social media marketing technology and the potential ethical issues regarding privacy infringement and behavioral control of teenagers and young adults that such technology presents. The scenario invites students to consider how much, if at all, such marketing practices should be resisted going forward.
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  36. On the instrumental value of hypothetical and counterfactual thought.Thomas Icard, Fiery Cushman & Joshua Knobe - 2018 - Proceedings of the 40th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
    People often engage in “offline simulation”, considering what would happen if they performed certain actions in the future, or had performed different actions in the past. Prior research shows that these simulations are biased towards actions a person considers to be good—i.e., likely to pay off. We ask whether, and why, this bias might be adaptive. Through computational experiments we compare five agents who differ only in the way they engage in offline simulation, across a variety of different environment types. (...)
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  37. Better Together: Reliable Application of the Post-9/11 and Post-Iraq US Intelligence Tradecraft Standards Requires Collective Analysis.Alexandru Marcoci, Mark Burgman, Ariel Kruger, Elizabeth Silver, Marissa McBride, Felix Singleton Thorn, Hannah Fraser, Bonnie C. Wintle, Fiona Fidler & Ans Vercammen - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology.
    Background. The events of 9/11 and the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction precipitated fundamental changes within the US Intelligence Community. As part of the reform, analytic tradecraft standards were revised and codified into a policy document – Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 – and an analytic ombudsman was appointed in the newly created Office for the Director of National Intelligence to ensure compliance across the intelligence community. In this paper we investigate (...)
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  38. Choice in a two systems world: picking & weighing or managing & metacognition.Tillmann Vierkant - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):1-13.
    Intuitively, choices seem to be intentional actions but it is difficult to see how they could be. If our choices are all about weighing up reasons then there seems no room for an additional intentional act of choice. Richard Holton has suggested a solution to this puzzle, which involves thinking of choices in a two systems of cognition framework. Holton’s suggestion does solve the puzzle, but has some unsatisfactory consequences. This paper wants to take over the important insights from Holton (...)
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  39. Embodied Decisions and the Predictive Brain.Christopher Burr - 2017 - Philosophy and Predictive Processing.
    A cognitivist account of decision-making views choice behaviour as a serial process of deliberation and commitment, which is separate from perception and action. By contrast, recent work in embodied decision-making has argued that this account is incompatible with emerging neurophysiological data. We argue that this account has significant overlap with an embodied account of predictive processing, and that both can offer mutual development for the other. However, more importantly, by demonstrating this close connection we uncover an alternative perspective on the (...)
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  40. The Complementarity of Means and Ends: Putnam, pragmatism and the critique of economic rationality.Brendan Hogan & Lawrence Marcelle - 2017 - Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 38 (2):401-428.
  41. Termination of prehospital resuscitative efforts: a study of documentation on ethical considerations at the scene.Søren Mikkelsen, Caroline Schaffalitzky, Lars Grassmé Binderup, Hans Morten Lossius, Palle Toft & Annmarie Touborg Lassen - 2017 - Journal of Trauma, Resuscitation and Emergency Medicine 35 (25).
    Background Discussions on ethical aspects of life-and-death decisions within the hospital are often made in plenary. The prehospital physician, however, may be faced with ethical dilemmas in life-and-death decisions when time-critical decisions to initiate or refrain from resuscitative efforts need to be taken without the possibility to discuss matters with colleagues. Little is known whether these considerations regarding ethical issues in crucial life-and-death decisions are documented prehospitally. This is a review of the ethical considerations documented in the prehospital medical records (...)
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  42. Knowledge central: A central role for knowledge attributions in social evaluations.John Turri, Ori Friedman & Ashley Keefner - 2017 - Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 70 (3):504-515.
    Five experiments demonstrate the central role of knowledge attributions in social evaluations. In Experiments 1–3, we manipulated whether an agent believes, is certain of, or knows a true proposition and asked people to rate whether the agent should perform a variety of actions. We found that knowledge, more so than belief or certainty, leads people to judge that the agent should act. In Experiments 4–5, we investigated whether attributions of knowledge or certainty can explain an important finding on how people (...)
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  43. Influencing choice without awareness.Jay A. Olson, Alym A. Amlani, Amir Raz & Ronald A. Rensink - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 37 (C):225-236.
    Forcing occurs when a magician influences the audience's decisions without their awareness. To investigate the mechanisms behind this effect, we examined several stimulus and personality predictors. In Study 1, a magician flipped through a deck of playing cards while participants were asked to choose one. Although the magician could influence the choice almost every time (98%), relatively few (9%) noticed this influence. In Study 2, participants observed rapid series of cards on a computer, with one target card shown longer than (...)
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  44. The systemic mind and a conceptual framework for the psychosocial environment of business enterprises: Practical implications for systemic leadership training.Radek Trnka & Petr Parma - 2015 - In Martin Kuška & M. J. Jandl (eds.), Current Research in Psychosocial Arena: Thinking about Health, Society and Culture. Wien: Sigmund Freud PrivatUniversitäts Verlag. pp. 68-79.
    This chapter introduces a research-based conceptual framework for the study of the inner psychosocial reality of business enterprises. It is called the Inner Organizational Ecosystem Approach (IOEA). This model is systemic in nature, and it defines the basic features of small and medium-size enterprises, such as elements, structures, borders, social actors, organizational climate, processes and resources. Further, it also covers the dynamics of psychosocial reality, processes, emergent qualities and the higher-order subsystems of the overall organizational ecosystem, including the global business (...)
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  45. Making a task difficult: Evidence that device-oriented steps are effortful and error-prone.Maartje Ga Ament, Anna L. Cox, Ann Blandford & Duncan P. Brumby - 2013 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 19 (3):195.
  46. Developing as a leader and decison maker.Marcus Selart - 2010 - In A Leadership Perspective on Decision Making. Oslo: Cappelen Academic Publishers. pp. 147-176.
    This chapter makes it clear that a significant element of both leadership and decision making is the development aspect. Leaders develop in their decision making by being confronted with difficult decision situations. However, they also develop through various forms of systemized training and education. Different leaders tend to develop in different directions. For this reason, one can identify a number of key leadership styles based on different ways of leading. These different styles are appropriate for various types of organization. Some (...)
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  47. Facilitating leadership decisions.Marcus Selart - 2010 - In A Leadership Perspective on Decision Making. Oslo: Cappelen Academic Publishers. pp. 73-94.
    This chapter illustrates that in order to reach a decision a leader must decide which persons should be involved in the process and when. A relatively common method of involving others is delegating the decision to a group. A main objective of this is often to generate as many innovative ideas as possible, and different techniques can be employed for this, including brainstorming. The proposal generated must then be validated by the group using different criteria on the basis of which (...)
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  48. Structuring the decision process.Marcus Selart - 2010 - In A Leadership Perspective on Decision Making. Oslo: Cappelen Academic Publishers. pp. 97-120.
    This chapter includes a discussion of leadership decisions and stress. Many leaders are daily exposed to stress when they must make decisions, and there are often social reasons for this. Social standards suggest that a leader must be proactive and make decisions and not flee the situation. Conflict often creates stress in decision-making situations. It is important for leaders to understand that it is not stress in itself that leads to bad decisions, rather, bad decisions may be the result of (...)
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  49. Analyzing leadership decisions.Marcus Selart - 2010 - In A Ledership Perspective on Decision Making. Oslo: Cappelen Academic Publishers. pp. 47-70.
    In this chapter it is pointed out that leaders who make decisions normally rely on both their intuition and their analytical thinking. Modern research shows that intuitive thinking has the potential to support the analytical, if used properly. Leaders must therefore be aware of the possibilities and limitations of intuition. Fresh thinking and innovation are key elements in leadership analysis, thus creative problem-solving is an important complement to traditional leadership thinking. Creative leaders work extensively with both intuition and logic. They (...)
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  50. The relevance of selecting what's relevant: A dual process approach to transitive reasoning with spatial relations.Eef Ameel, Niki Verschueren & Walter Schaeken - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 13 (2):164 – 187.
    The present paper focuses on the heuristic selection process preceding the actual transitive reasoning process. A part of the difficulty of transitive reasoning lies in the selection of the relevant problem aspects. Two experiments are presented using the paradigm introduced by Markovits, Dumas, and Malfait (1995), in which children were asked to make “higher than” inferences about arrays of coloured blocks. In order to discriminate between genuine transitive inference and a simple strategy of relative position, Markovits et al. interspersed white (...)
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