57 found
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  1.  29
    Actively open-minded thinking in politics.Jonathan Baron - 2019 - Cognition 188 (C):8-18.
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  2.  72
    Nonconsequentialist decisions.Jonathan Baron - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):1-10. Translated by Jonathan Baron.
    According to a simple form of consequentialism, we should base decisions on our judgments about their consequences for achieving our goals. Our goals give us reason to endorse consequentialism as a standard of decision making. Alternative standards invariably lead to consequences that are less good in this sense. Yet some people knowingly follow decision rules that violate consequentialism. For example, they prefer harmful omissions to less harmful acts, they favor the status quo over alternatives they would otherwise judge to be (...)
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  3.  63
    Unsentimental ethics: Towards a content-specific account of the moral–conventional distinction.Edward B. Royzman, Robert F. Leeman & Jonathan Baron - 2009 - Cognition 112 (1):159-174.
  4.  51
    Challenges for the sequential two-system model of moral judgement.Burcu Gürçay & Jonathan Baron - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (1):49-80.
    Considerable evidence supports the sequential two-system model of moral judgement, as proposed by Greene and others. We tested whether judgement speed and/or personal/impersonal moral dilemmas can predict the kind of moral judgements subjects make for each dilemma, and whether personal dilemmas create difficulty in moral judgements. Our results showed that neither personal/impersonal conditions nor spontaneous/thoughtful-reflection conditions were reliable predictors of utilitarian or deontological moral judgements. Yet, we found support for an alternative view, in which, when the two types of responses (...)
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  5.  56
    Tradeoffs among reasons for action.Jonathan Baron - 1986 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 16 (2):173–195.
  6.  18
    Utility, exchange, and commensurability.Jonathan Baron - 1988 - Journal of Thought 23:111-131.
    The principle of exchange seems to be limited in its application, and it cannot serve as a link between utilitarianism and the idea of a market for interpersonal relations. Our preferences concern the inner states of other people as well as their overt behavior. The neglect of this aspect of our preferences is a result of the coupling of utilitarianism with behaviorism. The problem is thus behaviorism, not consequentialism. It might be argued that commensurability is wrong because it sanctions impure (...)
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  7.  51
    Myside bias in thinking about abortion.Jonathan Baron - 1995 - Thinking and Reasoning 1 (3):221 – 235.
    College-student subjects made notes about the morality of early abortion, as if they were preparing for a class discussion. Analysis of the quality of their arguments suggests that a distinction can be made between arguments based on well-supported warrants and those based on warrants that are easily criticised. The subjects also evaluated notes made by other, hypothetical, students preparing for the same discussion. Most subjects evaluated the set of arguments as better when the arguments were all on one side than (...)
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  8.  45
    Back to basics.Jonathan Baron - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):706-706.
  9.  36
    Correlations of trait and state emotions with utilitarian moral judgements.Jonathan Baron, Burcu Gürçay & Mary Frances Luce - 2018 - Cognition and Emotion 32 (1):116-129.
    In four experiments, we asked subjects for judgements about scenarios that pit utilitarian outcomes against deontological moral rules, for example, saving more lives vs. a rule against active killing. We measured trait emotions of anger, disgust, sympathy and empathy, asked about the same emotions after each scenario. We found that utilitarian responding to the scenarios, and higher scores on a utilitarianism scale, were correlated negatively with disgust, positively with anger, positively with specific sympathy and state sympathy, and less so with (...)
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  10.  40
    Second-order probabilities and belief functions.Jonathan Baron - 1987 - Theory and Decision 23 (1):25-36.
  11.  19
    A decision analysis of consent.Jonathan Baron - 2006 - American Journal of Bioethics 6 (3):46 – 52.
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  12.  41
    Social acceptability, personal responsibility, and prognosis in public judgments and transplant allocation.Peter A. Ubel, Jonathan Baron & David A. Asch - 1999 - Bioethics 13 (1):57–68.
    Background: Some members of the general public feel that patients who cause their own organ failure through smoking, alcohol use, or drug use should not receive equal priority for scarce transplantable organs. This may reflect a belief that these patients (1) cause their own illness, (2) have poor transplant prognoses or, (3) are simply unworthy. We explore the role that social acceptability, personal responsibility, and prognosis play in people's judgments about transplant allocation. Methods: By random allocation, we presented 283 prospective (...)
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  13.  34
    Utilitarian Emotions: Suggestions from Introspection.Jonathan Baron - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):286-286.
    In folk psychology and some academic psychology, utilitarian thinking is associated with coldness and deontological thinking is associated with emotion. I suggest, mostly through personal examples, that these associations are far from perfect. Utilitarians experience emotions, which sometimes derive from, and sometimes cause or reinforce, their moral judgments.
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  14.  73
    Belief-Overkill in Political Judgments.Jonathan Baron - 2009 - Informal Logic 29 (4):368-378.
    When people tend toward a political decision, such as voting for the Republican Party, they are often attracted to this decision by one issue, such as the party’s stance on abortion, but then they come to see other issues, such as the party’s stand on taxes, as supporting their decision, even if they would not have thought so in the absence of the decision. I demonstrate this phenomenon with opinion poll data and with an experiment done on the World Wide (...)
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  15. Use of a Rasch model to predict response times to utilitarian moral dilemmas.Jonathan Baron, Burcu Gürçay, Adam B. Moore & Katrin Starcke - 2012 - Synthese 189 (S1):107-117.
    A two-systems model of moral judgment proposed by Joshua Greene holds that deontological moral judgments (those based on simple rules concerning action) are often primary and intuitive, and these intuitive judgments must be overridden by reflection in order to yield utilitarian (consequence-based) responses. For example, one dilemma asks whether it is right to push a man onto a track in order to stop a trolley that is heading for five others. Those who favor pushing, the utilitarian response, usually take longer (...)
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  16.  33
    Determinants of insensitivity to quantity in valuation of public goods: Contribution, warm glow, budget constraints, availability, and prominence.Jonathan Baron & Joshua Greene - 1996 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 2 (2):107.
  17. Utilitarian voting.Jonathan Baron - manuscript
    Self-interest voting is irrational when it has even a small cost, but it can be rational for those who care about others; its expected utility (EU) may exceed its cost. For cosmopolitan voters (those who care about outsiders), the EU of voting increases with the number of affected others. The EU of voting for the good of the world now and in the future can thus be large. In some cases, the EU of parochial voting (e.g., considering only one's nation) (...)
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  18.  15
    Protected Values and Other Types of Values.Jonathan Baron - 2017 - Analyse & Kritik 39 (1):85-100.
    Protected values (PVs) are values protected from trade-offs with other values. They are absolute in this sense. People hold these values even when they do not necessarily abide by them in their behavior. I suggest that most of these values are a subset of deontological rules, defined by their absoluteness. Their origin may be understood by looking at the origin of deontological rules more generally, which includes religious (hence sacred) values among others. But PVs are usually maintained by lack of (...)
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  19.  85
    A Psychological View of Moral Intuition.Jonathan Baron - 1995 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 5 (1):36-40.
  20.  43
    Normative, descriptive and prescriptive responses.Jonathan Baron - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):32-42.
  21.  81
    Cognitive biases in moral judgments that affect political behavior.Jonathan Baron - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):7 - 35.
    Cognitive biases that affect decision making may affect the decisions of citizens that influence public policy. To the extent that decisions follow principles other than maximizing utility for all, it is less likely that utility will be maximized, and the citizens will ultimately suffer the results. Here I outline some basic arguments concerning decisions by citizens, using voting as an example. I describe two types of values that may lead to sub-optimal consequences when these values influence political behavior: moralistic values (...)
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  22.  21
    Cognitive biases in moral judgments that affect political behavior.Jonathan Baron - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):7-35.
    Cognitive biases that affect decision making may affect the decisions of citizens that influence public policy. To the extent that decisions follow principles other than maximizing utility for all, it is less likely that utility will be maximized, and the citizens will ultimately suffer the results. Here I outline some basic arguments concerning decisions by citizens, using voting as an example. I describe two types of values that may lead to sub-optimal consequences when these values influence political behavior: moralistic values (...)
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  23.  41
    Norm-Endorsement Utilitarianism and the Nature of Utility.Jonathan Baron - 1996 - Economics and Philosophy 12 (2):165.
    In this article, I shall suggest an approach to the justification of normative moral principles which leads, I think, to utilitarianism. The approach is based on asking what moral norms we would each endorse if we had no prior moral commitments. I argue that we would endorse norms that lead to the satisfaction of all our nonmoral values or goals. The same approach leads to a view of utility as consisting of those goals that we would want satisfied. In the (...)
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  24.  20
    Joint presentation reduces the effect of emotion on evaluation of public actions.Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron - 2011 - Cognition and Emotion 25 (4):657-675.
  25.  17
    Richard M. Hare.Jonathan Baron - 2021 - Utilitarianism.Net.
    Richard M. Hare (1919 - 2002) is usually acknowledged to be one of the major moral thinkers of the 20th century. After being a Japanese prisoner of war for most of World War II, he completed his education at Oxford, later joining the faculty and becoming a professor. In 1983 he moved to the University of Florida but still kept his ties with Oxford. He had many students, including Peter Singer. At a memorial service for Hare in 2002, Singer ascribed (...)
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  26.  15
    Individual Differences in Argument Strength Discrimination.Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen, Mika Hietanen & Jonathan Baron - forthcoming - Argumentation:1-27.
    Being able to discriminate poorly justified from well justified arguments is necessary for informed citizenship. However, it is not known whether the ability to recognize argument strength generalizes across different types of arguments, and what cognitive factors predict this ability or these abilities. Drawing on the theory of argument schemes, we examined arguments from consequence, analogy, symptoms, and authority in order to cover all major types of arguments. A study (_N_ = 278) on the general population in Finland indicated that (...)
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  27.  7
    The elephant's other legs: What some sciences actually do.Jonathan Baron - 2024 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 47:e35.
    Integrative experiments, as described, seem blindly empirical, as if the question of generality of effects could not be understood through controlled one-at-a-time experiments. But current research using such experiments, especially applied research, can resolve issues and make progress through understanding of cause–effect pathways, leaving to engineers the task of translating this understanding into practice.
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  28.  27
    Deduction as an example of thinking.Jonathan Baron - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):336-337.
  29.  43
    Normative and prescriptive implications of individual differences.Jonathan Baron - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):668-669.
    Stanovich & West (S&W) have two goals, one concerned with the evaluation of normative models, the other with development of prescriptive models. Individual differences have no bearing on normative models, which are justified by analysis, not consensus. Individual differences do, however, suggest where it is possible to try to improve human judgments and decisions through education rather than computers.
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  30. Uncertainty and Probability within Utilitarian Theory.Jonathan Baron - 2017 - Diametros 53:6-25.
    Probability is a central concept in utilitarian moral theory, almost impossible to do without. I attempt to clarify the role of probability, so that we can be clear about what we are aiming for when we apply utilitarian theory to real cases. I point out the close relationship between utilitarianism and expected-utility theory, a normative standard for individual decision-making. I then argue that the distinction between “ambiguity” and risk is a matter of perception. We do not need this distinction in (...)
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  31.  7
    Against bioethics.Jonathan Baron - 2006 - MIT Press.
    Argues that applied bioethics should embrace utilitarian decision analysis, thus avoiding recommendations expected to do more harm than good. -/- Governments, health professionals, patients, research institutions, and research subjects look to bioethicists for guidance in making important decisions about medical treatment and research. And yet, argues Jonathan Baron in Against Bioethics, applied bioethics lacks the authority of a coherent guiding theory and is based largely on intuitive judgments. Baron proposes an alternative, arguing that bioethics could have a coherent theory based (...)
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  32. Are moral judgments rational?Jonathan Baron - 2021 - In Bertram F. Malle & Philip Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.
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  33.  34
    A theory of social decisions.Jonathan Baron - 1995 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 25 (2):103–114.
  34.  22
    Biting the utilitarian bullet.Jonathan Baron - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):545-546.
    The heuristics-and-biases approach requires a clear separation of normative and descriptive models. Normative models cannot be justified by intuition, or by consensus. The lack of consensus on normative theory is a problem for prescriptive approaches. One solution to the prescriptive problem is to argue contingently: if you are concerned about consequences, here is a way to make them better.
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  35.  21
    Criteria and explanations.Jonathan Baron - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (2):287-288.
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  36. Decision-making and the threat of global warming.Jonathan Baron & Jay Schulkin - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.
     
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  37.  7
    Individual differences and multi-step thinking.Jonathan Baron - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e114.
    Deliberative thinking often consists of several steps, each involving a switch decision. These decisions may be influenced by confidence in the thinking done so far. Individuals may differ in their tolerance of low confidence and thus may arrive at unjustified high confidence too soon, either from trusting their intuition or by bolstering an initially favored conclusion.
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  38.  39
    Kuhn`s The Skills of Argument.Jonathan Baron - 1992 - Informal Logic 14 (1).
  39.  8
    No Title available: Reviews.Jonathan Baron - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (1):151-157.
  40.  41
    Optimality as an evaluative standard in the study of decision-making.Jonathan Baron - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (2):216-216.
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  41.  21
    Purposes and methods.Jonathan Baron - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):403-403.
    The methods of experiments in the social sciences should depend on their purposes. To support this claim, I attempt to state some general principles relating method to purpose for three of the issues addressed. (I do not understand what is not a script, so I will omit that issue.) I illustrate my outline with examples from psychological research on judgment and decision making (JDM).
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  42.  19
    Reliability and g.Jonathan Baron - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (2):220-221.
  43.  21
    Rationality and illusion.Jonathan Baron - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):252-253.
    Commitment to a pattern of altruism or self-control may indeed be learnable and sometimes rational. Commitment may also result from illusions. In one illusion, people think that their present behavior causes their future behavior, or causes the behavior of others, when really only correlation is present. Another happy illusion is that morality and self-interest coincide, so that altruism appears self-interested.
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  44.  8
    Rationality and intelligence.Jonathan Baron - 1985 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    What is intelligence? Can it be increased by teaching? If so, how, and what difference would an increase make? Before we can answer these questions, we need to clarify them. Jonathan Baron argues that when we do so we find that intelligence has much to do with rational thinking, and that the skills involved in rational thinking are in fact teachable, at least to some extent. Rationality and Intelligence develops and justifies a prescriptive theory of rational thinking in terms of (...)
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  45.  28
    Response to Open Peer Commentaries on “A Decisional Analysis of Consent”.Jonathan Baron - 2006 - American Journal of Bioethics 6 (3):W51-W53.
    Many of the comments on my article reiterate standard criticisms of utilitarianism, which have been answered, and the answers continue to be ignored. For example: interpersonal comparison has been...
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  46.  22
    Stimuli and subjects in one-tailed tests.Jonathan Baron - 1975 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 6 (6):608-610.
  47.  6
    Semantic components and conceptual development.Jonathan Baron - 1973 - Cognition 2 (3):299-317.
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  48.  30
    Situated cognition, prescriptive theory, evolution, and something.Jonathan Baron - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (2):324-326.
    This response agrees with Stanovich's emphasis on the need for decentering, and, in response to Beyth-Marom, attempts to clarify the normative-prescriptive-descriptive distinction and point in the direction of prescriptive models. It takes issue with Cabanac and with Lindsay & Gorayska.
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  49.  17
    Some thinking is irrational.Jonathan Baron - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):486-487.
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  50. Thinking and deciding (5th edition).Jonathan Baron - forthcoming - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    The fifth edition of the classic text Thinking and Deciding updates the broad overview of the field of judgments and decisions offered in previous editions. It covers the normative standards used to evaluate conclusions, such as logic, probability, and various forms of utility theory. It explains descriptive accounts of departures from these standards, largely in terms of principles of cognitive psychology, emphasizing the distinction between search processes and inferences. Chapters cover decisions under risk, decision analysis, moral decisions and social dilemmas, (...)
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