In a response to my recent article in this journal, Shahram Shahryari argues that I fail to present a third position between absolutism and relativism. He makes two points: first, that fallibilism is insufficient as an alternative, because it is compatible with both relativism and absolutism. The second point is that my argument that experience can lead to objective judgment without being a new absolute fails. I discuss these in turn, showing that both critiques fail and that pragmatism is (...) a genuine alternative between absolutism and relativism. (shrink)

This book highlights the philosophical and creative basis of knowledge co-production by all citizens regardless of socio-economic background in contrast with neoliberal ideology. Exploring beginning, transitional and theorised practices, the book is a memoir of the author's extensive personal and educational experience. Each topic is discussed in relation to a number of pragmatist themes that run throughout to illustrate how the process of dialectical emergence underpins and substantiates meaningful human living. Building on the work of American Pragmatism, this is (...) a systematic and detailed reintroduction of pragmatism to educators worldwide for progressive educational change. (shrink)

This paper gives a critical evaluation of the philosophical presuppositions and implications of two current schools in the sociology of knowledge: the Strong Programme of Bloor and Barnes; and the Constructivism of Latour and Knorr-Cetina. Bloor's arguments for his externalist symmetry thesis (i.e., scientific beliefs must always be explained by social factors) are found to be incoherent or inconclusive. At best, they suggest a Weak Programme of the sociology of science: when theoretical preferences in a scientific community, SC, are (...) first internally explained by appealing to the evidence, e, and the standards or values, V, accepted in SC, then a sociologist may sometimes step in to explain why e and V were accepted in SC. Latour's story about the social construction of facts in scientific laboratories is found to be misleading or incredible. The idea that scientific reality is an artifact turns out to have some interesting affinities with classical pragmatism, instrumentalism, phenomenology, and internal realism. However, the constructivist account of theoretical entities in terms of negotiation and social consensus is less plausible than the alternative realist story which explains consensus by the preexistence of mind-independent real entities. The author concludes that critical scientific realism, developed with the concept of truthlikeness, is compatible with the thesis that scientific beliefs or knowledge claims may be relative to various types of cognitive and practical interests. However, the realist denies, with good reasons, the stronger type of relativism which takes reality and truth to be relative to persons, groups, or social interests. (shrink)

Constructivist analyses of risk regulation are typically agnostic about what should count as robust or reliable knowledge. Indeed, constructivists usually portray competing accounts of risk as if they were always equally contingent or engaged with different and incommensurable issues and problem definitions. This article argues that assumptions about the equal reliability of competing accounts of risk deserve to be, and sometimes can be, examined empirically. A constructivist approach grounded in epistemological realism is outlined and applied empirically to a particular comparative (...) U.S./u.k. case study of pesticide regulation. The article argues that while the scope for interpretative flexibility when addressing risk issues is clearly extensive, it is not unconstrained. By scrutinizing the structure and coherence of particular risk assessments and policy decisions by reference to both empirical evidence and commonly held robust standards of interpretation, the article argues that the U.K. evaluation was not only less precautionary than its U.S. equivalent, but it was also less well constructed and therefore less reliable. Several social and institutional characteristics of U.S. and U.K. policy making are highlighted that appear variously to facilitate or inhibit the production of reliable knowledge and the making of prudent policy decisions. (shrink)

Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by Tor Egil Førland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on the pragmatist idea of epistemic interests. Second, we show that there are three quite different senses in which one can be an explanatory pluralist: one can be a pluralist about questions, a pluralist about answers to questions, and a pluralist about both. We defend (...) the last position. Finally, our third aim is to argue that pluralism should not be equated with “anything goes”: we will argue for non-relativistic explanatory pluralism. This pluralism will be illustrated by examples from history and social science in which different forms of explanation (for example, structural, functional, and intentional explanations) are discussed, and the fruitfulness of our framework for understanding explanatory pluralism is shown. (shrink)

This paper addresses, and seeks to correct, some frequent misunderstandings concerning the claim that science is socially constructed. It describes several features of scientific inquiry that have been usefully illuminated by constructivist studies of science, including the mundane or tacit skills involved in research, the social relationships in scientific laboratories, the causes of scientific controversy, and the interconnection of science and culture. Social construction, the paper argues, should be seen not as an alternative to but an enhancement of (...) scientists’ own professional understanding of how science is done. The richer, more finely textured accounts of scientific practice that the constructivist approach provides are potentially of great relevance to public policy. (shrink)

forthcoming in Philosophy Compass [penultimate draft .pdf file] A survey of the contemporary social constructionist landscape.

The starting point of the following inquiry addresses John Searle’s and Ian Hacking’s most prominent critique of contemporary “constructionism” in the 1990s. It is stimulated by the astonishing fact that neither Hacking nor Searle take into account Peter Berger’s and Thomas Luckmann’s classical essay and sociological masterpiece The Social Construction of Reality in their contributions. Critically revisiting Searle’s and Hacking’s critique on the so-called constructivist approach, the article demonstrates that both authors have failed to put forth a sociologically valid (...) understanding of the approach in question. The following analysis aims to deconstruct the conceptualizations offered by Searle and Hacking, and to reconstruct and defend the original sense of the term “social construction” as most prominently introduced by Berger and Luckmann to sociology, and social sciences in general. (shrink)

In addition to providing a rebuttal of the “paper-doubts” of the would-be skeptic, pragmatists have also been quite responsive to the social dimensions of doubt. This is true concerning the causes of doubt. This is true also regarding its consequences: doubt has consequences on epistemic trust; on the way we discuss truths, either about the sciences or about the “construction of good”. Readers of Dewey’s The Quest for Certainty and of some of his most important political writings can easily (...) see how practical uncertainty can degenerate into practical and political skepticism, preventing the emergence of the public. This social aspect of the question has received less attention, perhaps, than the general pragmatist stance towards skepticism, and the present symposium offers a rst round of insights into this aspect of the question: the papers retrieved below all cast light on important aspects of the debate on justi cation, on scienti c dogmatism, on irony and skepticism, on doubt and legal theory, on skepticism and political anarchism. (shrink)

According to a standard criticism, Robert Brandom's “normative pragmatics”, i.e. his attempt to explain normative statuses in terms of practical attitudes, faces a dilemma. If practical attitudes and their interactions are specified in purely non-normative terms, then they underdetermine normative statuses; but if normative terms are allowed into the account, then the account becomes viciously circular. This paper argues that there is no dilemma, because the feared circularity is not vicious. While normative claims do exhibit their respective authors' practical attitudes (...) and thereby contribute towards establishing the normative statuses they are about, this circularity is not a mark of Brandom's explanatory strategy but a feature of social practice of which we theorists partake. (shrink)

The thesis of this work is that in both modern Japanese philosophy and American pragmatism there has been a paradigm shift from a monological concept of self as an isolated "I" to a dialogical concept of the social self as an "I-Thou relation," including a communication model of self as individual-society interaction. It is also shown for both traditions all aesthetic, moral, and religious values are a function of the social self arising through communicative interaction between the (...) individual and society. However, at the same time this work critically examines major ideological conflicts arising between the social self theories of modern Japanese philosophy and American pragmatism with respect to such problems as individualism versus collectivism, freedom versus determinism, liberalism versus communitarianism, and relativism versus objectivism. (shrink)

This article introduces and critically analyses Richard Rorty’s neo-pragmatism as a contribution to the philosophy of social sciences. Although Rorty has written little about philosophy of social sciences as such, it is argued that his overall philosophical position has significant ramifications for this subject area. The first part of the article sets out the implications of Rorty’s neo-pragmatism for various issues in the philosophy of social sciences, for instance, the doctrine of naturalism, the nineteenth-century Methodenstreit, (...) the philosophical tenets of Marxism, and the relatively recent wave of post-structuralism. The second part presents a constructive critique of Rorty’s neopragmatist philosophy of social sciences. Although critical of some aspects of Rorty’s argument, it is argued that his stance could provide a base for a fruitful view of social sciences, aiming at enlarging human potentialities rather than representation. (shrink)

How might the social sciences best be employed in the study of law, especially in light of today's legal climate of anti-foundationalism? Realistic Socio-Legal Theory addresses this question thoroughly and precisely. Drawing upon philosophical pragmatism to construct an epistemological and methodological foundation, this book formulates a framework for a realistic approach to socio-legal theory. Brian Z. Tamanaha contrasts the strengths of his realistic approach with those of the major schools of socio-legal theory through application to many key issues (...) in the field. He explores the problematic state of socio-legal studies, the relationship between behavior and meaning, the notion of legal ideology, the nature of the concept of law, the problem of indeterminacy in rule following and application, and the structure of judicial decision making. Tamanaha's discussion is always clear and concise as he articulates a social theory of law that draws equally from legal theory and socio-legal studies. His book has much to offer those interested in the gathering and organization of knowledge about law and legal phenomena. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss critical realists’ and contemporary sociological pragmatists’ approaches to conceptualizing social mechanisms, which, on my reading, each involve some ambiguities or confusions. I sketch some corrections and clarifications that bring into view ways pragmatism and critical realism might inform each other in a constructive fashion on the question of what social mechanisms are. Finally, I suggest a concept of social mechanisms that is compatible with both critical realist and pragmatist insights, as a (...) starting point from which to launch further conversation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 22 (2002) 244-248 [Access article in PDF] Book Review The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism. By Steve Odin. SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought. Albany: SUNY, 1996. xvi + 482 pp. Better late than never! As one of the few volumes—only two to date, actually—in the SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought to (...) address a perennial philosophical problem by drawing seriously upon both the Eastern (Zen Buddhism) and Western (American pragmatism) philosophical traditions, this book should have been reviewed in the pages of this journal a long time ago. Odin's thesis is that both traditions evidence a paradigm shift during the twentieth century from a monological and subjectivistic concept of an individualized self toward a dialogical and intersubjective concept of social self. He explores this hypothesis in the three parts of the book devoted to the social self in modern Japanese philosophy, the social self in Mead and American pragmatism, and a comparative analysis.Part 1 consists of three chapters focused on the philosophical thought of Watsuji Tetsuro (1885-1962) and Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), and on the psychological investigations of Doi Takeo (dates not given, but whose primary works were published in the 1970s and 1980s). Watsuji's central idea is a Zen and Confucian ningenmodel of personhood whereby the self emerges in "the betweenness of person and person" as the individual (nin), understood primarily in temporal categories, and society (gen), understood primarily in the spatial categories of nature, community and family, mutually empty themselves into the other. (In a later chapter, Odin draws parallels between the yi-li—spontaneous, novel reaction-ritual action—dialectic of Confucianism and the I-me dialectic of George Herbert Mead.) This notion of self as ningen subsequently served, at least in part, the development of nihonjinron scholarship—"studies of Japanese identity"—as advanced by thinkers like Kimura Bin, Hamaguchi Eshun, and Kumon Shumpei. The goal has been to steer the middle way between individualistic (Western) and collectivistic (Confucian) conceptions of the self toward what Hamaguchi and Kumon call a contextualist (kanjin), and thereby truly Japanese, understanding.Odin's exposition of Nishida focuses on his idea of the true self—the perennial quest of the Zen tradition—as a "social self" (shakaiteki jiko) that emerges from the I-thou, self-other, and individual-environment dialectics that take "place" in the absolutely empty spatial "field" of basho.(Here, Odin suggests that rather than drawing from Martin Buber's philosophy, both Nishida and Buber drew common inspiration from Ludwig Feuerbach's Principles of the Philosophy of the Future [Grundsatze der Philosophie der Zukunft, 1843]). The true self is therefore the no-self in the locus of absolute Nothingness. As such, the true self is also the empty self. This leads Nishida to draw analogies in his last few essays between the Buddhist idea of sunyata, or "emptiness," with the Christian notion of kenosis, or "self-emptiness." In [End Page 244] keeping with the Zen insistence against reifying emptiness, however, the true self is that which overcomes nihilism but yet resists eternalism. Buddhist sunyatais now symbolized by the bodhisattva's self-negating vow of compassion for all sentient beings, even as Christian kenosis is symbolized by Christ's self-emptying love for the world. This leads to the true self conceptualized as the intersubjective self. Odin suggests that this insight of Nishida is latent in the Chan/Zen tradition as captured in the famous Ten Oxherding Pictures. He also briefly portrays how later Kyoto school thinkers like Ueda Shizuteru, Nishitani Keiji, Abe Masao, Tanabe Hajime, and MutoKazuo have extended Nishida's insights and contributed to the Buddhist-Christian dialogue.Meanwhile, Doi Takeo, a distinguished Japanese psychiatrist, has suggested that human intrapsychic drives are not limited to sexual and aggressive instincts as hypothesized by Freud. Rather, there is an amae or dependency drive that explains the human need for love, intimacy, warmth, protection, nurturing, and so forth. This other-reliance and relational aspect of the human being explains, at least from a psychoanalytical perspective, the... (shrink)

This article addresses the problem of inter-normative engagement, of constructing dialogical interaction across substantive normative difference. Focusing on how this affects democratic and pluralistic contexts, it argues that a social-practice-based approach to normativity and reasoning offers unique resources to understand and frame such encounters. It specifically draws on pragmatism and the work of Richard Rorty to reframe normativity, authority, identity, and reason, linking these understandings to recent trends to deliberative political inclusivism in democratic theory. The upshot is that (...) framing inter-normative engagement as calls to responsive engagement between diverse systems of normative authority offers real insights for constructing and maintaining ongoing democratic engagements in a non-hierarchical manner. This, the article argues, extends emerging methodological trends in the broader literature while overcoming the morass between conflict- and consensus-oriented approaches in democratic th... (shrink)

Henry S. Richardson is Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University. From 2008-18, he was the editor of Ethics. His previous books include Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, Democratic Autonomy, and Moral Entanglements. He has held fellowships sponsored by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University.

J’analyse dans quelle mesure la cohérence théorique et l’efficacité pratique des approches constructionnistes sociales, en particulier les approches descriptives ou amélioratives, sont affectées par le relativisme dans le contexte d’analyses concurrentes d’une construction, prétendue sociale, de X. Ma tâche dans cet article consiste à expliquer, organiser, et clarifier comment le relativisme appliqué à la question «Quel devrait être notre concept de X?» affecte les approches constructionnistes sociales — en particulier, les versions amélioratives. Cet article vise à clarifier, pour ceux qui (...) ne sont pas versés dans ce domaine, ce qui est en jeu dans ces approches et pourquoi elles ne doivent pas être facilement rejetées. (shrink)

The charged debate on the ‘C‐S‐R‐ization’ of organizational practices seems to have produced two opposing and seemingly incompatible explanations for why organizations should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR): one, the normative rationale based on an appeal to ethics; and the other, the instrumental rationale, based on an appeal to business pragmatism. This paper argues that a missing link in this debate is the failure to recognize that the normative and instrumental approaches to corporate social responsibility are (...) underpinned by substantively, differentiating, relative logics of emotional rationalism on the one hand, and instrumental rationalism on the other. The paper makes a case that for CSR as a management practice to be practicable and actionable within a sustainable business agenda, it will need to be stripped of its current normative undertone and reconstructed in the instrumentally, pragmatic (utlish) language of business. Otherwise, the whole concept of CSR may continue to dwell in the realm of abstract theorizing without yielding many beneficial and practicable outcomes. The paper concludes that such an approach that situates CSR within a pragmatic business lingua, rather than a non‐business lingua, will help in legitimizing CSR as a ‘neutral’ management practice. (shrink)

The charged debate on the ‘C‐S‐R‐ization’ of organizational practices seems to have produced two opposing and seemingly incompatible explanations for why organizations should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR): one, the normative rationale based on an appeal to ethics; and the other, the instrumental rationale, based on an appeal to business pragmatism. This paper argues that a missing link in this debate is the failure to recognize that the normative and instrumental approaches to corporate social responsibility are (...) underpinned by substantively, differentiating, relative logics of emotional rationalism on the one hand, and instrumental rationalism on the other. The paper makes a case that for CSR as a management practice to be practicable and actionable within a sustainable business agenda, it will need to be stripped of its current normative undertone and reconstructed in the instrumentally, pragmatic (utlish) language of business. Otherwise, the whole concept of CSR may continue to dwell in the realm of abstract theorizing without yielding many beneficial and practicable outcomes. The paper concludes that such an approach that situates CSR within a pragmatic business lingua, rather than a non‐business lingua, will help in legitimizing CSR as a ‘neutral’ management practice. (shrink)

Contemporary issues involving knowledge and science examined from a constructivist-pragmatist perspective often labeled "relativism." Individual chapters include a review of the difference between constructivist-pragmatist epistemology and "social constructivism;" an examination of recent writings by Bruno Latour; a critique of computational methods in literary studies; a skeptical look at current efforts to "integrate" the humanities and the natural sciences; and reflections on the social dynamics of belief in relation to denials of climate change and to hopes expressed by environmentalists.

Relativist and constructivist conceptions of knowledge have become orthodoxy in vast stretches of the academic world in recent times. This book critically examines such views and argues that they are fundamentally flawed. The book focuses on three different ways of reading the claim that knowledge is socially constructed, one about facts and two about justification. All three are rejected. The intuitive, common sense view is that there is a way things are that is independent of human opinion, and that we (...) are capable of arriving at belief about how things are that is objectively reasonable, and is binding on anyone capable of appreciating the relevant evidence, regardless of their social or cultural perspective. Difficult as these notions may be, it is a mistake to think that recent philosophy has uncovered powerful reasons for rejecting them. (shrink)

The following paper presents and discuses the epistemological premises of one of the relativistic expressions of the so-called constructivism i.e. the social constructionism. Firstly, we trace constructivism’s theoretical origins and later, we distinguish the main ideas of Kenneth Gergen’s social constructionist proposal. The analysis is done in the following way: (a) we analyse the epistemological premises and the philosophical problems arising from them, and (b) we analyse the problematic impact these premises have in the praxis of social (...) sciences. Finally, we conclude that the exclusion of clear philosophical distinctions inside social constructionism undermines social constructionism’s plausibility. El siguiente artículo presenta y discute los postulados epistemológicos de una de las expresiones relativistas del denominado constructivismo i.e. el construccionismo social. En primer momento, se rastrean los orígenes teóricos del constructivismo y, posteriormente, se distinguen los principales postulados del construccionismo social de Kenneth Gergen. El análisis se realiza del siguiente modo: (a) Se analizan los supuestos epistemológicos y los problemas filosóficos derivados de éstos, y (b) Se analizan las consecuencias que los postulados construccionistas tienen en la praxis que llevan a cabo las ciencias sociales. Finalmente, se concluye que la exclusión de distinciones filosóficas claras por parte del construccionismo social le resta plausibilidad al enfoque. (shrink)

This book offers a vigorous and constructive challenge to relativism by examining a wide range of anti-realist theories, and in response offering a variety of arguments amounting to a strong defence of critical realism in the natural and social sciences.

Relativism is a theory about how people organize their beliefs. We construct mental representations of the world—particular configurations of our internal brain stuff—to guide our actions. But our brains contain only a minuscule part of the world’s stuff. Given the limited brain stuff available, we can have detailed representations of some features of the world only if we simplify our representations of other parts. Our internal representational means are thus too meager to accurately represent reality in full. Which representations we (...) adopt will therefore depend upon our purposes: different purposes, different representations, different beliefs. Such a relativism does not deny the reality of the outside world, is not self-contradictory, and allows for progress, moral persuasion, and cross-cultural criticism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Postmodern Assumptions of Philosophy of PsychiatryThe author reports no conflicts of interest.This paper makes claims for relevance of philosophy to psychopathology, as inspired in part by the work of Karl Jaspers. Yet there is no such thing as philosophy, in a general sense; there are philosophies, or as Jaspers would prefer, there is philosophizing (Ehrlich & George, 1994; Jaspers, 1951). Jaspers' approach to philosophy was akin to Freud's approach (...) to psychology: the goal was to make unconscious assumptions conscious. The unconscious assumption in the present paper is that there is such a thing as philosophy, which could then be useful for psychopathology. In effect, the author is probably meaning academic philosophy, or mainstream thinking in current philosophy of psychiatry. If that is the meaning, then Jaspers' question would be: What are the unconscious underlying assumptions of modern academic philosophy of psychiatry? The author's paper does not ask that question. But if we do, my answer would be that current mainstream philosophy of psychiatry has a basic worldview, another concept very central to Jaspers' thinking (Rindermann, 2021). Its worldview is postmodernist relativism about truth and skepticism about science, especially biology as applied to psychiatry. This unconscious assumption in modern philosophy of psychiatry is a major impediment in any benefits it might provide to psychiatry and psychopathology, as will be explained in the rest of this commentary.The paper refers to major depressive disorder (MDD) without appreciating that the term itself makes assumptions which the paper wishes to argue should be in the province of philosophy to analyze. The term MDD is not the same as depression, although the paper synonymizes the two. This synonym is an unanalyzed assumption, namely, that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) diagnostic system validly defines psychopathology. It clearly does not, for reasons that modern philosophy of psychiatry has not accurately analyzed (Ghaemi, 2014).About a decade ago, when DSM-5 was being developed, colleagues in the field of philosophy of psychiatry had worked for decades on psychiatric diagnosis, and there was initial hope that the time had come for an impact (Kendler et al., 2008). The leader of the prior edition of DSM was unhappy [End Page 17] with the fifth revision. A set of essays were published where philosophers and psychiatrists engaged the former DSM leader about psychiatric diagnosis (Frances, 2013). His response, with a somewhat derisive reference to "philosophyland," was eye opening to me. He explicitly stated that DSM revisions were not based on science or facts, but on "pragmatism," on the beliefs of DSM leaders about what was best for the profession or society. In short, it was admitted that DSM was a social construction, just as postmodern thinking had said about psychiatric diagnosis since Foucault. Yet this admission was made unconsciously; DSM leadership does not use that phrase, nor does it understand its conceptual foundations. Surprisingly to me, colleagues in the world of philosophy and psychiatry also failed to make the obvious connection, or if they did, they seemed to have little problem with it (Phillips et al., 2012). Social constructionism was their worldview too.In effect, philosophy of psychiatry had nothing to provide; it did not analyze or critique the philosophical worldview of DSM leadership; it shared that worldview and participated in it (Kendler, 2013).The result, in my view, is that mainstream philosophy of psychiatry has failed in the role which it could have played, the role of making the unconscious postmodern assumptions of psychiatry conscious, and criticizing those assumptions. Instead, it applauded them.My broader critique of mainstream philosophy of psychiatry gets played out in papers such as this one in relation to the DSM term MDD, which should be dropped because it is not a scientifically sound term; it has many conceptual and scientific falsehoods within it, which both a philosophical analysis and a scientific analysis would demonstrate.The term MDD was invented in the DSM-III process in the late 1970s to get votes for passage of that third revision by the American Psychiatric Association in 1980 (Decker, 2013). It literally was a social construction. To the extent that it had any scientific basis, it had its roots in the... (shrink)

The anti-sceptical relativism and self-conscious rhetoric of the pragmatist tradition, which began with the Older Sophists of Ancient Greece and developed through an American tradition including William James and John Dewey has attracted new attention in the context of late twentieth-century postmodernist thought. At the same time there has been a more general renewal of interest across a wide range of humanistic and social science disciplines in rhetoric itself: language use, writing and speaking, persuasion, figurative language, and the effect (...) of texts. This book, written by leading scholars, explores the various ways in which rhetoric, sophistry and pragmatism overlap in their current theoretical and political implications, and demonstrates how they contribute both to a rethinking of the human sciences within the academy and to larger debates over cultural politics. (shrink)

During the last decade of his life, Rorty emphasized the anti-authoritarian credentials of his pragmatism. He came to see pragmatism as the fighting faith of a second phase of the Enlightenment. The first stage, as Rorty construed it, concerns our emancipation from nonhuman authority in practical matters: issues of what we ought to do and how things ought to be. The envisaged second stage addresses rather our emancipation from nonhuman authority in theoretical matters. Pragmatism moves beyond the (...) traditional model of reality as authoritative over our cognitive representations of it in language and thought to a new conception of how discursive practices help us cope with the vicissitudes of life. Hegel anticipates the challenge to the very idea of objective reality as providing norms for thought that Rorty thought required us to enact a second phase of the Enlightenment. Unlike Rorty, Hegel presents a detailed, constructive, anti-authoritarian, nonfetishistic, social pragmatist account of the representational dimension of conceptual content. At its heart is an account of the social dimension of discursive normativity in terms of reciprocal recognition, and an account of the historical dimension of discursive normativity in terms of a distinctive new conception of reason: the recollective rationality that turns a past into a tradition. His idealism thereby offers a concrete pragmatist alternative to Rorty’s global semantic and epistemological anti-representationalism. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction The Tacit ‐ Agreement Approach to Morality as Social Construction Speaker Relativism What it Might Mean for Morality to be Constructed as Part of Human Culture Explaining Moral Commonalities and Differences Across Cultures Relativism and the Meaning of Moral Terms Explaining Intra ‐ Group Disagreement Why Fundamental Intragroup Disagreement Might Be Inevitable References.

Pragmatism is experiencing a powerful revival. But the new pragmatism has not yet expressed itself in a new aesthetic, and not since Dewey's Art as Experience has there been a comprehensive pragmatist treatment of this field. Shusterman's bold and lively book fills the gap by proposing a pragmatist aesthetics for our current postmodern condition. Pragmatist Aesthetics treats the traditionally central topics of aesthetics: the definition of art, aesthetic experience and value, form and unity, interpretation, and the cognitive and (...) moral worth of art. But it also directs philosophical aesthetics towards a much wider and more socially pertinent agenda by considering such contemporary issues as the institutionalization and cultural oppression of art, the aesthetic legitimacy of popular culture, and the ethical art of living beauty through the stylization of conduct and the aesthetic construction of the self. Gracefully but vigorously argued, Pragmatist Aesthetics is an important book which breaks new ground and liberates new areas and directions for philosophical inquiry. Its wide-ranging breadth and accessible style will appeal to all readers with an interest in contemporary philosophy, aesthetics and cultural studies. (shrink)

"The political and academic worlds are fractured by two competing discourses: the universalism of human rights and cultural relativism. This fracture is represented by the deep separation of cultural analysis and theories of international politics. Derek Robbins in a brilliant interrogation of European thinkers from Montesquieu to Pierre Bourdieu seeks to replace cultural relativism with cultural relationism as a step towards reconciling Enlightenment universalism and anthropological insistence on cultural difference. Inter alia he reflects on the tensions between political and (...) class='Hi'>social science and takes up the challenge from Raymond Aron to construct a sociology of international relations. A dazzling achievement." - Bryan S. Turner, The Graduate Center, CUNY Through historical studies of some of the work of Montesquieu, Comte, Durkheim, Boas, Morgenthau, Aron and Bourdieu, Derek Robbins examines the changing and competing conceptualisations of the political and the social in the Western European intellectual tradition. He suggests that we are now experiencing a new ‘dissociation of sensibility’ in which political thought and its consequences in action have become divorced from social and cultural experience. Developing further the ideas of Bourdieu which he has presented in books and articles over the last twenty years, Robbins argues that we need to integrate the recognition of cultural difference with the practice of international politics by accepting that the ‘field’ of international political discourse is a social construct which is contingent on encounters between diverse cultures. ‘Everything is relative’ (Comte) and ‘everything is social’ (Bourdieu), not least international politics. (shrink)

Relativism in psychology unravels the truth-claims and oppressive\npractices of the discipline, but simply relativizing psychological knowledge\nhas not been sufficient to comprehend and combat the discipline\nas part of the ‘psy-complex’. For that, a balanced review of the contribution\nand problems of relativism needs to work dialectically, and so\nthis article reviews four problematic rhetorical balancing strategies in\nrelativism before turning to the contribution of critical realism. Critical\nrealism exposes positivist psychology’s pretensions to model itself\non what it imagines the natural sciences to be, and it grounds (...) discursive\naccounts of mentation in social practices. The problem is that those\nsympathetic to mainstream psychology are also appealing to ‘realism’\nto warrant it as a science and to discredit critical research that situates\npsychological phenomena. Our use of critical realism calls for an\naccount of how psychological facts are socially constructed within\npresent social arrangements and for an analysis of the underlying historical\nconditions that gave rise to the ‘psy-complex’. Only by understanding\nhow the discipline of psychology reproduces notions of\nindividuality and human nature, a critical realist endeavour, will it be\npossible to transform it, and to socially construct it as something different. (shrink)

Chapter 2 primarily discusses Bernstein’s account and its differences both from Nagle’s metaphysical realism and Rorty’s postmodern pragmatism. Trying to diagnose assumptions that polarize thinkers to become objectivists and relativists, Bernstein articulates a Cartesian Anxiety he thinks they ironically both share. Descartes’ anti-skeptical wave of rigor was presented as a rationalistic project of rebuilding an unstable and dilapidated ‘house of knowledge’ on secure philosophical and scientific foundations. His overtly foundationalist metaphor of rebuilding from timbers set “in rock or hard (...) clay” shapes Descartes’ attempt to refute the skeptic and to secure the objectivity of knowledge as pursued by a more rigorous and analytical method of knowing. (shrink)

Jesse Prinz argues that recent work in philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology supports two radical hypotheses about the nature of morality: moral values are based on emotional responses, and these emotional responses are inculcated by culture, not hard-wired through natural selection. In the first half of the book, Jesse Prinz defends the hypothesis that morality has an emotional foundation. Evidence from brain imaging, social psychology, and psychopathology suggest that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we are merely (...) expressing our emotions. Prinz argues that these emotions do not track objective features of reality; rather, the rightness and wrongness of an act consists in the fact that people are disposed to have certain emotions towards it. In the second half of the book, he turns to a defense of moral relativism. Moral facts depend on emotional responses, and emotional responses vary from culture to culture. Prinz surveys the anthropological record to establish moral variation, and he draws on cultural history to show how attitudes toward practices such as cannibalism and marriage change over time. He also criticizes evidence from animal behavior and child development that has been taken to support the claim that moral attitudes are hard-wired by natural selection. Prinz concludes that there is no single true morality, but he also argues that some moral values are better than others; moral progress is possible. Throughout the book, Prinz relates his views to contemporary and historical work in philosophical ethics. His views echo themes in the writings of David Hume and Friedrich Nietzsche, but Prinz supports, extends, and revises these classic theories using the resources of cutting-edge cognitive science. The Emotional Construction of Morals will stimulate and challenge anyone who is curious about the nature and origin of moral values. (shrink)

Moral relativism comes in many varieties. One is a moral doctrine, according to which we ought to respect other cultures, and allow them to solve moral problems as they see fit. I will say nothing about this kind of moral relativism in the present context. Another kind of moral relativism is semantic moral relativism, according to which, when we pass moral judgements, we make an implicit reference to some system of morality (our own). According to this kind of moral relativism, (...) when I say that a certain action is right, my statement is elliptic. What I am really saying is that, according to the system of morality in my culture, this action is right. I will reject this kind of relativism. According to yet another kind of moral relativism, which we may call epistemic, it is possible that, when one person (belonging to one culture) makes a certain moral judgement, such as that this action is right, and another person (belong to another culture) makes the judgement that the very same action is wrong, they may have just as good reasons for their respective judgements; it is even possible that, were they fully informed about all the facts, equally imaginative, and so forth, they would still hold on to their respective (conflicting) judgements. They are each fully justified in their belief in conflicting judgements. I will comment on this form of moral relativism in passing. Finally, however, there is a kind of moral relativism we could call ontological, according to which, when two persons pass conflicting moral verdicts on a certain action, they may both be right. The explanation is that they make their judgements from the perspective of different, socially constructed, moral universes. So while it is true in the first person's moral universe that a certain action is right, it is true in the second person's moral universe that the very same action is wrong. I explain and defend this version of ontological moral relativism. (shrink)

We aim to show how collective emotions can be incorporated into the study of episodes of political contention. In a critical vein, we systematically explore the weaknesses in extant models of collective action, showing what has been lost through a neglect or faulty conceptualization of collective emotional configurations. We structure this discussion in terms of a review of several “pernicious postulates” in the literature, assumptions that have been held, we argue, by classical social-movement theorists and by social-structural and (...) cultural critics alike. In a reconstructive vein, however, we also lay out the foundations of a more satisfactory theoretical framework. We take each succeeding critique of a pernicious postulate as the occasion for more positive theory-building. Drawing upon the work of the classical American pragmatists–especially Peirce, Dewey, and Mead–as well as aspects of Bourdieu's sociology, we construct, step by step, the foundations of a more adequate theorization of social movements and collective action. Accordingly, the negative and positive threads of our discussion are woven closely together: the dismantling of pernicious postulates and the development of a more useful analytical strategy. (shrink)

I defend cultural relativism against the following objections: The analogy between motion and morality is flawed. Cultural relativism has greater potential to be harmful to our daily lives than is cultural absolutism. We made moral progress when we moved from slavery to equality. There are some moral principles that are accepted by all cultures around the world. Moral argumentation is impossible within the framework of cultural relativism. We construct arguments for and against cultures.

A work which addresses the question: What constructive role can pragmatism play, either in structuring public debate or in dealing with life?. The contributors examine what pragmatism can offer in the way of a positive social programme in the field of law and political science.

The concept of "practices"--whether of representation, of political or scientific traditions, or of organizational culture--is central to social theory. In this book, Stephen Turner presents the first analysis and critique of the idea of practice as it has developed in the various theoretical traditions of the social sciences and the humanities. Understood broadly as a tacit understanding "shared" by a group, the concept of a practice has a fatal difficulty, Turner argues: there is no plausible mechanism by which (...) a "practice" is transmitted or reproduced. The historical uses of the concept, from Durkheim to Kripke's version of Wittgenstein, provide examples of the contortions that thinkers have been forced into by this problem, and show the ultimate implausibility of the idea. Turner's conclusion sketches a picture of what happens when we do without the notion of a shared practice, and how this bears on social theory and philosophy. It explains why social theory cannot get beyond the stage of constructing fuzzy analogies, and why the standard constructions of the contemporary philosophical problem of relativism depend upon this defective notion. This first book-length critique of practice theory is sure to stir discussion and controversy in a wide range of fields, from philosophy and science studies to sociology, anthropology, literary studies, and political and legal theory. (shrink)

Following his successful Who's Afraid of Postmodernism? leading Christian philosopher James K. A. Smith introduces the philosophical sources behind postliberal theology. Offering a provocative analysis of relativism, Smith provides an introduction to the key voices of pragmatism: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom. Many Christians view relativism as the antithesis of absolute truth and take it to be the antithesis of the gospel. Smith argues that this reaction is a symptom of a deeper theological problem: an inability to (...) honor the contingency and dependence of our creaturehood. Appreciating our created finitude as the condition under which we know (and were made to know) should compel us to appreciate the contingency of our knowledge without sliding into arbitrariness. Saying "It depends" is not the equivalent of saying "It's not true" or "I don't know." It is simply to recognize the conditions of our knowledge as finite, created, social beings. Pragmatism, says Smith, helps us recover a fundamental Christian appreciation of the contingency of creaturehood. This addition to an acclaimed series engages key thinkers in modern philosophy with a view to ministry and addresses the challenge of relativism in a creative, original way. (shrink)

Environmental pragmatists such as Bryan Norton and Ben Minteer argue that environmental philosophers should look to the values of real people and communities to determine which environmental policies and legislation should be put into place. But they want to avoid a kind of simplistic relativism, since that view entails all sorts of reprehensible conclusions about what is right and wrong and what is valuable, both generally and with respect to the environment. Their solution is to distinguish between the community’s surface (...) or apparent values and its true values—the community’s true values serve as the basis for the moral appraisal and justification of policies and legislation, and they believe that these will neither endorse nor justify reprehensible principles or policies. The community’s true values, according to Norton, are those that survive a critical, deliberative process. However, there is no reason to think that the process described by Norton will yield normatively better values—values that do not have reprehensible implications. Even if the process described by Norton were to have this effect, he cannot consistently appeal to it, since it runs counter to his overall account of value as being nothing more than actual instances of real people caring about and valuing something. If value is a function of what people actually value here and now, then what people would value under conditions that are unlikely to occur is irrelevant to what is valuable and what can count as the true values of a community. Thus, Norton’s view, and environmental pragmatism, at least to the extent that Norton’s account is representative of that view, remains susceptible to the reprehensible implications problem. (shrink)

Much has been done to establish a body of scholarly work on women pragmatists since Mary Jo Deegan and Charlene Haddock Seigfried first stressed the importance of the contribution of Jane Addams, Florence Kelley, Anna Julia Cooper, Charlotte Perkins Gilman and others to the foundations of the pragmatist tradition of thought. Nevertheless, it took decades to fully correct the gender and race bias of the genealogies: that is, to overcome the temptation of reducing pragmatism to the writings of a (...) few white male professional philosophers living in the areas of Boston or Chicago a century ago. The reconstruction of pragmatism might also require a rethinking of the philosophical canon itself, the ways in... (shrink)

This book contributes to the contemporary revival of pragmatism as a practical and ultimately, as Mayer argues, necessary philosophical stance within democratic schools. Given that pragmatism addresses the question of how people can move forward in the absence of transcendent Truth, the author shows how pragmatism also-and not incidentally-provides grounds for pluralistic democratic societies to move forward in the absence of shared belief systems. Weaving together philosophical analysis and classroom discourse research, Mayer explores the relationships among (...) class='Hi'>pragmatism, progressive educational theory, and democratic knowledge construction processes and their implications for enacting progressive educational practices in schools. Several original, research-based heuristics that can serve in reliably identifying, studying, and orchestrating distinctively democratic knowledge construction processes are presented. The importance of granting all students a share of interpretive authority is also emphasized. For in learning to observe and reflect on one's own terms, attend closely to the observations and interpretations of one's peers, and reason collaboratively in a transparent and principled manner, young people are enculturated into essential democratic values, commitments, and practices. This book is written for a general audience and is intended for all those concerned with strengthening the democratic character of schools and societies. It is likely to appeal to scholars, researchers, and practitioners with interests in philosophy and classroom discourse and curriculum studies, as well as philosophers of education and the social sciences more broadly. (shrink)

Le pluralisme qui caractérise le pragmatisme doit être distingué du relativisme avec lequel on a l’habitude de le confondre. Le pragmatisme substitue à l’idée d’une rationalité fixe et close celle d’une rationalité ouverte qui renvoie dos à dos relativisme et anti-relativisme, et qui échappe au scepticisme moral en se refusant à admettre que l’absence de justification ou de fondement équivaut à l’arbitraire des choix. L’espoir social en est la pierre de touche. La variété des langages et des valeurs n’entraîne (...) pas leur incommensurabilité. (shrink)

I. Introduction In 1966 two sociologists, Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, published a small yet influential book, titled The Social Construction of Reality, in which they argue that reality is socially constructed and that it is the task of the sociology of knowledge to analyze the process in which this occurs (1966: 1). They acknowledge in their Introduction that “reality” and “knowledge” are two terms with a long philosophical history, and they are careful to claim they are not (...) using t... (shrink)

Abstract: For most people, mobile phones and various forms of personal information technology (PIT) have become standard equipment for everyday life. Recent theorists such as Sherry Turkle raise psychological and philosophical questions about the impact of such technologies and practices, but deeper further philosophical work is needed. This paper takes a pragmatic approach to examining the effects of PIT practices upon experience. After reviewing several main issues with technology raised by Communication theorists, the paper looks more deeply at Turkle’s analysis (...) of technology's impacts upon solitude and conversation. Because Turkle only raises but doesn’t pursue the philosophical dimensions of these issues, the work on experience of John Dewey, William James, and John J. McDermott is utilized to provide concepts and methods by which PIT’s effects might be judged. Finally, pragmatist aesthetics is introduced and consulted as a source of constructive ideals which might guide future amelioration of PIT’s more significant drawbacks. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethnophilosophy, Comparative Philosophy, Pragmatism:Toward a Philosophy of EthnoscapesThorsten Botz-Bornstein, Associate ResearcherIn this essay I would like to reflect on the place of philosophy within a "globalized" world and reconsider its status as a phenomenon that is potentially linked to a "local" culture. Whenever we question the authority of "general" truths and we look for ways of integrating "local discourses" into the overall construction called "global philosophy," we come (...) across the old idea of "ethnophilosophy." Far from suggesting ethnophilosophy as a model for the philosophy of the future, I intend to rethink certain themes of ethnophilosophy and contrast them with disciplines such as "comparative philosophy" and pragmatism. I will sketch an approach that I believe to be appropriate for the development of philosophy in times of globalization.One of the negative undertones of the term "globalization" is that it is seen as a uniformizing and flattening power that eliminates existing cultural differences. On the other hand, there is an important side effect of globalization represented by those movements acting against it, stressing the importance of "localization" or "regionalization." Ethnophilosophy, in spite of its outdated origin and its potential dangers, remains interesting as an intellectual model as long as it is not formulated in a radical fashion. When it is formulated in a radical fashion it has to face the reproach of relativism and of enclosing itself in a cultural sphere that it declares to be inaccessible to others.Ethnophilosophy: A Renaissance?Ethnophilosophy was developed in Africa in the 1960s, although its origin can be traced back to a book on Bantu philosophy by the Belgian missionary Placide Tempels. In this book, published in 1946, Tempels tried to conclude with the view that primitive peoples have neither ontology nor logic and are unable to recognize the nature of being or even of reality as such. Tempels was looking for an ontology colored by "local" cultural components but also by language,1 and he made a serious attempt to build a philosophical system based on Bantu thought.What followed were endless controversies about the nature of African philosophy that made of "ethnophilosophy" a stream of thought much richer than its name might allow one to suppose. A part of its stimulating power can perhaps be traced to the ambiguity of Tempels' approach: on the one hand it could easily be dismissed as paternalism or the attempt to force African philosophy into the straightjacket of European concepts, while on the other hand the expressed desire to give "ethnic" [End Page 153] philosophy a new role within the international hierarchy of the philosophies was immensely attractive. Be that as it may, Tempels' book became the real manifest of "ethnophilosophy."Another point at issue that spurned internal ethnophilosophical discussions was the question whether African philosophy is advanced by an entire people (that is, by a collective) or by individual philosophers. This question (which does not arise in Tempels' book) was first taken up by the Beninese philosopher Paulin Hountondji,2 who claimed that ethnophilosophy is no philosophy at all because it remains indifferent toward individually critical, that is, typically philosophical, approaches. Related debates touch upon fundamental questions concerning the meaning of "collective thinking" or the nature of philosophy as such.3However subtle the points may be that emerge from these discussions, for the outside observer ethnophilosophy appears to be a kind of anthropology (whose premises it continues to share) with an incorporated interest in metaphysical questions. Its opposite is "conventional" Western philosophy, which persistently explores truth with the help of a single, individual mind, aiming at the crystallization of a truth relevant for everybody. What matters for ethnophilosophy is the truth brought forward by a certain way of life of a group of people that can be found on the "inside" of a culture and that can exist independently of any considerations of those things that exist on the outside. Ethnophilosophy is radical in the sense that it not only aims to reestablish, through its opposition to the all-intruding "international" philosophy, its own philosophy within the borders of a certain nation; going much further than many of today's opponents of globalization would dare to go, ethnophilosophy thinks of philosophy... (shrink)