A few years ago, Malcolm de Mowbray argued that nearly everything that had been written concerning the origins of the condemnation issued on March 7, 1277 by the bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, was based on the unproven assumption that what motivated the condemnation were provocative doctrines taught by university masters; in contrast, de Mowbray maintained that the sources of the prohibited views were not the Arts masters, but students who uttered them in the course of «their disputations». The present (...) article discusses the historiographical and methodological background of de Mowbray’s interpretation, provides evidence of the involvement of full-fledged masters in the dissemination of the prohibited doctrines, and examines the meaning of some controversial expressions and passages found in Tempier’s prefatory letter. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Disputing the Unity of the World: The Importance of Res and the Influence of Averroes in Giles of Rome’s Critique of Thomas Aquinas concerning the Unity of the WorldG. J. Mcaleer1. introductiongiles of rome (1243–1316) earned, after a decidedly difficult start, the most complete honors open to an academic religious in the Middle Ages. Joining the Hermits of St. Augustine at age 14, he became the first regent master (...) of his order at the University of Paris (1285–1291); his works were made compulsory in the education of students entering the Hermits in 1287; finally, in 1292 he became the general of the order itself.1 Giles is significant, as Mandonnet puts it, because he “est incontestablement au premier rang des théologiens de la fin du XIIIe siècle.”2 But this is not all. Giles is also important to the period because his writings were censured by the same commission that composed the famous Parisian condemnation of 1277. As a result of this [End Page 29] censure, Giles had to leave Paris, returning only in 1285.3 Perhaps of even greater significance is the fact that his teacher was Thomas Aquinas: Giles studied with Thomas at Paris during the years 1269–1272.4 It has been acknowledged for a long time now that Giles did not slavishly follow his teacher but wrought his own subtle and wide-ranging philosophical synthesis out of the various grand traditions of medieval thought.5 As the critical editions of Giles’s works appear (an enormous task currently moving forward under the guidance of F. Del Punta and G. Fioravanti) it will become clearer on how many issues Giles saw fit to criticize the positions of Thomas. It is one of these issues, Giles’s dispute with Thomas over the unity of the matter of the universe, that I wish to elaborate and analyze in this essay.6The thirteenth century is surely one of the greatest for philosophical innovation. Thinkers of the stature of Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Giles of Rome engaged great metaphysical themes ranging from the unity of being and creation to the composition of material substances. These speculations were prompted by their efforts to systematize the vast theological heritage of Christian thought and their encounter with the rich and varied traditions of Greek, Islamic, and Jewish thought newly entering the Latin West in translation. Questions involving matter were especially common amongst these speculations, carrying special significance in that they redounded upon conceptions of human nature and thus upon the Incarnation and Resurrection. Moreover, disputes about matter demanded arduous thought on the interrelations of the fundamental metaphysical notions of the period: act and potency; substance and accident; generation and corruption; essence and existence; principle and thing; and so on. The productivity of these thinkers, and the range and complexity of the [End Page 30] questions they treated, was stunning, and ultimately led to a massive condemnation of 219 philosophical and theological propositions at the University of Paris in 1277. The Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, with the aid of a theological commission that included Henry of Ghent, hoped to efface certain errors contained in these speculations. A large number of the condemned propositions were associated with Siger of Brabant and other so-called “Radical Aristotelians.” However, theses found in the works of Aquinas were included, and, as already mentioned, Tempier soon turned his attention to Giles of Rome.7A dominant issue throughout the condemnations and the works of the period, especially in questions concerning matter, is that of unicity and plurality. This is true of perhaps the two most famous debates: whether human nature is a composition of one or many forms and whether the intellect is one for all human persons. The latter is probably the most studied of all the disputes of that time and the controversy most often associated with Averroes. The question of whether there is one matter in the universe or two is very much connected with the plurality of forms debate. Regarding this debate, thinkers wanted to know not only the number of forms in material composites but also what material... (shrink)

Disputing the Unity of the World: The Importance of Res and the Influence of Averroes in Giles of Rome's Critique of T homas Aquinas concerning the Unity of the World G. j. MCALEER 1. INTRODUCTION tILES OF ROME earned, after a decidedly difficult start, the most complete honors open to an academic religious in the Middle Ages. Joining the Hermits of St. Augustine at age 14, he became the first regent master of his order at the University of Paris ; (...) his works were made compul- sory in the education of students entering the Hermits in 1287; finally, in 1292 he became the general of the order itself.' Giles is significant, as Mandonnet puts it, because he "est incontestablement au premier rang des th~ologiens de la fin du XIII e si~cle. "2 But this is not all. Giles is also important to the period because his writings were censured by the same commission that composed the famous Parisian condemnation of 1277. As a result of this I would like to thank Robert Wielockx, Jos Decorte, Jennifer DeRose, and especially two anonymous referees of theJHP, for their extremely useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. P. Nash, "Giles of Rome," New Catholic Eneydopedia, vol. 6 , 485 9 "P. Mandonnet, O. P., "La carri6re scolaire de Gilles de Rome," Revue des sciences philosophiques et thlologiques 4 09t~ 497. [~9] 3 ~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 36: I JANUARY 1998 censure, Giles had to leave.. (shrink)

In this article I argue that although the prevailing interpretation within the Thomistic contemporary critical literature, claiming the inaccessibility of God’s quid sit, is faithful both to Saint Thomas and to John Capreolus’s account of Aquinas’s doctrine, it is far from being uncontroversial in the first steps of the history of Thomism. A central step in this history is marked by the Parisian Condemnation of 1277, which is at the origin of relevant debate within the Dominican Order on the (...) question of the knowledge of God’s quid sit. Aquinas’s contemporaries, indeed, interpreted the condemnation of Proposition 214 as a measure taken against Saint Thomas’s negative theology, as confirmed by John Capreolus’s testimony. Capreolus defends Aquinas, claiming that Saint Thomas’s doctrine is not a radical negative theology; in spite of this, he maintains that we cannot know God’s quiddity. In the following history of the debate, however, two influential representatives of the Dominican Order, Tommaso de Vio and Francesco Silvestri will affirm the accessibility of God’s quid sit, restoring an old doctrine by Durand of Saint Pourçain and Hervé of Nédellec. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts; Studien und TexteTimothy B. Noone, Ph.D., M.S.L.Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery, Jr., and Andreas Speer, editors. Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts; Studien und Texte. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001. Pp. x + 1033. Cloth, DM (...) 498.00In this masterful volume of essays, we have one of the most thorough examinations of the Parisian condemnation of 1277 since the appearance of the groundbreaking study by Roland Hissette (Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277) in 1977. Presenting the work of some 38 contributors, the volume allows the reader to have access to a wide variety [End Page 339] of interpretations of the condemnation as well as studies devoted to its context and impact upon later thought. Indeed, the studies range from assessing the character of the period around the condemnation by comparing it with the thought of the early Scholastic author William of Auvergne to detailing rememberances of the condemnation among sixteenth century authors.Though no radically new approaches to the condemnation emerge from the volume, many of the new research findings presented modify and amplify the standard interpretations. For example, Prof. Marrone's article indicates that the period just prior to the condemnation may well be one that, on balance, was surprisingly receptive to Aristotelian learning, even in the case of an "Augustinian" author such as St. Bonaventure; consequently, Marrone argues, there may well be some truth in the now mainly discarded Duhemian thesis that the Church restored a more non-Aristotelian manner of thinking through the condemnation (297-98). Prof. Courtenay's study, moreover, suggests that the Parisian theological faculty may well have reached its institutional zenith, at least in terms of the independence of its judgments and the reverence shown its opinions, in the period just prior to the condemnation, inasmuch as in the succeeding period the faculty became increasingly an instrument in the hands of royal authority.Of the many fine studies included in the volume, the following especially deserve mention. Prof. Emery's detailed analysis of the image of God in the recesses of the mind (abditum mentis) in the teaching of Henry of Ghent gives an overarching and convincing account for Henry's eventual rejection of intelligible species and the continuity of his illuminationist theory from his earlier to his later writings. Prof. Pini shows in his study of Giles of Rome how Giles avoided explicit discussion of the eternity of the world following his 'exile' from Paris, but managed to advance his own metaphysical ideas on the nature of creatures as a result, a possibly happy, though doubtless unintended, consquence of the condemnation. Prof. Aertsen analyzes the thought of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent regarding their views on whether God's essence may be an object of knowledge and their respective doctrines of the distinction between essence and existence. Prof. Dumont's study of the textual history of Scotus's doctrine of the will and his demonstration that the Subtle Doctor's later writings veer back towards a more voluntaristic position is a landmark contribution to Scotistic scholarship as well as a solid indication of how the autonomy of the will, a matter of tremendous concern in the condemnatory documents, remained a sensitive topic into the early fourteenth century at Paris.Significant additions to our knowledge of medieval authors and their works are also found in the volume. Profs. Goris and Pickavé present a partial edition of the anonymous Commentary on the Sentences found in Bruge, Stadtbibliothek, MS 491, showing how its discussion of angelic knowledge continued the earlier discussion of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, while itself serving as a principal source for William Peter Godinus's influential Lectura Thomasina. Prof. Brown's edition and study of the part of Prosper of Reggio's prologue to his Commentary on the Sentences also points to the importance of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, but this time apropos of one of their... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Descartes and the Last ScholasticsBlake D. DuttonRoger Ariew. Descartes and the Last Scholastics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. Pp. xi + 230. Cloth, $42.50.The attempt to understand Descartes vis-à-vis the scholastic tradition dates back to the studies of Etienne Gilson early in this century. Though Descartes saw himself as a revolutionary who would overthrow the Aristotelianism entrenched in the universities, Gilson was able to demonstrate his reliance upon (...) a variety of scholastic sources for important terminology, distinctions, and arguments which permeate his writings. Unfortunately, this line of investigation was largely ignored among Anglo-American scholars who were generally hostile to Scholasticism and uninterested in contextualizing Descartes's thought. However, since the mid-eighties there has been a distinct shift in attitude as scholars have increasingly turned their attention to the place of Scholasticism within Descartes's intellectual environment. Among these, Roger Ariew has to be counted as one of the most sophisticated, and his new book, Descartes and the Late Scholastics, marks an important contribution to the growing literature on the topic.Ariew's book is actually a collection of essays published over the last decade, including two which he co-authored with Marjorie Grene. Many of these have been substantially expanded to include fresh material and reworked so as to give the whole a greater sense of continuity. After a marvelous opening chapter in which he lays out his overall account of Descartes's attitude towards Scholasticism, Ariew presents the remaining essays in two large groups: those dealing with the immediate context of Descartes's thought and those dealing with its reception through the early part of the eighteenth century.Among the more interesting results of the first group of studies is Ariew's claim that the scholastic climate in and around Paris during Descartes's lifetime was predominately Scotistic rather than Thomistic. He shows this by looking at positions taken by a number of Parisian schoolmen on important issues which typically divided Scotists and Thomists. Ariew goes on to argue that not only was the Parisian environment Scotistic, but that Descartes aligned himself with the Scotists on many key issues in both physics (e.g., that time is independent of motion) and metaphysics (e.g., that the principle of individuation is a form). This is certainly an intriguing claim since most studies of this type have viewed Descartes in relation to Aquinas and those Jesuit thinkers who were broadly Thomistic in outlook. In bringing to light this Scotistic background, Ariew has opened up an important new line of inquiry.Other topics included in this first section are the literary and philosophical background [End Page 275] to the "new way of ideas" of which Descartes is a founder, the place of Descartes's doctrine of matter and form in seventeenth century debates over hylomorphism, and the reaction of Scholastics to the observational results of the new astronomy. What emerges in these essays is not only a highly nuanced view of Descartes's relation to Scholasticism, but an important corrective to still prevalent views of the Scholastics as reactionary and blindly opposed to developments within the new science. This last point is made with particular force in the fifth essay entitled "Scholastics and the New Astronomy." There Ariew argues that the astronomical observations of Galileo et alia were not in themselves decisive for overthrowing the Aristotelian cosmology as it had been articulated in the seventeenth century. This is because scholastic astronomers were generally accepting of such findings (e.g., sunspots) and were able to accommodate them within their own systems by making relatively minor adjustments. Although these systems ultimately proved themselves inadequate, Ariew makes a strong case that the Aristotelianism of the seventeenth century was sufficiently fluid to accommodate most of what the astronomers offered up. Thus the necessity for a radical overhaul of basic philosophical and scientific assumptions was by no means as evident as standard histories of this period would have us believe.The second section of the book is dedicated to debates over Cartesianism and its fate in the generations immediately following Descartes's death. Here Ariew provides a wealth of detail about various condemnations of Cartesianism, a comparative study of... (shrink)

What aspects of philosophical style really count? What aspects of philosophical writing count only as matters of style? Some features of philosophical writing and talking do seem to be of merely ornamental significance, worthy subjects only of gossip or banter. We are familiar with the academic sneer with which poor Professor Kluck is charged with having “somehow managed to confuse” one thing with another. A more serious stylistic matter, of course, would be Professor Kluck’s own willingness to use the apparatus (...) of modal logic in his pathetic endeavors. Or is that a matter of style? If so, does the same concept apply to such amusing and affective phenomena as accent and cadence? We have heard Professor Chisholm’s rising terminal voice inflection, if only because it is so widely imitated. One thinks of Professor Earle’s favorite condemnation “boring” pronounced with an “o” which seems to touch base on every vowel sound known to man. We are impressed by Goodman’s pithiness, and we register his penchant for alliterative triples. We compare Bergmann’s Laocöonian baroque prose with Quine’s soothing urbanity. It is an interesting fact that these are the features which come to mind when we begin to consider the whole question of philosophical style. Have we so internalized the parts that really count that they seem “white,” neutral, style-free? There might well be historical factors which encourage such blindness. Varying degrees of lingering transcendentalism about philosophical method would not be easily reconciled with the awful idea that one is merely speaking a local dialect. Of course the transcendentalism itself is rarely owned up to as such, as if it is assumed that it is Reason which speaks but that it is in poor taste to say so. Alternative methods, when confronted, generate distaste, horror, or the head-shaking sort of wonderment of the Eighteenth Century Parisian who wondered how on earth anyone could be a Persian. (shrink)

The double truth question is located at the center of an extensive debate on the relationship of theology and philosophy—on the epistemic order of reason and scientific knowledge on the one hand and revelation and faith on the other. While this field of tension has been a crucial topic for the self-perception of Christian theology ever since, the disputes largely intensified in the 13th century within the scope of both the growing influence of the rediscovered Aristotelianepistemology and the condemnation of (...) 219 articles by the Parisian bishop Étienne Tempier. In this context, the present article investigates the accounts offered by Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Meister Eckhart, discusses their mutual relation, and traces significant aspects in their interpretation of the Early Christian authors Augustine and Boethius. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 30.1 (2006) 102-117 [Access article in PDF] Gossip and Literary Narrative Blakey Vermeule Northwestern University Since its murky origins in Grub Street, a specter has haunted the novel—the specter of gossip. In its higher-minded mood, literary narratives have been very snobbish about gossip and the snobbishness is unfair. Even the most casual reader of social fiction will recognize that gossiping is what characters do most passionately. (...) However, they can neither admit nor be aware of it. Only minor or morally compromised characters are allowed to indulge in its pleasures. Matronly middle-aged women, chatty maids, little girls, and effeminate fops are the ones who gossip; their more reflective counterparts—the men and women designated as heroes and heroines—only briefly tolerate such idle chatter. Gossip is derided, decried, condemned, and maligned. It is womanish, low, slavish, servantish, silly, pert, loose, wanton, jiggetty, mean. It is the "tittle-tattle of Highbury" in Austen's Emma, an activity for the old maid Miss Bates and her even older, blind, and senile mother. In Middlemarch, although the world is "apparently a huge whispering-gallery," the greatest gossip of all is Mrs. Cadwallader, a matron with a mind like "phosphorous, biting at everything" (Spacks, p. 194). In Richardson's Clarissa, Lovelace—a man not known for his indifference to social information—airily dismisses gossip as "the female go-round." (In novels, the male equivalents of the "female go-round" tend to be such despised modes of exchange as business letters, gambling, chess, and games of chance.) Gossip has always been a part of charivari with the power to turn the world upside down. It also has the power to destroy lives (Les Liasons Dangereuses) and to derail love (when it becomes the "prejudice" of Pride and Prejudice). If it ever innocent, it is only because it is meaningless.Gossip is all of these things even—especially—when it powers the [End Page 102] whole narrative. This paradox is evident almost anywhere we choose to look. Social novelists view the stuff of direct, unmediated social information as so intense that it requires special handling—even disavowal. I will briefly survey examples from French, English, and Russian fiction. The first is a lurid and overheated speech by Henri de Marsay, the peculiar hero of Balzac's short novel, The Girl with the Golden Eyes (1815). De Marsay is a dissipated aristocrat in love with a mysterious young girl who, he finds out much later, is the sexual slave of de Marsay's long-lost sister. But first, after a night of passion that "had begun with a slow trickle of pleasures and ended in overflowing torrents," de Marsay realizes, when his lover accidentally lets slip the name of his rival, that the person he is competing with is female. The next day he becomes consumed with a bitter plan to kill his faithless lover. He reflects to his friend Paul "Upon my honor, man is a clown dancing on the edge of a cliff. We're told about the immorality of Les Liaisons dangereuses, and some book with the name of a chambermaid. But there is one ghastly, dirty, dreadful, corrupting book that is always open and never closed, the great book of the world—not to mention another book, a thousand times more dangerous, that consists of everything passed on by word of mouth between men or women behind their fans at the ball."1 Even though de Marsay is a corrupt aristocrat, his sentiments are little different from those the narrator expresses in the book's opening chapter, a panoptic survey of Parisian life as a glorious mosaic of infection, rot, and moral disease.In Emily Bronte's Wuthering Heights, Heathcliff's new tenant Lockwood breaks his self-imposed exile from social life by pressing the housekeeper Nellie Dean to do what housekeepers do best and launch into an aggrieved saga about her master's family. He wants her to serve up the gossip hot. "I ate..., hoping sincerely she would prove a regular gossip, and either rouse me to animation, or lull me to sleep... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Pour une histoire de la ‘double vérité’David PichéLuca Bianchi. Pour une histoire de la ‘double vérité’. Conférences Pierre Abélard. Paris: Vrin, 2008. Pp. 192. Paper, €18.00.Since the publication of the work of the Belgian medievalist Fernand Van Steenberghen, a solid consensus seems to have emerged in the community of historians of medieval philosophy: no scholar in the Middle Ages defended the so-called “doctrine of the double truth” that (...) the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, had denounced in the prologue of his 1277 Condemnation. Moreover, how could a professional philosopher or theologian seriously contend that two contradictory statements are simultaneously true, one due to natural reason, and the other through the authority of faith? Therefore, the matter seemed settled and the file definitely closed: the double truth is nothing more than a “legend.” Yet the Italian medievalist Luca Bianchi’s in-depth critical analysis of the pseudo-historical evidence has now changed this. Without wanting to propose an entirely new interpretation of the historical ins and outs of this famous doctrine, Bianchi carries out a re-examination of the subject through a meticulous study of certain key texts that he has read in the light of a three-fold question: What impact did passages from Tempier’s decree on the “double truth” have on the medieval scholars themselves? Does the expression itself, ‘duplex veritas’, appear in some medieval documents? What were medieval thinkers’ attitudes in the face of philosophical arguments leading to conclusions contradicting the teachings of the Catholic faith?Due to space constraints, I will limit my discussion to Bianchi’s most crucial results. The answer to the first question (ch. 1) leads us in a surprising fashion to the famous Disputatio of Luther (1539). In this text, the father of the Reformation opposes the principle according to which what is true in theology must also be true in philosophy—a thesis whose paternity he attributes to Parisian theologians. Wanting to ensure the pre-eminence of faith-based teachings over all forms of human rationalization, Luther came to subscribe to a certain form of the double truth, since he claimed that what is absolutely true according to faith can be false and impossible from the perspective of philosophy. This explains his radical opposition to the “Parisian” principle that Bianchi calls “the principle of the oneness of truth.” We learn that some theologians in fifteenth- century Paris, notably Jean Gerson and Guillaume Baudin, were actually inspired by Tempier’s decree to defend some form of this principle.To respond to the second question (ch. 2), Bianchi first researched the electronic database Library of Latin Texts (CLCLT-6), and came up with “disappointing results”: no author uses the expression ‘duplex veritas’ in the relevant sense. Nevertheless, as imposing as it is, this database is not exhaustive, and Bianchi, well aware of this, extended his research by consulting other documents on paper, allowing him ultimately to reach a positive conclusion: the expression ‘duplex veritas’ appears in the course of a debate that took place around [End Page 99] 1470 on the subject of the truth-value of statements about future contingents. This debate involved a master of arts from Louvain, Pierre de Rivo, who considered it essential to distinguish between the truth of philosophers and the “popular” truth upheld by the churchmen, and a Parisian theologian whom we have already encountered, Guillaume Baudin, who invoked the “principle of the oneness of truth” to denounce the “double truth” that his adversary was promoting.From Bianchi’s multifaceted response to the third question (chs. 3–4), I can only present the groundswell. From the statutes promulgated by the Parisian Arts Faculty in 1272 up to the condemnation of Galileo in 1633, including the constitution Apostolici regiminis issued by the Fifth Lateran Council (1513), a significant evolution may be observed in the requirements academic and religious authorities imposed on professors of philosophy (as well as on scientists) in the western Christian world. Indeed, we may observe that these requirements correspond, first, to the obligation to counter, as far as possible, arguments that contradict faith, and then transform into the duty to commit to a strong... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Pour une histoire de la ‘double vérité’David PichéLuca Bianchi. Pour une histoire de la ‘double vérité’. Conférences Pierre Abélard. Paris: Vrin, 2008. Pp. 192. Paper, €18.00.Since the publication of the work of the Belgian medievalist Fernand Van Steenberghen, a solid consensus seems to have emerged in the community of historians of medieval philosophy: no scholar in the Middle Ages defended the so-called “doctrine of the double truth” that (...) the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, had denounced in the prologue of his 1277 Condemnation. Moreover, how could a professional philosopher or theologian seriously contend that two contradictory statements are simultaneously true, one due to natural reason, and the other through the authority of faith? Therefore, the matter seemed settled and the file definitely closed: the double truth is nothing more than a “legend.” Yet the Italian medievalist Luca Bianchi’s in-depth critical analysis of the pseudo-historical evidence has now changed this. Without wanting to propose an entirely new interpretation of the historical ins and outs of this famous doctrine, Bianchi carries out a re-examination of the subject through a meticulous study of certain key texts that he has read in the light of a three-fold question: What impact did passages from Tempier’s decree on the “double truth” have on the medieval scholars themselves? Does the expression itself, ‘duplex veritas’, appear in some medieval documents? What were medieval thinkers’ attitudes in the face of philosophical arguments leading to conclusions contradicting the teachings of the Catholic faith?Due to space constraints, I will limit my discussion to Bianchi’s most crucial results. The answer to the first question (ch. 1) leads us in a surprising fashion to the famous Disputatio of Luther (1539). In this text, the father of the Reformation opposes the principle according to which what is true in theology must also be true in philosophy—a thesis whose paternity he attributes to Parisian theologians. Wanting to ensure the pre-eminence of faith-based teachings over all forms of human rationalization, Luther came to subscribe to a certain form of the double truth, since he claimed that what is absolutely true according to faith can be false and impossible from the perspective of philosophy. This explains his radical opposition to the “Parisian” principle that Bianchi calls “the principle of the oneness of truth.” We learn that some theologians in fifteenth- century Paris, notably Jean Gerson and Guillaume Baudin, were actually inspired by Tempier’s decree to defend some form of this principle.To respond to the second question (ch. 2), Bianchi first researched the electronic database Library of Latin Texts (CLCLT-6), and came up with “disappointing results”: no author uses the expression ‘duplex veritas’ in the relevant sense. Nevertheless, as imposing as it is, this database is not exhaustive, and Bianchi, well aware of this, extended his research by consulting other documents on paper, allowing him ultimately to reach a positive conclusion: the expression ‘duplex veritas’ appears in the course of a debate that took place around [End Page 99] 1470 on the subject of the truth-value of statements about future contingents. This debate involved a master of arts from Louvain, Pierre de Rivo, who considered it essential to distinguish between the truth of philosophers and the “popular” truth upheld by the churchmen, and a Parisian theologian whom we have already encountered, Guillaume Baudin, who invoked the “principle of the oneness of truth” to denounce the “double truth” that his adversary was promoting.From Bianchi’s multifaceted response to the third question (chs. 3–4), I can only present the groundswell. From the statutes promulgated by the Parisian Arts Faculty in 1272 up to the condemnation of Galileo in 1633, including the constitution Apostolici regiminis issued by the Fifth Lateran Council (1513), a significant evolution may be observed in the requirements academic and religious authorities imposed on professors of philosophy (as well as on scientists) in the western Christian world. Indeed, we may observe that these requirements correspond, first, to the obligation to counter, as far as possible, arguments that contradict faith, and then transform into the duty to commit to a strong... (shrink)

This paper gives a full picture of the moral universe pressuring all sides in the strike by porters in Paris during January 1786. These Parisian day-labourers found their livelihood taken away by a new system of parcel delivery, part of a many-sided endeavour to rationalise the economy. They rioted and were the first rioting mob to appeal to the king at Versailles. This paper looks at the riot from the points of view of the rioters and their neighbours, the (...) police, the investors in the new parcel post scheme and the advancing American trade. This exemplifies a theort of hustoiry that focuses on the moral universes of past actors. (shrink)

Our culture is conflicted about morally judging and condemning. We can't avoid it altogether, yet many layfolk today are loathe to do it for reasons neither they nor philosophers well understand. Their resistance is often confused (by themselves and by theorists) with some species of antiobjectivism. But unlike a nonobjectivist, most people think that (a) for us to judge and condemn is generally (objectively) morally wrong , yet (b) for God to do so is (objectively) proper, and (c) so too (...) for certain persons in certain relations (e.g., self-condemnation, parental child rearing.) Certainly, religious (e.g., Christian) critics of judging and condemning without doubting the objective truth of their tradition's core moral teachings. Most puzzling is that (a) merely judging and condemning in one's heart may be improper, and (b) someone else with no more evidence or expertise might properly judge and condemn the same action. The answer is in condemning's complex structure of presuppostions. Condemning and judging are acts, and attitudes initiated by the act. Condemnation is motivated by two judgments presumed to justify it, a criticism of a target, and a judgment that the criticism justifies some negative response toward the target. Unlike nonpunitive penalties, punishments are motivated and explained by condemnation. Condemnation is an act of a hostile will, wishing some evil for its target, not (just) as a means to some good. Its root is in damning, an act akin to cursing. It declares a degraded status. The hostility makes it harder to justify condemnation than criticism, and punishment than nonpunitive penalties. Condemning claims objectivity and authority. It involves reflexive evaluation, regarding itself justified, approving its hostile feelings toward the target. Condemners presume themselves entitled to sit in judgment, pass judgment, and cast the condemned down. Those presumptions inhere in sitting in judgment, assuming jurisdiction. Unlike mathematical or scientific judgments, passing moral judgment seems to be a political act subject to extraepistemic constraints. "Who are you to judge?" may properly challenge your right to pass judgment. (shrink)

Twenty-two Catholic periodicals were printed in Paris in February 1848 when the Orleanist king, Louis Philippe was overthrown and France became a republic. They are valuable but neglected resources which elucidate what Catholics thought and what their concerns were in 1848. While many Catholics retained legitimist or royalist sympathies, they welcomed the republic because of its promise of freedoms . This article examines how that Catholic periodical press was affected by and how it responded to the February revolution and the (...) proclamation of a new republic. The number of these periodicals suggests there was a Catholic revival in France during the July Monarchy and indicates that were divergent Catholic opinions about religious and political ideas. Il y avait vingt-deux périodiques catholiques à Paris en février 1848 quand le roi, Louis Philippe d’Orléans, fut renversé et que la France devint une république. Ces journaux sont des sources utiles mais négligées, ils révèlent ce que les catholiques pensaient et en quoi ils étaient affectés à la fin de la monarchie de juillet. Quoique beaucoup de catholiques aient conservé des sympathies pour les régimes royalistes ou légitimistes, ils acceptèrent la république parce qu’elle promettait des libertés . Le présent article étudie comment la presse catholique fut atteinte et comment elle réagit à la révolution de février et à la proclamation de la République. Le nombre de ces périodiques manifeste qu’il y eut une renaissance catholique en France durant la monarchie de juillet et révéle qu’il y avait des opinions catholiques divergentes en ce qui concerne les idées politiques et religieuses. Als der französische König, Ludwig Philipp von Orléans, im Februar 1848 abgesetzt und Frankreich zu einer Republik wurde, gab es in Paris 22 katholische Zeitschriften. Diese Zeitungen sind nützliche, jedoch vernachlässigte Quellen, denn sie offenbaren, was die Katholiken dachten und was sie am Ende der Julimonarchie berührte. Obwohl zahlreiche Katholiken weiterhin Sympathien für monarchistische und „legitimierte“ Regierungsformen hegten, akzeptierten sie die Republik, da sie Freiheiten versprach. Der vorliegende Artikel untersucht, wie die katholische Presse sich betroffen fühlte und wie sie auf die Februarrevolution und die Ausrufung der Republik reagierte. Die hohe Zahl der Zeitschriften zeugt von einer katholischen Wiedergeburt in Frankreich während der Julimonarchie und deutet darauf hin, dass die katholischen Meinungen im Hinblick auf die politischen und religiösen Ideen auseinander gingen. (shrink)

Summary André-Jacob Roubo, author of Art du menuisier (Art of the Woodworker), included in the famous series of the Descriptions des arts et métiers published by the Paris Academy of Sciences, was a true worker whose craft was based on first-hand experience of the trade. At the same time, he was a literate artist, who shared the ideas and values of the Enlightenment and dedicated himself to writing technical treatises. Roubo was on the fringe of the guild system by virtue (...) of his training and his first steps in the trade. From the start, his connections with the circle of the learned elite were much more developed than with the world of the Parisian ‘maîtres menuisiers’. Yet Roubo considered himself to be a member of the community of woodworkers, and he addressed his treatise to his fellow workers, as if it were the masterpiece required to be received into the guild. So, who was Roubo? By training and status, he was certainly an artisan. But at the same time, we can see him as a sort of member of the Republic of Letters, whose fame rested on his expertise in woodworking and joinery. His case illustrates the fact that the gulf between ‘gens de métiers’ and ‘gens de lettres’ in the eighteenth century was less wide than is usually asserted. (shrink)

Opponents of commerce in organs sometimes appeal to Kant’s Formula of Humanity to justify their position. Kant implies that anyone who sells an integral part of his body violates this principle and thereby acts wrongly. Although appeals to Kant’s Formula are apt, they are less helpful than they might be because they invoke the necessity of respecting the dignity of ends in themselves without specifying in detail what dignity is or what it means to respect it, and they cite the (...) wrongness of an agent’s treating another merely as a means without clarifying conditions under which this occurs. This paper crystallizes two different approaches to the Formula of Humanity and probes when, according to them, the principle would imply that it is wrong to engage in “live donor” transactions, in which someone chooses to undergo a kidney extraction in exchange for money. (shrink)

In recent decades the publication of additional documentary sources and doctrinal and prosopographical studies for the University of Paris in the 1330s has radically expanded our information about theologians in what was once an obscure decade. Using a variety of evidence, this article outlines what we now know about bachelors of the Sentences active at Paris in the 1330s, part of what the author once called “the dormition of Paris.”.

Thomas Edison's incandescent lamp was one of four that were displayed at the first international exhibition of electricity in Paris in 1881. By the end of the exhibition, most observers believed that Edison had taken a clear lead over his rivals: Maxim, Swan, and Lane-Fox. In reality, his victory was a narrow one that owed much to the skilful management of public opinion by his aides in Paris. Nevertheless, it reinforced Edison's view of Paris as the natural starting point for (...) the implantation of his system in continental Europe. Almost immediately, however, the three companies that he established for the purpose in Paris were in difficulties as the financial crash of January 1882 hardened into sustained recession. Quickly Edison's favour turned to Milan and, more particularly, Berlin, leaving the once central Parisian venture to become a minor element in his European strategy. (shrink)

Many contemporary democratic theorists are democratic egalitarians. They think that the distinctive value of democracy lies in equality. Yet this position faces a serious problem. All contemporary democracies are representative democracies. Such democracies are highly unequal: representatives have much more power than do ordinary citizens. So, it seems that democratic egalitarians must condemn representative democracies. In this paper, I present a solution to this problem. My solution invokes popular control. If representatives are under popular control, then their extra power is (...) not objectionable. Unfortunately, so I argue, in the United States representatives are under loose popular control. (shrink)

This article uses the personal diaries and memoirs of Archpriest Sergius (Sergei) Bulgakov to examine the circumstances of his expulsion from Bolshevik-occupied Crimea in late 1922. At the time, he was rector of the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Yalta. The expulsion of Fr. Sergius was part of a large-scale operation to expel the humanist intelligentsia, who did not fit within the ideological contours of the new government. We will examine the political aspects of the condemnations of Fr. Sergius’s doctrine (...) of Sophia, the theological development of which he began in exile. We will also examine aspects of Fr. Sergius’s attitude to monarchy and his belief in the “white tsar,” noting that Bulgakov’s position as an émigré could hardly be characterized as monarchical. Sophiology may be the political equivalent of ecclesiastical democracy, of faith in the ecclesiastical people and the Christian community, which was alien to the conservative monarchism of Orthodox believers abroad, centered in Serbia’s Sremski Karlovci. We will examine the circumstances of the church’s condemnation of Fr. Sergius, which took place against the context of canonical uncertainty, and we will touch upon some aspects of the contemporary reception of Sophiology in Russia in a political context (V. Bibikhin, O. Kirichenko). (shrink)

The degree of realism that Duns Scotus understood his formal distinction to have implied is a matter of dispute going back to the fourteenth century. Both modern and medieval commentators alike have seen Scotus's later, Parisian treament of the formal distinction as less realist in the sense that it would deny any extra-mentally separate formalities or realities. This less realist reading depends in large part on a question known to scholars only in the highly corrupt edition of Luke Wadding, (...) where it is printed as the first of the otherwise spurious Quaestiones miscellaneae de formalitatibus. The present study examines this question in detail. Cited by Scotus's contemporaries as the Quaestio logica Scoti, we establish that it was a special disputation held by Scotus at Paris in response to criticisms of his use of the formal distinction in God, identify its known manuscripts, and provide an analysis based upon a corrected text, showing in particular the total unreliability of the Wadding edition. Our analysis shows that the Logica Scoti does not absolutely prohibit an assertion of formalities as correlates of the formal distinction, even in the divine Person, so long as their non-identity is properly qualified. That is, the positing of formalities does not of itself entail an unqualified or absolute distinction. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine the reception and use of Aristotle’s four causes by twelfth- and thirteenth-century Latin Christian theologians, primarily at Paris. I pay special attention to the early thirteenth century, when Aristotle’s works on natural philosophy were officially prohibited in the French capital. By looking at a wide range of texts from both prominent and obscure theologians, I hope to contribute to an expanded view of the ways in which intellectuals in the Latin west received and appropriated Aristotle’s (...) ideas. (shrink)

The struggle to delineate the relationship between theology and logic flourished in the thirteenth century and culminated in two condemnations in early 1277, one in Paris and the other in Oxford. To see how much and what kind of effect ecclesiastical actions such as condemnations and prohibitions to teach had on the development of logic in the Middle Ages, we investigate the events leading up to the 1277 actions, the condemned propositions, and the parts of these condemnations (...) connected to modal and temporal logic specifically. We show that because of the specific motivations late thirteenth-century and fourteenth-century logicians had when working in modal and temporal logic, the effect of the 1277 condemnations on the development of those branches was much smaller than might have been supposed. (shrink)

This article examines the novels Icône urbaine (2005, Urban Icon) by French-Togolese writer Lauren Ekué and Blues pour Elise (2010, Blues for Elise) by French-Cameroonian/afropean writer Léonora Miano, with regard to their contribution to chick-lit in a broad sense. With a focus on urban working women, their love lives and consumerism, these novels fulfil a number of criteria of mainstream chick-lit. At the same time, however, a serious concern for structural power relations is inscribed into these texts. Both novelists make (...) ample use of intermedial writing such as structural borrowing from and references to music, TV formats and the fashion press. I will analyse these narrative strategies and address how far Ekué and Miano copy, rewrite and reinvent the Anglo-American chick-lit genre from the transnational perspective of the African Diaspora in France and considering the peculiarities of black Paris as a space. (shrink)

In their article “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants,” Scott Sagan and Benjamin Valentino argue that the American public evaluates soldiers’ wartime actions more according to whether the war they are fighting was initiated justly, than on their actions during warfare. In this respect, their views are more similar to those of revisionist philosophers than to those of traditional just war theorists. Before leaping to broad conclusions from their survey, it should be (...) replicated. If the findings hold in the replication, intriguing questions could be asked about comparative cross-national attitudes and about the relationship between democracy and war. (shrink)