Two intellectual vices seem to always tempt us: arrogance and diffidence. Regarding the former, the world is permeated by dogmatism and table-thumping close-mindedness. From politics, to religion, to simple matters of taste, zealots and ideologues all too often define our disagreements, often making debate and dialogue completely intractable. But to the other extreme, given a world with so much pluralism and heated disagreement, intellectual apathy and a prevailing agnosticism can be simply all too alluring. So the need for (...)intellectualhumility, open-mindedness, and a careful, humble commitment to the truth are apparent. In this book, Dr Church and Dr Samuelson explicate a robust and vibrant account of the philosophy and science of this most valuable virtue, and they highlight how it can be best applied and personally developed. (shrink)
What is intellectualhumility? In this essay, we aim to answer this question by assessing several contemporary accounts of intellectualhumility, developing our own account, offering two reasons for our account, and meeting two objections and solving one puzzle.
Intellectualhumility, I argue in this paper, is a cluster of strong attitudes directed toward one's cognitive make-up and its components, together with the cognitive and affective states that constitute their contents or bases, which serve knowledge and value-expressive functions. In order to defend this new account of humility I first examine two simpler traits: intellectual self-acceptance of epistemic limitations and intellectual modesty about epistemic successes. The position defended here addresses the shortcomings of both ignorance (...) and accuracy based accounts of humility. (shrink)
In this chapter I argue that intellectualhumility is related to argumentation in several distinct but mutually supporting ways. I begin by drawing connections between humility and two topics of long-standing importance to the evaluation of informal arguments: the ad verecundiam fallacy and the principle of charity. I then explore the more explicit role that humility plays in recent work on critical thinking dispositions, deliberative virtues, and virtue theories of argumentation.
This chapter explores an unappreciated psychological dimension of intellectualhumility. In particular, I argue there is a plausible connection between intellectualhumility and epistemic egocentrism. Epistemic egocentrism is a well-known cognitive bias – often called ‘the curse of knowledge’ – whereby an agent attributes his or her own mental states to other people. I hypothesize that an individual who exhibits this bias is more likely to possess a variety of traits that are characteristic of intellectual (...)humility. This is surprising because intellectualhumility is often regarded as an antidote to cognitive biases, whereas I claim that a particular cognitive bias (namely, the curse of knowledge) may help foster an intellectual virtue. (shrink)
Intellectualhumility is commonly thought to be a mindset, disposition, or personality trait that guides our reactions to evidence as we seek to pursue the truth and avoid error. Over the last decade, psychologists, philosophers, and other researchers have begun to explore intellectualhumility, using analytical and empirical tools to understand its nature, implications, and value. This review describes central questions explored by researchers and highlights opportunities for multidisciplinary investigation.
We critique two popular philosophical definitions of intellectualhumility: the “low concern for status” and the “limitations-owning.” accounts. Based upon our analysis, we offer an alternative working definition of intellectualhumility: the virtue of accurately tracking what one could non-culpably take to be the positive epistemic status of one’s own beliefs. We regard this view of intellectualhumility both as a virtuous mean between intellectual arrogance and diffidence and as having advantages over other (...) recent conceptions of intellectualhumility. After defending this view, we sketch remaining questions and issues that may bear upon the psychological treatment of intellectualhumility such as whether evidence will help determine how this construct relates to general social humility on the one hand, and intellectual traits such as open-mindedness, curiosity, and honesty on the other. (shrink)
In this paper, I explore the relationship of virtue, argumentation, and philosophical conduct by considering the role of the specific virtue of intellectualhumility in the practice of philosophical argumentation. I have three aims: first, to sketch an account of this virtue; second, to argue that it can be cultivated by engaging in argumentation with others; and third, to problematize this claim by drawing upon recent data from social psychology. My claim is that philosophical argumentation can be conducive (...) to the cultivation of virtues, including humility, but only if it is conceived and practiced in appropriately ‘edifying’ ways. (shrink)
This chapter explores a species of false modesty, false intellectualhumility, which is defined as affected or pretended intellectualhumility concealing intellectual arrogance. False intellectualhumility is situated in a virtue epistemological framework, where it is contrasted with intellectualhumility, understood as excellence in self-attribution of intellectual weakness. False intellectualhumility characteristically takes the form of insincere expressions of ignorance or uncertainty – as when dogmatically committed conspiracy theorists (...) insist that they just want to know what’s going on – and, in such cases, false intellectualhumility is a kind of false skepticism or false fallibilism. In connection with this, the chapter further explores the relationship between the concepts of intellectualhumility, skepticism, and fallibilism. A distinction can be drawn between the virtues of intellectualhumility, skepticism, and fallibilism, but the traditional association of skepticism and fallibilism with intellectualhumility is vindicated by the fact that the virtues of intellectualhumility, skepticism, and fallibilism overlap. (shrink)
It is widely accepted that one strong motivation for adopting a conciliatory stance with regard to the epistemology of peer disagreement is that the non-conciliatory alternatives are incompatible with the demands of intellectual character, and incompatible with the virtue of intellectualhumility in particular. It is argued that this is a mistake, at least once we properly understand what intellectualhumility involves. Given some of the inherent problems facing conciliatory proposals, it is maintained that non-conciliatory (...) approaches to epistemic peer disagreement are thus on much stronger dialectical ground than many suppose, including some defenders of this line. In particular, non-conciliatory proposals can resist the idea that epistemic peer disagreement directly weakens one’s epistemic justification, as conciliatory views maintain. This means that the epistemic justification that our beliefs in this regard enjoy, and thus our knowledge, is more secure than conciliatory approaches to epistemic peer disagreement would suggest. (shrink)
In the literature on intellectualhumility, the standard view is that intellectualhumility and political conviction do not conflict. As Michael Lynch says, “[i]ntellectual humility is not an opponent of conviction” (2019: 150) and is “not antithetical to critical political engagement” (ibid: 151). Yet, the standard view arguably ignores empirical and theoretical work indicating that intellectualhumility does result in apathy or lack of political conviction. In this paper, we explore three ways in (...) which intellectualhumility may threaten political conviction: exposure to diversity, the role of empathy, and epistemic calibration. We also suggest that certain forms of intellectualhumility could sometimes develop into a form of quietism. (shrink)
A familiar point in the literature on the epistemology of disagreement is that in the face of disagreement with a recognised epistemic peer the epistemically virtuous agent should adopt a stance of intellectualhumility. That is, the virtuous agent should take a conciliatory stance and reduce her commitment to the proposition under dispute. In this paper, we ask the question of how such intellectualhumility would manifest itself in a corresponding peer disagreement regarding knowledge-how. We argue (...) that while it is relatively straightforward to recast this debate in terms of a reductive intellectualist account of knowledge-how, whereby knowledge-how just is a matter of having a particular propositional attitude, the issue becomes more complex once we turn to anti-intellectualist positions. On these views, after all, such a disagreement won’t be just a matter of disagreeing about the truth of a proposition. Accordingly, to the extent that some kind of conciliation is plausibly required of the virtuous agent in the face of a recognised peer disagreement, this conciliation will not consist simply in belief revision. We propose a novel way to address this problem. We claim that what is required of the epistemically virtuous agent when confronted with peer disagreement regarding knowing how to φ is that thereafter she should be disposed to employ her way of φ-ing across a narrower range of practical circumstances than beforehand. Moreover, just as an agent needs to call on her intellectual virtues in order to determine the extent of conciliation required in an ordinary case of epistemic peer disagreement, so the intellectual virtues will play an important role in determining this shift in dispositions to φ that occurs as regards epistemic peer disagreement about knowledge-how. (shrink)
This paper will be broken down into four sections. In §1, I try to assuage a worry that intellectualhumility is not really an intellectual virtue. In §2, we will consider the two dominant accounts of intellectualhumility in the philosophical literature—the low concern for status account the limitations-owing account—and I will argue that both accounts face serious worries. Then in §3, I will unpack my own view, the doxastic account of intellectualhumility, (...) as a viable alternative and potentially a better starting place for thinking about this virtue. And I’ll conclude in §4 by trying to defend the doxastic account against some possible objections. (shrink)
I offer an account of the virtue of intellectualhumility, construed as a pair of dispositions enabling proper management of one's intellectual confidence. I then show its integral role in a range of familiar educational practices and concerns, and finally describe how certain entrenched educational attitudes and conceptions marginalise or militate against the cultivation and exercise of this virtue.
Reflection has been proclaimed as a means to help physicians deal with medicine’s inherent complexity and remedy many of the shortcomings of medical education. Yet, there is little agreement on the nature of reflection nor on how it should be taught and practiced. Emerging neuroscientific concepts suggest that human thought processes are largely nonconscious, in part inaccessible to introspection. Our knowledge of the world is fraught with uncertainty, ignorance and indeterminacy, and influenced by emotion, biases and illusions, including the illusion (...) of not having illusions. Neuroscience also documents that lifelong learning processes may hone nonconscious cognition to high levels of sophistication, allowing rapid and precise perceptions, judgments and actions in complex situations. We argue that knowledge of mechanisms underlying human thought may be useful in designing educational programs to foster desired attributes such as curiosity, critical self-awareness and intuitive acumen in medical professionals. The juxtaposition of neuroscientific insights with ideas from Kant on reflective judgement, van Manen on tact, and Aristotle on phronésis, supports a concept of reflection that manifests as wise practice. We suggest that reflection in medical education should be an imperative for educators seeking to guide learners to manage the complexity and “messiness” of medical practice, and a role-modelling mode of medical practice characterized by self-correcting behaviors that culminate in good and right professional actions. An example illustrates reflective practice in the teaching and learning of physicianship. (shrink)
Does intellectualhumility preclude the possibility of religious dogmatism and firm religious commitments? Does intellectualhumility require religious beliefs to be held with diffidence? What is intellectualhumility anyway? There are two things I aim to do in this short article. First, I want to briefly sketch an account of intellectualhumility. Second, drawing from such an account, I want to explore whether intellectualhumility could be compatible with virtuous religious (...) dogmatism. (shrink)
Empathy can be terribly important when we talk to people who are different from ourselves. And it can be terribly important that we talk to people who are different precisely about those things that make us different. If we’re to have productive conversations across differences, then, it seems we must develop empathy with people who are deeply different. But, as Laurie Paul and others point out, it can be impossible to imagine oneself as someone who is deeply different than oneself—something (...) that plausible definitions of empathy seem to require. How then, can these terribly important conversations take place? I argue that philosophical and psychological work on intellectualhumility can show us a way to empathize and have these conversations even when we can’t imagine ourselves as the other. (shrink)
Intellectualhumility is an interesting but underexplored disposition. The claim “I am (intellectually) humble” seems paradoxical in that someone who has the disposition in question would not typically volunteer it. There is an explanatory gap between the meaning of the sentence and the meaning the speaker expresses by uttering it. We therefore suggest analyzing intellectualhumility semantically, using a psycholexical approach that focuses on both synonyms and antonyms of ‘intellectualhumility’. We present a thesaurus-based (...) method to map the semantic space of intellectualhumility as a heuristic to support philosophical and psychological analysis of this disposition. We find three semantic clusters that compose intellectualhumility: the sensible self, the discreet self, and the inquisitive self; likewise, we find three clusters that compose its contraries: the overrated self, the underrated other, and the underrated self. (shrink)
One response to the preface paradox—the paradox that arises when each claim in a book is justified for the author and yet in the preface the author avers that errors remain—counsels against the preface belief. It is this line of thought that poses a problem for any view that places a high value on intellectualhumility. If we become suspicious of preface beliefs, it will be a challenge to explain how expressions of fallibility and intellectualhumility (...) are appropriate, whether voiced verbally or encoded mentally. Moreover, banning expressions of intellectualhumility is especially disturbing in our context, for such a preface claim is just the sort of expression of intellectualhumility that is supposed to provide a barrier to the costly damage that can be done by zealous faith found in various forms of fundamentalism. The goal is thus to find a way to express humility without engendering paradox. (shrink)
In this exploratory paper, I consider how intellectualhumility and epistemic injustice might contribute to the failure of testimonial exchanges. In §1, I will briefly highlight four broad ways a testimonial exchange might fail. In §2, I will very briefly review the nature of epistemic injustice. In §3, I will explore how both epistemic injustice and intellectualhumility can lead to failures in testimonial exchange, and I’ll conclude by suggesting how intellectualhumility and epistemic (...) injustice might be related. (shrink)
Intellectualhumility has something important in common with trust: both, independently, help secure knowledge. But they also do so in tandem, and this chapter discusses how. Intellectualhumility is a virtue of a person’s cognitive character; this means that it disposes her to perceive and think in certain ways that help promote knowledge. Trust is a form of cooperation, in which one person depends on another (or on herself) for some end, in a way that is (...) governed by certain norms. Epistemic trust is trust for epistemic ends, where the one that I will focus on here is knowledge. When the parties to an epistemic-trust relationship exhibit intellectualhumility, I will argue, they are in a better position than otherwise to secure knowledge. Some think that this is true trivially, on the grounds that knowledge (on their view) is constituted by the exercise of epistemic virtues. Whether or not this is so, I will focus on two different ways in which intellectualhumility makes epistemic trust knowledge-conducive: first, it equips trusters to invest trust effectively – that is, in those who are trustworthy; second, it equips trustees to be epistemically trustworthy. (shrink)
The cultivation of intellectual character is an important goal within university education. This article focusses on cultivating intellectualhumility. It first explores an account of intellectualhumility from recent literature on the intellectual virtues. Then, it considers one recent pedagogical approach – Making Thinking Visible – as a means of teaching intellectual virtue. It assesses one particular technique for cultivating intellectualhumility arising from this pedagogical literature, and applies it to the (...) teaching of political philosophy. Finally, there is a discussion concerning how to supplement these techniques to best teach political philosophy generally, and for the purposes of cultivating intellectualhumility in particular. It is argued that, by introducing the technique of the Circle of Viewpoints, supplemented by techniques from the Compassion in Education literature, the modules I teach can better cultivate intellectualhumility in my students. (shrink)
Intellectualhumility plays a crucial role among intellectual virtues. It has attracted considerable attention from virtue epistemologists, who have offered a fair number of treatments. In this essay, I argue that, regardless of the difference among these treatments, they are beset by two problems: they fall into a circular argument; they fall into a self-referential contradiction. I then argue that a recent proposal by D. Pritchard allows us to avoid, but not. However, by combining this proposal with (...) another reflection advanced by the same author while he discusses the Wittgensteinian notion of hinge commitments, it is possible to avoid. The thesis that emerges is that only a partial application of intellectualhumility solves. Finally, I reinforce this thesis by rejecting an alternative solution to. (shrink)
Although therapists often work with clients with whom they share a great many beliefs, there remain many cases where the therapist and client have very little in common. Spirituality is, especially in the latter kind of case, one specific area in which clashes and similarities may be important. However, recent evidence suggests spirituality is to a surprising extent ignored in therapy when exploring it would be therapeutically relevant and, even more, that counsellors often struggle when training to more effectively engage (...) with client spirituality. These results are problematic, especially when taken together. In this paper, I attempt to address this vexing issue in a way that brings together work on counselling and spirituality with recent discussions of intellectual virtue in contemporary epistemology. In particular, I show why it is important for the therapist to cultivate and maintain the virtue of intellectualhumility with respect to spirituality in a counselling context. To this end, I explore, with reference to a particularly promising model of intellectualhumility, how the therapist can be attentive to—and own—their limitations in a productive way when dealing with a wide range of spiritual backgrounds. (shrink)
Philosophers and psychologists have devoted considerable attention to the study of intellectualhumility and intellectual arrogance. To this point, theoretical and empirical studies of intellectualhumility and arrogance have focused on these traits as possessed by individual reasoners. However, it is natural in some contexts to attribute intellectualhumility or intellectual arrogance to collectives. This paper investigates the nature of collective intellectualhumility and arrogance and, in particular, how these traits (...) are related to the attitudes of individuals. I discuss three approaches to collective intellectualhumility and arrogance. Rather than arguing that one of these approaches is applicable to all instances of collective intellectualhumility and arrogance, I argue that there are at least two and perhaps three distinct forms of both collective intellectualhumility and arrogance. Recognizing these distinct forms of collective intellectualhumility and arrogance, I argue, is crucial to understanding how intellectualhumility and arrogance are related to troubling phenomena like political polarization. (shrink)
Recent literature suggests that intellectualhumility is valuable to its possessor not only morally, but also epistemically-viz., from a point of view where epistemic aims such as true belief, knowledge and understanding are what matters. Perhaps unsurprisingly, epistemologists working on intellectualhumility have focused almost exclusively on its ramifications for how we go about forming, maintaining and evaluating our own beliefs, and by extension, ourselves as inquirers. Less explored by contrast is how intellectualhumility (...) might have implications for how we should conduct our practice of asserting. The present entry aims to rectify this oversight by connecting these two topics in a way that sharpens how it is that intellectualhumility places several distinctive kinds of demands on assertion, and more generally, on how we communicate what we believe and know. (shrink)
Recent literature suggests that intellectualhumility is valuable to its possessor not only morally, but also epistemically-viz., from a point of view where epistemic aims such as true belief, knowledge and understanding are what matters. Perhaps unsurprisingly, epistemologists working on intellectualhumility have focused almost exclusively on its ramifications for how we go about forming, maintaining and evaluating our own beliefs, and by extension, ourselves as inquirers. Less explored by contrast is how intellectualhumility (...) might have implications for how we should conduct our practice of asserting. The present entry aims to rectify this oversight by connecting these two topics in a way that sharpens how it is that intellectualhumility places several distinctive kinds of demands on assertion, and more generally, on how we communicate what we believe and know. (shrink)
In this paper I distinguish two levels of intellectual importance, derived and underived, showing how the former can be species-based. Then I do four things: first, identify a neglected way, stemming from perceived human intellectual maturity, in which many of us are vulnerable to a sense of species-based importance; second, show—in part by appealing to facts about deep time—that we have no right to this sense and so evince a failure of intellectualhumility if we acquiesce (...) in it; third, defend the view that the claims of intellectualhumility on those who would be overall rational are not in this regard overridden; and then, finally, gesture at some of the consequences of this result for inquiry. (shrink)
In this paper I explore how intellectualhumility manifests in mathematical practices. To do this I employ accounts of this virtue as developed by virtue epistemologists in three case studies of mathematical activity. As a contribution to a Topical Collection on virtue theory of mathematical practices this paper explores in how far existing virtue-theoretic frameworks can be applied to a philosophical analysis of mathematical practices. I argue that the individual accounts of intellectualhumility are successful at (...) tracking some manifestations of this virtue in mathematical practices and fail to track others. There are two upshots to this. First, the accounts of the intellectual virtues provided by virtue epistemologists are insightful for the development of a virtue theory of mathematical practices but require adjustments in some cases. Second, the case studies reveal dimensions of intellectualhumility virtue epistemologists have thus far overlooked in their theoretical reflections. (shrink)
This paper investigates the connection of intellectualhumility to a somewhat neglected form of a limitation of human knowledge—a limitation in which facts or truths we human beings can in principle represent conceptually. I consider some arguments for such a limitation, and argue that, under standard assumptions, the sub-algebra hypothesis is the best hypothesis about how the facts we can represent relate to the ones that we can not. This hypothesis has a consequence for intellectualhumility (...) in that it supports it in metaphysics, but not in ordinary inquiry. (shrink)
This paper presents five studies on the development and validation of a scale of intellectualhumility. This scale captures cognitive, affective, behavioral, and motivational components of the construct that have been identified by various philosophers in their conceptual analyses of intellectualhumility. We find that intellectualhumility has four core dimensions: Open-mindedness (versus Arrogance), Intellectual Modesty (versus Vanity), Corrigibility (versus Fragility), and Engagement (versus Boredom). These dimensions display adequate self-informant agreement, and adequate convergent, (...) divergent, and discriminant validity. In particular, Open-mindedness adds predictive power beyond the Big Six for an objective behavioral measure of intellectualhumility, and Intellectual Modesty is uniquely related to Narcissism. We find that a similar factor structure emerges in Germanophone participants, giving initial evidence for the model’s cross-cultural generalizability. (shrink)
This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. Second, we propose that rejecting (KNA-S) is the best way out of the puzzle. Our argument to this end appeals to the epistemic value of intellectual (...)humility in social-epistemic practice. (shrink)
This paper concerns would-be necessary connections between doxastic attitudes about the epistemic statuses of your doxastic attitudes, or ‘higher-order epistemic attitudes’, and the epistemic statuses of those doxastic attitudes. I will argue that, in some situations, it can be reasonable for a person to believe p and to suspend judgment about whether believing p is reasonable for her. This will set the stage for an account of the virtue of intellectualhumility, on which humility is a matter (...) of your higher-order epistemic attitudes. Recent discussions in the epistemology of disagreement have assumed that the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns whether you ought to change your doxastic attitude towards p. My conclusion here suggests an alternative approach, on which the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns the proper doxastic attitude to adopt concerning the epistemic status of your doxastic attitude towards p.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.HIGHER-ORDER EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITYVolume 9, Issue 3Allan HazlettDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.11Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. HIGHER-ORDER EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITYVolume 9, Issue 3Allan HazlettDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.11Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. HIGHER-ORDER EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITYVolume 9, Issue 3Allan HazlettDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.11Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)
The study of intellectualhumility is still in its early stages and issues of definition and measurement are only now being explored. To inform and guide the process of defining and measuring this important intellectual virtue, we conducted a series of studies into the implicit theory – or ‘folk’ understanding – of an intellectually humble person, a wise person, and an intellectually arrogant person. In Study 1, 350 adults used a free-listing procedure to generate a list of (...) descriptors, one for each person-concept. In Study 2, 335 adults rated the previously generated descriptors by how characteristic each was of the target person-concept. In Study 3, 344 adults sorted the descriptors by similarity for each person-concept. By comparing and contrasting the three person-concepts, a complex portrait of an intellectually humble person emerges with particular epistemic, self-oriented, and other-oriented dimensions. (shrink)
Recent scholarship in intellectualhumility (IH) has attempted to provide deeper understanding of the virtue as personality trait and its impact on an individual's thoughts, beliefs, and actions. A limitations-owning perspective of IH focuses on a proper recognition of the impact of intellectual limitations and a motivation to overcome them, placing it as the mean between intellectual arrogance and intellectual servility. We developed the Limitations-Owning IntellectualHumility Scale to assess this conception of IH (...) with related personality constructs. In Studies 1 (n= 386) and 2 (n = 296), principal factor and confirmatory factor analyses revealed a three-factor model – owning one's intellectual limitations, appropriate discomfort with intellectual limitations, and love of learning. Study 3 (n = 322) demonstrated strong test-retest reliability of the measure over 5 months, while Study 4 (n = 612) revealed limitations-owning IH correlated negatively with dogmatism, closed-mindedness, and hubristic pride and positively with openness, assertiveness, authentic pride. It also predicted openness and closed-mindedness over and above education, social desirability, and other measures of IH. The limitations-owning understanding of IH and scale allow for a more nuanced, spectrum interpretation and measurement of the virtue, which directs future study inside and outside of psychology. (shrink)
Some philosophers working on the epistemology of disagreement claim that conciliationist responses to peer disagreement embody a kind of intellectualhumility. Others contend that standing firm or “sticking to one’s guns” in the face of peer disagreement may stem from an admirable kind of courage or internal fortitude. In this paper, we report the results of two empirical studies that examine the relationship between conciliationist and steadfast responses to peer disagreement, on the one hand, and virtues such as (...)intellectualhumility, courage, grit, and actively open-minded thinking, on the other. We observed positive correlations between measures of conciliationism, intellectualhumility, and actively open-minded thinking but failed to find any reliable association between steadfastness, courage, and grit. Our studies reveal that there are at least two important intellectual virtues associated with conciliationist responses to peer disagreement (viz., intellectualhumility and actively open-minded thinking) and two vices associated with steadfast responses (intellectual arrogance and myside bias). These findings shed new light on the overall epistemic goodness of the conciliationist perspective. -/- keywords: disagreement, conciliationism, steadfastness, intellectualhumility, courage, actively open-minded thinking. (shrink)
Virtues are acquirable, so if intellectualhumility is a virtue, it’s acquirable. But there is something deeply problematic—perhaps even paradoxical—about aiming to be intellectually humble. Drawing on Edward Slingerland’s analysis of the paradoxical virtue of wu-wei in Trying Not To Try (New York: Crown, 2014), we argue for an anti-individualistic conception of the trait, concluding that one’s intellectualhumility depends upon the intellectualhumility of others. Slingerland defines wu-wei as the “dynamic, effortless, and unselfconscious (...) state of mind of a person who is optimally active and effective” (Trying Not to Try, 7). Someone who embodies wu-wei inspires implicit trust, so it is beneficial to appear wu-wei. This has led to an arms race between faking wu-wei on the one hand and detecting fakery on the other. Likewise, there are many benefits to being (or seeming to be) intellectually humble. But someone who makes conscious, strategic efforts to appear intellectually humble is ipso facto not intellectually humble. Following Slingerland’s lead, we argue that there are several strategies one might pursue to acquire genuine intellectualhumility, and all of these involve commitment to shared social or epistemic values, combined with receptivity to feedback from others, who must in turn have and manifest relevant intellectual virtues. In other words, other people and shared values are partial bearers of a given individual’s intellectualhumility. If this is on the right track, then acquiring intellectualhumility demands epistemic anti-individualism. (shrink)
While it is widely regarded that intellectualhumility is among the intellectual virtues, there is as of yet little consensus on the matter of what possessing and exercising intellectualhumility consists in, and how it should be best understood as advancing our epistemic goals. For example, does intellectualhumility involve an underestimation of one’s intellectual abilities, or rather, does it require an accurate conception? Is intellectualhumility a fundamentally interpersonal/social virtue, (...) or might it be valuable to exercise in isolation? To what extent does intellectualhumility demand of us an appreciation of how the success of our inquiries depends on features of our social and physical environment beyond our control? These are just a few of the many questions that are crucial to getting a grip on this intellectual virtue and why we might aspire to cultivate it. Furthermore, and apart from the nature and value of humility, it is worthwhile to consider how this notion, properly understood, might have import for other philosophical debates, including those about (for example) scepticism, assertion, epistemic individualism and anti-individualism, and the philosophy of education. This special issue brings together a range of different philosophical perspectives on these and related questions to do with intellectualhumility with an aim to contributing to this important and timely topic. (shrink)
We believe that intellectualhumility is an essential intellectual virtue for university students to foster. It enables them to excel as students of philosophy and other disciplines, to navigate the fast-changing world inside and outside academia, and to flourish in interaction with others. In this paper, we analyze this virtue by singling out two distinct but related aspects: the openness-aspect and the care-aspect. The former makes one value a dialogue with those who have different views from one’s (...) own. The latter aspect involves searching for implicit assumptions one brings to encounters with one’s object of inquiry and trying to study this object as unique and irreducible. We discuss four learning activities we developed for the philosophy bachelor course “Who are we? Philosophical views on humans and the gods” at University College Utrecht. Throughout this paper, we show extracts from the students’ assignments, reflections, and evaluations. These extracts indicate that students developed both aspects of intellectualhumility —openness to different views and care for the uniqueness of each object of inquiry— and acknowledged their importance. (shrink)
Epistemic anti-individualism is the view that positive epistemic statuses fail to supervene on internal, physical or mental, properties of individuals. Intellectualhumility is a central intellectual virtue in the pursuit of such statuses. After some introductory remarks, this paper provides an argument for epistemic anti-individualism with respect to a virtue-theoretic account of testimonial knowledge. An outline of a dual-aspect account of intellectualhumility is then offered. The paper proceeds to argue that insofar as testimonial knowledge (...) is concerned, this stripe of epistemic anti-individualism leads to a particular account of intellectualhumility. (shrink)
Although the relationship between faith and intellectualhumility has yet to be specifically addressed in the philosophical literature, there are reasons to believe that they are at least in some sense incompatible, especially when judging from pre-theoretical intuitions. In this paper I attempt to specify and explicate this incompatibility, which is found in specific conflicting epistemic attitudes they each respectively invite. I first suggest general definitions of both faith and intellectualhumility (understood as intellectual virtues), (...) building off current proposals in the literature, in an attempt to portray both in as broad and uncontroversial a manner as feasible. I then move to arguing how this prima facie incompatibility aligns with these understandings of faith and intellectualhumility, and illustrate how this incompatibility is even clearer on one recent theory. I close by considering one avenue of response for those who want to maintain that, while conflicting in these ways, intellectualhumility and faith can be simultaneously virtuous. (shrink)
Intellectualhumility is a hot topic. One of the key questions the literature is exploring is definitional: What is intellectualhumility? In their recent paper, “IntellectualHumility: Owning our Limitations,” Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr, and Daniel Howard-Snyder have proposed an answer: Intellectualhumility is “proper attentiveness to, and owning of, one’s intellectual limitations”. I highlight some limitations of the limitations-owning account of intellectualhumility. And in conclusion, I (...) suggest that ultimately these are not limitations that any viable account of intellectualhumility should own and that Whitcomb et al. should revise their view accordingly. (shrink)