Intellectual Humility as Attitude

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):399-420 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Intellectual humility, I argue in this paper, is a cluster of strong attitudes directed toward one's cognitive make-up and its components, together with the cognitive and affective states that constitute their contents or bases, which serve knowledge and value-expressive functions. In order to defend this new account of humility I first examine two simpler traits: intellectual self-acceptance of epistemic limitations and intellectual modesty about epistemic successes. The position defended here addresses the shortcomings of both ignorance and accuracy based accounts of humility.

Similar books and articles

The Doxastic Account of Intellectual Humility.Ian M. Church - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (4):413-433.
The Semantic Neighborhood of Intellectual Humility.Markus Christen, Mark Alfano & Brian Robinson - 2014 - Proceedings of the European Conference on Social Intelligence.
The Values and Varieties of Humility.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):889-910.
Intellectual humility, knowledge-how, and disagreement.Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - In Chienkuo Mi, Michael Slote & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue. pp. 49-63.


Added to PP

1,041 (#9,531)

6 months
155 (#9,973)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Alessandra Tanesini
Cardiff University

Citations of this work

Vices of the Mind: A Reply to ALFANO, PLAKIAS, TANESINI, and VIGANI.Quassim Cassam - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):881-888.
Humility Is Not A Virtue.Paul Bloomfield - 2021 - In Mark Alfano, Michael P. Lynch & Alessandra Tanesini (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility. London: Routledge. pp. 36-46.

View all 41 citations / Add more citations