Logos and Episteme 7 (4):489-502 (2016)

Authors
J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow
Emma C. Gordon
University of Glasgow
Abstract
This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. Second, we propose that rejecting (KNA-S) is the best way out of the puzzle. Our argument to this end appeals to the epistemic value of intellectual humility in social-epistemic practice.
Keywords assertion  epistemic value  intellectual humility  knowledge  social-epistemic practice
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ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme20167444>)
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References found in this work BETA

Norms of Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
Knowing and Asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489.
``Is Understanding Factive?".Catherine Z. Elgin - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 322--30.
Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.
Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):492-508.

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