Res Philosophica 93 (3):509-532 (2016)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
One response to the preface paradox—the paradox that arises when each claim in a book is justified for the author and yet in the preface the author avers that errors remain—counsels against the preface belief. It is this line of thought that poses a problem for any view that places a high value on intellectual humility. If we become suspicious of preface beliefs, it will be a challenge to explain how expressions of fallibility and intellectual humility are appropriate, whether voiced verbally or encoded mentally. Moreover, banning expressions of intellectual humility is especially disturbing in our context, for such a preface claim is just the sort of expression of intellectual humility that is supposed to provide a barrier to the costly damage that can be done by zealous faith found in various forms of fundamentalism. The goal is thus to find a way to express humility without engendering paradox.
|
Keywords | Catholic Tradition Contemporary Philosophy History of Philosophy |
Categories |
No categories specified (categorize this paper) |
ISBN(s) | 2168-9105 |
DOI | 10.11612/resphil.2016.93.3.8 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Studia Logica 16:119-122.
View all 56 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.
Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - Mind:fzab031.
Similar books and articles
Analytics
Added to PP index
2017-02-14
Total views
37 ( #306,998 of 2,506,349 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #170,234 of 2,506,349 )
2017-02-14
Total views
37 ( #306,998 of 2,506,349 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #170,234 of 2,506,349 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads