127 found
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  1. Intellectual Humility as Attitude.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):399-420.
    Intellectual humility, I argue in this paper, is a cluster of strong attitudes directed toward one's cognitive make-up and its components, together with the cognitive and affective states that constitute their contents or bases, which serve knowledge and value-expressive functions. In order to defend this new account of humility I first examine two simpler traits: intellectual self-acceptance of epistemic limitations and intellectual modesty about epistemic successes. The position defended here addresses the shortcomings of both ignorance and accuracy based accounts of (...)
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  2. "Calm down, dear": intellectual arrogance, silencing and ignorance.Alessandra Tanesini - 2016 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):71-92.
    In this paper I provide an account of two forms of intellectual arrogance which cause the epistemic practices of conversational turn-taking and assertion to malfunction. I detail some of the ethical and epistemic harms generated by intellectual arrogance, and explain its role in fostering the intellectual vices of timidity and servility in other agents. Finally, I show that arrogance produces ignorance by silencing others (both preventing them from speaking and causing their assertions to misfire) and by fostering self-delusion in the (...)
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  3. Intellectual Servility and Timidity.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43.
    Intellectual servility is a vice opposing proper pride about one's intellectual achievements. Intellectual timidity is also a vice; it is manifested in a lack of proper concern for others’ esteem. This paper offers an account of the nature of these vices and details some of the epistemic harms that flow from them. I argue that servility, which is often the result of suffering humiliation, is a form of damaged self-esteem. It is underpinned by attitudes serving social-adjustive functions and causes ingratiating (...)
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  4. Epistemic Vice and Motivation.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (3):350-367.
    This article argues that intellectual character vices involve non-instrumental motives to oppose, antagonise, or avoid things that are epistemically good in themselves. This view has been the recent target of criticism based on alleged counterexamples presenting epistemically vicious individuals who are virtuously motivated or at least lack suitable epistemically bad motivations. The paper first presents these examples and shows that they do not undermine the motivational approach. Finally, having distinguished motivating from explanatory reasons for belief and action, it argues that (...)
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  5. Teaching Virtue: Changing Attitudes.Alessandra Tanesini - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (4):503-527.
    In this paper I offer an original account of intellectual modesty and some of its surrounding vices: intellectual haughtiness, arrogance, servility and self-abasement. I argue that these vices are attitudes as social psychologists understand the notion. I also draw some of the educational implications of the account. In particular, I urge caution about the efficacy of direct instruction about virtue and of stimulating emulation through exposure to positive exemplars.
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  6.  58
    The mismeasure of the self: a study in vice epistemology.Alessandra Tanesini - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
    The Mismeasure of the Self is dedicated to vices that blight many lives. They are the vices of superiority, characteristic of those who feel entitled, superior and who have an inflated opinion of themselves, and those of inferiority, typical of those who are riddled with self-doubt and feel inferior. Arrogance, narcissism, haughtiness, and vanity are among the first group. Self-abasement, fatalism, servility, and timidity exemplify the second. This book shows these traits to be to vices of self-evaluation and describes their (...)
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  7. Silencing and assertion.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 749-769.
    Theories of assertion must explain how silencing is possible. This chapter defends an account of assertion in terms of normative commitments on the grounds that it provides the most plausible analysis of how individuals might be silenced when attempting to make assertions. The chapter first offers an account of the nature of silencing and defends the view that it can occur even in contexts where speakers’ communicative intentions are understood by their audience. Second, it outlines some of the normative commitments (...)
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  8. Virtues and Vices in Public and Political Debate.Alessandra Tanesini - 2021 - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 325-335.
    In this chapter, after a review of some existent empirical and philosophical literature that suggests that human beings are essentially incapable of changing their mind in response to counter-evidence, I argue that motivation makes a significant difference to individuals’ ability rationally to evaluate information. I rely on empirical work on group deliberation to argue that the motivation to learn from others, as opposed to the desire to win arguments, promotes good quality group deliberation. Finally I provide an overview of some (...)
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  9.  72
    Affective polarisation and emotional distortions on social media.Alessandra Tanesini - unknown
    In this paper I argue that social networking sites (SNSs) are emotion technologies that promote a highly charged emotional environment where intrinsic emotion regulation is significantly weakened, and people's emotions are more strongly modulated by other people and by the technology itself. I show that these features of social media promote a simplistic emotional outlook which is an obstacle to the development and maintenance of virtue. In addition, I focus on the mechanisms that promote group-based anger and thus give rise (...)
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  10. An Introduction to Feminist Epistemologies.Alessandra Tanesini - 1999 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Although their positions and arguments differ in several respects, feminists have asserted that science, knowledge, and rationality cannot be severed from their social, political, and cultural aspects.
  11. .Alessandra Tanesini - 2008
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  12.  30
    Contemporary Debates in Epistemology.Alessandra Tanesini - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):303-306.
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  13. Collective Amnesia and Epistemic Injustice.Alessandra Tanesini - 2016 - In J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford, UK: pp. 195-219.
    Communities often respond to traumatic events in their histories by destroying objects that would cue memories of a past they wish to forget and by building artefacts which memorialize a new version of their history. Hence, it would seem, communities cope with change by spreading memory ignorance so to allow new memories to take root. This chapter offers an account of some aspects of this phenomenon and of its epistemological consequences. Specifically, it is demonstrated in this chapter that collective forgetfulness (...)
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  14.  33
    Intellectual arrogance: individual, group-based, and corporate.Alessandra Tanesini - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-20.
    In the article I argue that intellectual arrogance can be an individual, collective and even corporate vice. I show that arrogance is in all these cases underpinned by defensive positive evaluations of epistemic features of the evaluator in the service of buttressing its illegitimate social dominance. Individual arrogance as superbia or as hubris stems from attitudes biased by the motive of self-enhancement. Collective arrogance is underpinned by positive defensive attitudes to a one’s social identity that seeks to maintain its unwarranted (...)
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  15.  49
    Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives.Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch (eds.) - 2021 - London, UK: Routledge.
    Introduction / Alessandra Tanesini and Michael P. Lynch -- Reassessing different conceptions of argumentation / Catarina Dutilh Novaes -- Martial metaphors and argumentative virtues and vices / Ian James Kidd -- Arrogance and deep disagreement / Andrew Aberdein -- Closed-mindedness and arrogance / Heather Battaly -- Intellectual trust and the marketplace of ideas / Allan Hazlett -- Is searching the Internet making us intellectually arrogant? / J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon -- Intellectual humility and the curse of knowledge (...)
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  16.  46
    Scaffolding knowledge.Alessandra Tanesini - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):367-381.
    In this article I argue that often propositional knowledge is acquired and retained by extensive reliance on physical and social scaffolds that create an environment or niche conducive to knowledge. It is incumbent on epistemologists to subject these aids to epistemic assessments. I show that several of the activities involved in the creation of niches within which inquiry can thrive are carried out by whole cultures. New generations benefit from inheriting these niches whilst being able to improve upon them to (...)
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  17. Standpoint theory then and now.Alessandra Tanesini - 2019 - In M. Fricker, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, D. Henderson & P. J. Graham (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge.
  18. Blaming the Intellectually Vicious: a Critical Discussion of Cassam’s Account of Blameworthiness and Reprehensibility for Epistemic Vice.Alessandra Tanesini - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):851-859.
    There is much of interest in Cassam’s ground-breaking Vices of the Mind. This discussion focuses exclusively on one aspect of his view, namely, his account of what it takes to be properly criticisable or blameworthy for one’s epistemic vices. This critical discussion consists of two sections. The first provides an overview of Cassam’s account of responsibility and criticisability for intellectual vices. The second raises a problem for that account whose formulation is due to Battaly and proposes a solution which, at (...)
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  19. Passionate Speech: On the Uses and Abuses of Anger in Public Debate.Alessandra Tanesini - 2021 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 89:153-176.
    Anger dominates debates in the public sphere. In this article I argue that there are diverse forms of anger that merit different responses. My focus is especially on two types of anger that I label respectively arrogant and resistant. The first is the characteristic defensive response of those who unwarrantedly arrogate special privileges for themselves. The second is often a source of insight and a form of moral address. I detail some discursive manifestations of these two types of anger. I (...)
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  20.  36
    Arrogance, Anger and Debate.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2):213-227.
    Alessandra Tanesini ABSTRACT: Arrogance has widespread negative consequences for epistemic practices. Arrogant people tend to intimidate and humiliate other agents, and to ignore or dismiss their views. They have a propensity to mansplain. They are also angry. In this paper I explain why anger is a common manifestation of arrogance in order to understand the...
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  21. Arrogance, anger and debate.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2):213-227.
    Arrogance has widespread negative consequences for epistemic practices. Arrogant people tend to intimidate and humiliate other agents, and to ignore or dismiss their views. They have a propensity to mansplain. They are also angry. In this paper I explain why anger is a common manifestation of arrogance in order to understand the effects of arrogance on debate. I argue that superbia (which is the kind of arrogance that is my concern here) is a vice of superiority characterised by an overwhelming (...)
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  22. Introduction.Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch - 2020 - In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. Routledge.
     
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  23.  92
    Temporal Externalism: A Taxonomy, an Articulation, and a Defence.Alessandra Tanesini - 2014 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 8 (1):1–19.
    I argue that the semantic content of thoughts and the linguistic meaning of expressions are things with a history in the sense that they can be made fully intelligible only from the point of view of the future. I defend this position by articulating a version of a view known in the philosophy of language as temporal externalism. Temporal externalism about content is the view that the content of a subject’s thoughts and utterances at a time t depends on features (...)
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  24. Ignorance, Arrogance, and Privilege: Vice Epistemology and the Epistemology of Ignorance.Alessandra Tanesini - 2020 - In Ian James Kidd, Quassim Cassam & Heather Battaly (eds.), Vice Epistemology. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 53-68.
    At the start of the #metoo protests, many men professed genuine surprise about the prevalence of sexual harassment, whilst many women could not figure out how men could have been so ignorant. Black people have long observed that a similar apparent commitment to ignorance about race is widespread among whites. In a blog post originally written in 2004, the British journalist, Reni EddoLodge, reported that she had given up talking about race to white people because the majority simply refuse to (...)
     
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  25.  75
    Virtuous and vicious intellectual self-trust.Alessandra Tanesini - 2019 - In Katherine Dormandy (ed.), Trust in Epistemology. London, U.K.: Routledge.
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  26.  45
    Caring for Esteem and Intellectual Reputation: Some Epistemic Benefits and Harms.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:47-67.
    This paper has five aims: it clarifies the nature of esteem and of the related notions of admiration and reputation ; it argues that communities that possess practices of esteeming individuals for their intellectual qualities are epistemically superior to otherwise identical communities lacking this practice and that a concern for one's own intellectual reputation, and a motivation to seek the esteem and admiration of other members of one's community, can be epistemically virtuous ; it explains two vices regarding these concerns (...)
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  27.  48
    Intellectual Autonomy and Its Vices.Alessandra Tanesini - 2021 - In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. Routledge.
    This chapter argues for three related points. First, answerability is the key to intellectual autonomy. However, in order to enjoy that status that befits an intellectually autonomous subject, other epistemic subjects must also recognize that one is answerable for one’s believing. Second, systemic conditions of social oppression impede recognition since they promote situations in which members of oppressed groups are disabled in their attempts to make themselves answerable for their believing. Third, these oppressive conditions foster the development of the epistemic (...)
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  28. Bringing about the normative past.Alessandra Tanesini - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):191-206.
  29.  44
    Humility and self-knowledge.Alessandra Tanesini - 2021 - In Mark Alfano, Michael Lynch & Alessandra Tanesini (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility. New York and London: Routledge. pp. 283-291.
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  30.  77
    Wittgenstein: a feminist interpretation.Alessandra Tanesini - 2004 - Malden, MA: Polity Press.
    In this new book, Alessandra Tanesini demonstrates that feminist thought has a lot to offer to the study of Wittgenstein's philosophical work, and that -at the same time-that work can inspire feminist reflection in new directions. In Wittgenstein, Tanesini offers a highly original interpretation of several themes in Wittgenstein's philosophy. She argues that when we look at his work through feminist eyes we discover that he is not primarily concerned with providing solutions to technical problems in the philosophy of mind, (...)
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  31. Epistemic vice and motivation.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - In Michel Croce & Maria Silvia Vaccarezza (eds.), Connecting Virtues: Advances in Ethics, Epistemology, and Political Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
     
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  32. Nietzsche on the Diachronic Will and the problem of morality.Alessandra Tanesini - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):652-675.
    In this paper I offer an innovative interpretation of Nietzsche's metaethical theory of value which shows him to be a kind of constitutivist. For Nietzsche, I argue, valuing is a conative attitude which institutes values, rather than tracking what is independently of value. What is characteristic of those acts of willing which institute values is that they are owned or authored. Nietzsche makes this point using the vocabulary of self-mastery. One crucial feature of those who have achieved this feat, and (...)
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  33. Perception and action: The taste test.Alessandra Tanesini & Richard Gray - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):718-734.
    Traditional accounts of perception endorse an input–output model: perception is the input from world to mind and action is the output from mind to world. In contrast, enactive accounts propose action to be constitutive of perception. We focus on Noë's sensorimotor version of enactivism, with the aim of clarifying the proper limits of enactivism more generally. Having explained Noë's particular version of enactivism, which accounts for the contents of perceptual experience in terms of sensorimotor knowledge, we use taste as a (...)
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  34. Collective amnesia and epistemic injustice.Alessandra Tanesini - 2016 - Imperfect Cognitions.
    Alessandra Tanesini is a Professor of Philosophy at Cardiff University working on epistemology and philosophy of language. In this post she summarises some of her recent work on collective amnesia and epistemic injustice.
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  35. Emotion and Rationality.Mark Lance & Alessandra Tanesini - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):275-295.
  36.  38
    Reducing arrogance in public debate.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - In James Arthur (ed.), Virtues in the Public Sphere: Citizenship, Civic Friendship and Duty. New York, NY: Routledge Press.
    Self- affirmation techniques can help reduce arrogant behaviour in public debates. This chapter consists of three sections. The first offers an account of what speakers owe to their audiences, and of what hearers owe to speakers. It also illustrates some of the ways in which arrogance leads to violations of conversational norms. The second argues that arrogance can be understood as an attitude toward the self which is positive but defensive. The final section offers empirical evidence why we should expect (...)
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  37.  52
    Whose language?Alessandra Tanesini - 1994 - In Kathleen Lennon & Margaret Whitford (eds.), Knowing the Difference. London, UK: pp. 203-16.
  38. Affective polarization, wholeheartedness, and fanaticism.Alessandra Tanesini - 2024 - In .
    : In this chapter I argue that fanaticism is characterized by an orientation to value. I identify three distinctive features of this way of committing to one’s values. First, it is wholehearted. Second, it involves a perception that the values one has chosen are at risk of being rendered unintelligible. Third, the choice of the values to which the fanatic commits wholeheartedly is based on emotional appraisals or moral testimony rather than on reflection. I also argue that these appraisals are (...)
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  39.  24
    Vices of the Mind, by Quassim Cassam.Alessandra Tanesini - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):959-964.
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  40. Nietzsche's theory of truth.Alessandra Tanesini - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):548 – 559.
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  41.  22
    Emotion and Rationality.Mark Lance & Alessandra Tanesini - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 30 (sup1):275-295.
    This paper is concerned with the roles played by emotions in rationality, a topic which has been generally, but unjustifiably, ignored by epistemologists. Silence on this matter is, we believe, indicative of the overly narrow view that epistemologists have had of their field. Whatever else we might accomplish by considering the rational role of emotions, we hope to motivate a number of questions and philosophical contexts not commonly considered by epistemologists.Everyone knows that rationality depends on the doxastic state of the (...)
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  42.  57
    Logical aliens.Alessandra Tanesini - 2014 - In A. Skodo (ed.), Other Logics: Historical and Philosophical Alternatives to Formal Logic. Leiden, Netherlands: pp. 123-47.
  43.  48
    Virtues, emotions and fallibilism.Alessandra Tanesini - 2008 - In G. Brun, U. Dogluoglu & D. Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and the Emotions. Aldershot, UK: pp. 67-82.
  44.  38
    Speech in non-ideal conditions: On silence and being silenced.Alessandra Tanesini - 2023 - In Laura Caponetto & Paolo Labinaz (eds.), Sbisà on Speech as Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 2147483647-2147483647.
    In this chapter I show that idealizing assumptions can obscure conversational dynamics because they neglect power differentials that are crucial enablers of the successful performance of some speech acts (see, Sbisà, 2020). I examine how silencing is promoted by conversational norms that would defeasibly entitle linguistic agents to presume that silence indicates acceptance. I focus on Goldberg’s (2020) discussion of these phenomena. Goldberg argues in support of a norm of no silent rejections claiming that silencing is partly the result of (...)
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  45.  8
    Epistemic Vice and Motivation.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - In Michel Croce & Maria Silvia Vaccarezza (eds.), Connecting Virtues. Oxford, UK: Wiley. pp. 151–167.
    This article argues that intellectual character vices involve non‐instrumental motives to oppose, antagonise, or avoid things that are epistemically good in themselves. This view has been the recent target of criticism based on alleged counterexamples presenting epistemically vicious individuals who are virtuously motivated or at least lack suitable epistemically bad motivations. The paper first presents these examples and shows that they do not undermine the motivational approach. Finally, having distinguished motivating from explanatory reasons for belief and action, it argues that (...)
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  46.  58
    Identity judgements, queer politics.Mark Norris Lance & Alessandra Tanesini - 2000 - Radical Philosophy 100:42-51.
  47. Arrogance, polarisation and arguing to win.Alessandra Tanesini - 2020 - In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. London, UK: Routledge. pp. 158-174.
    A number of philosophers have defended the view that seemingly intellectually arrogant behaviours are epistemically beneficial. In this chapter I take issue with most of their conclusions. I argue, for example, that we should not expect steadfastness in one's belief in the face of contrary evidence nor overconfidence in one’s own abilities to promote better evaluation of the available evidence resulting in good-quality group-judgement. These features of individual thinkers are, on the contrary, likely to lead groups to end up in (...)
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  48. Eloquent Silences: Silence and Dissent.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - In Casey Rebecca Johnson (ed.), Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public. New York: Routledge. pp. 109-128.
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  49. The Gift of Testimony.Alessandra Tanesini - 2020 - Episteme 17 (3):331-348.
    In this paper I argue that in Western contemporary societies testimony is structured by norms of reciprocation and thus is best understood as involving the exchange of gifts rather than, as philosophers and game theorists have tended to presume, market transactions. My argument is based on an initial analysis of the reactive attitudes that are exhibited in testimonial exchanges. I highlight the central role played by the reciprocating attitudes of gratitude and gratification respectively in the recipient and the donor of (...)
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  50.  82
    Spatial attention and perception: seeing without paint.Alessandra Tanesini - unknown
    Covert spatial attention alters the way things look. There is strong empirical evidence showing that objects situated at attended locations are described as appearing bigger, closer, if striped, stripier than qualitatively indiscernible counterparts whose locations are unattended. These results cannot be easily explained in terms of which properties of objects are perceived. Nor do they appear to be cases of visual illusions. Ned Block has argued that these results are best accounted for by invoking what he calls ‘mental paint’. In (...)
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