Prominent philosophical accounts of artistic forgery have neglected a central aspect of the aesthetic harm it perpetrates. To be properly understood, forgery must be seen in the context of our ongoing attempts to augment our aesthetic understanding in conditions of uncertainty. The bootstrapping necessary under these conditions requires a highly refined comprehension of historical context. By creating artificial associations among aesthetically relevant qualities and misrepresenting historical relationships, undetected forgeries stunt or distort aesthetic understanding. The effect of this may be (...) quite pervasive, and removing known forgeries from museum walls will be insufficient to eradicate it. Continued attention to forgeries, once exposed, can in fact serve us by increasing our understanding of how aesthetic understanding is formed and by helping us to repair the damage they have inflicted. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Forgeries and Art Evaluation:An Argument for Dualism in AestheticsTomas Kulka (bio)If a fake is so expert that even after the most thorough and trustworthy examination its authenticity is still open to doubt, is it or is it not as satisfactory a work of art as if it were unequivocally genuine? 1It is a wonderful moment in the life of a lover of art when he finds himself suddenly (...) confronted with a hitherto unknown painting by a great master, untouched, on the original canvas, and without any restoration, just as it left the painter's studio. And what a picture! Neither the beautiful signature... nor the pointillé on the bread which Christ is blessing, is necessary to convince us that we have here—I am inclined to say—the masterpiece of Johannes Vermeer of Delft... quite different from all his other paintings and yet every inch a Vermeer. In no other picture by the great master of Delft do we find such sentiment, such a profound understanding of the Bible story—a sentiment so nobly human expressed through the medium of highest art.2The author of these lines is Professor Abraham Bredius, the nestor of Holland's art historians and the greatest authority on seventeenth-century Dutch painting. The source is The Burlington Magazine for Connoisseurs, the most prestigious periodical for the history of art of the period. The year is 1937. The painting, however, is not a masterpiece of Vermeer but a fake produced by the mediocre Dutch artist Han van Meegeren.The Problem of ForgeryMany art dealers have been financially ruined, and many art historians academically discredited, because of incorrect attribution. Apart from the practical problems that worry curators and art historians, there is also a theoretical problem, which has become a subject of heated discussions since the late 1960s. The dispute gained a momentum with the publication of Nelson Goodman's Languages of Art. In its third chapter titled "Art and Authenticity," [End Page 58] which put the problem of forgeries on the agenda of contemporary aesthetics, Goodman states that a "philosopher of art caught without an answer to [the] question... why there is any aesthetic difference between a deceptive forgery and an original work... is at least as badly off as a curator of paintings caught taking a Van Meegeren Vermeer for a Vermeer."3Although the literature on the problem of forgeries is extensive, the answers that have been put forward fall roughly into three categories: the formalist answer, which states that there is no aesthetic difference between an original painting and a deceptive forgery; the reductionist answer, which claims that there is such a difference and that it can be traced to the minute physical differences between originals and its copies; and the historicist answer, which also asserts that there must be an aesthetic difference but claims that it stems from the different histories of the two objects.The most prominent proponent of the formalist approach is Monroe C. Beardsley. His theory is based on the assumption that "two objects that do not differ in any observable qualities cannot differ in aesthetic value."4 Aesthetic formalism, as the name suggests, maintains that works of art should be judged according to their form. Only the visual features of the painted surface—the configuration of its lines and colors, composition, spatial relations, texture, design, etc., are relevant for its appreciation. The subject of our evaluation is the finished product, not the information pertaining to the history of its production. Who, when, and where painted the picture, just like the intentions of the painter, are irrelevant for the assessment of its aesthetic qualities. Only the "internal" properties, that is, the properties of the "work itself," count. The "external" properties, by which Beardsley means anything that "relates to something existing before the work itself, to the manner in which it was produced, or its connection to antecedent objects," have no bearing on aesthetic value. Hence the conclusion that if fakes resemble the original "in their internal characteristics, so that no one could tell them apart just by looking at them" there can be no aesthetic difference between them.5 Originality is thus excluded... (shrink)

I argue that there is no distinction between allographic and autographic representations. One consequence of this is that replicative forgeries have the same aesthetic and artistic value as originals, and are accurate records of actions. I end with some reflections on the pragmatic structure of forgery.

Still, in this paper I’m not going to be laudatory, enthusiastic, or appreciative, but instead address the distinctly philosophical question of what a forgery is—investigate the concept of a forgery, as philosophers used to say, and sometimes still do. Only after that question and a few others have been answered should we ask the question that everyone wants to ask straight off: What, if anything, is aesthetically wrong with a forgery? Interesting as that question is, space limitations prevent me from (...) addressing it here. (shrink)

How to Forge a Musical Work’, I argue that the best way to view an attempted forgery of a lost autograph that accidentally duplicates the lost original is as a ‘version’, not a ‘forgery’, although I acknowledge the plausibility of Jerrold Levinson's alternate view, that it remains a forgery nevertheless. John Dilworth, in his article, ‘A Representational Theory of Artefacts and Artworks’, defends Levinson's ‘intuition’ against mine. In the present article I argue that our ‘intuitions’ here are divided, as they (...) are in the case of fictional literary works that accidentally turn out to be ‘true’, where some would say that what we have is still ‘fiction’, others that it is ‘accidental history’. (shrink)

Forgery in eighteenth-century London was more than a crime of opportunity; it completely undermined the economic, social and political orders of that society. Using the works of authors such as Randall McGowen, John Beattie, Craig Muldrew, and others, this paper examines cases tried in the London Old Bailey from 1700- 1740 in the context of the financial revolution and the rise of the bloody code. The paper looks at the implications this crime had on the greater London society, the changes (...) in legislation that came about as a result of forgery, and the changes in punishment for the crime. Ultimately, it examines at the reasons for the radical change in people‟s perception of this crime in such a short time period. (shrink)

Although art forgery is documented throughout the history of Western art, philosophical discussion of the problems of art forgery is a relatively recent matter, beginning largely in the latter half of the twentieth century. Arising even more recently is the practice of creating ‘appropriation art’, a topic that has so far been largely ignored in aesthetics but which raises some challenging questions especially when compared with forgery. This article introduces some of the philosophical problems that arise from the practice and (...) products of art forgery and in the contemporary movement of art appropriation. Rather than involving issues on the periphery of aesthetics, I suggest, forgery and appropriation art cut to the heart of issues in the ontology of art, the intersection of aesthetics and ethics, and other central areas in the philosophy of art. (shrink)

FORGERY and PLAGIARISM are both forms of fraud. In committing art forgery I claim my work is by another person. As a plagiarist, I claim another person’s work is my own. In forgery, someone’s name is stolen in order to add value to the wrong work; in plagiarism someone’s work is stolen in order to give credit to the wrong author.

Latin ‘plvs.’—To begin somewhat remotely, I am not satisfied with the current explanation of Lat. plus. As regards pleores, to pass over Cuny's mistaken derivation in MSL. 16. 322, the explanation from plēyōses is correct— IE. plēyo. : plēyos–:: Sk. návya: compv. návyas, cf. pánya: pányas and távya: távyas. IE. plēyes also appears, not only in Sanskrit as prắyas and in πλε–ων , but, by a quite rigorous phonetic, in O.Norse fleiri, from a primate flaiz-an (...) ‘sow,’ borrowed from a North Germanic verb-stem sā–ya shrink)

Peter Lamarque, in chapter 4 of his 2010 book Work and Object, argues that certain artworks, like musical scores and literary texts, are such that there can be no forgeries of them that purport to be of an actually existing work—what Lamarque calls “referential forgeries”. Lamarque motivates this claim via appeal to another distinction, first made by Goodman, between “allographic” and “autographic” artworks. This article will evaluate Lamarque’s argument that allographic literary works are unable to be referentially forged (...) and will find them wanting. In so doing, the distinction between allographic and autographic artworks (and therefore artforms) will be called into question. In section I, I characterize referential forgery and Lamarque’s definition of allographic and autographic artforms. Section II critically examines Lamarque’s argument against the possibility of referential forgery in allographic artforms. Section III offers a case where it appears that a putatively allographic text’s type membership is sensitive to facts about its causal-intentional provenance. This case serves as pretext for Section IV’s identification of this causal-intentional relation with the sanctioning relation as formulated by Sherri Irvin. On the basis of considerations treated in sections I through IV, section V questions the tenability of the allographic/autographic distinction. -/- . (shrink)

Original paintings and forgeries are not sufficiently the same sort of thing to have many comparable aesthetic qualities. 1) many aesthetic quality predicates have the form of attributives: they are two-place relations between an object and a class of objects and have a semantic account which requires that the object belongs to the class to which it is related; 2) there is no useful semantic class which contains an original and its forgery and 3) therefore these paintings are not (...) to be compared in at least many aesthetic qualities. attention is given to style predicates, which are defined. (shrink)

The topic of art forgery draws attention in many quarters: major art fraud schemes make big news, books are written that bring forgers fame, the buyers and sellers of art look for assurance they are getting the genuine article, authentication specialists strain to spot phony items, museums present special exhibitions of forgeries, and theorists tackle the topic on occasion ranging from a postmodern perspective extolling the virtues of forgery to more traditional concerns about its ontological status. The dark side (...) of the art world is often brought into the light. Forgery is a commonly, if uncomfortably, recognized force. It might be assumed, then, that the meaning of the term “forgery” is uniformly established:... (shrink)

Legal norms serve as practical standards for individuals and officials. While this ‘normative aspect’ of law is widely acknowledged, its significance for theories of law remains contested. In this paper, I examine three views on the matter. First, that we should explain legal norms as reason-giving. Second, that we should explain legal discourse as being about reasons for action. Third, that we should explain law as capable of being reason-giving. I survey some challenges associated with each of these views. What (...) they have in common is an implicit assumption about the form that normative explanation must take: that it must be a linear, non-reductive explanation. There is an alternative model for normative explanation available, however. That model explains normative notions in terms of the practices and attitudes involved in recognizing, offering, and demanding them. I highlight the potentials, and limitations, of this practice-centered alternative. (shrink)

The field of scientific image integrity presents a challenging research bottleneck given the lack of available datasets to design and evaluate forensic techniques. The sensitivity of data also creates a legal hurdle that restricts the use of real-world cases to build any accessible forensic benchmark. In light of this, there is no comprehensive understanding on the limitations and capabilities of automatic image analysis tools for scientific images, which might create a false sense of data integrity. To mitigate this issue, we (...) present an extendable open-source algorithm library that reproduces the most common image forgery operations reported by the research integrity community: duplication, retouching, and cleaning. We create a large scientific forgery image benchmark with enriched ground truth using this library and realistic scientific images. All figures within the benchmark are synthetically doctored using images collected from creative commons sources. While collecting the source images, we ensured that the they did not present any suspicious integrity problems. Because of the high number of retracted papers due to image duplication, this work evaluates the state-of-the-art copy-move detection methods in the proposed dataset, using a new metric that asserts consistent match detection between the source and the copied region. All evaluated methods had a low performance in this dataset, indicating that scientific images might need a specialized copy-move detector. The dataset and source code are available at https://github.com/phillipecardenuto/rsiil. (shrink)

In "How to Forge a Musical Work," Peter Kivy poses a counterexample to Nelson Goodman's view that forgery is impossible in "allographic" art form such as music. Yet Kivy's example does not raise problems for Goodman's position, because his example does not exemplify the sort of forgery of concern to Goodman. By focusing on Kivy's characterization of what counts as a version of a work of art, I argue that he only seems to make room for musical forgeries (of (...) the sort damaging to Goodman's view) by collapsing the difference between versions of a work and instances of a work. (shrink)

Sándor Radnóti looks at forgeries, artistic reproductions, replicas, variations, and pastiches in order to study the dilemmas surrounding artistic illusion and "poetic license." He reveals how forgeries as the parasites of art make clear and transparent the meaning of artistic orginality.

V. 1 is a detailed analysis of a previously unknown proof copy of the first edition of Galileo's Sidereus nuncius, in which watercolor drawings appear in place of the etchings of the published edition, consigned in 2005 to the antiquarian bookselling firm of Martayan Lan. V. 2 is an account of the composition and production of the edition, based on analysis of extant copies as well as the New York proof copy. V. 3 was written in response to the discovery, (...) soon after the publication of v. 2, that the proof copy was in fact an elaborate forgery produced between 2003 and 2005 under the direction of Marino Massimo de Caro, as first reported in the article "A very rare book," by Nicholas Schmidle, in The New Yorker issue of 16 December 2013. V. 4, in German, is a heavily revised edition of Horst Bredekamp's Galilei der Künstler, which had included a chapter on the then unrecognized forgery. (shrink)

Advancements in digital technology have made it easy to alter faces using editing software, posing challenges for industries in verifying photograph authenticity. Digital image forensics, a scientific method, is employed to gather data and determine the veracity of faces. This study assesses the effectiveness of digital image forensics in detecting fake digital faces using tools such as Foto Forensics, Forensically Beta, and Opanda IExif. Foto Forensics analyzes JPEG picture compression levels to detect image edits, revealing metadata differences compared to the (...) original photo. Forensically Beta examines digital characteristics like color and noise levels to identify alterations. Opanda IExif scrutinizes image metadata, disclosing information about the camera used and subsequent changes. All three forensic methods effectively identify fake digital faces. Analyzing metadata differences and contrast variations between the original and altered faces proves to be an effective method for spotting alterations. Digital image forensics enhances legal and investigative processes, serving as a valuable tool for identifying digital face manipulation. Stronger digital security measures, including improved encryption, authentication, and legal regulations, are needed to protect against facial photograph manipulation. Updating legal and regulatory frameworks for digital security is vital to address increasingly sophisticated techniques used in facial photograph editing. As digital technology advances, continuous development and improvement of forensic techniques are crucial to detect digital face fabrication. Given the growing complexity of digital editing tools and the ease with which facial images can be altered, reliable methods are essential. Digital image forensics provides a systematic approach to gather data and verify the authenticity of digital photographs. (shrink)

Sándor Radnóti looks at forgeries, artistic reproductions, replicas, variations, and pastiches in order to study the dilemmas surrounding artistic illusion and "poetic license." He reveals how forgeries as the parasites of art make clear and transparent the meaning of artistic orginality.

SOndor Radn-ti looks at forgeries, artistic reproductions, replicas, variations, and pastiches in order to study the dilemmas surrounding artistic illusion and 'poetic license.' He reveals how forgeries as the parasites of art make clear and transparent the meaning of artistic orginality.

Review of KURT VON FRITZ (ed.) Pseudepigrapha i: Pseudopythagorica, Lettres de Platon, Litterature pseudepigraphique juive. Huit exposes par Ronald Syme, Walter Burkert, Holger Thesleff, Norman Gulley, G.J.D. Aalders, Morton Smith, Martin Hengel, Wolfgang Speyer. (Entretiens sur l'Antiquite Classique, xviii.) Pp. iv + 404. Vandoeuvres, Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1972. Cloth, 48 Sw. frs.

Resumen Este artículo aborda dos reescrituras de William Shakespeare en la dramaturgia chilena actual, Shakespeare falsificado: reconstrucción falsificada de un manuscrito censurado de Luis Barrales y La Tempestad de Juan Radrigán. Para ello propone la reescritura como ejercicio metadramático, un gesto consciente, dramático y político, que busca dialogar y discutir con el original, inscribiendo la nueva perspectiva autorial en el continuum de la tradición cultural. Dentro de este enfoque, el trabajo expone, en primer lugar, las características de la dramaturgia renacentista (...) inglesa como una praxis híbrida, colaborativa, refundidora y política. Luego, caracteriza ambas reescrituras como prácticas que muestran la vigencia y continuación de un canon cultural, literario y dramático, por medio de las distintas modulaciones que se imprimen desde estas nuevas voces. Asimismo, las perspectivas de Barrales y Radrigán se exhiben como gestos políticos expresados hacia sus contextos.The following article approaches two rewritings of William Shakespeare’s work within current Chilean playwriting:Shakespeare falsificado: reconstrucción falsificada de un manuscrito censurado, by Luis Barrales andLa Tempestad, by Juan Radrigán. It proposes rewriting as a metadramatic exercise, a conscious gesture -both political and dramatic- that seeks to establish dialogue and discussion with its original, inscribing a new authorial perspective within the cultural tradition continuum. With this approach, this work exposes, first, characteristics from English renaissance dramaturgy as a hybrid praxis, collaborative, refounding and political. Then, it characterises both rewritings as practice that showcase the currency and continuation of a cultural, literary and dramatic canon through different articulations that print themselves in our voices. Likewise, Barrales and Radrigan’s perspectives display themselves as political gestures expressed towards their contexts. (shrink)