A number of arguments against relativism are based on the concept of majority rule. Since, the arguments allege, on relativism moral truth is founded on majority opinion, relativism entails that (a) moral progress and reform are impossible, (b) propaganda, advertising, brainwashing, and high birth rates turn mistaken moral judgments into correct ones, (c) moral horrors, if enough people believe them acceptable, are not moral horrors at all, (d) finding out what’s right and what’s wrong is extremely easy, (e) moral reasoning (...) is very different from what we normally take it to be, and (f) internal criticism of a moral code is impossible. These arguments get their due in this article, which first defines and explicates relativism and then exposes, explains, and criticizes the arguments. Especially important to understand about the relation between relativism and majority opinion is the notion of a convention. Accordingly, it is discussed at some length. (shrink)

This paper criticizes the pragma-dialectical conception of a fallacy, according to which a fallacy is an argumentative speech act which violates one or more of the rules of 'rational discussion'. That conception is found to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for committing a fallacy. It is also found wanting in several other respects.

If asked to define ‘omnipotence,’ the man on the street would probably say that it’s the ability to do anything. That’s about it, he’d think; nothing more needs be said. Philosophers are never so easily satisfied. They take it as matter of professional duty to find serious problems in important concepts, and to suggest that the concept be rejected or that solutions are at hand. This paper falls into the latter camp. Beginning with a relatively simple definition of ‘omnipotence,’ increasingly (...) complex definitions are proposed, problems are found with them, and newer, refined definitions are offered. In all, seven unsatisfactory definitions are examined before an adequate one is arrived at. Both traditional and new problems are addressed, and novel solutions are advanced. The definition argued to be adequate is itself novel, but also very much in keeping with our pre-reflective understanding of omnipotence. On the basis of the definition it’s concluded not only that an adequate definition of ‘omnipotence’ is possible, but that various problems alleged to attend attributing the notion to God can also be solved. (shrink)

This paper is a defense of the view that existence is a property. Since the view is still a minority one, a fair amount of space is allotted to defending it against objections and counter-arguments. Positive arguments aren’t lacking, however, and emerge in the course of the discussion. Not all of the many positive or negative arguments which follow are wholly original—a fact to be expected in this context—but a fair number are, and both sorts of argument are seamlessly interwoven (...) in the warp and woof of what follows. (shrink)

Still, in this paper I’m not going to be laudatory, enthusiastic, or appreciative, but instead address the distinctly philosophical question of what a forgery is—investigate the concept of a forgery, as philosophers used to say, and sometimes still do. Only after that question and a few others have been answered should we ask the question that everyone wants to ask straight off: What, if anything, is aesthetically wrong with a forgery? Interesting as that question is, space limitations prevent me from (...) addressing it here. (shrink)

A common view is that relativism requires tolerance. We argue that there is no deductive relation between relativism and tolerance, but also that relativism is not incompatible with tolerance. Next we note that there is no standard inductive relation between relativism and tolerance—no inductive enumeration, argument to the best explanation, or causal argument links the two. Two inductive arguments of a different sort that link them are then exposed and criticized at length. The first considers relativism from the objective point (...) of view ‘of the universe’, the second from the subjective point of view of the relativist herself. Both arguments fail. There is similarly no deductive relation between absolutism and tolerance—neither entails the other—and no inductive connection of any sort links the two. We conclude that tolerance, whether unlimited or restricted, is independent of both relativism and absolutism. A metaethical theory that says only that there is one true or valid ethical code, or that there is a plurality of equally true or valid ethical codes, tells us nothing about whether we should be tolerant, much less how tolerant we should be. (shrink)

Two brainless curs, Alan Brinton and Douglas Walton, have recently had the impudence to suggest that several of my views on argumentum ad baculum are mistaken. While hardship and toil await them in this life and eternal damnation in the next, punishment begins with this paper. In it, I clarify my position, defend my views, and critique their arguments. Last, I argue ad baculum against both of them, threatening both with the loss of reputation, employment, and respect unless they repudiate (...) every objection raised against me and publicly abase themselves. (shrink)

While lies have attracted philosophical attention since antiquity, phenomena in the near area have generated considerably less interest. Lately, however, Max Black and Harry Frankfurt have visited a close relative: humbug or bullshit, as it's either more politely or more rudely called. In this article their views on humbug and bullshit are exposed, explained, critiqued, and, ultimately, rejected. An alternative view is then proposed and defended.

Some patients have no chance of surviving if not treated, but very little chance if treated. A number of medical ethicists and physicians have argued that treatment in such cases is medically futile and a matter of physician discretion. This paper is a critical examination of that position. According to Howard Brody and others, a judgment of medical futility is a purely technical matter, and one which physicians are uniquely qualified to make. Although Brody later retracted these claims, he held (...) fast to the view that physicians need not consult the patient or his family to determine their values before deciding not to treat. This is because professional integrity dictates that treatment shouldn't be undertaken. The argument for this claim is that medicine is a profession and a social practice, and thus capable of breaches of professional integrity. Underlying professional integrity are two moral principles, one concerning harm, the other fraud. Both point to the fact that when the odds of survival are very low treatment is a violation of professional integrity. The details of this skeletal argument are exposed and explained, and the full argument is subjected to criticism. On a number of counts, it's found wanting. If anything, professional integrity points to the opposite conclusion. (shrink)

This paper is a critical assessment of argumentum ad baculum, or appeal to force. Its principal contention is that, contrary to common opinion, there is no general fallacy of ad baculum. Most real-life ad baculums are, in fact, fairly strong. A basic logical form for reconstructed ad baculums is proposed, and a number of heterodoxical conclusions are also advanced and argued for. They include that ad baculum is not necessarily a prudential argument, that ad baculum need not involve force, violence, (...) or threats, and that one can argue ad baculum to oneself. The starting point of the paper, however, is a critical evaluation of three ad baculums from the exercise sets of Irving Copi's well-known Introduction to Logic. (shrink)

"The essays, both philosophical and historical, demonstrate the continuing significance of a neglected aspect of Kant’s thought."—Religious Studies Review Challenging the traditional view that Kant's account of religion was peripheral to his thinking, these essays demonstrate the centrality of religion to Kant's critical philosophy. Contributors are Sharon Anderson-Gold, Leslie A. Mulholland, Anthony N. Perovich, Jr., Philip J. Rossi, Joseph Runzo, Denis Savage, Walter Sparn, Burkhard Tuschling, Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, and Allen W. Wood.

Discussions regarding abortion are often misguided and confused. This paper critically examines the extreme liberal view, which argues that neither the fetus, at any stage of development, nor the young infant has a right to life. It focuses on the general argumentative strategy employed by a number of philosophers in arriving at an extreme liberal view. An evaluative critique of an extreme liberal view is offered as a step toward clarifying and expanding upon the abortion debate. Keywords: abortion, personhood, speciesism, (...) right to life, human being CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

SummaryThis paper is a critical examination of argumentum ad ignorantiam, or arguing from ignorance. Ad ignorantiam is regarded as a fallacy, and certainly no route to knowledge, by most philosophers. However, case studies of ad ignorantiam are almost non‐existent, and theoretical discussions few in number. Thus this paper begins with a number of case studies. From them some morals are drawn. The morals concern the interpretation and evaluation of arguments in general and the nature and epistemic value of ad ignorantiam (...) in particular. Two theoretical discussions of the argument‐type are next considered, those of Richard Robinson and John Woods and Douglas Walton. I conclude that there is no general fallacy of ad ignorantiam– no argument is fallacious just because it's an ad ignorantiam– and that sometimes no reason is good reason. (shrink)

A number of arguments against moral relativism are based on the reality of intracultural conflict or the related possibility of sliding down a slippery slope and out the door of morality altogether. The first batch of arguments draws upon the evident fact that cultures are not unitary or homogenous but contain subgroups at odds with each other. The second batch is based on the claim that if moral truth is relativized to a culture, consistency demands that it eventually be relativized (...) to the individual, and with that comes the end of morality. In this paper, (A) moral relativism is first defined, clarified, and defended—these preliminaries being necessary, given what follows—and (B) the common but infrequently discussed arguments mentioned above are distinguished, exposed, explained, evaluated, and ultimately rejected. (shrink)

On relativism, it has been argued, certain comparative moral judgments are impossible. Judgments which compare two moral codes, judgments which compare one’s own moral code with another, judgments which, on the basis of a comparison with one’s own code, condemn specific moral practices permitted or required by other codes, judgments which speak of moral progress or reform—all are nonsensical or impossible, the argument alleges. Although commonly conflated, arguments for these distinct but related theses are first distinguished, then exposed, and last (...) subjected to critical scrutiny. While seemingly powerful, all are found wanting. (shrink)

This paper is a critical examination of the so-called slippery slope argument for the conservative position on abortion. The argument was discussed in the philosophic literature some time back, but has since fallen into disfavor. The argument is first exposed and a general objection to it is advanced, then rebutted. Rosalind Hursthouse's more detailed and stronger objection is next aired, but also found less than convincing. In the course of discussing her objection, the correct form of the argument is identified, (...) and it's noted that rejection of the argument requires finding fault with its inductive premise. That, in turn, requires either (a) identifying and defending a cutoff point other than conception, or (b) not identifying a cutoff point but directly attacking the argument's conclusion. As far as (a) is concerned, all except one alternative cutoff point have severe problems that have been well discussed in the literature. The one that doesn't, the appearance of the ‘primitive streak’, is examined in detailed, but ultimately rejected. As for (b), five different grounds for rejecting the conclusion are identified and discussed, but none is found plausible. Variations on the slippery slope argument, concerning different conclusions that it may have, are then distinguished, related to each other, and critically discussed, and the paper ends with some cautionary remarks about the defense of the argument tendered. (shrink)

One form of argument from analogy is identified and Stephen Barker's remarks about a second kind of argument from analogy, non-inductive (and non-deductive) argument from analogy, are used as a springboard to identify a second form. That form is then refined, explained, exemplified, and related to the first form. It is argued that there is a spectrum of different forms of argument from analogy, with the two forms identified being end points on the spectrum. Except in terms of form, however, (...) there is no reason to speak of two different kinds of argument from analogy. (shrink)

One well-known argument for the view that a person isn’t identical with his body is commonly attributed to Descartes. In brief, the argument is: ‘I can doubt that my body exists; I can’t doubt that I exist; so I am not my body.’ No one thinks that the argument is sound --- not even Descartes after he closely examined it. In this paper, I reconstruct the argument, explain and criticize various objections to it , and identify and defend what I (...) take to be the real problem with it. Contrary to popular opinion, the real problem has nothing to do with Leibniz’s Law. (shrink)

This paper is a defense of the view that existence is a perfection. Anselm’s First Ontological Argument is referred to throughout. Two major objections are advanced: the ‘perfect island’ objection and the ‘perfect devil’ objection. A rebuttal of both, based on Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo, is tendered, but itself faces a major objection. Two lines of defense against this objection are possible. The first is sympathetically explained but it is argued that it ultimately fails. The second, which focuses on the (...) idea of a perfection and a perfect being, is elaborated and defended against a seemingly powerful objection. It is concluded that there is a reasonable interpretation of the claim that existence is a perfection. (shrink)

Gilbert Ryle and a number of other philosophers have argued that Descartes’ claim his senses could always deceive him is false. Ryle’s argument is the well-known ‘counterfeit coins’ argument. A similar argument, featuring forged paintings, has been advanced by Jay Rosenberg. Both Ryle’s and Rosenberg’s arguments are refutations by logical analogy. In this paper, their arguments are exposed and reconstructed, and it is shown and how and why their refutations by logical analogy fail. It is then noted that, even so, (...) they could be right about the invalidity of Descartes’ argument. A close examination of Descartes’ argument, however, shows that there is nothing wrong with it. (shrink)

This paper is an analysis of the concept of creativity. Tradition is followed in distinguishing three related but increasing complex concepts. The first concerns mere making or bringing into existence. It is not examined at length. The second builds on the first but includes the notion of novelty. The third incorporates the second but adds the notion of value. The latter two concepts of creativity are explored in great detail.

With his clear and accessible prose, impeccable scholarship, and balanced Judgment, Roland Teske, SJ, has been an influential and important voice in Medieval philosophy for more than thirty years. This volume, in his honour, brings together more than a dozen essays on central metaphysical and theological themes in Augustine and other medieval thinkers. The authors, listed below, are noted scholars who draw upon Teskes work, reflect on it, go beyond it, and at times even disagree with it, but always in (...) a spirit of respectful co-operation, and always with the aim of getting at the truth. Essays on Augustine contributed by Gerald Bonner, Charles Brittain, Joseph Koterski, SJ, Joseph T. Lienhard, SJ, David Vincent Meconi, SJ, Ann A. Pang-White, Frederick Van Fleteren, Dorothea Weber, and James Wetzel. Essays on Bernard of Clairvaux, William of Auvergne, and other medieval themes contributed by John P. Doyle, William Harmless, SJ, John A. Laumakis, Edward P. Mahoney, and Philipp W. Rosemann. (shrink)

With his clear and accessible prose, impeccable scholarship, and balanced Judgment, Roland Teske, SJ, has been an influential and important voice in Medieval philosophy for more than thirty years. This volume, in his honour, brings together more than a dozen essays on central metaphysical and theological themes in Augustine and other medieval thinkers. The authors, listed below, are noted scholars who draw upon Teskes work, reflect on it, go beyond it, and at times even disagree with it, but always in (...) a spirit of respectful co-operation, and always with the aim of getting at the truth. Essays on Augustine contributed by Gerald Bonner, Charles Brittain, Joseph Koterski, SJ, Joseph T. Lienhard, SJ, David Vincent Meconi, SJ, Ann A. Pang-White, Frederick Van Fleteren, Dorothea Weber, and James Wetzel. Essays on Bernard of Clairvaux, William of Auvergne, and other medieval themes contributed by John P. Doyle, William Harmless, SJ, John A. Laumakis, Edward P. Mahoney, and Philipp W. Rosemann. (shrink)