Democracy may contribute to friendly attitudes and positive attitudes toward outgroups (i.e., outgroup tolerance) because members of democratic societies learn to exercise their rights (i.e., cast a vote) and, in the process, listen to different opinions. Study 1 was a survey study with representative samples from 33 countries (N = 45, 070, 53.6% female) and it showed a positive association between the levels of democracy and outgroup tolerance after controlling for gender, age and the rate of immigrants influx from (...) 2010 to 2013. Study 1 demonstrated that members in countries with higher political participation and civil liberty showed greater tolerance toward immigrants. In Study 2, we conducted an experimental study in Taiwan (N = 93, 67.7% female) to further examine two potential mediators (opinion sharing and voting) of the effect of democratic system on tolerance toward outgroups (i.e., attitudes toward mental patients) after controlling for gender and age. We found that when individuals were allowed to share opinions and vote, they had the highest positive other-oriented emotions toward mental patients, which in turn led to greater tolerance toward outgroups compared to those who were not allowed to share opinions or vote. In general, these results demonstrated that the democratic system plays a critical role in increasing outgroup tolerance. Limitations of the two studies and implications regarding opinion sharing, voting, democratic systems, and effects on outgroup tolerance are discussed. (shrink)

The well-established pattern of Executive expansionism and limited oversight of Executive action in times of terrorism is problematic from the civil libertarian point of view. How to limit such action has been the subject of much scholarship, a large amount of which focuses on perceptions of institutional competence rather than effectiveness. For the authors, the effective control of security-focused state action is to be judged by the extent to which it consists only of action that is necessary and (...) proportionate and thereby strikes an appropriate balance between security exigencies and individual rights. This article, written and structured in dialectic form, presents competing perspectives on effective oversight mechanisms: on the one hand, an extra-constitutionalism perspective, proposing a limited role for the Judiciary and emphasizing the need for legislative and democratic controls; and on the other, an argument for judicial muscularity. (shrink)

Contemporary democratic theorists have tended to assume that democracy is compatible with and even requires a capitalist economic system. Rosa Luxemburg offers a democratic criticism of this view, arguing that the dominating effects of a capitalist economy undermine the ability of liberal democracy to actualise its ideals of freedom and equality. Drawing on Luxemburg’s writings, this article theorises a model of socialist democracy which combines support for public ownership and control of the means of production with a (...) plural multi-party electoral system and a defence of civil liberties. It recovers Luxemburg’s conceptualisation of a socialist democracy as the extension of democratic principles to major social and economic institutions currently governed by nondemocratic authority structures. It defends this version of socialist democracy from the liberal objection that it violates citizens’ property rights and the Marxist objection that it retains the dominating structures of the state and a coercive legal system. (shrink)

Contemporary democratic theorists have tended to assume that democracy is compatible with and even requires a capitalist economic system. Rosa Luxemburg offers a democratic criticism of this view, arguing that the dominating effects of a capitalist economy undermine the ability of liberal democracy to actualise its ideals of freedom and equality. Drawing on Luxemburg’s writings, this article theorises a model of socialist democracy which combines support for public ownership and control of the means of production with a (...) plural multi-party electoral system and a defence of civil liberties. It recovers Luxemburg’s conceptualisation of a socialist democracy as the extension of democratic principles to major social and economic institutions currently governed by nondemocratic authority structures. It defends this version of socialist democracy from the liberal objection that it violates citizens’ property rights and the Marxist objection that it retains the dominating structures of the state and a coercive legal system. (shrink)

In the article, becoming civil democratic control is considered above military powers of Russian Federation, certainly the factors of influence in relation to forming of political model of the civilly soldiery relations.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RusselL on Chinese Civilization 23 RUSSELL ON CHINESE CIVILIZATIONI Yu DONG Ph}losophy / McMaster University Hamilton, Ont., Canada L8s 4K1 1 I am indebted to Nicholas Griffin for his valuable comments and encouragement. I thank Marty Fairbairn and Perer Lovrick for many corrections in the paper. I am also greatly indebred to Ken Blackwell for his helpful criticisms and suggesrions. • (London: Allen & Unwin, 1922), p. 20. 3 (...) Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeron: Princeton U. P.), p. 173· B ertrand Russell arrived in China with Dora Black in October 1920. World War I had deepened his disillusionment with both the capitalist system and Western civilization in general. Seeking a socialist solution, he had visited Soviet Union just a few months before. But he had found that the Communist state there presented an unappealing alternative to the capitalist West in that it treated its citizens as slaves. The sad mood in which he "set out for China to seek a new hope"2 was described in his The Problem of China, published in 1922 after his nine-month visit: "It was on the Volga, in the. summer of 1920, that I first realized how profound is the disease in our Western mentality, which the Bolsheviks are attempting to force upon an essentially Asiatic population, just as Japan and the West are doing in China" (p. 18). The 1920S were a time when China, both as a nation and as a civilization, was in deep trouble. Her young people were eagerly looking outside their country to find a way of saving her. Since the 1840 Opium War, the Western Powers had poured into China, which had been a closed society, at least in Karl Popper's sense,3 for more than 3,000 years. With the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 19I1, China had been thrown into a state of anarchy by feuding warlords. The Great World Powers had both politically and economically dominated China through successive wars with her;4 through demanding indemnities, the cession of territory, fixed tariffs, etc.; and through controlling the corrupt and inept central government and warlords. Meanwhile, China was plagued by famine, piracy, brigandage, incipient rebellion,5 and the failures of various attempts at reform and revolution.6 China was well on the way toward disintegration, divided into "spheres of influence" by Britain, Germany, France, Russia and, especially, Japan. In the 1920S, China was also in the period of the May Fourth Movement-named after a popular student protest on 4 May 1919against foreign imperialism and an impotent Chinese government. It was agitated by the Treaty of Versailles which transferred, at the request ofJapan, the properties and privileges of the German sphere of influence in the Shandong Peninsula to Japan. This movement advocated learning science and adopting democratic principles in order to save China. It is important in Chinese history as a symbol of Chinese awareness of the need for the most profound changes in her tradition. All of these factors constituted the background to Russell's visit to China and thus affected the formation of his distinct view of the problem of China.? The invitation to him was a part of Chinese efforts in seeking methods from the West to save their country. Russell had already been known in China as a great philosopher, not only for his philosophy of logic and science, but also for his views on social problems. Some Chinese had access to his books: Principles ofSocial Reconstruction (1916), Political Ideals (1917), Roads To Freedom (1918), and magazine publication of parts of The Practice and Theory ofBolshevism (1920).8 Considering this background, it is quite understandable why 4 For example, Brirain and France 1856-60, Japan 1894-95, 1914-15. 5 For example, Taiping 1850-65, and the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. 6 The revolution of 1911 actually just changed the name of the government, rather than the reality of society. 7 A detailed description of this background as "psychological roots" can be seen in S. P. Odgen, "The Sage in the Inkpot", Modern Arian Studies, 16 (1982): 529-600. 8 For example, Zhang Shenfu, a student originally majoring in mathematics in Beijing University, had read almost all of... (shrink)

The modern world space, which is affected by the post-pandemic consequences, is noted by the globalization of society, the increasing role of citizenship in making important state and international decisions has become possible in the context of the information revolution and has its own characteristics of communication in information and communication networks. The importance and need for a thorough study of the chosen topic is that the widespread use of various forms and methods of civil communication, free access of (...) citizens to information at all stages of decision-making and the functioning of central and local governments, the participation of civil society institutions in the work of expert, consultative, and advisory public councils on the expression and protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens, public control, direct electronic receipt of public services, etc. are important factors in the democratization of government in post-pandemic modern times. After all, we are talking about a deliberate orientation to new values - the person and the collective, their direct participation in the democratic organization of life of the state and society. The main thing in this context is that the rational consensus of civil society and the state is a factor in universal social discourse and a strategic resource for democratic development in the context of post-pandemic modernity. The aim of the article is to consider the epistemological and sociocultural aspects of the functioning of the communication capabilities of civil society institutions in the context of revealing the possibility and significance of their involvement in the processes of implementing state security policy. (shrink)

Objective: To assess the relation between autocratisation—substantial decreases in democratic traits (free and fair elections, freedom of civil and political association, and freedom of expression)—and countries’ population health outcomes and progress toward universal health coverage (UHC). -/- Design: Synthetic control analysis. -/- Setting and country selection: Global sample of countries for all years from 1989 to 2019, split into two categories: 17 treatment countries that started autocratising during 2000 to 2010, and 119 control countries that never (...) autocratised from 1989 to 2019. The treatment countries comprised low and middle income nations and represent all world regions except North America and western Europe. A weighted combination of control countries was used to construct synthetic controls for each treatment country. This statistical method is especially well suited to population level studies when random assignment is infeasible and sufficiently similar comparators are not available. The method was originally developed in economics and political science to assess the impact of policies and events, and it is now increasingly used in epidemiology. -/- Main outcome measures: HIV-free life expectancy at age 5 years, UHC effective coverage index (0-100 point scale), and out-of-pocket spending on health per capita. All outcome variables are for the period 1989 to 2019. -/- Results: Autocratising countries underperformed for all three outcome variables in the 10 years after the onset of autocratisation, despite some improvements in life expectancy, UHC effective coverage index, and out-of-pocket spending on health. On average, HIV-free life expectancy at age 5 years increased by 2.2% (from 64.7 to 66.1 years) during the 10 years after the onset of autocratisation. This study estimated that it would have increased by 3.5% (95% confidence interval 3.3% to 3.6%, P<0.001) (from 64.7 to 66.9 years) in the absence of autocratisation. On average, the UHC effective coverage index increased by 11.9% (from 42.5 to 47.6 points) during the 10 years after the onset of autocratisation. This study estimated that it would have increased by 20.2% (95% confidence interval 19.6% to 21.2%, P<0.001) (from 42.5 to 51.1 points) in the absence of autocratisation. Finally, on average, out-of-pocket spending on health per capita increased by 10.0% (from $4.00 (£3.1; €3.4) to $4.4, log transformed) during the 10 years after the onset of autocratisation. This study estimated that it would have increased by only 4.4% (95% confidence interval 3.9% to 4.6%, P<0.001) (from $4.0 to $4.2, log transformed) in the absence of autocratisation. -/- Conclusions: Autocratising countries had worse than estimated life expectancy, effective health service coverage, and levels of out-of-pocket spending on health. These results suggest that the noticeable increase in the number of countries that are experiencing democratic erosion in recent years is hindering population health gains and progress toward UHC. Global health institutions will need to adjust their policy recommendations and activities to obtain the best possible results in those countries with a diminishing democratic incentive to provide quality healthcare to populations. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to show that mainstream liberal accounts of civil disobedience fail to fully capture the latter’s specific characteristics as a genuinely political and democratic practice of contestation that is not reducible to an ethical or legal understanding either in terms of individual conscience or of fidelity to the rule of law. In developing this account in more detail, I first define civil disobedience with an aim of spelling out why the standard liberal (...) model, while providing a useful starting point, ultimately leads to an overly constrained, domesticated and sanitized understanding of this complex political practice. Second, I place the political practice of civil disobedience between two opposing poles: symbolic politics and real confrontation. I argue that the irreducible tension between these poles precisely accounts for its politicizing and democratizing potential. Finally, I briefly examine the role of civil disobedience in representative democracies, addressing a series of recent challenges made in response to this radically democratic understanding of disobedience. (shrink)

The present book comprises thirteen chapters written by Nordic scholars in the human and social sciences, and developed out of conference papers presented at regular winter and summer symposia held by two research groups emanating from the Nordic Summer University. Born within and informed by this specific milieu, the chapters address significant sociopolitical implications for contemporary societies emerging from the ethical reflections of leading 20th century thinkers (e.g. Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas), important procedural as well as substantive aspects of (...) democracy, and pivotal ethico-political issues arising from the abstract logic and concrete manifestations of market economies. Though by no means devoid of their own economic, cultural and political problems, the Nordic countries are still paramount examples of humane prosperity, democratic civility, environmentally sound policy, and peaceful resolution of social and industrial conflicts. Year after year, if not decade after decade, they keep topping the international charts for socio-economic indicators about sostainable development, healthcare quality and accessibility, educational levels, crime control, preceived happiness and much else. As such, the scholarly and scientific reflections orginating within the Nordic Summer University might prove to be useful sources of insight for policy-makers, intellectuals and interested persons outside the Nordic context, and not solely inside it. (shrink)

Democratic Republic of the Congo’s fight with Ebola was just settling when WHO declared COVID‐19 to be a global pandemic on March 12, 2020. This has caused concomitant setbacks in the treatment and control of major health issues like HIV, tuberculosis, measles, and malaria in the country. This, coupled with civil unrest and risk to the safety of the health workers, is a 'perfect storm' waiting to unfold. Military contingents as peacekeepers are having the most difficult time, (...) handling the situation, in the wake of risks involved. (shrink)

Democratic civility is a core civic virtue of persons engaged in democratic deliberation. It is a complex trait that includes tolerance of diverse political views, openness regarding civic matters to reasons offered by others, willingness to seek compromise in an effort to find workable political solutions, and willingness to limit one’s individual interests for the public good when there are adequate reasons for doing so. Various writers have noted a tension between rights and civility. Insofar as rights trump (...) general considerations of community welfare and entail claims that can be demanded, an emphasis on individual rights and standing on one’s rights can undermine the sort of civility required for political compromise. Similarly an emphasis on civility might require not standing on rights when doing so is at the expense of the welfare of the community. Notwithstanding this tension, I argue that human rights and democratic civility have a symbiotic relationship. In particular, I argue that democratic civility is important for determining the scope of human rights as they are implemented in institutional structures, and that human rights have an important role to play in shaping the virtue of democratic civility. (shrink)

Democratic civility is a core civic virtue of persons engaged in democratic deliberation. It is a complex trait that includes tolerance of diverse political views, openness regarding civic matters to reasons offered by others, willingness to seek compromise in an effort to find workable political solutions, and willingness to limit one’s individual interests for the public good when there are adequate reasons for doing so. Various writers have noted a tension between rights and civility. Insofar as rights trump (...) general considerations of community welfare and entail claims that can be demanded, an emphasis on individual rights and standing on one’s rights can undermine the sort of civility required for political compromise. Similarly an emphasis on civility might require not standing on rights when doing so is at the expense of the welfare of the community. Notwithstanding this tension, I argue that human rights and democratic civility have a symbiotic relationship. In particular, I argue that democratic civility is important for determining the scope of human rights as they are implemented in institutional structures, and that human rights have an important role to play in shaping the virtue of democratic civility. (shrink)

Technologies for mitigating and adapting to climate change are inherently political. Their development, diffusion and deployment will have uneven impacts within and across national borders. Bringing the governance of climate technologies under democratic control is imperative but impeded by the global scale of governance and its polycentric nature. This article draws on innovative theorising in the deliberative democracy tradition to map possibilities for global democratic governance of climate technologies. It is argued that this domain is not beyond (...) the reach of democracy. Civil society has a unique and expanded role to play in generating democratic legitimacy by fostering public deliberation; translating and transmitting concepts, ideas and messages; and promoting and facilitating deliberative accountability. (shrink)

At its core, the evolution of democratic civil society is a process of transcending existing, historical social space, a process that desires to dissolve "political society" into "civil society" and with it to reformulate space as more democratic, participatory public space, and global spheres of interaction. In this article, the author examines the implications of globalization and the evolution of democratic civil society. Drawing on the work of French theorists de Certeau and Lefebvre, the (...) author examines the nature of space as a social construct and the importance of understanding space as a practiced place in relation to the evolution of democratic civil society that makes transnational space a practiced place for global civil society. The author argues that as globalization spreads across nation-states, spatial forces produced by economic, cultural, and political discourses and practices give way to the potential for the evolution of democratic civil society. (shrink)

While ancient civilizations worshipped strong, active emotions, modern societies have favored more peaceful attitudes, especially within the democratic process. We have largely forgotten the struggle to make use of _thymos_, the part of the soul that, following Plato, contains spirit, pride, and indignation. Rather, Christianity and psychoanalysis have promoted mutual understanding to overcome conflict. Through unique examples, Peter Sloterdijk, the preeminent posthumanist, argues exactly the opposite, showing how the history of Western civilization can be read as a suppression and (...) return of rage. By way of reinterpreting the _Iliad_, Alexandre Dumas's _Count of Monte Cristo_, and recent Islamic political riots in Paris, Sloterdijk proves the fallacy that rage is an emotion capable of control. Global terrorism and economic frustrations have rendered strong emotions visibly resurgent, and the consequences of violent outbursts will determine international relations for decades to come. To better respond to rage and its complexity, Sloterdijk daringly breaks with entrenched dogma and contructs a new theory for confronting conflict. His approach acknowledges and respects the proper place of rage and channels it into productive political struggle. (shrink)

While ancient civilizations worshipped strong, active emotions, modern societies have favored more peaceful attitudes, especially within the democratic process. We have largely forgotten the struggle to make use of _thymos_, the part of the soul that, following Plato, contains spirit, pride, and indignation. Rather, Christianity and psychoanalysis have promoted mutual understanding to overcome conflict. Through unique examples, Peter Sloterdijk, the preeminent posthumanist, argues exactly the opposite, showing how the history of Western civilization can be read as a suppression and (...) return of rage. By way of reinterpreting the _Iliad_, Alexandre Dumas's _Count of Monte Cristo_, and recent Islamic political riots in Paris, Sloterdijk proves the fallacy that rage is an emotion capable of control. Global terrorism and economic frustrations have rendered strong emotions visibly resurgent, and the consequences of violent outbursts will determine international relations for decades to come. To better respond to rage and its complexity, Sloterdijk daringly breaks with entrenched dogma and contructs a new theory for confronting conflict. His approach acknowledges and respects the proper place of rage and channels it into productive political struggle. (shrink)

This is the first full-length presentation of a republican alternative to the liberal and communitarian theories that have dominated political philosophy in recent years. The latest addition to the acclaimed Oxford Political Theory series, Pettit's eloquent and compelling account opens with an examination of the traditional republican conception of freedom as non-domination, contrasting this with established negative and positive views of liberty. The first part of the book traces the rise and decline of this conception, displays its many attractions, and (...) makes a case for why it should still be regarded as a central political ideal. The second part of the book looks at what the implementation of the ideal would imply for substantive policy-making, constitutional and democratic design, regulatory control and the relation between state and civil society. Prominent in this account is a novel concept of democracy, under which government is exposed to systematic contestation, and a vision of relations between state and society founded upon civility and trust. Pettit's powerful and insightful new work offers not only a unified, theoretical overview of the many strands of republican ideas, but also a new and sophisticated perspective on studies in related fields including the history of ideas, jurisprudence, and criminology. (shrink)

Medical practitioners owe much of the significant progress made in the diagnosis and treatment of disease to industrial research. Hence, co-operation between providers of medical services, most notably medical practitioners, and the pharmaceutical industry is in the best interest of patients. Yet, empirical evidence shows how well-directed influence exerted by the pharmaceutical industry impacts physicians’ decision-making. Profit-motivated inducement by the pharmaceutical industry may expose patients to considerable risks. Against what many think to be based on overwhelming evidence, Joao Calinas-Correia takes (...) the view that the criticism levelled at the pharmaceutical industry as well as the call for transparency in the relationships between physicians and the industry are exaggerated. In his polemic he praises “Big Pharma” as a success and espouses the view that the undesired consequences of its activities are allegedly inherent in the underlying market environment shaped by politics. Moreover, he believes that the proposals made to control and eliminate such undesired effects will lead to mediocrity. Astonishingly, his polemic reaches out to contest the appropriateness of setting rules at all—even if being set by a democratic process. Calinas-Correia’s assertions are based on the wrong premises. They fail to recognize that today individual civil rights and liberties often enough do not have to be defended against encroachments by governmental authorities. Rather, it is incumbent on the state to create rules designed to defend the individual against infringements by overly powerful non-governmental institutions, in our case the medical-industrial complex. Given the power exercised by physicians and the special nature of their role in public health, clear-cut rules have to be enacted and implemented with respect to their relationship to Big Pharma. (shrink)

Is there a public good? A prevalent view in political science is that democracy is unavoidably chaotic, arbitrary, meaningless, and impossible. Such scepticism began with Condorcet in the eighteenth century, and continued most notably with Arrow and Riker in the twentieth century. In this powerful book, Gerry Mackie confronts and subdues these long-standing doubts about democratic governance. Problems of cycling, agenda control, strategic voting, and dimensional manipulation are not sufficiently harmful, frequent, or irremediable, he argues, to be of (...) normative concern. Mackie also examines every serious empirical illustration of cycling and instability, including Riker's famous argument that the US Civil War was due to arbitrary dimensional manipulation. Almost every empirical claim is erroneous, and none is normatively troubling, Mackie says. This spirited defence of democratic institutions should prove both provocative and influential. (shrink)

The long republican tradition is characterized by a conception of freedom as non‐domination, which offers an alternative, both to the negative view of freedom as non‐interference and to the positive view of freedom as self‐mastery. The first part of the book traces the rise and decline of the conception, displays its many attractions and makes a case for why it should still be regarded as a central political ideal. The second part of the book looks at the sorts of political (...) and civil institutions that would be required in a society in which freedom as non‐domination is systematically fostered. It outlines the causes and policies, the constitutional and democratic forms, and the regulatory controls that a republican state ought to endorse. And it argues for a vision of the state's relation to civil society in which there is no pretence of doing without widespread civility and trust; the argument is that the state ought, at once, to foster and build on such extra‐political foundations. (shrink)

From the $700 billion bailout of the banking industry to president Barack Obama’s $787 billion stimulus package to the highly controversial passage of federal health-care reform, conservatives and concerned citizens alike have grown increasingly fearful of big government. Enter Nobel Prize–winning economist and political theorist F. A. Hayek, whose passionate warning against empowering states with greater economic control, The Road to Serfdom, became an overnight sensation last summer when it was endorsed by Glenn Beck. The book has since sold (...) over 150,000 copies. The latest entry in the University of Chicago Press’s series of newly edited editions of Hayek’s works, The Constitution of Liberty is, like Serfdom, just as relevant to our present moment. The book is considered Hayek’s classic statement on the ideals of freedom and liberty, ideals that he believes have guided—and must continue to guide—the growth of Western civilization. Here Hayek defends the principles of a free society, casting a skeptical eye on the growth of the welfare state and examining the challenges to freedom posed by an ever expanding government—as well as its corrosive effect on the creation, preservation, and utilization of knowledge. In opposition to those who call for the state to play a greater role in society, Hayek puts forward a nuanced argument for prudence. Guided by this quality, he elegantly demonstrates that a free market system in a democratic polity—under the rule of law and with strong constitutional protections of individual rights—represents the best chance for the continuing existence of liberty. Striking a balance between skepticism and hope, Hayek’s profound insights are timelier and more welcome than ever before. This definitive edition of The Constitution of Liberty will give a new generation the opportunity to learn from his enduring wisdom. (shrink)

Medical practitioners owe much of the significant progress made in the diagnosis and treatment of disease to industrial research. Hence, co-operation between providers of medical services, most notably medical practitioners, and the pharmaceutical industry is in the best interest of patients. Yet, empirical evidence shows how well-directed influence exerted by the pharmaceutical industry impacts physicians’ decision-making. Profit-motivated inducement by the pharmaceutical industry may expose patients to considerable risks. Against what many think to be based on overwhelming evidence, Joao Calinas-Correia takes (...) the view that the criticism levelled at the pharmaceutical industry as well as the call for transparency in the relationships between physicians and the industry are exaggerated. In his polemic he praises “Big Pharma” as a success and espouses the view that the undesired consequences of its activities are allegedly inherent in the underlying market environment shaped by politics. Moreover, he believes that the proposals made to control and eliminate such undesired effects will lead to mediocrity. Astonishingly, his polemic reaches out to contest the appropriateness of setting rules at all—even if being set by a democratic process. Calinas-Correia’s assertions are based on the wrong premises. They fail to recognize that today individual civil rights and liberties often enough do not have to be defended against encroachments by governmental authorities. Rather, it is incumbent on the state to create rules designed to defend the individual against infringements by overly powerful non-governmental institutions, in our case the medical-industrial complex. Given the power exercised by physicians and the special nature of their role in public health, clear-cut rules have to be enacted and implemented with respect to their relationship to Big Pharma. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a new interpretation of the British evolutionary synthesis. The synthetic work of J. B. S. Haldane, R. A. Fisher and J. S. Huxley was characterized by both an integration of Mendelism and Darwinism and the unification of different biological subdisciplines within a coherent framework. But it must also be seen as a bold and synthetic Darwinian program in which the biosciences served as a utopian blueprint for the progress of civilization. Describing the futuristic visions of (...) these three scientists in their synthetic heydays, I show that, despite a number of important divergences, their biopolitical ideals could be biased toward a controlled and regimented utopian society. Their common ideals entailed a social order where liberal and democratic principles were partially or totally suspended in favor of bioscientific control and planning for the future. Finally, I will argue that the original redefinition of Darwinism that modern synthesizers proposed is a significant historical example of how Darwinism has been used and adapted in different contexts. The lesson I draw from this account is a venerable one: that, whenever we wish to define Darwinism, we need to recognize not only its scientific content and achievements but expose the other traditions and ideologies it may have supported. (shrink)

Multi-stakeholder initiatives involve actors from several spheres of society in collaborative arrangements to reach objectives typically related to sustainable development. In political CSR literature, these arrangements have been framed as improvements to transnational governance and as being somehow democratic. We draw on Mouffe’s works on agonistic pluralism to problematize the notion that consensus-led multi-stakeholder initiatives bring more democratic control on corporate power. We examine two initiatives which address two very different issue areas: the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm (...) Oil and the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety. We map the different kinds of adversarial relations involved in connection with the issues meant to be governed by the two initiatives, and find those adversarial relations to take six main shapes, affecting the initiatives in different ways: competing regulatory initiatives; pressure-response relations within multi-stakeholder initiatives; pressure-response relations between NGOs and states through multi-stakeholder initiatives; collaboration and competition between multi-stakeholder initiatives and states; pressure-response relations between civil society actors and multi-stakeholder initiatives; and counter-hegemonic movements against multi-stakeholder initiatives as hegemonic projects. We conclude that multi-stakeholder initiatives cannot be democratic by themselves, and we argue that business and society researchers should not look at democracy or politics only internally to these initiatives, but rather study how issue areas are regulated through interactions between a variety of actors—both within and without the multi-stakeholder initiatives—who get to have a legitimate voice in this regulation. (shrink)

Discussion about the viability of democracy in what can broadly be called our `postmodern', technologically dominated age, has mainly turned around two central issues: does not the current dispersion and fragmentation of social actors — deriving partly from the overriding presence of the media in our civilization — conspire against the emergence of strong social identities which could operate as nodal points for the consolidation and expansion of democratic practices?; and is not this very multiplicity the source of a (...) particularism of social aims which could result in the dissolution of the wider emancipatory discourses considered as constitutive of the democratic imaginary?The first issue is connected with the increasing awareness of the ambiguities of those very social movements about which so many sanguine hopes were conceived in the 1970s. There is no doubt that their emergence has involved an expansion of the egalitarian imaginary to increasingly wider areas of social relations. However, it has also become progressively clear that such an expansion does not necessarily lead to the aggregation of the plurality of demands around a broader collective will. Even more: does not this fragmentation of social demands make it easier for the state apparatuses to deal with them in an administrative fashion — which results in the formation of all types of clientalistic networks, capable of neutralizing any democratic opening? The control of the media by powerful financial conglomerates is only one aspect — albeit a crucial one — of a far more general phenomenon.As for the second issue, its formulation runs along parallel lines. With the breaking up of the totalizing discourses of modernity, we are running the risk of being confronted with a plurality of social spaces, governed by their own aims and leaving any management of the community — conceived in a global sense — in the hands of a techno-bureaucracy located beyond any democratic control. With this, the notion of a public sphere, to which the very possibility of a democratic experience was always linked, is seriously put into question. (shrink)

Soon after the 2013 military coup, state-sponsored violence and human rights abuses have begun to shake Egyptian society. The regime of president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has attempted to rationalize them, claiming that this is the only path to save the most populous Middle Eastern country from civil unrest, terrorism, and economic decay. Al-Sisi, the former army chief during the 2013 coup, initially portrayed his ascendency to power as the only way to restore security and end the threat of terrorism. (...) Egypt’s generals have also recognized that they cannot rely only on the promise of restoring security to justify ending of the democratic opening and their heavy-handed ruling techniques. Therefore, they have also been using a web of alternative narratives to justify their approach and have been spreading these narratives using security-controlled public and private media institutions. Conspiracy theories, defamation campaigns, and hate speech against voices of dissent have assumed central positions... (shrink)

Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is currently understood as a theory of power in Western, democratic societies, and therefore as a theory of cultural power (“cultural hegemony”). The aim of this article is to show that this interpretation is erroneous, at least for three reasons. Firstly, because the notion of “democracy” itself has to be placed within its historical context: the meaning of “democracy” in the 1920s and 1930s in Europe was very different from what it became in the post-WWII (...) era. Secondly, because all the regimes Gramsci could have been taking into account when he wrote the Prison Notebooks were the result of the crisis of the Liberal State and parliamentarianism. Even if in different ways, political conflict in each of them unfolded in a manner that is very different from what is today presupposed by the notion of cultural hegemony. And thirdly, because the genetic reconstruction of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, as it is developed in the Prison Notebooks, will show that the core of what is usually considered the Gramscian theory of hegemony was already developed before 1926 (I shall refer to it as “standard theory”), while in the Notebooks he substantially updated this theory, in order to think the new conditions of political struggle in Italy and Europe. This revision can be summarised in three points. First: the notion of hegemony is organically combined with that of “war of position”. The latter will refer no longer the political struggle characterised by a strongly developed civil society, typical of the “West” (as opposed to backward “Eastern” context). The war of position is now the sort of political struggle that we have when huge masses of population enter into political life and actively participate in it. It thus means not a place where political struggles take place but a phase of these struggles, that Gramsci calls “culminating” and “decisive”. The image Gramsci adopts to visualise this phase of political struggles is that of two “reciprocal sieges”: of the masses to the State and of the State to the masses. Second: “hegemony” comes to mean now the means the rulers adopt with the purpose of winning the support of the masses. Politics is no longer the business of active minorities; it is now the organisation of the lifestyle of huge masses of population, in order to control their political agency (hence the notion of “passive revolution”). Third, from the above, the importance of religion follows since it is the most widespread language, as well as that of political myths which manage to mobilise politically social forces, translating religion into political action and the vice-versa, political ideology into religious faith. (shrink)

Collective action occurs when people voluntarily join with one another for obtaining collective goods, such as rights and equality, that institutions fail to provide or bloc them from getting. Collective action has to overcome obstacles due to free riding, recruitment, participation, costs of organizing, and social control by the opposition. Collective actions range from episodic protests and hostile crowds to sustained social movements and civil strife.Collective action theory in the tradition of methodological individualism assumes that individuals make adaptive (...) decisions under uncertainty, contingent on expectations about the decisions of peers, opponents and bystanders. The four key variables of participation are number of participants, costs of participation, the value of the collective good, and the production function for different tactics and modes of contestation.The reduction of uncertainty is achieved by strategies of resource mobilization, selective incentives, solidarity, bloc mobilization, political opportunity, shared culture, mass media effects, signaling of information, and pace setter-follower diffusion dynamics. The theory explains unconventional political and social advocacy in democratic and autocratic regimes, from routine politics, strikes, demonstrations, hostile crowds to social movements and other modes of confrontation. (shrink)

Mill contends that the fullest publicity and freedom of discussion is essential for all citizens to share in political freedom. Previous commentators have focused on Mill's strictures against censorship; they have paid little attention to his understanding of how freedom of discussion and political will formation are mediated in the public sphere by the distribution of social power in civil society, particularly control of the means of communication. This article shows that Mill's account of the sociology and political (...) economy of how public opinion forms is central to his understanding of freedom of discussion and democratic political freedom. (shrink)

One of numerous definitions of globalization describes it as a dynamic process whereby the social structures of modernity, such as capitalism, bureaucracy, high technology, and philosophy of rationalism and liberalism are spread the world over. Indeed, in that sense, liberalism has in general prevailed as the authoritative policy framework in present-day globalization. Most governments have promoted neoliberal policies toward globalization, as well as influential multilateral agencies have continually linked globalization with liberalization. Champions of neoliberal globalization have also abounded in commercial (...) circles, particularly in the financial markets and among managers of transborder firms. Business associations and business-oriented mass media have likewise figured as bastions of neoliberalism which has overall ranked as policy orthodoxy in respect of globalization. Generally speaking, neoliberal ideas recently gained widespread unquestioned acceptance as “common sense”. On the other hand, neoliberalism as a sort of philosophical, political and economic theory known as libertarianism, which has generally prevailed as theoretical approach in contemporary globalization, does not have much in common with the ideal of liberal democracy of well-ordered society, which arises from quite different ideas, aspects and dimensions of liberal philosophy. Social philosophy of liberalism, developed by Kant, Hayek, Dworkin and Rawls, has promoted the idea of modern liberal democracy which is generally based on the rule of law, protection of human and civil rights, ideas of equality and justice as fairness. In that sense “affirmative action” programmes in favour of the least advantaged groups are fully consonant with a general liberal philosophy that protects individual rights. Economic and cultural globalization should be accompanied by a clear conceptual analysis and a normative requirement of a globalization of responsibility in order to protect the global future of humankind. A democratic control as well as the rule of law in our globalized world is necessary, too. Central tasks of global policy to prevent global chaos as a consequence of uncontrolled globalization include, among other things, a legalized international order with a sort of global democratic governance. Concerning the improvement of global democracy and global rule of law the genuine question is: who can realize a policy of global governance in our divided world? (shrink)

Judicial Deliberations compares how and why the European Court of Justice, the French Cour de cassation and the US Supreme Court offer different approaches for generating judicial accountability and control, judicial debate and deliberation, and ultimately judicial legitimacy. Examining the judicial argumentation of the United States Supreme Court and of the French Cour de cassation, the book first reorders the traditional comparative understanding of the difference between French civil law and American common law judicial decision-making. It then uses (...) this analysis to offer the first detailed comparative examination of the interpretive practice of the European Court of Justice. Lasser demonstrates that the French judicial system rests on a particularly unified institutional and ideological framework founded on explicitly republican notions of meritocracy and managerial expertise. Law-making per se may be limited to the legislature; but significant judicial normative administration is entrusted to State selected, trained, and sanctioned elites who are policed internally through hierarchical institutional structures. The American judicial system, by contrast, deploys a more participatory and democratic approach that reflects a more populist vision. Shunning the unifying, controlling, and hierarchical French structures, the American judicial system instead generates its legitimacy primarily by argumentative means. American judges engage in extensive debates that subject them to public scrutiny and control. The ECJ hovers delicately between the institutional/argumentative and republican/democratic extremes. On the one hand, the ECJ reproduces the hierarchical French discursive structure on which it was originally patterned. On the other, it transposes this structure into a transnational context of fractured political and legal assumptions. This drives the ECJ towards generating legitimacy by adopting a somewhat more transparent argumentative approach. (shrink)

Globalization presages an important new stage in the centuries-old 'civilizing process,' which Norbert Elias analyzed with such clarity and in such depth. At the root of the fundamental transformations of our world of nation-states are combined integrating and disintegrating tendencies, or centralization and individualization, which manifest themselves in a steady monopolization of the means of violence and taxation, an interventionist human rights discourse, and war as a means of democratizing and pacifying the planet. Elias' 'historical social psychological' approach offers new (...) categories of analysis with which to both explain the effects of globalization and indicate how international interdependence fosters both control and resistance, both democratization and radicalization, and both integration and disintegration. (shrink)

In Vexed, James Mumford tackles the polarization of civil society across the democratic West, taking a fresh look at the existential questions and "hot button" issues that are an essential part of the politics of the Left and Right. In examining issues like the "right-to-die" movement and assisted suicide, family values and economic injustice, sexual liberation and consent, gun-control and abortion, the environment and technology, criminal justice and reform, Mumford questions the basic assumptions of our political groups. (...) His challenge is simple: "Why should believing strongly about one topic mean the automatic adoption of so many others?" With this refreshing and eye-opening book, James Mumford, a public thinker and independent commentator, has written an essential and provocative account that will appeal to anyone of independent thought, and a welcome call for new reflection on the moral issues most relevant to our modern way of life." -- Amazon.com. (shrink)

Declaration of independence became a reference point of a new historical epoch - epoch of free, sovereign development of Uzbekistan. Our country from first days of independent development, under direction of President I.A. Karimov, has headed for refusal of a heritage of a command control system, having started to construction of bases of a democratic legal society with the socially-focused market economy. For achievement of these purposes own model of updating and progress which essential features are the selective (...) approach to experience of the developed countries and the account of specificity and features of centuries-oldevolution of national statehood is involved. In Republic of Uzbekistan process of democratization and modernization of a society became stage-by-stage, with a stress on maintenance of deep understanding of an essence of democracy, in view of sociopolitical traditions and features of national mentality. The heritage of sociopolitical culture of our society has acted original “Means”. By means of which modern values and principles of democracy were brought home to people, their perception and understanding was facilitated. Psychological features of national character, such as tolerance, the aggravated feeling of validity, equality before the law, etc. were especially effectively used. It is known, that the basic directions of democratic transformations and formation of a civil society are defined depending on real needs and opportunities of their realization. We have a precise comprehension of that the major condition of formation of a democratic society is strengthening a role and value in a life of a society of not state and public institutes. In Uzbekistan this process goes by practical realization of the concept “From the strong state - to a strong society”. It is a question of stage-by-stage and gradual reduction of a role of the state structures in the decision of social and economic questions and about transfers of these functions to public organizations. Gradually we go to that participation of the state in economic sphere and a field of activity of managing structures, first of all, a private sector - decreases. In parallel the problem of creation of favorable conditions for realization of publiccontrol on the basis of corresponding motivation - public interests is solved. (shrink)

‘The Strong Arm of the Law’ seeks to explain how the identification with military power that is produced through corporate mass mediated spectacles such as bodybuilding threatens democratic identifications. What is more, the militarized body aims at ever-greater control over the physical world yet results only in evergreater estrangement from it. The article begins by illustrating the martial dimensions of the bodybuilder’s body. Then, it reveals the extent to which the built body promises safety, security, and freedom while (...) contributing to the militarization of civil society – a process at odds with democratization. Next, it demonstrates the logic behind the bodybuilder’s identification and appeal as not merely soldier but weapon. The article concludes by raising the possibility of imagining the democratized body. (shrink)

In her book, Conscience and Conviction, Kimberley Brownlee argues that there is nothing undemocratic about the robust, primary right to civil disobedience that she devotes most of her argument to defending. To the contrary, she holds that there is nothing paternalistic about civil disobedients opposing the will of democratic majorities, because, inter alia, democratic majorities cannot claim particular epistemic superiority, and because there are flaws inherent to democratic procedures that civil disobedience addresses. I hold (...) that Brownlee’s arguments fail. In particular, her argument fails because it does not properly construe the nature of the epistemic claim that can be made either by democratic procedures or by civil disobedients, and because it illegitimately conflates the concern about permanent minorities that has been a constant thorn in the side of democratic theorists, with a concern with all outvoted minorities, whether permanent minorities or not. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to analyse the new forms of militarism as well as the position and the role of the armed forces in Latin American political systems in the twenty-first century. The first part analyses two selected forms of military participation in politics: the participation of former servicemembers in presidential elections and their performance as presidents, and the militarisation of political parties. The second part of the article focuses on the issue of contemporary civil-military relations in (...) Latin America, discussing the problems associated with the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces, the reform of the Ministries of Defense and the redefinition of the functions of the army. (shrink)

Intolerance, abuse, calling of names because of differences of opinion about religion or politics or business, as well as because of differences of race, color, wealth or degree of culture are treason to the democratic way of life. Merely legal guarantees of the civil liberties of free belief, free expression, free assembly are of little avail if the give and take of ideas, facts, experiences, is choked by mutual suspicion, by abuse, by fear and hatred.Without some kind of (...) oversight, the golem, not God, might emerge from machines … it is naïve to believe that government is competent, let alone in a position to control the development and deployment of robots, self-generating algorithms, and artificial intelligence.... (shrink)

Women’s voices are widely expressed in current movements of rejuvenation of Jewish traditions. These moves raise tensions within the religious world and the civil legal realm. In focus here is a much-debated instance: the nearly thirty-year effort by Jewish women to pray in a group in song and read from the Bible at the holy site of the Western Wall in Jerusalem. The group is called the Women of the Wall (WoW). In addition to the women's rights of speech, (...) discussion here highlights the need to recognize duties of respect for the women’s voices. Moral analysis of the Jewish and democratic values which constitutionally define Israel founds the legal basis for this duty of respect. Both Jewish thought and Kantian analysis are seen to conceptualize the essence of freedom as obligation, from which arise duties of respect for the other. Duties of respect indeed are owed to WoW by the other worshippers at the Western Wall, as well as by the rabbinic authorities in control of forms of prayer at the site. That both Jewish and democratic values deem obligation as the essence of freedom lends support to seeing coherence between the two sets of values defining the State of Israel. (shrink)

The questions of this article are: what can we learn from deliberative democratic theory, its critics, the practices of local deliberative communities, the needs of potential participants, and the experiences of virtual communities that would be useful in designing a technology-facilitated institution for global civil society that is deliberative and democratic in its values? And what is the appropriate design of such an online institution so that it will be attentive to the undemocratic forces enabled by power (...) inequalities that can emerge in discursive communities? I answer these questions with an institutional innovation that meets a need of global civil society and that is responsive to critics of deliberative democratic theory and attentive to the particular agents engaged in women's human rights activism. (shrink)

This essay from 1999, republished in Notre Dame Magazine online in July 2023, explores how the 1950s were a time of fundamental transformations in American society, a time when the United States went fully megatechnic. The hugely increased power of military, corporate-industrial and “big science” institutions developed during the 1950s signaled the transformation to megatechnic America, with atomic bombs and nuclear testing, automobiles and televisions as key symbols of that transformation. Figures such as J. Robert Oppenheimer and Edward Teller illustrated (...) the battle between national security dictates controlling nuclear bomb testing and responsible science. -/- Since the Second World War the United States has been problematically guided by a power-oriented culture, which, in the names of national security and convenience, has tended to reshape America toward an increasingly hierarchical model of society based on the system requirements of a machine. This same era gave birth to a generalized economic prosperity in the United States, to the civil rights movement, to feminism, literary and artistic innovations, and to other openings of public equality and freedom. Yet the magnification of bureaucratic-corporate structures in that postwar, cold war prosperity has ultimately tended to restructure America against the basic requirements of democratic community. (shrink)

The ombudsman tradition originated in Sweden in 1809 and has spread throughout the world in less than two hundred years. An ombudsman is a public official that offers people an opportunity to have their complaints heard, evaluated, and investigated by a neutral and independent body, and offers recommendations to the involved parties. The ombudsman plays an important role in strengthening democratic governance, rule of law, and civil society. Article 73 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania establishes (...) that: ‘The Seimas controllers shall examine complaints of citizens concerning the abuse of powers by, or bureaucratic intransigence of, State and municipal officials (with the exception of judges). They shall have the right to submit a motion before a court that the guilty officials be dismissed from office. The powers of the Seimas controllers shall be established by law. If necessary, the Seimas shall also establish other institutions of control. Their system and powers shall be established by law.’. (shrink)

Resumo O artigo trata da análise crítica de Jürgen Habermas a respeito das consequências do modelo neoliberal de integração global via mercado, em especial o desequilíbrio entre política e mercado, o fim do compromisso com o Estado social e o déficit democrático no nível transnacional. Para o filósofo alemão, a concepção neoliberal de sociedade desestatizada do capitalismo global atinge o nexo entre Estado nacional, democracia e justiça social, marginalizando o Estado e a política, em favor da privatização dos serviços públicos (...) e sendo insensível às questões de justiça social, aos custos sociais do crescente aumento da pobreza, desigualdade e exclusão social, mesmo em países abastados da Europa e América do Norte. Ao deslocar o fiador da integração social para além das fronteiras nacionais, o capitalismo global foge ao controle estatal e esvazia o poder dos Estados nacionais, em termos de substância democrática e de política social, e gera um déficit de legitimação, ao transferir competências nacionais para agências ou organismos transnacionais, cuja legitimação não deriva da sociedade civil ou de uma esfera pública politicamente constituída. Em contrapartida, Habermas defende um poder democrático capaz de domesticar politicamente o mercado globalizado, reconstruir a democracia estatal-social num nível transnacional, em vista de uma ordem socialmente mais equilibrada, e compensar o déficit social e de legitimação democrática, no âmbito transnacional. Depois de recapitular alguns problemas que se solucionaram nas formas de Estado nacional, o artigo descreve como a globalização econômica afeta a soberania cultural, econômica, administrativa e jurídica, política, social e trabalhista dos Estados nacionais, e quais as possibilidades de reenquadrar politicamente os mercados, estendendo a democracia estatal para além das fronteiras nacionais. Com isso, quer-se mostrar que a obra de Habermas não é cega para a relação democracia-capitalismo, para os efeitos colaterais da “colonização da política pela economia”, para a influência corrosiva da economia capitalista na despolitização da esfera pública e da política.The article presents Jürgen Habermas critical analysis of the consequences of the neoliberal model of global market integration, in particular the imbalance between politics and market, the end of the commitment to the welfare state and the democratic deficit at the transnational level. For the German philosopher, the neoliberal conception of the privatized society of global capitalism undermine the nexus between national state, democracy and social justice, marginalizing the state and politics in favour of privatization of public services and being insensitive to questions of social justice, the costs increasing poverty, inequality and social exclusion, even in wealthy countries in Europe and North America. Moving the guarantor of social integration across national borders, global capitalism is beyond the state control and exhaust the power of national states in terms of democratic substance and social policy and creates a legitimacy deficit by transferring national powers to agencies or transnational corporations whose legitimacy does not derive from civil society or from a politically constituted public sphere. In contrast, Habermas advocates a democratic power able to politically neutralize the global market, rebuild the welfare-state democracy in a transnational level in view of a more socially balanced order, and compensate the social deficit and democratic legitimacy in the transnational order. After reviewing some problems that have been solved in national state forms, the article describes how economic globalization affects the cultural, economic, administrative, juridical, political, social and labor sovereignty of the national states, and what are the possibilities of politically reframing markets, extending welfare-estate democracy beyond national borders. In this way, we want to show that Habermas’ work is not blind to the relation between democracy and capitalism, to the collateral effects of the “colonization of politics by the economy”, to the corrosive influence of the capitalist economy on the depoliticization of the public sphere and politics. (shrink)

The main thesis of this paper is that justice is not a natural law that (re)establishes equilibrium and order in the universe, but a disposition enforced by a fighting will to render to every man his due in line with a regime of rights, powers, or immunities to use, enjoy and control some external goods. Inasmuch as there is no sense, feeling or instinct of justice, it is reasonable to assert that people regulate their conduct under the authority of (...) a legislative authority according to certain ideas of justice, which they adopt and promote through a steady effort of knowledge and will. Critical analysis of the main types of justice − associative justice, punitive justice, corrective justice, restorative justice, functional justice, normative justice, commutative justice and distributive justice − from a liberal democratic perspective highlights the formal requirements of justice in different social arrangements and in relation to various aspects of personal and social life. Because it lacks a natural foundation of justice and people have strong interests in enforcing a certain idea of justice, public debates about justice entail a clash of militant wills. Debaters engage in a struggle for political hegemony trying to exclude from the public sphere the rival ideas about justice. In other words, all substantive debates about justice are carried out in an agonistic public sphere. The more civilized and reasonable the agonistic debates about justice are, the more likely the idea of justice is to fit the vital interests of individuals and society. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the main contribution of Hegel's philosophy of right to the contemporary political debate is that it opens a window on the idea that liberalism and individual freedom are incompatible. My main thesis is that the liberal conception of the State and law, structured from a nonrelational account of singularity, ends up denying the individual freedom that it claims to defend. I begin by reconstructing the Hegelian concept of freedom from its most general lines, showing (...) that being free consists in wanting to become someone and not so much in wanting to do something. After showing that the purpose of becoming someone can only be fulfilled in a social medium, I focus on Hegel's critique of the liberal state (as expounded in the section on “civil society”). I argue that civil society structurally impedes individuals from realizing their purpose of becoming someone: the economical interactions of civil society give rise to impersonal and inscrutable mechanisms, which take the social conditions of people's individuation beyond their control. Finally, I claim that (rational) individual freedom consists in being able to thematize and democratically control the very social conditions of individuation through the State and law. (shrink)

The resurgence of religious movements all over the world, their varying claims to identity and politics, and their success in generating system-transforming effects in both national and world politics have indicated clearly that there is a need to uncover the invisible interconnections between religion and politics. Moreover, the way in which religion has been striking back has taken different forms. From religious and terrorist fundamentalism to multiculturalism, from communitarian claims to the religious state to religion-based civil societal calls for (...) pluralism and freedom, it is possible to see different articulations of the resurgence of religion in the world in which we live. In this context, Turkey constitutes a sociologically illuminating, theoretically challenging and politically timely case study. As a modern republic on the margins of Europe and preparing for accession negotiations with the European Union for full membership, Turkey is both a Muslim society and a strictly secular nation-state. This article suggests, first, that the process of modernization and democratization in Turkey has always faced the problem of establishing a delicate balance between politics and religion, and, second, that in this process the more secularism is used by the state elite to control religion, the less pluralistic and democratic the state has become in governing a society where Islam has always played an important role in the symbolic formation of Turkish identity. What is needed in this context is a ‘democratic secular imaginary’ as a more dialogical, tolerant and accommodating strategy of living with difference, enabling us to understand religious claims to difference in their own right, and to approach them clearly and critically. (shrink)

The resurgence of religious movements all over the world, their varying claims to identity and politics, and their success in generating system-transforming effects in both national and world politics have indicated clearly that there is a need to uncover the invisible interconnections between religion and politics. Moreover, the way in which religion has been striking back has taken different forms. From religious and terrorist fundamentalism to multiculturalism, from communitarian claims to the religious state to religion-based civil societal calls for (...) pluralism and freedom, it is possible to see different articulations of the resurgence of religion in the world in which we live. In this context, Turkey constitutes a sociologically illuminating, theoretically challenging and politically timely case study. As a modern republic on the margins of Europe and preparing for accession negotiations with the European Union for full membership, Turkey is both a Muslim society and a strictly secular nation-state. This article suggests, first, that the process of modernization and democratization in Turkey has always faced the problem of establishing a delicate balance between politics and religion, and, second, that in this process the more secularism is used by the state elite to control religion, the less pluralistic and democratic the state has become in governing a society where Islam has always played an important role in the symbolic formation of Turkish identity. What is needed in this context is a ‘democratic secular imaginary’ as a more dialogical, tolerant and accommodating strategy of living with difference, enabling us to understand religious claims to difference in their own right, and to approach them clearly and critically. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Medical Ethics in a Time of De-CommunizationRobert Baker (bio)Ethics is often treated as a matter of ethereal principles abstracted from the particulars of time and place. A natural correlate of this approach is the attempt to measure actual codes of ethics in terms of basic principles. Such an exercise can be illuminating, but it can also obscure the circumstances that make a particular codification of morality a meaningful response (...) to specific historic circumstances. This is particularly true of the codes of medical ethics beginning to emerge from the post-Communist societies of Eastern Europe, which are, perhaps, best understood as artifacts of an era, rather than as expressions of abstract principles.The era in question is post-Communist. It is an era informed by a reaction to decades of Communism, which, of course, was more than an economic system or even an ideology; it was a form of life that permeated every aspect of civil society—advertising, art, literature, music. Medicine was not exempt. I recall entering an oncology ward in East Berlin and finding the patients seated around a large table making posters. Wondering whether this was a form of art therapy, I asked the head nurse what the patients were doing. She replied: it is "Party time—the portion of each week every citizen donates to the people and the Party." I looked again at the posters and saw that they honored Karl Marx on the 100th anniversary of his death: "1883-1983, The Struggle Goes On." The Party, the struggle, the people, were everywhere, and they penetrated and informed daily life even for terminal patients on a cancer ward.The interweaving of Communist practices into the warp and woof of daily life has profound implications for the post-Communist era. It means that East Europeans cannot simply rebuild; they must unweave Communist thought patterns—what might be called the ideostructure of Communism—from the fabric of their lives through a deliberate process of deCommunization. What remains after de-Communization depends upon [End Page 363] the historical relationship each country had with Communism. In Russia, removing Communist ideostructure sets the conceptual calendar back to 1918. For the Czechs, the calendar advances to the 1930s, leaving them with thought patterns that are Western, industrial, and democratic. In the rest of Eastern Europe the conceptual clock also tends to turn back to the 1930s, but at that time the conceptual frameworks were nationalist, anti-Western, and frequently fascist, or even Nazi.In Poland the situation is different. World War II opened with the Nazi invasion of the country—which Hitler (later joined by Stalin) subsequently occupied. After the war, the Soviet army controlled the country, which became a captive player in the Soviet sphere of influence (aptly denominated, "the Warsaw Pact"). Poland's pre-Communist thought patterns are nationalist, West-leaning, accepting of parliamentary structures, but also of authoritarian government. They are also Catholic.Catholicism to Poles is not merely a religion, it is a posture of opposition to their German (Nazi, antichristian) and Russian (Orthodox or atheist) occupiers. I toured Polish hospitals several times during the Communist period —always accompanied by one or more "tour guides." (Westerners were not allowed to roam Communist countries unescorted.) Almost all of my guides wore little pins adorned with the face of Lenin (not the hammer and sickle—a symbol of Soviet occupation). Most doctors and nurses, however, adorned themselves with Catholic icons—typically a crucifix. Their conspicuously displayed crosses symbolized less their embrace of Catholicism than their rejection of Communism. Catholicism, in the Polish context, was thus an affirmation of individual and national independence.De-Communizing Polish Medical Ethics: The Abortion ControversyIn Poland, de-Communization was initiated through a series of negotiations between Lech Walensa's Solidarity and the Communist Government. The Polish Code of Medical Ethics is an indirect consequence of these negotiations, which stipulated the dissolution of Communist medical organizations. They were to be replaced by a Polish Medical Chamber—a type of quasi-governmental body, common in Eastern Europe, which combines the functions of a governmental licensing agency with those of a national medical association. Medical chambers also set standards of professional conduct and (unlike... (shrink)