Soon after the 2013 military coup, state-sponsored violence and human rights abuses have begun to shake Egyptian society. The regime of president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has attempted to rationalize them, claiming that this is the only path to save the most populous Middle Eastern country from civil unrest, terrorism, and economic decay. Al-Sisi, the former army chief during the 2013 coup, initially portrayed his ascendency to power as the only way to restore security and end the threat of terrorism. Egypt’s (...) generals have also recognized that they cannot rely only on the promise of restoring security to justify ending of the democratic opening and their heavy-handed ruling techniques. Therefore, they have also been using a web of alternative narratives to justify their approach and have been spreading these narratives using security-controlled public and private media institutions. Conspiracy theories, defamation campaigns, and hate speech against voices of dissent have assumed central positions... (shrink)

The military coup was staged in the summer of 2013. In the intervening period, Egypt’s ruling generals have succeeded in handcuffing the public space and bringing back fear as an everyday feature of life in a country that is still in dire straits. By various repressive measures, civilians have learned to fear the consequences of free expression and peaceful opposition. To this end as well, Egypt’s ruling generals have also adapted legal and legislative tools to persecute political enemies and eradicate (...) the existence of autonomous civil society organizations. However, far less attention has been paid to the details surrounding the legal and legislative tools utilized by Egypt’s generals, and even less to the concerning implications these tools carry regarding notions of justice and the populace’s faith in the neutrality of public institutions. A thorough explanation and analysis are necessary to understand fully the functioning of the new authoritarianism. It is also of paramount importance to highlight the fact it is impossible to search for ways to restore a democratic transition in Egypt without a structured thinking about how to dismantle the legal and legislative framework of the new authoritarianism. (shrink)

The relationship between religion and politics complicated efforts to develop a constitutional and legal framework for the post-revolution Egyptian state. During different stages of the transitional phase, this led to results that are dangerously misaligned with the principles of democracy and citizenship. During the period between 2011 and 2013, several constitutional and legal results emerged. New laws on the exercise of political rights, election procedures and political parties did not stipulate a ban on the use of religion for political, electoral, (...) or partisan purposes. This provided a legal loophole for the use of religious slogans in politics and prevented the imposition of penalties on groups exploiting religious spaces for electoral campaigning and other political purposes. This situation is contradictory to inclusive, citizenship-based politics. It also leaves society vulnerable to serious risks related to political and partisan affiliations as well as to electoral behavior based on religious identity instead of ideas and goals common to all citizens, regardless of religion. In addition to the contradictions between the constitutional and legal results of the transitional phase and the principles of democracy and citizenship resulting from the mixing of religion and politics in post-revolution Egypt, another set of political contradictions resulted from the ongoing use of religion in politics by conflicting groups. These contradictions, among other factors, prevented the success of efforts to foster democracy, citizenship and power devolution. (shrink)