Quite often, for one or the other purpose, the fact (or phenomenon) that does not exist is presented to the society or individuals as the real, really existing although it (the fact or phenomenon) simply does not exist in the real life. And often the term “fiction” is used to describe such phenomena. Although fiction is considered an inseparable companion of a social life, the question arises what the actual (true) fiction is and whether the use of it in (...) class='Hi'>criminal proceeding does not mean an intentional law maker’s (or the person’s applying the law) fraud, deceit directed towards the addressee of the applicable law. Fiction and its impact on criminal proceedings is analyzed in this article. Features, characterizing fiction are discussed here as well. (shrink)

The paper addresses the issue of a relatively new institution of criminal procedural law in Latvia. The article is relevant due to the need for an effective mechanism for the objective possibility of realization of the right person for the completion of the criminal process in a reasonable time. Analysis of the European Court of Human Rights has allowed some conclusions that should be considered when investigating criminal cases.

Independence as a professional virtue is included amongst the core ethical principles governing lawyers yet its precise meaning remains elusive. This article aims to examine the meaning of lawyer independence in criminal proceedings by taking as its focus the situation of criminal defence lawyers in China. The problem of lack of independence from the state is analysed against the backdrop of historical examples of extreme denial of independence such as Germany under National Socialism, South Africa under apartheid (...) and the Soviet Union. The associated issue of independence from the client is then addressed with a view to assessing where the balance of relative independence should lie. It is suggested that excessive dependence on the state, as it is experienced in China, may have the effect either of driving criminal defence lawyers towards exactly the type of human rights advocacy that the state has taken action to suppress, or of chasing them away from a career in criminal law at a time when change is underway and experienced criminal defence lawyers are most needed. The balance is therefore upset on many levels and restoring independence so as to allow lawyers the professional freedom to fulfil their role may ultimately be in the interests both of the state and lawyers working in the area of criminal justice. (shrink)

The continuous increase in criminal activities in all countries, namely the offences which undermine the interests of contemporary societies, call for the need to fight them in a more successful manner. In this way, the country through its mechanisms detects the criminal offences, the criminal liability and imposes the meritorious sanction to the perpetrators of such criminal offences, in full compliance with the danger caused by them. However, the court and other parties in the proceedings (...) in any case before the sanction is imposed, are involved in a complicated evidentiary proceedings related to the grounded suspicion that such offence was a criminal offence, the special mitigating and aggravating circumstances, that the person involved was conscious, that he committed the offence intentionally or negligently, his mental state, etc. All these have to be supported by facts through conclusive pieces of evidence. In parallel with the overall development of science and technology, the evidentiary procedure has evolved and it provides a greater possibility to argue our facts. This paper shall make efforts to highlight some of the most important issues related to the evidentiary procedure, such as: What is the evidence? What evidence should be provided in a certain criminal case? What is the importance of the evidence in a criminal matter? What should be the credibility and the evidentiary value of a piece of evidence? The research done in this paper shall apply the analytical method and the paper shall also include the conclusions that were reached as well as the recommendations. (shrink)

Recent research has detailed the use of neuroscience in several jurisdictions, but Australia remains a notable omission. To fill this substantial void we performed a systematic review of neuroscience in Australian criminal cases. The first section of this article reports the results of our review by detailing the purposes for which neuroscience is admitted into Australian criminal courts. We found that neuroscience is being admitted pre-trial, at trial, and during sentencing. In the second section, we evaluate these applications. (...) We generally found that courts admit neuroscience cautiously, and to supplement more well-established forms of evidence. Still, we found some instances in which the court seemed to misunderstand the neuroscience. These cases ranged from interpreting neuroscience as “objective” evidence to admitting neuroscience when the same non-neuroscientific psychiatric evidence would be inadmissible for being common sense. Furthermore, in some cases, neuroscientific evidence presents a double-edged sword; it may serve to either aggravate or mitigate a sentence. Thus, the decision about whether or not to tender this evidence is risky. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with argumentation in legal proceedings, namely in criminal cases. My interest is to explore how in the legal realm different argumentation fields interact, the juridical field being just one of them. The paper lays out an approach of studying argumentation in the legal realm in the framework of an ethnographic methodology by identifying the “topical rules” the participants in criminal trials adhere to. Suggesting the notion of field-dependence as a good starting point for (...) the analysis of legal argumentation, I will give several examples of different fields of argumentation interacting in criminal proceedings. The examination of what counts as a good reason and how arguments are employed, negotiated, and evaluated within a criminal proceeding might shed light on the practice of constructing facts and arriving at decisions in court. It can furthermore point at the constitution of legal rationality and how it is produced in criminal trials. I argue that rationality in criminal proceedings is interactively accomplished by negotiating different standards of validity. (shrink)

This study contrasts the evidence exclusion principles within the adversarial legal system of the United States, particularly the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, with the inquisitorial system of Vietnam. The U.S. model, emphasizing the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence to protect the presumption of innocence and ensure fair trials, relies on the Fourth Amendment to prevent police misconduct. Conversely, Vietnam, with its focus on uncovering the truth, has started to adopt adversarial elements, including evidence exclusion, to align with international (...) standards and enhance human rights protections within its criminal justice system. The research examines the application of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine in the U.S. and its implications for Vietnamese legal reforms, especially the proposed amendments to Article 87 of Vietnam's Criminal Procedure Code. These reforms aim to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence while allowing for the use of evidence collected independently from illegal actions. Highlighting the need for a balanced approach that respects procedural rights and promotes justice, the study advocates for comprehensive legal reforms in Vietnam. It suggests amendments to refine evidence exclusion principles, ensuring they reflect both the Vietnamese context and the progressive features of U.S. criminal justice practices, thereby enhancing the fairness and integrity of criminal proceedings. (shrink)

The criminal courts have a power to stop a prosecution from proceeding altogether where it would be inappropriate for it to continue. This power to stay proceedings which constitute an abuse of the process of the court has assumed great practical significance and is potentially applicable in many situations. There is at least one consideration of the abuse of process doctrine in virtually every major criminal trial today.This fully updated second edition of Abuse of Process and Judicial (...) Stays of Criminal Proceedings blends doctrinal discussion with a thorough consideration of the underlying theory to provide a searching analysis of the theory and practice of abuse of process in England and Wales, with comparative examinations of many other jurisdictions including The USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This edition focuses in particular upon the profound impact of the European Convention on Human Rights in this area. (shrink)

This paper addresses the selective mechanisms by which criminal proceedings produce strong arguments. It does so by focusing on the failing of argument themes (topoi) in the course of criminal proceedings, rather than on their career. In a further step, the notion of failing is bound to learning: different forms of failing point at different ways and places of learning. The study is comparative, relating cases from four different legal regimes (England, USA, Italy and Germany) that (...) are taken from four extensive ethnographic studies in defense lawyer’s firms. We will track down the failures of topoi at three different stages (pre-trial, trial, and deliberation) in our different legal regimes. Failing occurs in all proceedings in various modes and at different stages. We argue that those modes as well as the different stages at which they occur point at the spots in the respective procedures that allow for learning about the inherent conceptions of “good reasons.”. (shrink)

While many possible goals could be achieved by punishing offenders, the reality of punishment in today's criminal justice system is that lawmakers have created the illusion of purpose in punishment when in fact the expectations are unrealistic and the options for punishment too few to expect the simultaneous accomplishment of all possible desirable goals. This lack of clear purpose has led to a punishment policy shaped largely by what some scholars refer to as “paranoid politicians,” who have used public (...) fear of crime as a fulcrum to launch “tough on crime” policies. Over a long period of time, this process has created a punishment system that many scholars argue has become too harsh and exceeds what a system of just deserts would allow for. This outcome has led some to propose that systematic mercy be implemented where appropriate, in order to offset the perceived harshness of the criminal justice system. While such a proposal is problematic, a re-evaluation of punishment policy seems appropriate. This paper suggests that any re-evaluation of punishment policy should include provisions for a broader consideration of victims' issues in sentencing as an integral part of the implementation of punishment in a truly just system. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to address the questions as to whether a criminal conviction of a healthcare practitioner should affect his or her professional standing, and whether such conviction constitutes ‘unprofessional conduct’ in terms of the Health Professions Act. The article also explores a related matter, namely whether the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) has a legal duty to refer complaints regarding unprofessional conduct that displays criminal elements for criminal prosecution. After considering relevant (...) case law on these issues, the article concludes that a practitioner, after being convicted of an offence, should be afforded an opportunity to explain him- or herself to the board, not only in extenuation of the conduct in question, but also in response to the question of whether the conduct constitutes improper or disgraceful conduct. Moreover, the article explains why the HPCSA and professional boards have a legal duty to refer matters of unprofessional conduct with criminal elements in terms of section 34 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act to law enforcement agencies. (shrink)

Criminal offenders are sometimes required, by the institutions of criminal justice, to undergo medical interventions intended to promote rehabilitation. Ethical debate regarding this practice has largely proceeded on the assumption that medical interventions may only permissibly be administered to criminal offenders with their consent. In this article I challenge this assumption by suggesting that committing a crime might render one morally liable to certain forms of medical intervention. I then consider whether it is possible to respond persuasively (...) to this challenge by invoking the right to bodily integrity. I argue that it is not. (shrink)

Soon it may be possible to promote the rehabilitation of criminal offenders through _neurointerventions_ (interventions which exert direct physical, chemical or biological effects on the brain). Some jurisdictions already utilise neurointerventions to diminish the risk of sexual or drug-related reoffending. And investigation is underway into several other neurointerventions that might also have rehabilitative applications within criminal justice—for example, pharmacotherapy to reduce aggression or impulsivity. Ethical debate on the use of neurointerventions to facilitate rehabilitation—henceforth ‘neurorehabilitation’—has proceeded on two assumptions: (...) that we have instrumental reasons for employing neurorehabilitation (e.g. because it helps protect the public from crime); and that its permissibility depends upon whether its use unjustifiably infringes offenders’ rights. This paper defends a different, hitherto neglected thought. I argue we have rights-based reasons to offer neurorehabilitation to offenders—in other words, that offenders have a _moral right_ to neurorehabilitation. I identify three considerations which support a moral right to conventional rehabilitative interventions—(1) as a countermeasure to the debilitating side-effects of punishment; (2) as a derivative right of the right to hope for renewed liberty; and (3) as compensation for structural injustice. I argue these considerations extend to support a moral right to neurorehabilitation in the following instance: when neurorehabilitation would be part of the _most effective_ package for facilitating rehabilitation, and can be carried out at reasonable cost. I then defend my argument against potential objections, including the objection that neurorehabilitation is a bad option for offenders to have and the charge of over-medicalisation. (shrink)

Imagine the following. You have been asked to critically evaluate the criminal process in your home jurisdiction. In particular, you have been asked to determine whether the criminal process currently in place appropriately balances the need to maximize the chances of getting things right—of acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty—with the need to minimize the chances of getting things wrong—of acquitting the guilty and convicting the innocent. How would you proceed? What rules of evidence and procedure would (...) you put in place? Would you exclude germane inculpatory evidence that has been obtained in violation of the accused’s constitutional rights? Would you permit spouses to testify against each other, or allow the jury to draw adverse inferences from an accused’s failure to testify on his or her behalf? These are the sorts of epistemological issues addressed by Larry Laudan in his superb Truth, Error, and Criminal Law. The purpose of legal epistemology is to identify legal rules in order to assess them rationally, and, if necessary, to modify or replace them. The more and more widely Truth, Error, and Criminal Law is read, the more likely it is that legal epistemology will attract the attention of lawyers, legal academics, and philosophers, attention that can only contribute in a positive way to rethinking criminal law. (shrink)

The essays in Waldron’s Torture, Terror, and Trade-Offs have important implications for debates about the criminalization of terrorism and terrorism-related offences and its consequences for criminal law and criminal justice. His reflections on security speak directly to contemporary debates about the preventive role of the criminal law. And his analysis of inter-personal security trade-offs invites much closer attention to the costs of counter-terrorism policies, particularly those pursued outside the criminal process. But is Waldron right to speak (...) of a ‘welcome the return to the criminal justice model’? This article considers the arguments in favour of prioritizing the prosecution of terrorist suspects and asks if their prosecution can safely proceed without undue hazard to the criminal law and criminal process. (shrink)

In this article, I ask whether the state, as opposed to its individual members, can intelligibly and legitimately be criminalized, with a focus on the possibility of its domestic criminalization. I proceed by identifying what I take to be the core objections to such criminalization, and then investigate ways in which they can be challenged. First, I address the claim that the state is not a kind of entity that can intelligibly perpetrate domestic criminal wrongs. I argue against it (...) by building upon an account of the modern state as a moral agent proper, capable of both culpable moral and legal wrongdoing. I then consider objections to the intelligibility and legitimacy of subjecting states to domestic criminal processes, which primarily find their source in the assumption that such subjection would necessarily involve the state prosecuting, judging, and punishing itself. I argue that whether this (questionable) assumption is sound or not, it does not create the kinds of unsolvable quandaries its exponents think it does. I then move on to reject the distinct, yet related, objection that, at least in aspiring liberal jurisdictions, treating the state as a criminal objectionably involves extending to it various substantive and procedural guarantees that, given its nature and raison d’être, it should not have. Finally, I discuss three central objections to punishing the state. First, that organizations like states do not have the phenomenal consciousness required to suffer punishment. Second, that the constant possibility of dispersion of state punishment amongst individual members stands in the way of its justification. Lastly, that whatever justification there may be for making things harder for the state in response to its culpable wrongdoing, such treatment need not be understood as punishment. While partially conceding the strength of these objections, I strive to loosen their grip in ways that show that justified punishment of the state, meaningfully understood as such, remains a distinct possibility. I conclude by contrasting supposed alternatives to the criminalization of states, and by contending that my analysis leaves us with enough to keep the possibility of state criminalization on the table as a justifiable response to state wrongdoing. (shrink)

In this sense the collection offers a model of how international collaborative work should proceed. The book is the product of a workshop held at the International Institute for the Sociology of Law (IISL) in Onati, Spain.

This paper seeks to contribute to the field of transitional justice by adding new insights about the role that trials of victimizers can play within democratization processes. The main argument is that criminal proceedings affirming the value of equal respect and concern for both victims and abusers can contribute to the socialization of citizens’ politically relevant emotions. More precisely, using law constructively to engage public resentment and indignation can be successful to the extent that legality is not sacrificed. (...) In order to locate this argument within the rich literature on the pedagogical functions of transitional trials this paper enters a dialogue with three emblematic texts. Lawrence Douglas’s narrative jurisprudence approach, Judith Shklar’s critique of the limits of legalism, and Marc Osiel’s interest in ‘discursive solidarity’ represent starting points for a more complex conceptualization of the relationship between democracy, law and emotional education within transformational periods. (shrink)

This article refers to the analysis of types of entrapment while gathering evidence in criminal proceedings. Based on the analysis of the laws of criminal procedure, theory and judicial practice, one could say that entrapment, as absolutely impermissible action in the course of simulation of a criminal act, could not be seen as mere pressure, active enticement or instigation to engage in criminal activity by restricting a person’s freedom of choice. As it happens, it is (...) possible to provoke a person without any active enticement or instigation to engage in criminal activity. This could be regarded as passive, indirect type of entrapment. The gist of the latter – creating the effect of minimum risk, meaning that a person, without any active enticement or instigation to engage in criminal activity, is acting in the course of a simulated situation, by thinking that the criminal activity he or she is committing will never be discovered by law enforcement authorities. The identification of passive entrapment is quite complicated, as it requires the precise assessment of the relation between the conduct of law enforcement authorities, the criminal and the criminal act, by using subjective and objective criteria. (shrink)

The presumption of innocence (POI) requires all judges, juries, and other officials in a trial, to presume and treat any accused of criminal wrongdoing as innocent, until he or she is proven guilty. Although a POI lacks an authoritative definition, this overarching principle of procedural fairness is so robust and vital for the exercise of legal power in matters of criminal law that one rarely finds anyone questioning its standing. In this article I examine the rationale behind the (...) POI from a different perspective. The basic assumption is that this procedural standard captures the tenor of a broader principle which seeks to ensure fairness in criminal proceedings as well as in criminal law doctrine. I argue that honouring a principle of fairness is not exclusively a matter of criminal procedural law but also something that is deeply rooted in other areas of criminal law doctrine. Hence: not maintaining a principle of fairness in criminal law doctrine could lead to the POI being compromised or even undermined. In the article, I draw attention to three areas in which I believe that criminal law policies threaten a principle of fairness: criminalising remote harm, doctrine of ignorance of law and inversed presumptions of guilt. My conclusion is that some solutions to so called doctrinal problems in criminal law, are questionable and their practical consequences (on a general level) are, at least partially, equal to treating an individual (in a trial) as guilty for something for which he or she ought not to be accountable. Hence: gaining the support of a POI could thus work as principle for keeping the use of criminal law moderate and in accordance with a principle of fairness. (shrink)

Criminal law and the proceedings surrounding it work, at least in theory, much like an author works when writing a play or a novel. Both the lawyer and the writer follow traditional formulae that allow them to create and express a vision of reality. When done well, the reality created is virtually seamless. This, however, is the point at which law and literary works diverge. Although we embrace creativity in literary endeavors, we would prefer that the foundation of (...) our legal system be something more substantial. Unfortunately, where US. criminal HIV exposure statutes are concerned, there appears to be little if any concrete connection between proscribed behaviors and what we know about HIV transmission risk. Twenty-four states in the U.S. make it a criminal offense for a person who has HIV to expose another to the virus through consensual sexual activities. The relationship between the activities prohibited by these laws and actual risk of virus transmission is tenuous at best. (shrink)

Criminal law and the proceedings surrounding it work, at least in theory, much like an author works when writing a play or a novel. Both the lawyer and the writer follow traditional formulae that allow them to create and express a vision of reality. When done well, the reality created is virtually seamless. This, however, is the point at which law and literary works diverge. Although we embrace creativity in literary endeavors, we would prefer that the foundation of (...) our legal system be something more substantial. Unfortunately, where US. criminal HIV exposure statutes are concerned, there appears to be little if any concrete connection between proscribed behaviors and what we know about HIV transmission risk. Twenty-four states in the U.S. make it a criminal offense for a person who has HIV to expose another to the virus through consensual sexual activities. The relationship between the activities prohibited by these laws and actual risk of virus transmission is tenuous at best. (shrink)

This article focuses on the most recent debates in a certain area of the ‘law and emotion’ field, namely the literature on the role of affect in the criminal law. Following the dominance of cognitivism in the philosophy of emotions, authors moved away from seeing emotions as contaminations on reason and examined how affective reactions could be accommodated within penal proceedings. The review is structured into two main components. I look first at contributions about the multi-dimensional presence of (...) emotions within ordinary criminal proceedings. Second, I examine work done on the use of criminal trials under the emotionally stressful circumstances of post-conflict societies. In the conclusion I sketch a theoretical proposal for moving the discussion forward. (shrink)

The prosecution of international crimes is a challenge both under international and domestic law. Taking the example of international criminal law (ICL) , the fullest realization of its objectives is influenced by many factors including; (a) the adoption of appropriate laws by states, (b) the adequacy of the ICL framework on definitions of crimes and principles of criminal responsibility, (c) the level of political control and involvement in decision making related to investigation, prosecution or extradition, (d) Problems with (...) exclusion including restrictions on the rights of victims with regard to the proceedings and to reparation, and (e) The application of provisions for amnesties and similar measures of impunity. -/- Over the years, the mandate of States under ICL has expanded. Key reforms under ICL and domestic laws have been led by the above mentioned concerns. The scope of state obligations, in particular, has been shaped by the standards adopted under the ICL framework including the "duty to prosecute" international crimes. The article discusses the normative significance of the "duty to prosecute". (shrink)

Michael Clark; II*—The Sanctions of the Criminal Law, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 97, Issue 1, 1 June 1997, Pages 25–40, https://doi.org/10.

Switzerland is internationally known for its progressive animal laws and for its innovative tools in law enforcement. In 1992, the Canton of Zurich introduced a public lawyer vested with the task of representing animals’ interests in criminal procedure, known as the Animal Protection Lawyer. The APL had the power to access information about court proceedings, study pending court cases, and intervene on behalf of victim animals. This enforcement tool set a precedent across the world. It amounted to a (...) recognition of animals as de facto victims and created an “equality of arms” for human and animal parties in criminal procedure. In a historic move in 2014, the Zurich parliament removed the APL from office—by mistake, as some maintain. Meanwhile—unnoticed by many—the Canton of Berne maintained a state agency vested with the very same powers as those the APL had, called the Dachverband Berner Tierschutzorganisationen. Though the DBT operated as an established agency for over 2 decades, in August 2017, a criminal court in Berne denied the DBT standing, arguing that the laws conferring on it the right to represent animals violate the federal law on criminal procedure. In July 2018, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment, and effectively stripped the DBT of its rights to represent animals in criminal proceedings. This article describes these recent shifts in criminal animal law in detail and analyzes the sociopolitical factors that gave rise to them. Special attention is paid to the question of what is left for Switzerland as a role model in animal law given ongoing deregulations, particularly as recent cases in the United States point to an incremental emancipation of animals as victims. The article discusses current alternatives to the APL and the DBT and puts their promises under scrutiny. The analysis reveals that these alternatives skirt the main obstacles faced by animals in criminal procedure and threaten the democratic will of the Swiss people. Two alternatives are discussed that can help Switzerland overcome its insufficiencies: the organizational right to appeal and victim rights for animals in criminal procedure. Using these alternatives, the article calls for the global emancipation of animals as the proper victims of crimes and for furnishing them with correlating rights to enforcement, including rights to representation. (shrink)

Most people would agree that we should behave and act in a responsible way. Yet only 200 years ago, ‘responsibility’ was only of marginal importance in discussions of law and legal practice, and it had little ethical significance. What is the significance of the fact that ‘responsibility’ now plays such a central role in, for example, work, the welfare state, or the criminal justice system? What happens when individuals are generally expected to think of themselves as ‘responsible’ agents? And (...) what are the consequences of the fact that the philosophical analysis of ‘responsibility’ focuses almost exclusively on conditions of agency that are mostly absent from real life? -/- In this book, Frieder Vogelmann demonstrates how large parts of philosophy have fallen under responsibility’s spell, and he uses a Foucauldian approach in an attempt to break it. The three axes of power, knowledge, and self are used in a detailed analysis of the practical regimes of labour (including the welfare state), criminality (including policing, punishment practices, and criminal proceedings), and philosophy, and of the two subject positions required by ‘responsibility’ – those of the attributors and bearers of responsibility – within them. The power relations between these positions, which Vogelmann carefully excavates from the grounds of our practices, reveal that the deck is stacked unevenly from the start. (shrink)

This article analyzes the issues of content and scope of the immunity of a close person as a witness in criminal procedure of Lithuania. The question on sufficiency of this immunity is raised because protection of a personal and family secret in criminal proceedings depends upon it. The author also perceives uncertainty of the actual and legal status of a close person as a family member, while ascertaining and implementing one of the most important additional guarantees granted (...) for witnesses. The following propositions are formulated: as regards witness’ immunity from obligation to testify against a member of his/her family or against his/her close relative, it is necessary to assess not only the formal aspects of the concepts “family” or “marriage”, but also the actual nature of the relations of persons who are bound by family or similar ties. (shrink)

The article deals with the discussion of the concept and implementation of immunities of the witness in the criminal proceedings in abstracto. The problem is whether the additional guarantee of protection of the witness’ procedural interests, which is fixed in the Law of the Criminal Procedure, is appropriately methodologically regulated, or whether certain immunities of the witness are appropriately perceived and applied in practice, is raised in the present article. Through this reason, the author, searching for the (...) answers to these questions—how is all this and how must all this be?—singles out, in abstracto, two elements of immunities of the witness, in concreto—the immunities of the witness and witnessing. It would seem that these protective guarantees are similar in principle. The analysis of this article allows for the answer that they are analogous from the point of view of their value. However, they differ by the mechanisms of implementation. According to the author, the immunity of the witness protects the person from becoming a witness, whereas the immunity of witnessing secures protection from witnessing, which may cause harm to the witness himself/herself. Accordingly, it also determines the need not only to analyze these two elements, but their interrelation and interrelations as well. (shrink)

This article challenges stereotypical conceptions of Law and Science as cultural opposites, arguing that English criminal trial practice is fundamentally congruent with modern science’s basic epistemological assumptions, values and methods of inquiry. Although practical tensions undeniably exist, they are explicable—and may be neutralised—by paying closer attention to criminal adjudication’s normative ideals and their institutional expression in familiar aspects of common law trial procedure, including evidentiary rules of admissibility, trial by jury, adversarial fact-finding, cross-examination and the ethical duties of (...) expert witnesses. Effective partnerships between lawyers and forensic scientists are indispensable for integrating scientific evidence into criminal proceedings, and must be renegotiated between individual practitioners on an on-going basis. Fruitful interdisciplinary collaboration between scholars with a shared interest in forensic science should dispense with reductive cultural stereotypes of Science and Law. (shrink)

This paper analyses the role of remorse and apology in international criminal trials by juxtaposing two prominent cases of convicted war criminals Biljana Plavšić and Esad Landžo. Plavšić was the first and only Bosnian Serb political leader to plead guilty before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Her acknowledgement of guilt and purported remorse expressed during her ICTY proceedings was celebrated as a milestone for both the ICTY and the Balkans. However, she later retracted her (...) remorse while serving her prison sentence. Landžo was a guard at the notorious Čelebići detention camp and did not acknowledge his guilt publicly during his ICTY trial. Seven years after his release from prison, Landžo personally confronted survivors and apologised to them. Through comparison of these two widely different cases, we illustrate varying roles criminal trials can play in offender’s reflection on his/her crimes and how relevance and resonance of war criminal’s remorse in and outside of the courtroom depend on how remorse is expressed and to whom. (shrink)

In the first of these two lectures Professor Hart is concerned with certain controversies and changes of attitude towards the question of moral guilt—mens rea,’ the guilty mind’—in criminal proceedings according to English law. There is, on the one hand and at one extreme, the attitude of the McNaughten Rules which excludes guilt only in the case of a ‘defect of reason’; at the other extreme there is the modern position, represented by Lady Wootton according to which the (...) conception of metis rea should be dropped altogether—criminal proceedings are concerned with ‘social hygiene’ and have nothing to do with responsibility: the question of responsibility comes up only after a verdict has been reached in estimating what steps are likely to have the best consequences for the ‘criminal’ and for society. Between these extremes Professor Hart takes a kind of middle course, what he calls ‘a moderate form of the new doctrine’: ‘Under this scheme mens rea would continue to be a necessary condition of liability to be investigated and settled before conviction except so far as it relates to mental abnormality. The innovation would be that the accused person would not be able to adduce any form of mental abnormality as a bar to conviction. The question of his mental abnormality would under this scheme be investigated only after conviction and would primarily be concerned with his present rather than his past mental state’. He admits that there are some practical difficulties against this view, but he does not consider the theoretical difficulty that the theory does away with the principle that criminal conviction must be based on guilt and responsibility. (shrink)

In criminal cases at common law, juries are permitted to convict on wholly circumstantial evidence even in the face of a reasonable case for acquittal. This generates the highly counterintuitive—if not absurd—consequence that there being reason to think that the accused didn’t do it is not reason to doubt that he did. This is the no-reason-to-doubt problem. It has a technical solution provided that the evidence on which it is reasonable to think that the accused didn’t do it is (...) a different subset of the total evidence from that on which there is no reason to doubt that he did do it. It lies in the adversarial nature of criminal proceedings in the common law tradition that the subsets of the total evidence on which counsel base their opposing arguments are themselves different from and often incompatible with one another. While this solves the no-reason-to-doubt problem, it does so at the cost of triggering a second problem just as bad. It is the no-rival problem, according to which incompatible theories of the case based on incompatible subsets of the evidence cannot be rivals of one another. If neither party’s case contradicts the other’s then, by the burden of proof requirement, criminal convictions are impossible. Once having generated the dilemma, the object of the paper is to determine how it might be escaped. (shrink)

In this Article, I will argue that a person may be deserving of criminal punishment even in certain situations where she is not necessarily morally responsible for her criminal act. What these situations share in common are two things: the psychological factors that motivate the individual’s behavior are environmentally determined and her crime is serious, making her less eligible for sympathy and therefore less likely to be acquitted. -/- To get to this conclusion, I will proceed in four (...) steps. In Part II, I will offer the first two of these steps. First, I will argue that our foundational assumption that moral responsibility is necessary for just blame and punishment is not self-evident and is actually rather difficult to explain and justify. Second, I will offer an explanation and justification that appeals to our moral psychology. Specifically, I will argue that we subscribe to this assumption ultimately because we sympathize with agents who lack responsibility for their actions. -/- Third, in Part IV, I aim to show that even if moral responsibility is not conceptually — only “emotionally” — necessary for just blame and punishment, the traditionally recognized criminal excuses are not at risk because, contrary to popular wisdom, they do not really rely on this assumption to begin with. Instead, they stand less for the metaphysical proposition that we should refrain from blaming and punishing the non-responsible and more for the normative/ethical proposition that we should refrain from blaming and punishing those whom we cannot reasonably expect to have acted better. I will further argue that the latter proposition does not necessarily reduce to the former. -/- Fourth, once I have defended my account of the excuses, I will question in Parts V and VI the increasingly popular notion that we should add certain conditions or circumstances to the list of recognized excuses. I will focus on one in particular — the psychological theory of “situationism” — and will argue that, despite its initial plausibility, it should be kept off the list. While situationism arguably does negate moral responsibility, it does not negate criminal responsibility. -/- Of course, this is a controversial point. Criminal responsibility is almost universally thought to require moral responsibility. But in a previous article, "Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not Morally Responsible, Subject to Criminal Punishment And to Preventive Detention," 48 San Diego L. Rev. 1299, I used personality psychology to drive a wedge between the two. In this article, I will use the opposite end of the psychological spectrum — social psychology — to drive the same important wedge. (shrink)

In the opening of the article, the author briefly assesses the existing legal regulations of criminal procedure in the Czech Republic adopted as far back as in 1961. He points out to specific imperfections, which justify the need for their recodification. The mainstay of the article is devoted to the very pre-trial proceedings, i.e. checking and investigation. The existing legal regulations are analysed, and selected application problems are mentioned in relation to the recodification under preparation.

Neuroimaging showing brain abnormalities is increasingly being introduced in criminal court proceedings to argue that a defendant could not control his behavior and should not be held responsible for it. But imaging has questionable probative value because it does not directly capture brain function or a defendant’s mental states at the time of a criminal act. Advanced techniques could transform imaging from a coarse-grained measure of correlations between brain states and behavior to a fine-grained measure of causal (...) connections between them. Even if this occurs, bias and other attitudes may unduly influence jurors’ interpretation of the data. Moreover, judges’ decisions about whether neuroimaging data is legally relevant and admissible are normative decisions based on more than empirical evidence. Advanced neuroimaging will better inform assessments of criminal responsibility but will not supplant or explain away the psychological and normative foundation of the criminal law. (shrink)

In 2001, three non-Aboriginal men in their twenties were charged with the sexual assault of a twelve year old Aboriginal girl in rural Saskatchewan. Legal proceedings lasted almost seven years and included two preliminary hearings, two jury trials, two retrials with juries, and appeals to the provincial appeal court and the Supreme Court of Canada. One accused was convicted. The case raises questions about the administration of justice in sexual assault cases in Saskatchewan. Based on observation and analysis of (...) the record, this paper: (1) examines relationships between legal errors dealing with availability of the defence of “belief in consent” and interpretation of the “all reasonable steps” provision, the need for retrials, and apprehended race-gender-age bias and discrimination; and 2) proposes incremental and systemic remedies to address the weaknesses in police, prosecutorial and judicial policy and practice highlighted by this case. (shrink)

Drawing on Brown and Fraser’s (in: Giles, Scherer (eds) Social markers in speech, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 33–62, 1979) framework for the analysis of communicative situations and Fuentes Rodríguez’s (Lingüística pragmática y Análisis del discurso, Arco Libros, Madrid, 2000; in Estudios de Lingüística: Investigaciones lingüísticas en el siglo XXI, 2009. https://doi.org/10.14198/ELUA2009.Anexo3.04 ) model of pragmatic analysis, this paper examines three home-made recordings featuring some of the members of the terrorist cell responsible for the 2017 vehicle-ramming attacks in Barcelona and (...) Cambrils weighted as evidence during the trial held between November 2020 and May 2021 in the Spanish National High Court. The aim of this qualitative analysis is to test whether the linguistic evidence available supports the allegation that the participation in these recordings by one of the accused, Mohamed Houli Chemlal, had been planned by his interlocutors. Results show, first, that the exchanges analyzed present features indicative of both spontaneity and (limited) planification. Second, that Houli makes key contributions to the unfolding of the interactions shown in the recordings and that he does so in a cooperative and apparently relaxed manner, which could at best provide only partial support to his allegations. It is claimed that forensic linguistic analysis can generate valuable insights within terrorism-related legal proceedings. (shrink)

Criminal law scholars approach legality in various ways. Some scholars eschew over-arching principles and proceed directly to one or more distinct “rules”: (1) the rule against retroactive criminalization; (2) the rule that criminal statutes be construed narrowly; (3) the rule against the judicial creation of common-law offenses; and (4) the rule that vague criminal statutes are void. Other scholars seek a single principle, i.e., the “principle of legality,” that they claim underlies the four rules. In contrast, I (...) believe that both approaches are misguided. There is no such thing as a single “principle of legality;” yet, the four aforementioned rules are not unrelated to each other. The so-called “principle of legality” consists of two distinct norms that derive, respectively, from two fundamental principles of criminal justice, viz., the principle, “No person shall be punished in the absence of a bad mind,” and the principle that underlies the maxim, “Every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.” The first norm of legality explains the rules regarding ex post facto legislation, and rules regarding “notice” and “fair warning” of judicial decisions. When a person is punished for violating a rule that was non-existent or unclear at the time he acted, he is punished for conduct that the state now condemns and seeks to prevent by means of penal sanctions. Accordingly, at the time the person is prosecuted, his claim is not that he did not do anything that the state regards as wrong, but, rather, that he neither knew nor should have known that he was doing something that the state would come to regard as wrong. He ought, indeed, to be excused for his mistake, but only because of a principle that is common to excuses generally: “No person ought to be punished in the absence of a guilty mind.” He should be excused because even when a person does something the state condemns and seeks to prevent, he ought not to be blamed for it unless he was motivated in a certain way, namely, by an attitude of disrespect for the legitimate interests of the political community by whose norms he is bound.The second norm of legality informs several of the remaining rules, though not all of them. The second norm is that a person ought not to be punished in the name of a political community unless it can confidently be said that the community officially regards his conduct as warranting the criminal punishment at issue. It is a norm that is most commonly associated with the rule of lenity, but it is not confined to the construction of statutes that are ambiguous or vague. It can also be also violated when a person is punished for violating a statute that has fallen into desuetude, regardless of how widely promulgated or narrowly defined the statute may be. This second norm derives from a principle that also underlies the presumption of innocence - the only difference being that the presumption of innocence is a preference for acquittal in the event of uncertainty regarding the facts which an actor is charged, while the second norm of legality is a preference for acquittal in the event of uncertainty regarding the scope of the offense which he is charged.Nevertheless, one “rule” remains that this analysis throws into question - namely, the rule that “vague” criminal statutes are void. Criminal statutes are sometimes so broadly defined that they do, indeed, infringe constitutionally protected rights of speech, movement, etc. - in which event they ought to be invalidated on those very grounds. And criminal statutes are sometimes so broadly drafted that, before applying them, courts ought to construe them to apply only to constitutionally unprotected acts that courts can confidently say the relevant political community regards as warranting punishment. But once statutes are so construed to apply only to constitutionally unprotected conduct, courts have no further reason to invalidate them on grounds of “vagueness.” Lack of “notice” is no reason to invalidate them because, with respect to the narrowly defined conduct such statutes are construed to prohibit, “common social duty” alone ought to alert actors that their conduct is suspect. (shrink)

Michael Clark; II*—The Sanctions of the Criminal Law, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 97, Issue 1, 1 June 1997, Pages 25–40, https://doi.org/10.

The legalization of euthanasia, both in the Netherlands and in other countries is usually justified in reference to the right to autonomy of patients. Utilizing recent Dutch jurisprudence, this article intends to show that the judicial proceedings on euthanasia in the Netherlands have not so much enhanced the autonomy of patients, as the autonomy of the medical profession. Keywords: allowing to die, criminal law, euthanasia, law enforcement, legal aspects, legislation, medical ethics, medical profession, self determination, the Netherlands, voluntary (...) euthanasia, withholding treatment CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Prior to the extensive reform of the Finnish criminal procedure in 1997, the roles of the prosecutor and the defence attorney were passive compared to the role of the judge. The main task of the prosecutor was to read the written indictment and to help the judge to find the truth. The judge could procure evidence ex officio, although it may have been detrimental to the suspect. The roles of the judge, the attorneys and the prosecutor changed dramatically when (...) the reform concerning criminal matters was enacted. The prosecutor is now an active party to the case, ensuring the implementation of criminal liability and actively promoting the progress of the proceedings. It is the duty of the prosecutor to prove the charge by procuring sufficient evidence in support of the charge and by presenting it to the court. The court itself is neutral; it does not support or assist the prosecutor. The judge cannot hear a witness ex officio if the hearing is to be detrimental to the suspect. (shrink)

Language-related right in the legal proceedings is mostly associated with access to interpreting. Literature on the bilingual courtroom primarily centres on the role of interpreters in the intercultural communication. This paper, drawing on discourse analysis of a case study in a Chinese criminal court, investigates the atypical role played by an interpreter when she ceases to be an active participant in the bilingual interaction. It discusses how language ideology underlying the judicial practice could transform the role of the (...) interpreter and convert the bilingual arterial into a monolingual one. Situating the analysis in the wider social and legal context of Chinese criminal justice system, this paper attempts to explain and interpret the judicial behaviour to keep the interpreter silent and the impact on the language rights enjoyed by the minority-language-speaking defendants. (shrink)

This study examines the discursive history and interactive aspects of the opening statement in Anglo-American courts. Informed by the concepts of stance and engagement, the study explicates the process of conceptual interaction which turns the jurors into co-constructors of the discourse, thereby making the opening statement fictively dialogic. Drawing upon 51 opening statements as recorded in Proceedings of the Old Bailey, between 1759 and 1789, the qualitative and quantitative analysis reveals that interactive devices are an integral part of the (...) genre, and that pronouns appear to occur most frequently, followed by the lawyers’ use of attitude markers, questions, and reported discourse, respectively. With these devices, the lawyers are likely to be able to prime the jury into viewing the events and participants in a given direction. (shrink)

The objective of the paper is to present the differences in the grounds of appeal and the appeal proceedings against judgments issued by a court composed of representatives of the public in a criminal trial at first instance. At present, citizens are allowed to adjudicate most often in one of three forms: persons adjudicating independently without the participation of a professional factor, who are not professionals in the field of law and criminal procedure (e.g. judges of the (...) peace in the common law system); a jury composed of citizens and adjudicating mostly on guilt of the accused; or lay judges adjudicating all aspects of the case in one panel together with professional judges. However, the participation of laymen in adjudication is not a prevailing rule. Many countries legal systems do not allow the citizens to co-decide in criminal cases. The paper also indicates the arguments for the democratization of the judiciary through a wider admission of citizens to participate in criminal justice. This issue has been examined on the background of three aspects of democracy: representative, deliberative and participatory. (shrink)

This paper considers Canada’s young offenders in the context from which they enter the youth criminal courtroom. To determine how youth criminal justice courts violate the Canadian Youth Criminal Justice Act, this analysis relates said context to several phenomena, including legal linguistics, oral language competency, literacy, communicative competency, non-verbal communication, the physical structure of youth courtrooms, and legal translation. As a result of the standards of procedural communication upheld by the Canadian criminal justice system, young people’s (...) rights, including the right to be respected regardless of cultural, ethnic, or linguistic differences, the right to be heard and to participate in proceedings, the right to be sentenced meaningfully, the right to privacy, and the right to be tried in a timely manner are abused in the youth criminal courtroom. Although insufficient structures of procedural communication cause these issues and are beyond the control of counsel, defense counsel are often blamed for their effects. Legal professionals must make important adjustments such as altering the formal speech required in youth criminal courtrooms, employing legal professionals with the role of translating legal jargon to young people in the courtroom, and closing youth courtrooms off from the public to reduce the YCJA violations occurring in youth criminal justice court. These adjustments are ultimately the responsibility of the Canadian criminal justice system. (shrink)