Western contemporary logic has been used to advance the field of Islamic philosophical theology, which historically utilised Aristotelian-Avicennian logic, on grounds of there being an inherent normativity in logic. This is in spite of the surrounding controversy on the status of logic in the Islamic theological tradition. The normative authority of logic means that it influences the content of what we ought to believe and how we ought to revise those beliefs. This paper (...) seeks to demonstrate that, notwithstanding the incompatible differences between the two systems, the underlying feature of both Western contemporary logic and Aristotelian- Avicennian logic is logical normativity. It then argues that an inherent normativity of logic in the Islamic theological/philosophical tradition is unmotivated. Instead, it proposes to reinstate logic as anti-exceptional within the Islamic theological/philosophical tradition as a viable alternative. (shrink)

Through Aristotle's theory of catharsis and his concept of complex tragedy, Ben La Farge provides an original examination of genre. Moving effortlessly from Greek to Shakespearean tragedies, to nineteenth and twentieth-century British, American and Russian drama, and fiction and contemporary television, this study sheds new light on the art of comedy.

Through Aristotle's theory of catharsis and his concept of complex tragedy, Ben La Farge provides an original examination of genre. Moving effortlessly from Greek to Shakespearean tragedies, to nineteenth and twentieth-century British, American and Russian drama, and fiction and contemporary television, this study sheds new light on the art of comedy.

In this paper I develop a cross-cultural critique of contemporary critical thinking education in the United States, the United Kingdom, and those educational systems that adopt critical thinking education from the standard model used in the US and UK. The cross-cultural critique rests on the idea that contemporary critical thinking textbooks completely ignore contributions from non-western sources, such as those found in the African, Arabic, Buddhist, Jain, Mohist and Nyāya philosophical traditions. The exclusion of these traditions leads (...) to the conclusion that critical thinking educators, by using standard textbooks are implicitly sending the message to their students that there are no important contributions to the study of logic and argumentation that derive from non-western sources. As a case study I offer a sustained analysis of the so-called Hindu Syllogism that derives from the Nyāya School of classical Indian philosophy. I close with a discussion of why contributions from non-western sources, such as the Hindu Syllogism, belong in a Critical Thinking course as opposed to an area studies course, such as Asian Philosophy. (shrink)

The article mainly tries to discuss the dialogue between China and Western countries from the aspect of logic. There were three sources of logic, including formal logic in ancient Greek, logic in Early Qin of China as well as logic in ancient India. While, among all the schools in ancient China, Mohist and Virtuoso valued logic most. But as the rulers of Han Dynasty only paid their homage to Confucianism, the two schools gradually (...) sank, logic in Early Qin of China discontinued, without entering the main headstream of logic development worldwide. Later, logic in China had little influence on Chinese society although Indian logic was introduced in Tang Dynasty, a scholar-bureaucrat named Zhizao Li in Ming Dynasty, translated logic textbook Discussion of Name and Science, and German philosopher G.W. Leibniz explained Chinese changing theory with binary system. In the early 1900s, during the process of introducing western science, logic, regarded as the basis of science and a tool of scientific research, was highly valued by Chinese scholars, in fact, western logic entered China through two channels. After Chinese scholars learnt from western logic, they made their contribution to the development of logic. (shrink)

A common reaction to Hegel’s suggestion that we collapse Kant’s distinction between form and content is that, since such a move would also deprive us of any way of distinguishing the merely logical from the real possibility of our concepts, it is incoherent and ought to be rejected. It is true that these two distinctions are intimately related in Kant, such that if one goes, the other does as well. But it is less obvious that giving them up as Kant (...) conceives them is as incoherent a proposal as many of Hegel’s critics think. It has been the point of a recent account of Hegel’s idealism to demonstrate that his critique of Kant’s dichotomy between form and content or concept and intuition does not commit him to the view that human cognition is materially creative of its content in the manner of a God-like or intuitive intellect—does not, in other words, signify a return to a pre-Critical metaphysics. This is the interpretative stance I adopt here as well, in hope of giving defenders of Kant reasons for taking Hegel more seriously. (shrink)

In this paper I develop a cross-cultural critique of contemporary critical thinking education in the United States, the United Kingdom, and those educational systems that adopt critical thinking education from the standard model used in the US and UK. The cross-cultural critique rests on the idea that contemporary critical thinking textbooks completely ignore contributions from non-western sources, such as those found in the African, Arabic, Buddhist, Jain, Mohist and Nyāya philosophical traditions. The exclusion of these traditions leads (...) to the conclusion that critical thinking educators, by using standard textbooks are implicitly sending the message to their students that there are no important contributions to the study of logic and argumentation that derive from non-western sources. As a case study I offer a sustained analysis of the so-called Hindu Syllogism that derives from the Nyāya School of classical Indian philosophy. I close with a discussion of why contributions from non-western sources, such as the Hindu Syllogism, belong in a Critical Thinking course as opposed to an area studies course, such as Asian Philosophy. (shrink)

The article comprises three parts. Part I contains an overview of the areas in the analysis of modern French philosophy that have been of the greatest relevance to Russian researchers over the last years. We conclude that numerous aspects of the French philosophical thought of the twentieth century are well represented in the research of Russian authors, who also point out the emerging trends in its development. Part II deals with the development of analytic philosophy in Russia within the framework (...) of such areas as “critique of bourgeois philosophy”, a purely ideological stand only nominally related to philosophy, logic, and the history of philosophy and theoretical research. Part III contains a periodization of the history of phenomenology in Russia, pointing out the most important achievements of the contemporary Russian scholars of phenomenology as well as their understanding of the essence, the problems, and the aims of phenomenological philosophy. We also indicate the tendencies within the development of the discipline in the Russian Federation. (shrink)

This is an anthology in which all but one of the essays have been previously published. Western religious thought has made use of, or appropriated, or remained in dialogue with every major philosophical development from Platonism to Marxism. One of the latest versions of such appropriation, discovered as many would think in a most unlikely place, is the appropriation of analytic philosophy. A new natural theology is abroad in the land, and this volume attempts quite successfully to capture its (...) current state. If Flew and MacIntyre offered the first version of this dialogue and found analytic philosophy detrimental to western theism, this volume recognizes that more recent analytic philosophy has offered a second version and discovered analytic methodology as supportive of theistic philosophical persuasions. Essays by Ross, Rowe, Swinburne and Horsburgh consider the contribution of modal logic. Other essays by Alston, Bennett, and Hick, discuss the divine nature. Language and religion is developed by Ross, Pike, Plantinga, Rowe, Kenny, Mavrodes, Savage, and Donnelly. Miracle language is investigated by Holland and Dietl, while Gill discusses verification, and Chisholm the self. Although one may regret that some writers, Geach or Phillips, for example, are not included, it is time to recognize that natural theology has revived in our day by means of analytic philosophy, and this collection is an early and very successful reminder, as well as functioning as a good text for courses in the latest in philosophical theology on the Anglo-Saxon scene.—H. A. D. (shrink)

This essay takes the position, consistent with Ayer’s own retrospective judgments, that the philosophical significance of Language, Truth and Logic (LTL) was minimal at best, and that its real significance was socio-historical. LTL stands as one of the most influential expressions of an overzealous and simplistic scientism that swept through Western culture in the first half of the twentieth century. This scientism played a crucial role in problematizing the West’s relationship to truth in ways that contributed to the (...) eventual emergence of “post-truth” culture, with its “post-truth politics.” This in turn made possible the disastrous results of recent votes and elections in Britain and, above all, in the United States. In short, LTL’s real significance resides in the role it played as a sophisticated and successful bit of propaganda for an ideology that played a crucial role in loosing Western culture from its moral and epistemic moorings. (shrink)

This volume presents the proceedings from the Eleventh Brazilian Logic Conference on Mathematical Logic held by the Brazilian Logic Society in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil. The conference and the volume are dedicated to the memory of professor Mario Tourasse Teixeira, an educator and researcher who contributed to the formation of several generations of Brazilian logicians. Contributions were made from leading Brazilian logicians and their Latin-American and European colleagues. All papers were selected by a careful refereeing processs and were (...) revised and updated by their authors for publication in this volume. There are three sections: Advances in Logic, Advances in Theoretical Computer Science, and Advances in Philosophical Logic. Well-known specialists present original research on several aspects of model theory, proof theory, algebraic logic, category theory, connections between logic and computer science, and topics of philosophical logic of current interest. Topics interweave proof-theoretical, semantical, foundational, and philosophical aspects with algorithmic and algebraic views, offering lively high-level research results. (shrink)

Western Philosophy: An Anthology provides the most comprehensive and authoritative survey of the Western philosophical tradition from ancient Greece to the leading philosophers of today. Features substantial and carefully chosen excerpts from all the greats of philosophy, arranged thematically and chronologically Readings are introduced and linked together by a lucid philosophical commentary which guides the reader through the key arguments Embraces all the major subfields of philosophy: theory of knowledge and metaphysics, philosophy of mind, religion and science, moral (...) philosophy (theoretical and applied), political theory, and aesthetics Updated edition now includes additional contemporary readings in each section Augmented by two completely new sections on logic and language, and philosophy and the meaning of life. (shrink)

In his magnum opus, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (first published in German in 1934, English translation, 1959), Karl Popper make two fundamental philosophical moves. First, he relocates the center of gravity of the philosophical treatment of science around what he calls the problem of demarcation. This is the problem of distinguishing between science, on the one hand, and everything else on the other. (By contrast, his contemporaries of the Vienna Circle, whose positivism would prove the most influential brand (...) of empiricism of the day, located the center of gravity around the problem of linguistic meaning, and use a criterion according to which a statement is meaningful to the extent that one can identify verification conditions for it.) Popper excludes from science such things as logic, metaphysics, Freudian psychoanalysis, and Marx’s theory of history. Second, Popper propounds the doctrine of falsification, which handles the problem of demarcation, as well as answers David Hume’s shattering attack on science as the premier form of knowledge centuries before. The arguments he mounts for falsification would function also as an attack on any account of the scientific enterprise that, like positivism, adheres to the idea that science progresses logically from instances (given in observation or experience) to the high-order generalizations characteristic of mature scientific theory. In this small space I shall undertake neither to illuminate the nuances of Popper’s position, nor to trace the (numerous) lines of criticism that have accumulated against it some seventy years later. I shall busy myself instead with tracing a trajectory of thought on the subject of scientific reasoning and its relation to individual decision-making, reflecting on Popper’s contribution and on how his legacy might be further enlarged. (shrink)

The Euro-American far-right represents a highly diverse political movement comprising numerous ideological tendencies. It includes the European New Right, the US ‘alt-right’ and ‘alt-lite’, far-right accelerationism, traditionalism, and new forms of political misogyny. Despite the diversity in ideas and activities, this article argues that an overarching theme of the ‘fear of white extinction’ travels across and animates each major contemporary far-right tendency. The article explores a variety of older and contemporary metaphysical themes that are deployed in contemporary (...) fascism. These include new configurations of racism, occultist ideas of nature and vitalism, the rendering of culture and civilization in ‘biocultural’ and ‘anthropological’ terms, and ideas about cosmic destiny. The article considers how older ideas from Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Hans Günther, Ludwig Klages, Arnold Gehlen and others are mobilized in contemporary fascism to generate a critique of liberal modernity, one which leads remorselessly to a logic of white supremacy and apocalyptic violence. (shrink)

_Western Philosophy: An Anthology_ provides the most comprehensive and authoritative survey of the Western philosophical tradition from ancient Greece to the leading philosophers of today. Features substantial and carefully chosen excerpts from all the greats of philosophy, arranged thematically and chronologically Readings are introduced and linked together by a lucid philosophical commentary which guides the reader through the key arguments Embraces all the major subfields of philosophy: theory of knowledge and metaphysics, philosophy of mind, religion and science, moral philosophy, (...) political theory, and aesthetics Updated edition now includes additional contemporary readings in each section Augmented by two completely new sections on logic and language, and philosophy and the meaning of life. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: A comprehensive introduction to ancient (western) logic from earliest times to the 6th century CE, with an emphasis on topics which may be of interest to contemporary logicians. Content: 1. Pre-Aristotelian Logic 1.1 Syntax and Semantics 1.2 Argument Patterns and Valid Inference 2. Aristotle 2.1 Dialectics 2.2 Sub-sentential Classifications 2.3 Syntax and Semantics of Sentences 2.4 Non-modal Syllogistic 2.5 Modal Logic 3. The early Peripatetics: Theophrastus and Eudemus 3.1 Improvements and Modifications of Aristotle's (...) class='Hi'>Logic 3.2 Prosleptic Syllogisms 3.3 Forerunners of Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens 3.4 Wholly Hypothetical Syllogisms 4. Diodorus Cronus and Philo the Logician 5. The Stoics 5.1 Logical Achievements Besides Propositional Logic 5.2 Syntax and Semantics of Complex Propositions 5.3 Arguments 5.4 Stoic Syllogistic 5.5 Logical Paradoxes 6. Epicurus and the Epicureans 7. Later Antiquity. (shrink)

This is the first of a number of volumes designed to review the philosophical work which has been done in various areas of philosophy between the years 1956 and 1966. It succeeds an earlier three volume publication entitled Philosophy in the Mid-Century which covered the period from 1949 to 1955. This first volume in the series covers the fields of logic, philosophical logic, foundations and philosophy of mathematics. For anyone interested in these fields, the book is an indispensable (...) guide. The procedure is that an expert in a given area writes a summary of the work done in the area in the last ten years and adds a bibliography covering the same period. In all there are thirty-two such essays, most written in English, but a few in French and German. Some representative essays and their authors are the following: On the logical side, Modal Logic, Many Valued Logics, Logic of Practical Discourse, Semantics, Model Theory, Pragmatics, Chronological or Tense Logic, The Logic of Questions, Combinatory Logic and others. There are two general essays on recent developments in philosophical logic and a number of essays on the development of logic in various Eastern and Western European countries and Japan. On the mathematical side are three essays on foundations of set theory and mathematics, essays on Intuitionism in mathematics, and general essays by A. Church, H. Freudenthal and others. The essays are generally of high caliber and the bibliographies in most cases very comprehensive. Occasionally the essays contain not only summary of work done but original suggestions and development of ideas. It would be hard to find a more useful guide for the philosopher overwhelmed by the many developments in these fields in recent years.--R. H. K. (shrink)

An important contribution of the so-called ‘Indian logic’ is the set of predications developed by Jain philosophers. However, if assessed based on western classical logic, Jaina logic in general and its predications in particular are clear examples of incorrect or inconsistent frameworks. Against this last idea, in this paper, it is argued that Jaina logic has a great potential to explain the way human beings really make inferences, and that comparing it to modern standard (...) class='Hi'>logic can be a mistake. To do that, a current semantic approach about reasoning, the one of the mental models theory, is used. (shrink)

Unlike some western scholars who limit their interpretation of modernity and its source to conceptual, cultural, value, and psychological dimensions, Marx pointed out that modernity came mainly from modern production system. Starting from the historical context of his time, Marx explored various aspects of modernity and pointed out that modernity was inherent in the logic of capital, resided in the process of historical evolution, arose in social conflicts and segmentation, and presented itself in a global horizon. The (...) class='Hi'>logic of capital, the historical viewpoint, the theory of contradiction and a global perspective are fundamental in Marx's analysis of the problems of modernity. Marx's ideas of modernity are methodologically significant to the construction of modernity in contemporary Chinese society. (shrink)

This collection of articles and review essays, including many hard to find pieces, comprises the most important and fundamental studies of Indian logic and linguistics ever undertaken. Frits Staal is concerned with four basic questions: Are there universals of logic that transcend culture and time? Are there universals of language and linguistics? What is the nature of Indian logic? And what is the nature of Indian linguistics? By addressing these questions, Staal demonstrates that, contrary to the general (...) assumption among Western philosophers, the classical philosophers of India were rationalists, attentive to arguments. They were in this respect unlike contemporary Western thinkers inspired by existentialism or hermeneutics, and like the ancient Chinese, Greeks, and many medieval European schoolmen, only--as Staal says--more so. Universals establishes that Asia's contributions are not only compatible with what has been produced in the West, but a necessary ingredient and an essential component of any future human science. (shrink)

This article is part of a larger project in which I attempt to show that Western formal logic, from its inception in Aristotle onward, has both been partially constituted by, and partially constitutive of, what has become known as racism. In contrast to this trend, the present article concerns the major philosopher whose contribution to logic has been perhaps the most derided and marginalized, and yet whose character and politics are, from a contemporary perspective, drastically superior—John (...) Stuart Mill. My approach to my core concern will be one of narrowing concentric circles. I will begin with Mill’s occasional political writings that bear on the issue of racism, including “The Negro Question.” From there, the core of the article will explore the political dimensions of Mill’s A System of Logic. (shrink)

In the past the study of Asian philosophical traditions has often been approached by asking how the theories developed within these nonWestern cultures would help us to solve problems in contemporary Western philosophy. The present account, which summarizes results of a research project funded by the John Templeton foundation in 2015, attempts to reverse this way of studying Asian philosophy by investigating which theories, approaches and models from contemporary Western philosophy can be used to support, analyse, (...) refine and advance insights into key questions discussed by Indian Buddhist Madhyamaka. Our discussion concentrates on six key philosophical areas that can contribute in important ways to the analysis and development of Madhyamaka thought: metaphysics, logic, semantics, cognitive science, philosophy of science, and ethics. (shrink)

Conceptualizing the nature of reality and the way the world functions, Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko analyzes the foundations of human rights law in the strict subject/object dichotomy. Seeking to dismantle this dichotomy using topo-logic, a concept developed by Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitaro, this topical book formulates ways to operationalize alternative visions of human rights practice. Subject/object dichotomy, Yahyaoui Krivenko demonstrates, emerges from and reflects a particular Western worldview through a quest for rationality and formal logic. Taking a metaphysical (...) and epistemological perspective, this book explores the alternative views of reality and logic, developed by Kitaro, to demonstrate how topo-logic can enable both a theoretical and a practical renewal of human rights and overcome the subject/object dichotomy. Examining the recent growth of social movements, decolonization and diversification of discourses about human rights, and substantive equality, the book identifies these developments in contemporary human rights as indications of a movement towards a topo-logical view beyond the subject/object dichotomy. Students and scholars of critical legal studies, legal theory and philosophy, and international human rights law will find this book to be an invigorating read. Laying ground for the possible renewal and enhancement of human rights law, it will also be a useful resource for practitioners of human rights law. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: A comprehensive introduction to ancient (western) logic from earliest times to the 6th century CE, with a focus on issues that may be of interest to contemporary logicians and covering important topics in Post-Aristotelian logic that are frequently neglected (such as Peripatetic hypothetical syllogistic, the Stoic axiomatic system of propositional logic and various later ancient developments).

INDIAN AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHY- A Study in Contrasts By BETTY HEIMANN. Originally published in I937. Contents include: 1. INTRODUCTION 13 2. THEOLOGY 2Q 3. ONTOLOGY AND ESCHATOLOGY 46 4. ETHICS 63 5. LOGIC 79 6. AESTHETICS 98 7. HISTORY AND APPLIED SCIENCE Il6 8. THE APPARENT RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN WEST AND EAST 131 EPILOGUE 147 INDEX OF PROBLEMS TREATED 149. INDIAN AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHY. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION: ONE ceuvre dart est un coin de la creation vu d travers (...) un temperament, says Zola and we may be justified in applying this aphorism when we venture on a some what similar survey and attempt an artificial selection from World-Philosophy throughout the ages. My aim, however, is not to elaborate any finished outline of all the philosophical conceptions that have arisen in East and West up to the present day, but merely to indicate the essential and fundamental tendencies and principles. In tracing the sources of Western Philosophy to Plato and Aristotle, and still earlier to the pre-Socratics of ancient Greece, I became convinced that all translations are, to a greater or less degree, modes of interpretation. I studied the Classics, therefore, from the linguistic standpoint, and this procedure ultimately developed into a philosophical method intimately associated with the psychological aspects of Philology. In pursuing this task I discovered at the same time the specifically material basis of all Western thought. In other words in my regress from the history of modern Philosophy to the dawn of Greek speculation, or to repeat to the pre-Socratics, I found myself able to trace the main trends of Western Philosophy to the prior era of the Greek Sophists, whose outstanding role as the actual founders of Western thought is, in my opinion, too frequently underestimated. Their basic dogma which has held good in the West ever since was, Man is the Measure of all things. At this point an equally important feature must be emphasized for throughout this age of the Sophists there persists the profound contrast between the typically Western, and the equally distinctive Eastern, intellectual and spiritual atmospheres. In this connection, still further, I was deeply impressed by the far-reaching divergence of the Western anthropological tendency from the older cosmic out look upon Man as being part and parcel of the Universe And this radical antithesis is to be dis cerned in contemporary Greek drama. For Aeschylus, the Marathonomaches, creates all his immortal tragedies in the genuinely cosmic mood. Every in fraction of cosmic order, with no single exception, must generate its own inevitable reaction, and also its punishment, in order that the primal cosmic harmony may once more be restored... (shrink)

ABSTRACT: A comprehensive introduction to ancient (western) logic from earliest times to the 6th century CE, with an emphasis on topics which may be of interest to contemporary logicians.

We know that all natural beings have evolved from simpler to more complex states; and we also know that man himself has evolved physically, even within the comparatively short time of his recorded history. It would therefore be strange indeed if man had not also evolved psychically or spiritually. Such psychic evolution may, I think, be discovered in many of man's cultural works; and I believe that it may also be revealed through the history of western philosophy, and, indeed, (...) even more sharply and clearly there. If philosophy is the most general and abstract reflection of human existence, as I think it is, then the history of philosophy should be the most general and abstract expression of the history of human existence. As such it should display most purely, essentially, and definitively that evolution of western man which is manifested less clearly, essentially, and definitively in the history of any other aspect of human life. I do not mean that later stages are necessarily better than earlier ones; ancient man may very well have been better off than modern man is—and in one sense he indeed was, as my remarks may show. Better off or not, however, ancient man is still ancient and modern man modern; and the later stage is a more evolved or developed form than the earlier one in the sense that the later presupposes the earlier genetically and even logically, whereas the earlier does not presuppose the later. (shrink)

It has been common to frame Nishida Kitarō’s philosophy as an attempt to overcome Western modernity, but what has been downplayed in this reading is how Nishida redefines the concept of religion in a way that undermines the secular-religion binary formulated in Western modernity. Nishida’s view of religion, as both a structuring logic of historical reality and as an existential form of awareness, with its own epistemological criteria, contrasts with Western accounts of religion, which has assumed (...) religion to be a form opposite to the real. By designating religion as a logical category that structures the real, Nishida’s philosophy of religion seeks to liberate the races, cultures, and ethnicities of the world that have been historically subordinated to the West by giving them an epistemological footing to assert and participate in a world dialogue. In this sense, Nishida’s religious standpoint offers a way to think critically about the “problem of religion” and presents a discussion that speaks to some of the issues raised within postcolonial studies. (shrink)

Philosophy, like most things Chinese, must be understood in terms of continuities. And any discussion of the cultural interests of contemporary China must begin from context: the “where” and the “whenh” of things. In contrast to Western philosophy, which began from the decontextualizing metaphysical sensibilities of the classical Greeks, the Chinese tradition is resolutely historicist. Reason is a series of historical instances of reasonableness; culture is a specific historical pattern of human flourishing; logic is the internal coherence (...) of this particular human narrative; knowledge modestly is local and site‐specific – making one's way smoothly and without obstruction; truth is proximate – the capacity to foster productive relationships that begin with the maintenance of one's own integrity and extend to the enhancement of one's own natural, social and cultural contexts. (shrink)

In this translation of his 1936 essay, Tosaka Jun critically examines Tanabe Hajime’s “logic of species,” paying particular attention to its basis, i.e. the logic of “absolute mediation” that Tanabe had devised earlier. In 1936, the logic of species had only been developed within a few texts, including “The Logic of Social Being” (1934–5) and “The Logic of Species and the World Schema” (1935). Interestingly enough, Tosaka agrees to a certain extent with Tanabe’s criticism of (...) the “logic of nothingness” lying at the bottom of Nishida Kitaro’s philosophy, according to which criticism the place of nothingness represents a mystical immediacy. Tosaka, however, also criticizes Tanabe’s own position, claiming that his idea of absolute mediation, in which all immediacies are mediated, leads to a logical absolutism neglecting the materiality of nature. Tosaka claims that the temporal relationship between the mediator and the mediated should be addressed in terms of a “chronology” in which nature exists prior to the subject. Not only Tosaka’s immanent criticism of Tanabe contributed to the development of the “Kyoto School” (an expression Tosaka invented himself in 1932), but the question of “chronology,” with regard to mediation, has a modern theoretical significance as a point of contention in the contemporary debate between realism and constructivism. (shrink)

The species of metaphysical speculation known as ontology is as old as philosophy itself. It is encountered in one form or another in all climes and times. In Western philosophy, it is already cultivated in a fairly sophisticated form in Parmenides: Being is positive and does not admit to the possibility of negation. Being is a plenum, etc. The problem which exercised the mind of Parmenides has lost something of its vitality in our time but it has recognizably survived (...) in such contemporary questions as “Are there negative facts?” At the present day, however, the liveliest issues of ontology revolve round a topic which has a different, if no less celebrated, ancestry. It is the problem of universals which, much discussed by Plato, was taken up and made a principal concern by the scholastics. It is being canvassed again in recent times under the heading of abstract entities. What I wish to investigate is the connection between the metaphysics of abstract entities and the discipline of logic as developed in the modern era. (shrink)

The two most antagonistic schools in contemporary Western philosophy are Existentialism and Logical Positivism. They have nothing in common but the name of philosophy, and even that they deny each other. There is some kind of discussion going on between even such distant schools as Pragmatism and neo-Thomism; Existentialists and Logical Positivists have nothing but sarcasms for each other. To philosophers familiar only with the Anglo-Saxon scene Existentialism must appear negligible. In the Mediterranean countries, on the other hand, (...) where philosophy is a much more popular pastime, Existentialism has an unparalleled vogue and Logical Positivism is considered a horrible aberration from the naturally speculative course of philosophy. In South America whose philosophical life we are apt to underrate Logical Positivism seems to be known to almost nobody, whereas Existentialism, mostly in its German and anti-religious shape, has become, quite paradoxically, the rallying point of “Liberalism,” liberalism, in Spanish countries, being above all anti-catholicism. Although, ironically enough, both Logical Positivism and modern Existentialism originated in German speaking countries, the split between the two goes vaguely parallel with, and may have found some ready echo in, the different cultural inheritance of the Anglo-Saxon and Latin races. Hence, the subject of this paper would seem far-fetched to those steeped in their own national tradition. There is, however, a growing consciousness of the “one world” function of philosophy, particularly with regard to Eastern and Western philosophy. Would it not be a prerequisite of this more ambitious enterprise to gain a clear conception about the most radical split in our own contemporary Western philosophy, the split between Logical Positivism and Existentialism? This paper is an attempt to establish a perspective permitting a just evaluation of the two philosophies. (shrink)

Some contemporary Western theories of consciousness, such as the higher-order thought (HOT) theory and self-representationalism, hold that there is an implicit (pre-reflective) “self-awareness” that accompanies each conscious mental state. Important twentieth-century historical figures, such as Sartre and Brentano, have also embraced a similar position. This view, or something very close to it, can also be found centuries earlier in some Indian philosophy (such as in Dignāga) where conscious experience is thought of as “inherently reflexive” and cognition is understood (...) to have a “dual-aspect.” In this chapter, I lay out some of the similarities and differences among these views and explain why I prefer the way that HOT theory accounts for such self-awareness as compared to the others, including HOT theory’s ability to avoid the much-discussed infinite regress threat and its more plausible explanation of introspection. I also explain how HOT theory, like many Buddhist accounts, is not logically committed to the existence of an enduring substantial “self.”. (shrink)

The essay is a written version of a talk Nakamura Yūjirō gave at the College international de philosophie in Paris in 1983. In the talk Nakamura connects the issue of common sense in his own work to that of place in Nishida Kitarō and the creative imagination in Miki Kiyoshi. He presents this connection between the notions of common sense, imagination, and place as constituting one important thread in contemporary Japanese philosophy. He begins by discussing the significance of place (...) (basho) that is being rediscovered today in response to the shortcomings of the modern Western paradigm, and discusses it in its various senses, such as ontological ground or substratum, the body, symbolic space, and linguistic or discursive topos in ancient rhetoric. He then relates this issue to the philosophy of place Nishida developed in the late 1920s, and after providing an explication of Nishida’s theory, discusses it further in light of some linguistic and psychological theories. Nakamura goes on to discuss his own interest in the notion of common sense traceable to Aristotle and its connection to the rhetorical concept of topos, and Miki’s development of the notion of the imagination in the 1930s in response to Nishida’s theory. And in doing so he ties all three—common sense, place, and imagination—together as suggestive of an alternative to the modern Cartesian standpoint of the rational subject that has constituted the traditional paradigm of the modern West. (shrink)

The existence of philosophy as an academic discipline in African universities has been jeopardized by a growing skepticism regarding the value of contemporary African philosophy. First, it is argued that the discipline is either a Western ideology or an instrument of that ideology for the entrenchment of Western imperialism in Africa. Further, it is argued that as a discipline philosophy is too removed from reality to be of any relevance towards development. In short, the discipline should be (...) rejected from African universities for being either counterproductive or nonproductive to the process of development. ;It is the conclusion of this dissertation that both skeptical arguments lack plausibility, and that contemporary African philosophy is neither an ideology, an instrument of any ideology, nor a luxury even for the poorest countries of Africa. The first argument is refuted by arguing that the characteristics of philosophy, such as its critical epistemological attitude, rigorous methodology, and open-ended conclusions, as well as its logical status as a second-order activity that reflects critically on all disciplines including itself, are too incompatible with the corresponding characteristics of the pejorative Marxist sense of ideology presupposed by the critics. ;The second argument is refuted by arguing that contemporary African philosophy, like its Western counterpart, cultivates critical thinking skills, creativity, problem-solving skills, and certain liberal attitudes, all of which promote morality, the democratic way of life, and scientific thinking. In support of this argument a formal representation of the dilemma of development, a new theory of development, and a new ideology for developing countries are projected and defended against their relevant alternatives as the best means for dissolving the dilemma and for achieving accelerated successful development in Africa. ;My counter-arguments are supported by showing how contemporary African philosophers are facilitating the process of development through their analyses and prescriptions for transcending cultural barriers to a general orientation to science. (shrink)

The essay is a written version of a talk Nakamura Yūjirō gave at the Collège international de philosophie in Paris in 1983. In the talk Nakamura connects the issue of common sense in his own work to that of place in Nishida Kitarō and the creative imagination in Miki Kiyoshi. He presents this connection between the notions of common sense, imagination, and place as constituting one important thread in contemporary Japanese philosophy. He begins by discussing the significance of place (...) (basho) that is being rediscovered today in response to the shortcomings of the modern Western paradigm, and discusses it in its various senses, such as ontological ground or substratum, the body, symbolic space, and linguistic or discursive topos in ancient rhetoric. He then relates this issue to the philosophy of place Nishida developed in the late 1920s, and after providing an explication of Nishida’s theory, discusses it further in light of some linguistic and psychological theories. Nakamura goes on to discuss his own interest in the notion of common sense traceable to Aristotle and its connection to the rhetorical concept of topos, and Miki’s development of the notion of the imagination in the 1930s in response to Nishida’s theory. And in doing so he ties all three—common sense, place, and imagination—together as suggestive of an alternative to the modern Cartesian standpoint of the rational subject that has constituted the traditional paradigm of the modern West. (shrink)

This book is a monograph on contemporary utilitarianism, focusing on its evolving path and logic. It describes the evolution of utilitarianism from the classical model to the contemporary model and then summarizes the characteristics of contemporary utilitarianism, revealing its advantages and disadvantages. This book points out that the best characteristic of contemporary utilitarianism is to give up traditional view of individualism and take balanced attitude to the relationship between individual and community. The change makes the (...) goal of contemporary utilitarianism from the pursuit of maximizing the sum of individual utilities to optimal social utility. Therefore, the contemporary utilitarianism gradually evolves a public philosophy with multiple interests structure, which provides a new way to solve the contradiction between personal interest and public interest. Utilitarianism is still an important political philosophy in western society, but its existing defects actually make it difficult to have a transformative impact on western institutional structure and system. The target audience of this book are students and researchers majoring in politics and ethics. (shrink)

In order to appreciate the content and structure of this article, one must first distinguish between Indian philosophy, even in its modern form, and philosophy which is done by Indians. When a philosopher of Indian heritage writes on modern Western logic or on phenomenology, he/she is not doing Indian philosophy. Such philosophers have not been included in this essay. According to my understanding of the term, their work would be Indian philosophy only if these Western ideas have (...) some impact on their study of Indian philosophy, or if they use Indian philosophical ideas to interpret Western philosophy, or if their work is aimed at preserving and/or extending traditional Indian philosophical pursuits. Similarly, Indian philosophy is not restricted to philosophy written by Indians; it includes philosophy written by anyone, regardless of national origin, who develops, interprets, or reinterprets the themes of classical Indian philosophy. There are many excellent Western scholars of Indian philosophy, such as Eric Frauwallner, Eliot Deutsch, Daniel Ingalls, and Karl Potter. However, because of the limitations of space, I have not discussed their work in this article. I have selected only contemporary philosophers of Indian heritage whose work coherently fits into a narrative account of recent developments in Indian philosophy that reflects the continuation and enrichment of the Indian tradition. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive critique of Advaita, which is very contemporary in its outlook, analysis, and technique. It supplements the classical Indian analysis with many special concepts and techniques extensively used in contemporary Western logic and analytic philosophy.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"What Is Philosophy?"The Status of World Philosophy in the ProfessionRobert C. SolomonThe question "What is philosophy?" is both one of the most virtuously self-effacing and one of the most obnoxious that philosophers today tend to ask. It is virtuously self-effacing insofar as it questions, with some misgivings, its own behavior, the worth of the questions it asks, and the significance of the enterprise itself. It is obnoxious when it (...) refuses to question its own behavior but instead takes that same behavior as the exclusive standard to delegitimize any other activity that dares to call itself "philosophy." Thus, for most of this century, Anglo-American and most European philosophers have simply ignored the rich philosophical traditions of Africa, Asia, Latin and Native America, and the rest of the world. Some leading African American and African European philosophers have dismissed "ethnophilosophy" as "not philosophy," presumably to protect their own analytic credentials. Universities as far flung as Singapore, Sierra Leone, and New Delhi have prided themselves on their fidelity to Oxbridge philosophy. It seems that the globalization of free market economics goes with the globalization of one brief moment in philosophy, with similarly devastating effects on local cultures and the rich varieties of human experience.Philosophy might be thought of as made up of two components: critical thinking and passionate vision. But "critical thinking" does not necessarily imply the hermeneutics of suspicion, skepticism, or intellectual paranoia—all too often the trademarks of the bright young professional philosopher. One can be "critical," that is, reflective, while at the same time be committed, even devoted, to an idea or a way of thinking. The emphasis on passionate vision, however, is just as essential, and any philosophy that doesn't include both components just isn't worthy of the name. Without passionate vision, we get that utterly eviscerated focus on forms of argumentation—philosophia minimalia—devoid of "empirical" content (that is to say, content) and, as far as most people are concerned, devoid of any interest. Without critical reflection, we get gullibility and the worst of New Age philosophy, accepting of any kind of nonsense, just because it stirs the passions. But simply to assume that philosophy must be as rigorously self-questioning as modern European and Anglo-American philosophy is a subtle form of ethnic chauvinism. It eliminates from the realm of philosophy not only African ethnophilosophy and Latin and Native American and South Pacific mythology but a good deal of the philosophy of religion, the basis (for better or worse) of the development of Western philosophy over much of the past two thousand years. [End Page 100]I have just withdrawn from a recent dispute, in a respectable and supposedly eclectic philosophy journal, in which my worst fears in this regard were rather bluntly confirmed. I had made the point mentioned above—rather matter-of-factly, I thought—that if (analytic) philosophy dismisses or ignores modes of thinking that are not obviously self-critical and are presented poetically instead of by way of positions to be argued for, then a good deal of the world's philosophy, including a good deal of Western philosophy, would be left out of the arena. The journal's board reacted indignantly, to put it mildly, to the suggestion that anything should count as "philosophy" that was not sufficiently self-critical in just this sense. But what about the millennium or so of religious philosophy in the West? Does anyone believe that thinkers like Anselm, or Alvin Plantiga for that matter, are seriously skeptical of the truth of Christianity, as they go through their admittedly brilliant argumentative routines? For that matter, to what extent is the emphasis on logical form and argument subjected to scrutiny in contemporary analytic philosophy? (As one of the foremost practitioners of that art commented, "Metaphilosophy makes me sick.")Some of the hostility to world philosophy, to be sure, turns on the conflict between philosophy and religion, which may have its origins in ancient and medieval philosophy but emerges full-blown with the Enlightenment and its campaign against "superstition." But many people and a good many cultures do not distinguish between philosophy and religion. If we consider the word "philosophy... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"What Is Philosophy?"The Status of World Philosophy in the ProfessionRobert C. SolomonThe question "What is philosophy?" is both one of the most virtuously self-effacing and one of the most obnoxious that philosophers today tend to ask. It is virtuously self-effacing insofar as it questions, with some misgivings, its own behavior, the worth of the questions it asks, and the significance of the enterprise itself. It is obnoxious when it (...) refuses to question its own behavior but instead takes that same behavior as the exclusive standard to delegitimize any other activity that dares to call itself "philosophy." Thus, for most of this century, Anglo-American and most European philosophers have simply ignored the rich philosophical traditions of Africa, Asia, Latin and Native America, and the rest of the world. Some leading African American and African European philosophers have dismissed "ethnophilosophy" as "not philosophy," presumably to protect their own analytic credentials. Universities as far flung as Singapore, Sierra Leone, and New Delhi have prided themselves on their fidelity to Oxbridge philosophy. It seems that the globalization of free market economics goes with the globalization of one brief moment in philosophy, with similarly devastating effects on local cultures and the rich varieties of human experience.Philosophy might be thought of as made up of two components: critical thinking and passionate vision. But "critical thinking" does not necessarily imply the hermeneutics of suspicion, skepticism, or intellectual paranoia—all too often the trademarks of the bright young professional philosopher. One can be "critical," that is, reflective, while at the same time be committed, even devoted, to an idea or a way of thinking. The emphasis on passionate vision, however, is just as essential, and any philosophy that doesn't include both components just isn't worthy of the name. Without passionate vision, we get that utterly eviscerated focus on forms of argumentation—philosophia minimalia—devoid of "empirical" content (that is to say, content) and, as far as most people are concerned, devoid of any interest. Without critical reflection, we get gullibility and the worst of New Age philosophy, accepting of any kind of nonsense, just because it stirs the passions. But simply to assume that philosophy must be as rigorously self-questioning as modern European and Anglo-American philosophy is a subtle form of ethnic chauvinism. It eliminates from the realm of philosophy not only African ethnophilosophy and Latin and Native American and South Pacific mythology but a good deal of the philosophy of religion, the basis (for better or worse) of the development of Western philosophy over much of the past two thousand years. [End Page 100]I have just withdrawn from a recent dispute, in a respectable and supposedly eclectic philosophy journal, in which my worst fears in this regard were rather bluntly confirmed. I had made the point mentioned above—rather matter-of-factly, I thought—that if (analytic) philosophy dismisses or ignores modes of thinking that are not obviously self-critical and are presented poetically instead of by way of positions to be argued for, then a good deal of the world's philosophy, including a good deal of Western philosophy, would be left out of the arena. The journal's board reacted indignantly, to put it mildly, to the suggestion that anything should count as "philosophy" that was not sufficiently self-critical in just this sense. But what about the millennium or so of religious philosophy in the West? Does anyone believe that thinkers like Anselm, or Alvin Plantiga for that matter, are seriously skeptical of the truth of Christianity, as they go through their admittedly brilliant argumentative routines? For that matter, to what extent is the emphasis on logical form and argument subjected to scrutiny in contemporary analytic philosophy? (As one of the foremost practitioners of that art commented, "Metaphilosophy makes me sick.")Some of the hostility to world philosophy, to be sure, turns on the conflict between philosophy and religion, which may have its origins in ancient and medieval philosophy but emerges full-blown with the Enlightenment and its campaign against "superstition." But many people and a good many cultures do not distinguish between philosophy and religion. If we consider the word "philosophy... (shrink)

Contemporary philosophical discourse has deeply problematized the possibility of absolute existence. Hegel’s Foundation Free Metaphysics demonstrates that by reading Hegel’s Doctrine of the Concept in his Science of Logic as a form of Absolute Dialetheism, Hegel’s logic of the concept can account for the possibility of absolute existence. Through a close examination of Hegel’s concept of self-referential universality in his Science of Logic, Moss demonstrates how Hegel’s concept of singularity is designed to solve a host of (...) metaphysical and epistemic paradoxes central to this problematic. He illustrates how Hegel’s revolutionary account of universality, particularity, and singularity offers solutions to six problems that have plagued the history of Western philosophy: the problem of nihilism, the problem of instantiation, the problem of the missing difference, the problem of absolute empiricism, the problem of onto-theology, and the third man regress. Moss shows that Hegel’s affirmation and development of a revised ontological argument for God’s existence is designed to establish the necessity of absolute existence. By adopting a metaphysical reading of Richard Dien Winfield’s foundation free epistemology, Moss critically engages dominant readings and contemporary debates in Hegel scholarship. Hegel’s Foundation Free Metaphysics will appeal to scholars interested in Hegel, German Idealism, 19th- and 20th-century European philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology, and contemporary European thought. (shrink)

This paper argues that Collingwood's theories of logic and metaphysics ought to be understood in the context of a diagnosis of a crisis in modern Western civilisation and a response to this problem in the form of a dialectical and historical philosophy.The crisis of civilisation is explained as the failure of contemporary civilisation to significantly move beyond a dependency on a Platonic philosophy of being. The solution, it is proposed, is the development of a philosophy of becoming, (...) which reconciles normative thinking with historical change. Collingwood's reform of logic and metaphysics is supplemented by a broader philosophy of history where the criteria for value and truth are located, not in an ideal transcendent world, but in a 'way of life' in the widest sense.Collingwood's answer to the crisis of Western civilisation, I contend, is a theory of culture as process, historicity and identity realising itself by undergoing diversity. This interpretation of Collingwood's philosophy is developed through a comparison with the historicist philosophy of Ortega y Gasset and a contrast with Nietzsche. (shrink)

Tanabe Hajime, another pole of the so-called Kyoto-School of Philosophy of modern Japan, attempts to construct a dialectical, triadic logic of genus, species and individual as a creative synthesis between Eastern and Western philosophy. Although the formal pattern of his method is influenced by the Hegelian dialectic, the way of his thinking is rather prevailed by Kantian dualism. This makes a sharp contrast to his mentor Nishida Kitaro, whose logic of Topos or Place qua Absolute Nothingness is (...) criticized as all-embracing and static in character by him. The difference between them might be parallel to that of Greek and Latin theology concerning the Trinity. Tanabe never presupposes any preexistent entity as the primordial One in the eternal dimension, but rather maintains the individuality as the free subjective agent in the field of history. The dichotomy between the universal and the individual is overcome in and through the mediation of the third term— the species — as the negatively self-realized, specific form of the genus. The species, however, turns out to be the self-estrangement, when it loses the perpetually negative mediation of the free subjective activity of the individual. (shrink)