The Disinterested Witness is a detailed, contextual, and interpretive study of the concept of saksin (or that which directly or immediately perceives) in Advaita Vedanta, and a fascinating and significant comparison of the philosophies of ...

_An Introduction to Indian Philosophy_ offers a profound yet accessible survey of the development of India’s philosophical tradition. Beginning with the formation of Brahmanical, Jaina, Materialist, and Buddhist traditions, Bina Gupta guides the reader through the classical schools of Indian thought, culminating in a look at how these traditions inform Indian philosophy and society in modern times. Offering translations from source texts and clear explanations of philosophical terms, this text provides a rigorous overview of Indian philosophical contributions to epistemology, metaphysics, (...) philosophy of language, and ethics. This is a must-read for anyone seeking a reliable and illuminating introduction to Indian philosophy. (shrink)

The paper examines the ethical conception of the most well-known and much discussed Hindu text, the "Bhagavad Gītā", in the context of the Western distinction between duty ethics and virtue ethics. Most of the materials published on the "Gītā" make much of its conception of duty; however, there is no systematic investigation of the notion of virtue in the "Gītā". The paper begins with a discussion of the fundamental characteristics of virtue ethics, before undertaking a discussion of the conceptions of (...) duty and virtue in the "Gītā". The paper clearly demonstrates that (1) both duty and virtue coexist in the "Gītā", and (2) the "Gītā" accords virtue an important place. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The paper examines the ethical conception of the most well‐known and much discussed Hindu text, the Bhagavad Gītā, in the context of the Western distinction between duty ethics and virtue ethics. Most of the materials published on the Gītā make much of its conception of duty; however, there is no systematic investigation of the notion of virtue in the Gītā. The paper begins with a discussion of the fundamental characteristics of virtue ethics, before undertaking a discussion of the conceptions (...) of duty and virtue in the Gītā. The paper clearly demonstrates that (1) both duty and virtue coexist in the Gītā, and (2) the Gītā accords virtue an important place. (shrink)

The present volumeis an annotated biblography of the vedik- Laksana, the esitence of which could be determined on the basic of printed editions, catalogues of manuscripts, and citations in other texts. the incentive for compiling this bibliography grew out of an awareness that hardly any relaible information exists concerning manuscripts of veda-laksana texts, although they are of great use critical studies of vedic texts. The goal of this work is to provide a comprehensive handbook of source materials on Veda-Laksna by (...) identifying and distinguishing the texts in various manuscripts and printed editions according to their contents and actual title. (shrink)

Philosophical Questions: East and West is an anthology of source material for use in comparative courses in philosophy, religion, and the humanities. The readings—derived from the great works of the Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Islamic, and Western intellectual traditions—are presented as answers to some of the most enduring questions in philosophy.

As is the case with most pre‐modern philosophers of India, very little historical information is available about Bhartṛ‐hari. There are many interesting legends, some turned into extensive plays and poems, current about him. However, it is impossible to determine on their basis even whether there was only one philosopher called Bhartṛ‐hari. The appellation “philosopher” could unquestionably be applied to the author or authors of at least two Sanskrit works that are commonly ascribed to Bhartṛ‐hari.

In most common expositions of Indian philosophy the two traditions: self and no-self - are taken to be mutually incompatible. The former, having its origin in the Upaniṣads, finds expression in all āstikadarśanas , though its clearest and most important exposition is found in Advaita Vedānta. The latter having its origin in the teachings of the Buddha finds varied expressions in different schools of Buddhism. The Advaita Vedānta accepts ātman and rejects anattā ; the Buddhists argue for anattā and reject (...) ātman . My exposition in this paper is based primarily on the teachings of the Gautama Buddha and Śaṃkara, the founders of Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta respectively. Accordingly, unless otherwise specified, my use of the terms “Buddhist” and “Advaitins” refers to the teachings of these founders rather than to the later philosophers of these two traditions. I will begin with an overview of Advaita Vedānta. (shrink)

The first English translation of the "First Section" --the "Section on Inquiry" --of the Pañacapadikavivaranam, a Sanskrit commentary offering a systematic exposition of Advaita Vedanta from the Vivarana perspective. The central question concerns the nature of ignorance, or not-knowing, and its relation to knowing. It discusses how ignorance obstructs the nature of reality; the locus and support of ignorance; and whether ignorance is a positive entity. Includes a detailed introduction, transliterated text, translation, and explanatory notes. Published by American Institute of (...) Buddhist Studies. (shrink)

Eastern Philosophy represents one of the most ancient intellectual traditions of human culture, yet it is generally ignored by Western philosophers. Today more than ever, the need for understanding in a global community should be stressed as the scope, scale, and complexity of social changes increase. Bina Gupta strives to obtain a harmonious balance between the two traditions in her book Ethical Questions: East and West. Both ancient and modern sources such as the Buddha, Aristotle, the Upanishads, Simone de Beauvoir, (...) Kant, and Alasdair MacIntyre are used to illustrate the varying traditions. (shrink)

This is a philological and critical analysis of two crucial philosophical concepts, viz., reaso and experienceâ. The study shows that, though there is no word in Sanskrit which may be taken as equivalent of Western reason and thought, such terms as tarka, yukti, nyaya, anumana, buddhi, etc., clearly capture parts or aspects of what is meant by reason and thought (Denken). Moreover, it is misleading to trans- late sruti as revelation. Construing sruti as revelation surreptitiously imports a Semitic theological concept (...) into the Vedic tradition. The case of experience is more promising because we have such Sanskrit words as anubhava or anubhuti that do translate into experience. However, experience in Western thought has acquired many shades of meaning, and the study determines in what sense the Indian anubhava captures the Western experience. Finally, the book demonstrates that Indian philosophy provides an account of the cognitive process that begins with perception and culminates in wisdom (highest experience). This whole process may be called reason, at both ends of which we can talk of experience, which places experience not in an external opposition to reason, but rather as something that belongs to it internally. Thus, the modern Western opposition between reason and experience collapses and the two toge-ther yield an integrated process of acquisition, validation, and practical application of knowledge. (shrink)

In order to appreciate the content and structure of this article, one must first distinguish between Indian philosophy, even in its modern form, and philosophy which is done by Indians. When a philosopher of Indian heritage writes on modern Western logic or on phenomenology, he/she is not doing Indian philosophy. Such philosophers have not been included in this essay. According to my understanding of the term, their work would be Indian philosophy only if these Western ideas have some impact on (...) their study of Indian philosophy, or if they use Indian philosophical ideas to interpret Western philosophy, or if their work is aimed at preserving and/or extending traditional Indian philosophical pursuits. Similarly, Indian philosophy is not restricted to philosophy written by Indians; it includes philosophy written by anyone, regardless of national origin, who develops, interprets, or reinterprets the themes of classical Indian philosophy. There are many excellent Western scholars of Indian philosophy, such as Eric Frauwallner, Eliot Deutsch, Daniel Ingalls, and Karl Potter. However, because of the limitations of space, I have not discussed their work in this article. I have selected only contemporary philosophers of Indian heritage whose work coherently fits into a narrative account of recent developments in Indian philosophy that reflects the continuation and enrichment of the Indian tradition. (shrink)

In this work, a distinguished international group of philosophers offers critical assessments of eminent philosopher J. N. Mohanty's work on phenomenology and Indian philosophy. The concluding chapter by Mohanty responds to the critics and contains his assessment of his own philosophical position.

It is commonly taken for granted that in Vedānta, as also in Indian philosophy in general, yukti, anumāna, and tarka, translate into “reason” (of Western thought) while śruti is rendered as “revelation.” I reject this translation-interpretation; it is a good example of theway in which Sanskrit philosophical discourse is often misconstrued. The term śruti does not refer to revelation, nor do yukti, anumāna, or tarka to reason. Reason, I argue, comprehends all the pramānas; these are all means of legitimizing beliefs. (...) I distinguish between different levels of the application of “reason,” and I maintain that the mere reasoner (tārkika) has not grasped the true nature of “reason.” In effect, I maintain that śabda, both lauika and alukika, is a component of reason, and so is perception. There is no concept of “revelation” in Indian philosophy, and no opposition between reason and experience. (shrink)