Results for 'Sentimentalism'

390 found
Order:
  1. Sentimentalism and Moral Dilemmas.András Szigeti - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):1-22.
    It is sometimes said that certain hard moral choices constitute tragic moral dilemmas in which no available course of action is justifiable, and so the agent is blameworthy whatever she chooses. This paper criticizes a certain approach to the debate about moral dilemmas and considers the metaethical implications of the criticisms. The approach in question has been taken by many advocates as well as opponents of moral dilemmas who believe that analysing the emotional response of the agent is the key (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  2. Moral Sentimentalism.Michael Slote - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
    There has been a good deal of interest in moral sentimentalism in recent years, but most of that interest has been exclusively either in meta-ethical questions or in normative issues about caring or benevolence. The present book seeks to offer a systematically unified picture of both sorts of topics by making central use of the notion of empathy. The hope is that such an approach will give sentimentalism a "second chance" against the ethical rationalism that has typically dominated (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  3.  22
    Smithian Sentimentalism Anticipated: Pufendorf on the Desire for Esteem and Moral Conduct.Heikki Haara & Aino Lahdenranta - 2018 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 16 (1):19-37.
    In this paper, we argue that Samuel Pufendorf's works on natural law contain a sentimentalist theory of morality that is Smithian in its moral psychology. Pufendorf's account of how ordinary people make moral judgements and come to act sociably is surprisingly similar to Smith's. Both thinkers maintain that the human desire for esteem, manifested by resentment and gratitude, informs people of the content of central moral norms and can motivate them to act accordingly. Finally, we suggest that given Pufendorf's theory (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  4. Epistemic Sentimentalism and Epistemic Reason-Responsiveness.Robert Cowan - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Epistemic Sentimentalism is the view that emotional experiences such as fear and guilt are a source of immediate justification for evaluative beliefs. For example, guilt can sometimes immediately justify a subject’s belief that they have done something wrong. In this paper I focus on a family of objections to Epistemic Sentimentalism that all take as a premise the claim that emotions possess a normative property that is apparently antithetical to it: epistemic reason-responsiveness, i.e., emotions have evidential bases and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  5. Moral Sentimentalism.Michael Slote - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):3-14.
    In a way reminiscent of Hume's approach in the Treatise, a reviving moral sentimentalism can use the notion of empathy to ground both its normative account of moral obligation and its metaethical account of moral language. A virtuous person is empathically caring about others and expresses such feeling/motivation in her actions. But the judgment that something is right or good is also based in empathy, and the sentimentalist can espouse a form of moral realism by making use of a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   75 citations  
  6. Sentimentalism, Blameworthiness, and Wrongdoing.Antti Kauppinen - 2017 - In Karsten Stueber & Remy Debes (eds.), Ethical Sentimentalism. Cambridge University Press.
    For ambitious metaphysical neo-sentimentalists, all normative facts are grounded in fitting attitudes, where fittingness is understood in naturalistic terms. In this paper, I offer a neo-sentimentalist account of blameworthiness in terms of the reactive attitudes of a morally authoritative subject I label a Nagelian Imp. I also argue that moral impermissibility is indirectly linked to blameworthiness: roughly, an act is morally impermissible if and only if and because it is not *possible* in the circumstances to adopt a plan of performing (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  7. What Sentimentalists Should Say About Emotions.Charlie Kurth - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.
    Recent work by emotion researchers indicates that emotions have a multi-level structure. Sophisticated sentimentalists should take note of this work—for it better enables them to defend a substantive role for emotion in moral cognition. Contra the rationalist criticisms of May 2018, emotions are not only able to carry morally relevant information but can also substantially influence moral judgment and reasoning.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Sentimentalism Naturalized.Shaun Nichols - manuscript
    Sentimentalism, the idea that the emotions or sentiments are crucial to moral judgment, has a long and distinguished history. Throughout this history, sentimentalists have often viewed themselves as offering a more naturalistically respectable account of moral judgment. In this paper, I’ll argue that they have not been naturalistic enough. The early, simple versions of sentimentalism met with decisive objections. The contemporary sentimentalist accounts successfully dodge these objections, but only by promoting an account of moral judgment that is far (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  9.  87
    Moral Sentimentalism.Anttin D. Kauppinen - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  10.  54
    Neo-Sentimentalism's Prospects.Christine Tappolet - 2011 - In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press. pp. 117.
    Neo-sentimentalism is the view that to judge that something has an evaluative property is to judge that some affective or emotional response is appropriate with respect to it. The difficulty in assessing neo-sentimentalism is that it allows for radically different versions. My aim is to spell out what I take to be its most plausible version. I distinguish between a normative version, which takes the concept of appropriateness to be normative, and a descriptive version, which claims that appropriateness (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  11. Sentimentalism and the Intersubjectivity of Aesthetic Evaluations.Fabian Dorsch - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):417-446.
    Within the debate on the epistemology of aesthetic appreciation, it has a long tradition, and is still very common, to endorse the sentimentalist view that our aesthetic evaluations are rationally grounded on, or even constituted by, certain of our emotional responses to the objects concerned. Such a view faces, however, the serious challenge to satisfactorily deal with the seeming possibility of faultless disagreement among emotionally based and epistemically appropriate verdicts. I will argue that the sentimentalist approach to aesthetic epistemology cannot (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  12. Sentimentalism (International Encyclopedia of Ethics).Antti Kauppinen - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell.
    Sentimentalism comes in many varieties: explanatory sentimentalism, judgment sentimentalism, metaphysical sentimentalism, and epistemic sentimentalism. This encyclopedia entry gives an overview of the positions and main arguments pro and con.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  13. Sentimentalist Pluralism: Moral Psychology and Philosophical Ethics.Michael B. Gill & Shaun Nichols - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):143-163.
    When making moral judgments, people are typically guided by a plurality of moral rules. These rules owe their existence to human emotions but are not simply equivalent to those emotions. And people’s moral judgments ought to be guided by a plurality of emotion-based rules. The view just stated combines three positions on moral judgment: [1] moral sentimentalism, which holds that sentiments play an essential role in moral judgment,1 [2] descriptive moral pluralism, which holds that commonsense moral judgment is guided (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  14. Sentimentalist Virtue Ethics.Michael L. Frazer & Michael Slote - 2015 - In Lorraine L. Besser & Michael Slote (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 197-208.
    Moral sentimentalism can be understood as a metaethical theory, a normative theory, or some combination of the two. Metaethical sentimentalism emphasizes the role of affect in the proper psychology of moral judgment, while normative sentimentalism emphasizes the centrality of warm emotions to the phenomena of which these judgments properly approve. Neither form of sentimentalism necessarily implies a commitment to virtue ethics, but both have an elective affinity with it. The classical metaethical sentimentalists of the Scottish Enlightenment—such (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15.  66
    Sentimentalism About Moral Understanding.Nathan Robert Howard - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1065-1078.
    Some have attempted to explain why it appears that action based on deferential moral belief lacks moral worth by appealing to claims about an attitude that is difficult to acquire through testimony, which theorists have called “moral understanding”. I argue that this state is at least partly non-cognitive. I begin by employing case-driven judgments to undermine the assumption that I argue is responsible for the strangeness of deferential moral belief: the assumption that if an agent knows that some fact gives (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  16.  11
    A Sentimentalist Theory of the Mind.Michael Slote - 2014 - Oup Usa.
    Michael Slote argues that emotion is involved in all human thought and action on conceptual grounds, rather than merely being causally connected with other aspects of the mind. Such a sentimentalist view of the mind provides solutions to important problems about belief and action that other approaches fail to address.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  17. A Sentimentalist's Defense of Contempt, Shame and Disdain.K. Abramson - 2009 - In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press.
  18.  8
    Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives.Karsten Stueber & Remy Debes (eds.) - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
    In recent years there has been a tremendous resurgence of interest in ethical sentimentalism, a moral theory first articulated during the Scottish Enlightenment. Ethical Sentimentalism promises a conception of morality that is grounded in a realistic account of human psychology, which, correspondingly, acknowledges the central place of emotion in our moral lives. However, this promise has encountered its share of philosophical difficulties. Chief among them is the question of how to square the limited scope of human motivation and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  71
    Sentimentalist Virtue and Moral Judgement: Outline of a Project.Michael Slote - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1‐2):131-143.
  20. Transcendental Sentimentalism.Aaron Franklin - manuscript
    Broadly construed, moral sentimentalism is the position that human emotions or sentiments play a crucial role in our best normative or descriptive accounts of moral value or judgments thereof. In this paper, I introduce and sketch a defense of a new form of moral sentimentalism I call “Transcendental Sentimentalism”. According to transcendental sentimentalism, having a sentimental response to an object is a necessary condition of the possibility of a subject counting as having non-inferential evaluative knowledge about (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Epistemic Perceptualism and Neo-Sentimentalist Objections.Robert Cowan - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):59-81.
    Epistemic Perceptualists claim that emotions are sources of immediate defeasible justification for evaluative propositions that can sometimes ground undefeated immediately justified evaluative beliefs. For example, fear can constitute the justificatory ground for a belief that some object or event is dangerous. Despite its attractiveness, the view is apparently vulnerable to several objections. In this paper, I provide a limited defence of Epistemic Perceptualism by responding to a family of objections which all take as a premise a popular and attractive view (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  22. What Is Sentimentalism? What Is Rationalism? Commentary on Joshua May.Antti Kauppinen - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42:e157.
    In Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind, Joshua May argues successfully that many claims about the causal influence of affect on moral judgment are overblown. But the findings he cites are compatible with many of the key arguments of philosophical sentimentalists. His account of rationalism, in turn, relies on an overly broad notion of inference, and leaves open crucial questions about how we reason to moral conclusions.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  23.  15
    Moral Sentimentalism and Moral Psychology.Michael Slote - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 219--239.
    Moral sentimentalism holds that moral sentiment is the source of moral judgment and moral motivation. It contrasts with rationalism, which puts reason in place of sentiment. Sentimentalism goes hand in hand with a virtue theoretic approach in normative ethics. In the version of sentimentalism defended here, the chief moral sentiment is empathic concern. The chaper argues that moral goodness consists in empathic concern for others. Moreover, it argues that the reference of moral terms is fixed by actual (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  24.  35
    Adam Smith's Sentimentalist Conception of Self-Control.Lauren Kopajtic - 2020 - The Adam Smith Review 12:7-27.
    A recent wave of scholarship has challenged the traditional way of understanding of self-command in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments as ‘Stoic’ self-command. But the two most thorough alternative interpretations maintain a strong connection between self-command and rationalism, and thus apparently stand opposed to Smith’s overt allegiance to sentimentalism. In this paper I argue that we can and should interpret self-command in the context of Smith’s larger sentimentalist framework, and that when we do, we can see that self-command (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Sentimentalism: Its Scope and Limits.John Skorupski - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):125-136.
    The subject of this paper is sentimentalism. In broad terms this is the view that value concepts, moral concepts, practical reasons—some or all of these—can be analysed in terms of feeling, sentiment or emotion. More specifically, the paper discusses the following theses: (i) there are reasons to feel (‘evaluative’ reasons) that are not reducible to practical or epistemic reasons (ii) value is analysable in terms of these reasons to feel. (iii) all practical reasons are in one way or another (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26.  34
    Moral Sentimentalism in Counterfactual Contexts: Moral Properties Are Response-Enabled.Daniel Dohrn - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (1):69-82.
    According to moral sentimentalism, there are close connections between moral truths and moral emotions. Emotions largely form our moral attitudes. They contribute to our answerability to moral obligations. We take them as authoritative in guiding moral judgement. This role is difficult to understand if one accepts a full-blown moral realism, according to which moral truths are completely independent of our emotional response to them. Hence it is tempting to claim that moral truths depend on our emotional responses. I outline (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. Two Arguments for Sentimentalism.Justin D’Arms - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):1-21.
    Sentimentalism’ is an old-fashioned name for the philosophical suggestion that moral or evaluative concepts or properties depend somehow upon human sentiments. This general idea has proven attractive to a number of contemporary philosophers with little else in common. Yet most sentimentalists say very little about the nature of the sentiments to which they appeal, and many seem prepared to enlist almost any object-directed pleasant or unpleasant state of mind as a sentiment. Furthermore, because battles between sentimentalism and its (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  28.  93
    Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and Ralph Cudworth.Michael B. Gill - 2004 - Hume Studies 30 (1):149-181.
    Moral rationalism is the view that morality originates in reason alone. It is often contrasted with moral sentimentalism, which is the view that the origin of morality lies at least partly in sentiment. The eighteenth century saw pitched philosophical battles between rationalists and sentimentalists, and the issue continues to fuel disputes among moral philosophers today.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  29. Values and Emotions: Neo-Sentimentalism's Prospects.Christine Tappolet - 2011 - In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    Neo-sentmentalism is the view that to judge that something has an evaluative property is to judge that some affective or emotional response is appropriate with respect to it. The difficulty in assessing neo-sentimentalism is that it allows for radically different versions. My aim is to spell out what I take to be its most plausible version. I distinguish between a normative version, which takes the concepts of appropriateness to be normative, and a descriptive version, which claims that appropriateness in (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  30.  13
    Sentimentalist Contractualism—the First Steps.Nenad Miscevic - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):427-446.
    The paper connects two central ethical views, both with a rich tradition, sentimentalism and contractualism. From the former, it also borrows the response-dependentist metaphysics. The idea of combining the two has been sketched before, but not systematically and explicitly; for instance, in various comments on classical authors, especially on Kant and elsewhere, most prominently in Habermas. Here is the kernel of the present proposal. Our initial practical intuitions are emotion-based and the values, when detected, are response-dependent. This is the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  88
    Neo-Sentimentalism and Disgust.Joshua Gert - 2005 - Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (3):345-352.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  32. The Limits of Sentimentalism.François Schroeter - 2006 - Ethics 116 (2):337-361.
    Unlike traditional sentimentalists, sophisticated sentimentalists don’t think that the main linguistic function of evaluative terms is simply to express emotional responses. Instead, they contend that to predicate an evaluative term to an object is to judge that a particular emotion is justified toward that object. I will raise a fundamental difficulty for the sophisticated sentimentalists’ attempt to provide a credible account of the meaning of our most important evaluative terms. A more careful examination of the relations between the affective and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  33.  47
    Naturalizing Sentimentalism for Environmental Ethics.T. J. Kasperbauer - 2015 - Environmental Ethics 37 (2):221-237.
    Jesse Prinz and Shaun Nichols have argued that within metaethics, sentimentalism is the theory that best accords with empirical facts about human moral psychology. Recent findings in experimental moral psychology, they argue, indicate that emotions are psychologically central to our moral concepts. One way of testing the empirical adequacy of sentimentalism is by looking at research on environmental values. A classic problem in environmental ethics is providing an account of the intrinsic value of nonhuman entities, which is often (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  34. Mill, Sentimentalism and the Problem of Moral Authority.Daniel Callcut - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (1):22-35.
    Mill’s aim in chapter 3 of Utilitarianism is to show that his revisionary moral theory can preserve the kind of authority typically and traditionally associated with moral demands. One of his main targets is the idea that if people come to believe that morality is rooted in human sentiment then they will feel less bound by moral obligation. Chapter 3 emphasizes two claims: (1) The main motivation to ethical action comes from feelings and not from beliefs and (2) Ethical feelings (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  10
    Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives, Edited by Remy Debes and Karsten R. Stueber.Michael S. Brady - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (4):461-463.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Sentimentalism and Metaphysical Beliefs.Noriaki Iwasa - 2010 - Prolegomena 9 (2):271-286.
    This essay first introduces the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith, and clarifies important differences between them. It then examines whether moral judgment based on the moral sense or moral sentiments varies according to one's metaphysical beliefs. For this, the essay mainly applies those theories to such issues as stem cell research, abortion, and active euthanasia. In all three theories, false religious beliefs can distort moral judgment. In Hutcheson's theory, answers to stem cell research, abortion, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  37. Moral Rationalism Vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty?Michael B. Gill - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):16–30.
    One of the most significant disputes in early modern philosophy was between the moral rationalists and the moral sentimentalists. The moral rationalists — such as Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke and John Balguy — held that morality originated in reason alone. The moral sentimentalists — such as Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson and David Hume — held that morality originated at least partly in sentiment. In addition to arguments, the rationalists and sentimentalists developed rich analogies. The (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  38.  59
    Moral Sentimentalism.Michael L. Frazer - 2017 - In Adrian Blau (ed.), Methods in Analytical Political Theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 91-111.
    A "how-to" guide to writing political theory in a sentimentalist mode.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39.  29
    The Sentimentalist Paradox: On the Normative and Visual Foundations of Humanitarianism.Fuyuki Kurasawa - 2013 - Journal of Global Ethics 9 (2):201 - 214.
    This paper examines how Western humanitarianism has attempted to work through its simultaneous commitment to individualized moral universalism and ambivalence about substantive global egalitarianism via what is identified as humanitarian sentimentalism, namely an ensemble of narrative and visual mechanisms designed to cultivate charitable moral sentiments among Euro-American publics toward victims of humanitarian crises in the global South. After briefly discussing how the aforementioned ambivalence is rooted in the founding philosophical principles of humanitarianism, the paper examines the visual economy of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  75
    Moral Sentimentalism * by Michael Slote.A. M. Smith - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):197-200.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  41.  15
    Sentimentalist Practical Reason and Self-Sacrifice.Michael Slote - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (3):419-436.
    ABSTRACTFor obvious reasons sentimentalists have been hesitant to offer accounts of moral reasons for action: the whole idea at least initially smacks of rationalist notions of morality. But the sentimentalist can seek to reduce practical to sentimentalist considerations and that is what the present paper attempts to do. Prudential reasons can be identified with the normal emotional/motivational responses people feel in situations that threaten them or offer them opportunities to attain what they need. And in the most basic cases altruistic/moral (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42.  7
    Peirce, Sentimentalism, and Prison Reform.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2021 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 57 (2):172-201.
  43.  22
    A Sentimentalist Approach to Dirty Hands–Hume, Smith, Burke.Gabriela Remow - 2009 - Essays in Philosophy 10 (1):6.
    This paper explores what the three best-known thinkers in the sentimentalist tradition - David Hume , Adam Smith , and Edmund Burke – have to say about the topic of “dirty hands” . Although the views of these philosophers have often been declared inconsistent, my project is to defend and resurrect key elements of their position, which may have value for this debate. I contend that a coherent and unified view about dirty hands may be extracted from their work. By (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  65
    Moral Sense and Sentimentalism.Julia Driver - 2013 - In Roger Crisp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 358.
    This chapter focuses on sentimentalism – the view that morality is based on sentiment – in particular, the sentiment of sympathy. Sentimentalism was historically articulated in opposition to two positions: Hobbesian egoism, in which morality is based on self-interest; and Moral Rationalism, which held that morality is based on reason alone. The Sentimentalists challenged both views, arguing that there is more to what motivates human beings than simple self-interest and that reason alone is insufficient to motivate our actions, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  45. A Sentimentalist Solution to the Moral Attitude Problem.Antti Kauppinen - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  46.  44
    Ape Imagination? A Sentimentalist Critique of Frans de Waal’s Gradualist Theory of Human Morality.Paul Carron - 2018 - Biology and Philosophy 33 (3-4):22.
    This essay draws on Adam Smith’s moral sentimentalism to critique primatologist Frans de Waal’s gradualist theory of human morality. De Waal has spent his career arguing for continuity between primate behavior and human morality, proposing that empathy is a primary moral building block evident in primate behavior. Smith’s moral sentimentalism—with its emphasis on the role of sympathy in moral virtue—provides the philosophical framework for de Waal’s understanding of morality. Smith’s notion of sympathy and the imagination involved in sympathy (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47.  82
    A New Moral Sentimentalism.Eric Vogelstein - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):346-368.
    This paper argues for a novel sentimentalist realist metaethical theory, according to which moral wrongness is analyzed in terms of the sentiments one has most reason to have. As opposed to standard sentimentalist views, the theory does not employ sentiments that are had in response to morally wrong action, but rather sentiments that antecedently dispose people to refrain from immoral behavior, specifically the sentiments of compassion and respect.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48.  16
    Normative Sentimentalism and Animal Ethics.Monica Gerrek - unknown
    The purpose of this dissertation is to present what I think is a particularly compelling normative version of sentimentalism. The moral principle which is the foundation of this ethic is: An act, or a failure to act, is morally wrong if and only if it is committed by, contributed to by, or allowed by a moral agent, and both the motive is disapproved of by the impartial spectator and any consequence is disliked by the impartial spectator. I begin this (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  21
    Scottish Sentimentalism: Hume and Smith against moral egoism.María Alejandra Carrasco - 2018 - Veritas: Revista de Filosofía y Teología 39:55-74.
    Resumen Los filósofos sentimentalistas escoceses David Hume y Adam Smith proponen dos estrategias distintas para restringir las tendencias egoístas de la naturaleza humana. A pesar de las evidentes similitudes de sus propuestas morales, Smith encuentra dentro del ser humano la capacidad para transformar sus pasiones parciales y aspirar hacia ideales de perfección. El sentimentalismo de Hume, en cambio, no permite la autotransformación de la persona, y debe apoyarse en convenciones sociales para manipular y redirigir los impulsos egoístas desde fuera. Ambos (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  72
    Humean Sentimentalism and Non-Consequentialist Moral Thinking.Michael B. Gill - 2011 - Hume Studies 37 (2):165-188.
    Of the many objections moral rationalists have raised against moral sentimentalism, none has been more long-lived and central than the claim that sentimentalism cannot accommodate the non-consequentialist aspects of our moral thinking. John Balguy raised an early version of the non-consequentialist objection just two years after Francis Hutcheson published the first systematic development of moral sentimentalism. As Balguy understood it, Hutcheson's sentimentalism implied that what makes an action virtuous is its effects, such as the advantages or (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 390