Sentimentalist pluralism: Moral psychology and philosophical ethics

Philosophical Issues 18 (1):143-163 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

When making moral judgments, people are typically guided by a plurality of moral rules. These rules owe their existence to human emotions but are not simply equivalent to those emotions. And people’s moral judgments ought to be guided by a plurality of emotion-based rules. The view just stated combines three positions on moral judgment: [1] moral sentimentalism, which holds that sentiments play an essential role in moral judgment,1 [2] descriptive moral pluralism, which holds that commonsense moral judgment is guided by a plurality of moral rules2, and [3] prescriptive moral pluralism, which holds that moral judgment ought to be guided by a plurality of moral rules. In what follows, we will argue for all three positions. We will not present a comprehensive case for these positions nor address many of the arguments philosophers have developed against them. What we will try to show is that recent psychological work supports sentimentalist pluralism in both its descriptive and prescriptive forms

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,075

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Rules.Ron Mallon & Shaun Nichols - 2010 - In John M. Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Moral Psychology and the Mencian Creature.David Morrow - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):281-304.
The emotional basis of moral judgments.Jesse Prinz - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):29-43.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
246 (#82,539)

6 months
24 (#116,897)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Michael B. Gill
University of Arizona
Shaun Nichols
Cornell University

Citations of this work

Famine, Affluence, and Amorality.David Sackris - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (2):(A1)5-29.
Value pluralism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Deontology defended.Nora Heinzelmann - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5197–5216.
Moral judgments and emotions: A less intimate relationship than recently claimed.Thomas Pölzler - 2015 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 35 (3):177-195.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Principles of biomedical ethics.Tom L. Beauchamp - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by James F. Childress.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Thomas E. Hill & Arnulf Zweig.
On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

View all 48 references / Add more references