: This contribution aims to address epistemological issues at the crossroads of philosophy of science and psychiatry by reflecting on the notions of organization and resilience. Referring to the debate on the notion of “organization” and its explanatory relevance in philosophical neo-mechanistic theories, I consider how such positions hold up when tentatively applied to the mental health context. More specifically, I show how reflections on psychiatric resilience, cognitive reserve, and accommodation strategies challenge attempts to embrace a mechanistic perspective on mental (...) disorders. A deeper focus on these aspects of mental health is relevant to theoretical discussions on explanatory models as well as for clinical practice, diagnosis, and treatment. Keywords: Psychiatric resilience; Cognitive Reserve; Organization; Mechanism Il ruolo esplicativo dell’organizzazione e la resilienza psichiatrica: sfide ad un approccio meccanicistico alla malattia mentale Riassunto: Questo articolo intende discutere alcuni temi epistemologici all’incrocio tra la filosofia della scienza e la psichiatria, riflettendo sulle nozioni di organizzazione e resilienza. Muovendo dalle riflessioni sulla nozione di “organizzazione” sviluppate nell’ambito delle teorie neo-meccaniciste, e dalla difesa del suo ruolo esplicativo, il lavoro analizza la possibilità di estendere alcune posizioni relative alla spiegazione scientifica al contesto delle scienze della salute mentale. Più nello specifico, si illustra come le indagini sulla resilienza psichiatrica, la riserva cognitiva e le strategie di compensazione possano mettere in discussione i tentativi di abbracciare una prospettiva meccanicistica quando si affronta il tema del disturbo psichiatrico. Una maggiore attenzione ai suddetti filoni di ricerca può avere un impatto significativo sia sulla discussione relativa ai modelli teorici di spiegazione della malattia mentale sia sui processi clinici di diagnosi e terapia. Parole chiave: Resilienza psichiatrica; Riserva cognitiva; Organizzazione; Meccanicismo. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s life and thinking have been deeply influenced by the experience of illness and the related struggle to health, in a way that goes far beyond the very well-known episode of his mental breakdown. In the first part of this paper the history of the reception of the topic is reconsidered, focusing on the initial, “moral” interpretation of health and illness in Nietzsche, on the later stances of Thomas Mann and Georges Canguilhelm, the former offering a psychological perspective, the latter (...) a physiological one, and ending with an overview of newer studies on the question. The second part deals with Nietzsche’s understanding of human finitude, suffering and death, and contrasts it with post-humanist and trans-humanist assumptions. Health in Nietzsche is not standardized; it’s a result of self-cultivation, that is, of the full development of one’s potenBal. In the end an idea of health as a dynamic balance is developed, that also draws oh Gadamer’s reflections on the art of medicine and on the practical dimension of human experience. (shrink)

_Riassunto_: Il presente lavoro affronta il delicato tema dell’isolamento digitale e della profonda svolta antropologica scaturita dall’uso delle nuove tecnologie elettroniche. Le nostre relazioni amicali, lavorative e familiari fanno sempre più ricorso alla comunicazione telematica e meno al confronto personale. La conversazione vis-à-vis, che è quella più umanizzante, sta lasciando il posto a quella mediata da computer e smartphone. Tutto questo rischia di provocare un nocivo isolamento digitale, interrompendo ogni forma di dialogo e di introspezione personale. L’isolamento viene spesso abbinato (...) a un utilizzo intenso di Internet e di videogiochi. Le relazioni _online _non possono sostituire completamente quelle che nascono nel mondo reale né, d’altra parte, è pensabile frenare l’avanzata dei contesti virtuali entro i quali siamo immersi consapevolmente e, talvolta, inconsapevolmente. Non si tratta di essere pro o contro la tecnologia. Bisogna solo ritrovare il gusto dell’incontro, della conversazione faccia a faccia, della relazione fisica. Dislocare le nostre relazioni fisiche nel mondo digitale non ha nulla di rischioso. Il pericolo, semmai, è determinato dal contrario. Se la navigazione sul web diventa lo spazio esistenziale in cui vagare liberi e senza meta, con la convinzione che solo lì è possibile ottenere un’immagine vera di sé stessi, il rischio di rimanere prigionieri della propria solitudine potrebbe essere alto. Se, al contrario, le tecnologie sono usate coscientemente, possono portare a riflessioni capaci di esplorare il nostro Io. _Internet _non può eludere il bisogno di avere a che fare con gli altri nel mondo reale, perché solo questo tipo di rapporto fa di noi ciò che siamo realmente. _Parole chiave_: Inclusione digitale; Solitudine; Connessione; Empatia; Salute mentale _A contactless era? From empathic I to digital self_ _Abstract_: This paper addresses the sensitive issue of digital isolation and the profound anthropological shift that has resulted from the use of new electronic technologies. Friendship, work, and family relationships all increasingly rely more on telematic communication and less on personal encounters; face-to-face communication is giving way to modes of communication mediated by computers and smartphones. Does circumventing all forms of dialogue and personal introspection lead to dangerous digital isolation? The risk is real. Only through a balanced use of digital resources can we mitigate the harmful effects of social isolation. _Online _relationships cannot completely replace those that take place in the real world. At the same time, we cannot stop the advance of the virtual contexts within which we are consciously and sometimes unconsciously immersed. It is not a question of being for or against technology. We just need to rediscover our taste for human encounters, face-to-face conversations, and physical relationships. Displacing our physical relationships to the digital world is not in itself risky. The danger, if any, arises from another direction. If web surfing becomes the existential space in which we can roam freely and aimlessly, in the belief that only there is it possible to obtain a true image of oneself, then the risk of remaining a prisoner of one's own lonelinesss rises with devastating consequences at a psychological level. In contrast, technologies are used consciously, they can lead to valuable reflections that help us explore ourselves. The Internet should never circumvent or replace our need to deal with each other in the real world, because it only these kinds of real world relationship that make us who we really are. _Keywords_: Digital inclusion; Loneliness; Connection; Empathy; Mental Health. (shrink)

L'hypothèse formulée par Tschirnhaus avec la proposition d'une "medicina mentis" répond à la précise question de la notion de salut mental et de la nature pathologique de l'erreur; l'ars inveniendi résoud dans la philosophie de Tschirnhaus le problème de la sagesse par le lien veriîas - delectatio sur la même ligne spinoziènne de la correspondance entre Bien et Plaisir. On recherche ainsi la nature du lien entre Plaisir et Perfection chez Tschirnhaus et Spinoza, en dédiant un espace au rôle de (...) la propriété imaginative dans l'élaboration des lois morales, ainsi qu' à l'importance de la différence entre l'éveil et le sommeil qui mettent en question une philosophie vouée à une longue préparation à la mort pour une notion de vie liée au thème de la delectatio, de l'activité à mesure du faire politique. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diagnostic WannabesJennifer Radden, PhD (bio)Saunders explores challenges for the clinician faced with self-styled sufferers from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and fibromyalgia. The diagnostic system was not meant to be used as “a scaffold for identity,” she points out. Yet wannabe patients now step into the clinic wielding self-proclaimed diagnoses as social identities. Saunders explains the context where such phenomena arise, (...) and offers guidelines for clinicians addressing this new reality. To do so, she enlists Rashed’s innovative normative approach to the so-called boundary problem of assigning, and providing justification for, the contested line between normal and disordered. The boundary problem itself seems to rise to prominence during our current era of increasingly dimensional thinking, it is worth noting, with psychiatric diagnoses taken to refer to points on a continuum, rather than to discrete categorical disease entities.On the likely sources of these ‘diagnostic’ social identities, as well as reasons why certain diagnoses attach to them more commonly than others, Saunders points to social trends (including what she asserts to be a “post-stigma” cultural environment), the failure of efforts to identify neurobiological markers for psychiatric disorder, the ubiquity of social media, the algorithms themselves, and the hyperconnected existence of contemporary times. Such narratives also offer the comforts of a sense of belonging and explanations for perceived inadequacies, she rightly observes.Despite today’s virtual and other inducements, the problem introduced here is not an entirely new one. The first part of the seventeenth century in Europe saw an apparent “epidemic” of what was known as “melancholy,” a condition associated with the spleen, whose symptoms loosely resembled those of today’s depression and anxiety. Much of this suffering was undeniably real, but much was a fashionable, identity-conferring pose. “Every distemper of the body now is complicated with spleen,” the poet John Donne ironically observes in a letter dated 1622, “and when we were young men we scarce ever heard of the spleen. In our declinations now, every accident is accompanied with heavy clouds of melancholy”1 (Gosse, 2019). By then, the Melancholic Man (or homo melancholicus), with his surfeit of spleen, was an unmistakable character type—or social identity, as we would now say. Recognized and saluted in centuries-long literary and illustrative traditions, the type was an anchoring element of the humoral medicine which, despite the gradual emergence of more empirical science, had endured since Galenic times.Melancholy’s closest descendants, affective depressive and anxiety disorders, are today less evident among the troubling identities Saunders discusses—somewhat preempted, she points out, by more cognitively-based diagnoses such as ASD. [End Page 279] This is itself an ironic reminder of the vagaries of cultural attitudes, cautioning us to remember the broader context where these particular social identities are selected for emulation and adoption.The lure of the melancholy man’s2 social identity is well understood: already normalized, within the humoral system in which excess black bile afflicted roughly one in four people, it had been valorized for centuries—arguably by Aristotelian writing (in the dubious ‘Problems’), during the Renaissance by Ficino, and Shakespeare—even by Freud in his 1916 ‘Mourning and Melancholia.’ Through most of Western history, the positive attributes and benefits of the dark moods of melancholy have needed no further explaining or justifying. They glow with glamorous associations.Applying Rashed’s conditions for appropriately acknowledging and recognizing the fit of a person’s chosen social identity, Saunders‘ guidance for clinicians clarifies boundary matters. And it illustrates how to understand, regulate and communicate the appropriate norms in ways that can dissuade those whose personal growth and mental health are not served by claiming such identities.With at least some of the popular social identities Saunders describes, I think we can helpfully continue the comparison with the homo melancholicus. For the ‘neurodiversity’ rhetoric of our own times contains forces promoting both the normalization and the valorization of syndromes such as ASD. Pointing to analogies with differences of gender, ethnicity and culture, neurodiversity theorizing argues for a respect for, and appreciation of, difference. Mental or cognitive variations are equally natural and valuable, it is... (shrink)

La théologie herméneutique a modifié le rapport classique entre la théologie positive et la théologie spéculative. Il ne s'agit plus désormais d'inven­torier des sources - scriptuaires ou de la Tradition - pour ensuite cons­truire une théorie qui les expliquerait. Nous avons appris à tenir compte de notre compréhension actuelle pour lire les documents du passé. De ce fait, un rapport nouveau est établi entre l'horizon de compréhension actuel et les sources de la foi. L'interprétation y discerne leur visée propre et (...) ce qui relève de la mentalité et de l'époque où elles ont vu le jour. Après avoir établi la raison universelle comme milieu commun entre l'auteur et l'interprète, l'auteur rappelle, en deux parties distinctes, l'historicité de l'existence et de la raison « politique » comme également milieux communs entre l'auteur et l'interprète. Mais il ne s'agit pas là seulement de problèmes d'interprétation de l'Écriture ou d'une saisie nouvelle de la Tradition: l'enjeu est aussi d'avenir dans une articulation nouvelle entre herméneutique et politique dans la perspective qui demeure de la libération et du salut.Hermeneutical theology modified the classical relationship between positive and speculative theology. From now on it is not a question of making an inventory of sources - scriptural or from Tradition - in order to construct a theory that explains them. We have learned to take into account our present understanding to read the documents of the past. From this fact, a new relationship is established between the horizon of present comprehension and the sources of faith. Interpretation discerns in them their particular outlook and that which comes from the mentality and period from which they arose. After having established universal reason as a common milieu between the author and the interpreter, the author recalls, in two distinct parts, the historicity of existence and « political » reason as equally common context between the author and interpreter But here it is not only a question of the problem of interpretation of Scripture or a new grasp of Tradition : what is at stake is the future, with a new articulation between hermeneutics and politics in the perspective that reamains for liberation and salvation. (shrink)

Bultmann a-t-il été en partie victime d’une certaine « logique du protestantisme » ? R. Marlé a posé la question. Un théologien protestant peut être d’accord pour le fond avec la critique catholique, mais en la reprenant dans un esprit différent qui fera valoir la particula veri propre à Bultmann. On passera en revue à cet effet les quatre principaux griefs qui lui sont adressés.a) Réduction, au profit de la foi, de l’objectivité de l’historique et de celle du monde. — (...) L’objectivité à revendiquer est celle des données de la croyance, qui sont incarnées, et celle du monde comme lieu de salut. b) Survalorisation de la subjectivité de l’acte de foi au détriment de son contenu. — La particularité de l’engagement de foi dans le présent doit être maintenue, intégrée à une mémoire et à un corps de symbolismes et de références. c) Rejet de la révélation de Dieu à l’extérieur de la raison et de l’expérience historique. — Contre un refus radical à l’excès des médiations de la croyance, on maintiendra que Dieu est « pensable », sans que cela revienne à le « comprendre ». d) Insuffisance de la conception de la théologie comme simple intellectus fidei. — L’exercice théologique doit se déployer sous un horizon universel, mais aussi à un niveau socio-culturel attentif à toutes les inscriptions du religieux dans l’histoire et les mentalités.En définitive, on peut tenir le « fidéisme » du Bultmann pour l’illustration d’un « destin protestant », sans qu’il ait renié pour autant la théologie dialectique, mais pas davantage la théologie libérale, en tant que la première est une riposte articulée à la modernité et non un retour en arrière.Was Bultmann, to some extent, a victim of a certain “Protestant logic”? R. Marlé asked that question. A Protestant theologian can fundamentally agree with the Catholic position but take it in a different spirit, which would highlight the particula veri proper to Bultmann. The four principal complaints addressed to Bultmann in this matter will be reviewed.a) Reduction, in favor of the faith, of the objectivity of the historical and that of the world. — The objectivity demanded is for the tenets of belief, which are incarnate, and for a world as the place of salvation. b) Overvaluing of the subjectivity of the act of faith to the detriment of its content. — The particularity of the engagement of faith in the present must be upheld, integrated into a memory and a body of symbolisms and references. c) Rejection of the revelation of God outside reason and historical experience. — Against a radical refusal of the excess of mediations of belief, one can hold that God is “thinkable”, without being “understood”. d) Lack of the conception of theology as simple intellectus fidei. —The theological task should spread itself under a universal horizon, but also to a socio-cultural level that is attentive to all the inscriptions of the religious in history and mentalities.Finally, one can hold the “fideism” of Bultmann as an illustration of a “Protestant destiny”, without necessarily denying dialectical theology. Nor, indeed, liberal theology, in so far as the former is an articulated reply to modernity and not a return to the past. (shrink)

Cover title: Le salut du la'ic sur Herbert de Cherbury.

Aimed at philsophy graduates this book investigates mental content in a systematic way and advances a number of claims about how mental content states are related to the body and the world. Internalism is the thesis that they are; externalism is the theory that they are not.

Les articles essentiels de la religion chrétienne doivent être, pour Locke, accessibles à tous et suffire au Salut. Ce souci de simplification a été rapporté à sa vision de la société, les gens modestes devant se contenter de croire et de rester à un bas niveau de rationalité : les thèses, encore vivaces, de C. B. Macpherson font d’une telle religion un moyen de contrôle des mœurs et de maintien des pauvres dans l’obéissance. Locke les supposerait incapables d’un comportement moral (...) autonome. Mais cette simplification est liée à la volonté de séparer la partie pratique du christianisme de sa partie spéculative et de favoriser ainsi la tolérance mutuelle. Et la religion prêchée par le Christ est adaptée, au-delà des conditions sociales, à la faiblesse de la nature humaine. Chacun – à la place où il se trouve – est capable d’user suffisamment de sa raison pour travailler à son Salut. (shrink)

Dans ses Carnets de captivité, Levinas fait parler le fond intime de sa pensée : la vérité humaine trouvée dans l’expérience de l’inhumanité du Stalag. Mais cette « épochè » la plus radicale oblige à se détourner du Dasein heideggérien compris comme être-au-monde. Le problème existentiel devient : « Pourquoi ai-je le droit, tout simplement, d’être, d’être moi-même? ». C’est dans cette possibilité du Néant, dans cette solitude orpheline de monde, propre au « Je suis », que réside l’accès à (...) l’origine de l’historicité. Le chemin hors de la différence ontologique et de l’athéisme présupposé par le concept de l’Être conduit hors de la tentation métaphysique de l’être fermé monadologiquement sur lui-même, vers l’extériorité salvatrice. Le nouveau commencement de la pensée qui donne une orientation à l’être-soi mortel est trouvé en Autrui, plus précisément dans l’événement d’une rencontre avec Autrui, qui parle en son propre nom et me parle. L’être-pour-la-mort reçoit un nouveau sens : répondre à Autrui depuis une solitude devenue surnaturelle, pour commencer un nouvel avenir où je suis pour moi, en tant que mortelle liberté, moi-même. La réalisation salvatrice d’une histoire humaine repose donc sur cette compréhension infinie du Temps, car la relation à Autrui crée une certaine passivité, dans laquelle l’Infini se laisse éprouver. Qu’il soit impossible que le salut vienne de moi seul, qu’il doive se produire par l’entremise d’une relation religieuse au visage d’Autrui, prouve que nous sommes « élus » pour vivre. Amour et pardon, structures authentiques de l’humanité, remplacent « l’Être ». « Salut n’est pas l’être », écrit Levinas! (shrink)

During the last decade, children have shown an increasing need for mental wellbeing interventions due to their anxiety and depression issues, which the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated. Socially Assistive Robotics have been shown to have a great potential to support children with mental wellbeing-related issues. However, understanding how robots can be used to aid the measurement of these issues is still an open challenge. This paper presents a narrative review of child-robot interaction (cHRI) papers (IEEE ROMAN proceedings from 2016–2021 and (...) keyword-based article search using Google Scholar) to investigate the open challenges and potential knowledge gaps in the evaluation of mental wellbeing or the assessment of factors affecting mental wellbeing in children. We exploited the SPIDER framework to search for the key elements for the inclusion of relevant studies. Findings from this work (10 screened papers in total) investigate the challenges in cHRI studies about mental wellbeing by categorising the current research in terms of robot-related factors (robot autonomy and type of robot), protocol-related factors (experiment purpose, tasks, participants and user sensing) and data related factors (analysis and findings). The main contribution of this work is to highlight the potential opportunities for cHRI researchers to carry out measurements concerning children’s mental wellbeing. (shrink)

Just as bodily actions are things you do with your body, mental actions are things you do with your mind. Both are different from things that merely happen to you. Where does the idea of mental action come from? What are mental actions? And why do they matter in philosophy? These are the three main questions answered in this paper. Section 1 introduces mental action through a brief history of the topic in philosophy. Section 2 explains what it is to (...) be a mental action in terms of intentional action. Section 3 argues that the fact that we can perform mental actions has some striking consequences concerning mental content. Section 4 shows how mental action helps to explain some important facts about self-knowledge and the normativity of thought. The conclusion mentions two further fruitful avenues for philosophical research on mental action. (shrink)

This paper considers the connection between automaticity, control and agency. Indeed, recent philosophical and psychological works play up the incompatibility of automaticity and agency. Specifically, there is a threat of automaticity, for automaticity eliminates agency. Such conclusions stem from a tension between two thoughts: that automaticity pervades agency and yet automaticity rules out control. I provide an analysis of the notions of automaticity and control that maintains a simple connection: automaticity entails the absence of control. An appropriate analysis, however, shows (...) that actions are forms of control and pervasively automatic even if automaticity implies the absence of control. Consequences are drawn for the theory of mental agency and the psychological concepts of automaticity and control. (shrink)

Many philosophers and psychologists argue that out everyday ability to predict and explain the actions and mental states of others is grounded in out possession of a primitive 'folk' psychological theory. Recently however, this theory has come under challenge from the simulation alternative. This alternative view says that human beings are able to predict and explain each other's actions by using the resources of their own minds to simulate the psychological aetiology of the actions of the others. This book and (...) the companion volume Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate together offer a richly woven fabric of philosophical and psychological theory, which promises to yield real insights into the nature of our mental lives. (shrink)

Le recueil Salut gnostique et métaphysique plotinienne contient cinq études portant sur les relations entre Plotin et différents courants gnostiques, plus particulièrement celui des séthiens platonisants. L’ouvrage est le résultat de rencontres et de discussions intervenues entre les auteurs, mais aussi de la volonté de poursuivre la réflexion entamée par Zeke Mazur sur ce sujet à la suite de son décès en 2016. Les articles de ce recueil cherchent à relier entre elles plusieurs idées de même nature que l’on découvre (...) entre plusieurs traités plotiniens et des textes appartenant au courant séthien platonisant, des thèmes communs, fruits sans doute d’échanges qui eurent lieu avant ou même pendant que Plotin enseignait à Rome. (shrink)

Mental and behavioral disorders represent a significant portion of the public health burden in all countries. The human cost of these disorders is immense, yet treatment options for sufferers are currently limited, with many patients failing to respond sufficiently to available interventions and drugs. High quality ontologies facilitate data aggregation and comparison across different disciplines, and may therefore speed up the translation of primary research into novel therapeutics. Realism-based ontologies describe entities in reality and the relationships between them in such (...) a way that – once formulated in a suitable formal language – the ontologies can be used for sophisticated automated reasoning applications. Reference ontologies can be applied across different contexts in which different, and often mutually incompatible, domain-specific vocabularies have traditionally been used. In this contribution we describe the Mental Functioning Ontology (MF) and Mental Disease Ontology (MD), two realism-based ontologies currently under development for the description of humanmental functioning and disease. We describe the structure and upper levels of the ontologies and preliminary application scenarios, and identify some open questions. (shrink)

Bringing research on collective memory together with research on episodic future thought, Szpunar and Szpunar :376–389, 2016) have recently developed the concept of collective future thought. Individual memory and individual future thought are increasingly seen as two forms of individual mental time travel, and it is natural to see collective memory and collective future thought as forms of collective mental time travel. But how seriously should the notion of collective mental time travel be taken? This article argues that, while collective (...) mental time travel is disanalogous in important respects to individual mental time travel, the concept of collective mental time travel nevertheless provides a useful means of organizing existing findings, while also suggesting promising directions for future research. (shrink)

Jean Richard Deux articles de Tillich sont présentés ici, parus en 1946 et traitant tous deux du salut et de la santé. Le premier insiste sur deux aspects du salut. Tillich réinterprète de façon non supranaturaliste le caractère eschatologique du salut, et il soutient sa dimension cosmique : c’est le monde qui est sauvé, non pas seulement la personne individuelle. — Dans le second article, il distingue trois modes de santé et de guérison : la guérison physique, psychique et spirituelle. (...) En insistant sur la sphère intermédiaire du psychisme, il s’attaque à la dichotomie cartésienne de la pure extension et de la pure conscience. La réflexion théologique se trouve ouverte ainsi à tout le champ de l’inconscient. (shrink)

In a letter to an imagined future reader a century from now – at the 2121 bicentennial of the birth of Paulo Freire, I argue for the potential of a framework of timescapes and a feminist, Freirean praxis of letter-writing to enrich Freirean studies. In the context of analysis of Freire’s other letter-writing praxes across his life, I reflect on my recent interviews with two of Freire’s family correspondents, both women, whose letters with him have been published: the first to (...) be granted by his niece Cristina Bruno Freire and the first interview for an English-language publication (this journal) with his cousin Nathercia Lacerda. I aim to center their voices on the occasion of this current centennial and highlight the continuing need for critical translation and archiving of this work within Freirean studies, as well as for these creative forms of resistance and modes and areas of inquiry. (shrink)

Spinoza formule ainsi l’une des dernières propositions de l’Éthique, la 39e de la cinquième partie : « Qui a un corps apte au plus grand nombre d’actions, a un esprit dont la plus grande partie est éternelle. » Par rapport à ce qui a été dit de l’unité de l’esprit et du corps humains depuis la deuxième partie, cette proposition semble aller de soi : qui a un corps puissant aura des affects conformes à l’ordre de l’entendement, et donc aura (...) un esprit également puissant, c’est-à-dire éternel. Toutefois, une telle proposition n’en est pas moins étrange par rapport à l’ordre concret du salut qui, dans l’Éthique, en tant que béatitude ou connaissance du troisième genre, est uniquement d’ordre intellectuel. Y aurait-il donc un autre salut par le corps que Spinoza ne décrit pas mais qui aurait spinozistement un sens? Et si oui, comment parvenir ainsi à « se sauver » en réformant primordialement non son âme mais son corps? L’ensemble de cet article tente de répondre à cette question. (shrink)

William James's definition of psychology as 'the science of mental life' has been heard so often that we are apt to forget how radically it diverges from the view of psychology which so many of its practitioners hold today.

In this surprising book, Allan V. Horwitz argues that our current conceptions of mental illness as a disease fit only a small number of serious psychological conditions and that most conditions currently regarded as mental illness are cultural constructions, normal reactions to stressful social circumstances, or simply forms of deviant behavior.

Nonreductive physicalism states that actions have sufficient physical causes and distinct mental causes. Nonreductive physicalism has recently faced the exclusion problem, according to which the single sufficient physical cause excludes the mental causes from causal efficacy. Autonomists respond by stating that while mental-to-physical causation fails, mental-to-mental causation persists. Several recent philosophers establish this autonomy result via similar models of causation :1031–1049, 2016; Zhong, J Philos 111:341–360, 2014). In this paper I argue that both of these autonomist models fail on account (...) of the problem of Edwards’s Dictum. However, I appeal to foundational principles of action theory to resuscitate mental-to-mental causation in a manner that is consistent with the models of causation endorsed by these autonomists. (shrink)

Episodic memory (memories of the personal past) and prospecting the future (anticipating events) are often described as mental time travel (MTT). While most use this description metaphorically, we argue that episodic memory may allow for MTT in at least some robust sense. While episodic memory experiences may not allow us to literally travel through time, they do afford genuine awareness of past-perceived events. This is in contrast to an alternative view on which episodic memory experiences present past-perceived events as mere (...) intentional contents. Hence, episodic memory is a way of coming into experiential contact with, or being again aware of, what happened in the past. We argue that episodic memory experiences depend on a causal-informational link with the past events being remembered, and that, assuming direct realism about episodic memory experiences, this link suffices for genuine awareness. Since there is no such link in future prospection, a similar argument cannot be used to show that it also affords genuine awareness of future events. Constructivist views of memory might challenge the idea of memory as genuine awareness of remembered events. We explain how our view is consistent with both constructivist and anti-causalist conceptions of memory. There is still room for an interpretation of episodic memory as enabling genuine awareness of past events, even if it involves reconstruction. (shrink)

Our successful engagement with the world is plausibly underwritten by our sensitivity to affordances in our immediate environment. The considerable literature on affordances focuses almost exclusively on affordances for bodily actions such as gripping, walking or eating. I propose that we are also sensitive to affordances for mental actions such as attending, imagining and counting. My case for this ‘Mental Affordance Hypothesis’ is motivated by a series of examples in which our sensitivity to mental affordances mirrors our sensitivity to bodily (...) affordances. Specifically, subjects perceive opportunities to perform a mental action and their doing so leads, under the right conditions, to the automatic preparation of that action. I conclude by sketching a mental affordance research program that would reinforce my case for the Mental Affordance Hypothesis and establish its ramifications for a number of debates across philosophy and psychology. (shrink)

Mental (or semantic) holism is the doctrine that the identity of a belief content (or the meaning of a sentence that expresses it) is determined by its place in the web of beliefs or sentences comprising a whole theory or group of theories. It can be contrasted with two other views: atomism and molecularism. Molecularism characterizes meaning and content in terms of relatively small parts of the web in a way that allows many different theories to share those parts. For (...) example, the meaning of 'chase' might be said by a molecularist to be try to catch. Atomism characterizes meaning and content in terms of none of the web; it says that sentences and beliefs have meaning or content independently of their relations to other sentences or beliefs. One major motivation for holism has come from reflections on the natures of confirmation and learning. As Quine (1953) observed, claims about the world are confirmed not individually, but only in conjunction with theories of which they are a part. And typically, one cannot come to understand scientific claims without understanding a significant chunk of the theory of which they are a part. For example, in learning the Newtonian concepts of 'force', 'mass', kinetic energy' and 'momentum', one doesn't learn any definitions of these terms in terms that are understood beforehand, for there are no such definitions. Rather, these theoretical terms were all learned together in conjunction with procedures for solving problems. The major problem with holism is that it threatens to make generalization in psychology virtually impossible. If the content of any state depends on all others, it would be extremely unlikely that any two believers would ever share a state with the same content. Moreover, holism would appear to conflict with our ordinary conception of reasoning. What sentences one accepts influence what one infers. if i accept a sentence and then later reject it, i thereby change the inferential role of that sentence, so the meaning of what i accept wouldn't be the same as what i later reject. but then it would be difficult to understand on this view how one could rationally --or even irrationally!-- change one's mind. and agreement and translation are also problematic for much the same reason. holists have responded (1) by proposing that we should think not in terms of "same/different" meaning but in terms of a gradient of similarity of meaning, (2) by proposing "two factor" theories or (3) by simply accepting the consequence that there is no real difference between changing meanings and changing beliefs. (shrink)

In recent years, a new type of Neo-Augustinian theology has received extensive attention: Radical Orthodoxy. Leading figures behind Radical Orthodoxy such as John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward assert that they reclaim Augustine's theology over and against almost every major types of modern theology. Their leading claim is that an Augustinian participationist theological ontology overcomes Enlightment sourced secularism. In this essay, the Augustinian character of Radical Orthodox theology is put to the test in terms of a comparison and confrontation (...) between Radical Orthodoxy and Augustine's Christology. It is shown that Radical Orthodoxy's sole concern with regard to Christology is in the manifestation or expression of the ontological relationship or unity of God and the world. Thus, Radical Orthodoxy has its roots in a post-Hegelian rethinking of unity in difference rather than being a rediscovery of Augustine's theology. Subsequently, it is shown that Radical Orthodoy's reading of Augustine denies his understanding of the manifestation of the being of God in Christ; furthermore, it does not account for Augustine's doctrine of atonement: where we recover our original justice and happiness through the substituting life and death of Christ, an atonement which prepares us for the vision of God in the Eschaton. (shrink)

This piece commemorates Jean-Luc Nancy by focussing our attention on seven citations from his works which are followed by brief, tentative interpretations and reflections.

Two thousand years ago, Lucretius said that everything is atoms in the void; it's physics all the way down. Contemporary physicalism agrees. But if that's so how can we—how can our thoughts, emotions, our values—make anything happen in the physical world? This conceptual knot, the mental causation problem, is the core of the mind-body problem, closely connected to the problems of free will, consciousness, and intentionality. Anthony Dardis shows how to unravel the knot. He traces its early appearance in the (...) history of philosophical inquiry, specifically in the work of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and T. H. Huxley. He then develops a metaphysical framework for a theory of causation, laws of nature, and the causal relevance of properties. Using this framework, Dardis explains how macro, or higher level, properties can be causally relevant in the same way that microphysical properties are causally relevant: by their relationship with the laws of nature. Smelling an orange, choosing the orange rather than the cheesecake, reaching for the one on the left instead of the one on the right-mental properties such as these take their place alongside the physical "motor of the world" in making things happen. (shrink)