Cosa vuol dire “fare uso di concetti”? Che relazione sussiste tra l’uso di un sistema concettuale e l’uso di un linguaggio naturale? Esiste un’influenza delle pratiche sociali in cui sono coinvolti gli esseri umani sui significati delle loro espressioni linguistiche? Che rapporto lega il ragionamento con l’uso di concetti? Queste sono alcune delle domande centrali per il lavoro del filosofo statunitense Robert Brandom. Sulla scorta di simili interrogativi, e mediante un confronto articolato con autori quali Kant, Hegel, Frege, Wittgenstein, Sellars (...) e Dummett, Brandom ha elaborato una complessa teoria del linguaggio e della pratica discorsiva. Questo volume è dedicato, in primo luogo, a presentare le linee guida e le principali strategie argomentative della teoria di Brandom; in secondo luogo, a discutere alcune questioni chiave per il modello inferenzialista, selezionate con particolare attenzione alle principali discussioni suscitate dal dibattito teorico negli ultimi decenni. (shrink)

How do models represent reality? There are two conditions that scientific models must satisfy to be representations of real systems, the aboutness condition and the epistemic condition. In this article, I critically assess the two main fictionalist theories of models as representations, the indirect fiction view and the direct fiction view, with respect to these conditions. And I develop a novel proposal, what I call ‘the new fiction view of models’. On this view, models are akin to fictional stories; they (...) represent real-world phenomena if they stand in a denotation relation with reality; and they enable knowledge of reality via the generation of theoretical hypotheses, model–world comparisons and direct attributions. (shrink)

This paper discusses the transcription of three Greek proper names in Ovid, Metamorphoses Book 10. It argues that we should read Haemon, Amycliade and Panchaica rather than Haemum, Amyclide and Panchaia.

Wilfrid Sellars’ denunciation of the Myth of the Given was meant to clarify, against empiricism, that perceptual episodes alone are insufficient to ground and justify perceptual knowledge. Sellars showed that in order to accomplish such epistemic tasks, more resources and capacities, such as those involved in using concepts, are needed. Perceptual knowledge belongs to the space of reasons and not to an independent realm of experience. Dan Hutto and Eric Myin have recently presented the Hard Problem of Content as an (...) ensemble of reasons against naturalistic accounts of content. In a nutshell, it states that covariance relations—even though they are naturalistically acceptable explanatory resources—do not constitute content. The authors exploit this move in order to promote their preferred radical enactivist and anti-representationalist option, according to which, basic minds—the lower stratum of cognition—do not involve content. Although it is controversial to argue that the Hard Problem of Content effectively dismisses naturalistic theories of representation, a central aspect of it—the idea that information as covariance does not suffice to explain content—finds support among the defenders of classical cognitive representationalism, such as Marcin Miłkowski. This support—together with the acknowledgment this remark about covariance is a point already made by Sellars in his criticism of the Myth of the Given—has a number of interesting implications. Not only is it of interest for the debates about representationalism in cognitive science, where it can be understood as an anticipatory move, but it also offers some clues and insights for reconsidering some issues along Sellarsian lines—a conflation between two concepts of representation that is often assumed in cognitive science, a distinction between two types of relevant normativities, and a reconsideration of the naturalism involved in such explanations. (shrink)

Upholders of fictionalism about scientific models have not yet successfully explained how scientists can learn about the real world by making comparisons between models and the real phenomena they stand for. In this paper I develop an account of model-world comparisons in terms of what I take to be the best antirealist analyses of comparative claims that emerge from the current debate on fiction.

Discourses on Jaina philosophy; originally written in Jaipuri dialect; translated from the Gujarati edition, with variant readings.

The articles in this special edition exemplify three major issues in current debates on Sacred Plants: a) the wisdom of Indigenous understandings of sacred plants, b) beneficial emerging uses of sacred plants by non‐Indigenous people, c) the position of Indigenous wisdom for emerging uses of sacred plants.

How do scientific models represent in a way that enables us to discover new truths about reality and draw inferences about it? Contemporary accounts of scientific discovery answer this question by focusing on the cognitive mechanisms involved in the generation of new ideas and concepts in terms of a special sort of reasoning—or model-based reasoning—involving imagery. Alternatively, I argue that answering this question requires that we recognise the crucial role of the propositional imagination in the construction and development of models (...) for the purpose of generating hypotheses that are plausible candidates for truth. I propose simple fictionalism as a new account of models as Waltonian games of make-believe and suggest that models can lead to genuine scientific discovery when they are used as representations that denote real world phenomena and generate two main kinds of theoretical hypotheses, model-world comparisons and direct attributions. (shrink)

A collection of essays dedicated to Pier Luigi Lecis' retirement. Contributors include: Mariano Bianca, Silvana Borutti, Vinicio Busacchi, Massimo Dell'Utri, Rosaria Egidi, Roberta Lanfredini, Giuseppe Lorini, Diego Marconi, Francesco Orilia, Paolo Parrini, Alberto Peruzzi, Simonluca Pinna, Pietro Salis, Paolo Spinicci.

The problem of satisfaction conditions arises from the apparent difficulties of explaining the nature of the mental states involved in our emotional responses to tragic fictions. Greg Currie has recently proposed to solve the problem by arguing for the recognition of a class of imaginative counterparts of desires - what he and others call i-desires. In this paper I will articulate and rebut Currie's argument in favour of i-desires and I will put forward a new solution in terms of genuine (...) desires. To this aim I will show that the same sort of puzzling phenomenon involved in our responses to tragic fictions arises also in a non-fictional case, and I will offer a solution to the problem of satisfaction conditions that dispenses with i-desires. The key to the explanation is in the notion of condition-dependent desires triggered by fictions. (shrink)

Our paper draws attention to a neglected channel of corruption—the bribe payments by state-owned enterprises. This is an important phenomenon as bribe payments by SOEs fruitlessly waste national resources, compromising public welfare and national prosperity. Using a large dataset of 30,249 firms from 50 countries, we show that, in general, SOEs are less likely to pay bribes for achieving organizational objectives owing to their political connectivity. However, in deteriorated institutional environments, SOEs may be subjected to potential managerial rent-seeking behaviors, which (...) disproportionately increase SOE bribe propensity relative to privately owned enterprises. Specifically, our findings highlight the importance of fostering democracy and rule of law, reducing prevalence of corruption and shortening power distance in reducing the incidence of SOE bribery. (shrink)

A 27 de Outubro comemora a Igreja os santos Vicente, Sabina e Cristeta. Conhecidos como os Mártires de Évora, a eles foi erguida no século XV na cidade alentejana, no local onde se dizia terem nascido, uma ermida, ampliada no século seguinte já à conta do Município, que ainda hoje mantém a propriedade. Era-lhes também dedicada, na nave direita da Sé de Évora, uma das capelas laterais desaparecidas após a intervenção da Direcção-geral dos Monumentos Nacionais na década de 40 do (...) século XX.A naturalidade dos santos irmãos, embora assumida pelos eborenses, sobretudo após as argumentações de André de Resende, mantém-se de difícil comprovação, sendo por muitos autores atribuída não à cidade alentejana, mas a Talavera de la Reina (Toledo). Martirizados no século IV na cidade espanhola de Ávila, São Vicente e suas irmãs aí foram sepultados e em sua honra construída uma grande basílica, expressão do reconhecimento e devoção aos chamados Santos de Ávila. Da descrição legendária das suas vidas e martírios decorre a respectiva iconografia. Tudo aconteceu em tempo do governador Daciano, enviado à Península Ibérica pelo imperador Diocleciano, que promoveu uma intensa perseguição aos cristãos. O jovem Vicente, que poderia servir de incentivo aos pagãos pelo seu comportamento cristão exemplar, foi chamado à presença de Daciano que o pretendeu convencer a sacrificar a Júpiter. Perante a recusa, mandou conduzi-lo a uma das praças da cidade e obrigá-lo a executar o sacrifício ou a ser morto. Colocado sobre o altar de pedra, esta tornou-se mole ficando impressas as suas pegadas, prodígio que deixou todos os presentes admirados e convencidos de que o Deus de Vicente era o verdadeiro. Tal facto levou Daciano a suspender temporariamente a condenação, tendo mandado o jovem para a prisão, onde foi visitado por suas irmãs Sabina e Cristeta. Convencido por elas a fugir, foram os três perseguidos e apanhados em Ávila, sendo sujeitos a vários suplícios e finalmente partidas as suas cabeças com paus e pedras. Os seus corpos foram deixados ao abandono para pasto dos animais; todavia apareceu uma enorme serpente que os protegia e que se enroscou à volta de um judeu rico da cidade que pretendia desprezar os santos despojos e que só se viu livre da serpente quando prometeu converter-se ao cristianismo. Os mártires acabaram por ser sepultados pelos cristãos, espalhando-se rapidamente a sua devoção.O repertório iconográfico, muito reduzido no que concerne a arquidiocese de Évora, confina--se praticamente à igreja de São Vicente, onde se encontra a pedra na qual supostamente terá deixado as marcas dos seus pés; alguns painéis do retábulo-mor representam “São Vicente conduzido perante o altar de Júpiter”, “São Vicente na prisão e a visita de suas irmãs”, “o martírio de São Vicente”, e “o judeu impedido pela serpente de ultrajar os corpos dos três santos”. A representação escultórica segue muito de perto a de Ávila. Todos trazem a palma do martírio, São Vicente um livro aberto ou semicerrado. As irmãs Sabina e Cristeta apresentam uma iconografia pouco definida, sendo por vezes necessário, quando não estão inseridas no contexto duma cena conhecida, que o nome lhes seja sotoposto para fácil identificação. (shrink)

I approach a set of processes that involve transformations, transpositions, and intermediations between different expressive forms of Amazonian Indigenous Peoples associated with the use of ayahuasca. I focus on groups of the Pano linguistic stock, particularly the Huni Kuin (Kaxinawa) and the example of the MAHKU (Movimento dos Artistas Huni Kuin), a new artistic collective created by some of these Indigenous People. I point to the complex meanings of the various expressive forms of these peoples, from traditional (oral narratives, graphics, (...) visionary images linked to shamanic practices) to more recently adopted (figurative drawing and graphic recording in book format). I emphasize the importance of ayahuasca for the elaboration of these different expressive forms. By highlighting the meanings that imply the use of ayahuasca in certain Indigenous contexts, I also intend to contribute to the expansion of understanding of and broader debate about psychedelic experiences. (shrink)

Theoretical models are widely held as sources of knowledge of reality. Imagination is vital to their development and to the generation of plausible hypotheses about reality. But how can imagination, which is typically held to be completely free, effectively instruct us about reality? In this paper I argue that the key to answering this question is in constrained uses of imagination. More specifically, I identify make-believe as the right notion of imagination at work in modelling. I propose the first overarching (...) taxonomy of types of constraints on scientific imagination that enables knowledge of reality. And I identify two main kinds of knowledge enabled by models, knowledge of the imaginary scenario specified by models and knowledge of reality. (shrink)

Anti-representationalism is the hallmark of Richard Rorty's critique of the epistemological tradition. According to it, knowledge does not "mirror" reality and the human mind is not a representational device. Anti-representationalism is a family of philosophical theses, respectively dealing with the notion of "representation" in different ways. Though prima facie one may feel entitled to think about anti-representationalism as a kind of uniform philosophical movement, things stand quite differently. In fact, among many anti-representationalist options, we can identify two main versions: a (...) global anti-representationalism that entirely rejects the philosophical uses of the notion of "representation", and a local version that just removes the notion of "representation" from the explanatory toolbox. In this chapter I try to compare Rorty's global anti-representationalism and Robert Brandom's local version, exploiting a recent discussion by Brandom and a famous exchange between Rorty and Bjørn Ramberg about Donald Davidson's take on the special role of the intentional vocabulary. (shrink)

The problem of intersubjective identification arises from the difficulties of explaining how our thoughts and discourse about fictional characters can be directed towards the same (or different) characters given the assumption that there are no fictional entities. In this paper I aim to offer a solution in terms of participation in a practice of thinking and talking about the same thing, which is inspired by Sainsbury's name-using practices. I will critically discuss a similar idea that was put forward by Friend (...) in terms of participation in what Perry calls a notion-network. I will then argue in favor of Sainsbury's baptism-based approach against Perry's information-based approach and I will answer some recent objections that Friend put forward against the former. (shrink)

In this entry I present one of the most hotly debated issues in contemporary analytic philosophy regarding the nature of fictional entities and the motivations that might be adduced for and against positing them into our ontology. The entry is divided in two parts. In the first part I offer an overview of the main accounts of the metaphysics of fictional entities according to three standard realist views, fictional Meinongianism, fictional possibilism and fictional creationism. In the second part I describe (...) two main kinds of arguments for or against positing fictional entities into our ontology. The first kind is traditionally inspired by the linguistic data coming from our talk about fictional characters. The second kind is more recent and it builds on genuine ontological considerations. (shrink)

RESUMO Este texto apresenta parte de pesquisa recém-concluída, que delineia dimensões e balizas para o que vem sendo denominado perspectiva discursiva de alfabetização. Princípios da teoria da enunciação e de estudos que analisam as relações entre sujeito e linguagem e o papel das interações discursivas nos processos de ensino e aprendizagem organizam a base teórico-metodológica do estudo, em que se analisam relatos escritos por cinco professoras alfabetizadoras durante 18 meses. Duas dimensões teórico-metodológicas de análise são trabalhadas: discursiva e indiciária. Mergulha-se (...) nos modos como a prática pedagógica é movimentada em sala de aula, em busca de indícios para descrever a situação discursiva em que foram colhidos, analisá-los e interpretá-los. A pesquisa tem como horizonte compreender como podem ser concebidas metodologias de alfabetização em que o trabalho com a vida das crianças na cultura escrita se sobreponha ao trabalho tradicionalmente realizado com foco no sistema de escrita. ABSTRACT This paper presents data from a recently finished research that outlines dimensions and guidelines for what has been named discursive perspective on literacy. Principles of the theory of enunciation and studies that analyze the relationships between subject and language as well as the role of discursive interactions in the teaching and learning processes, organize the theoretical and methodological basis of the study. We analyzed reports written by five literacy teachers for 18 months. Two theoretical-methodological dimensions of analysis were employed, the discursive and the evidential. We focus on the ways the pedagogical practice is developed in the classroom, seeking for indexes to describe the discursive situation from which they were collected, and to analyze and interpret them. The aim of the research was to understand how to construct literacy methodologies in which working with children's lives in written culture overcomes the traditional work focused on the writing system. (shrink)

O texto quer discutir, fundamentalmente, a formação do estudante universitário, tomando os mecanismos da pesquisa e da extensão como formas privilegiadas nesse processo. Para tanto, propõe-se a pôr em destaque a noção de conhecimento, visto como uma instância efetiva para a construção do sujeito consciente que é capaz de desenvolver uma visão crítica da realidade, sabendo discernir em meio às amarras que a força coatora da cultura lhe impõe. Acreditando que a Universidade pode operar essa passagem do ignorar ao conhecer (...) – que produz o sujeito consciente–, através da prática investigativa e do trabalho da extensão, o texto busca mostrar que a abertura ao saber decorre da possibilidade efetiva de romper com o processo nivelador a que a cultura submete os indivíduos. E, ao fazer isso, a Universidade estará formando o estudante, o sujeito do conhecimento e, sobretudo, o cidadão. Palavras-chave: Pesquisa; Extensão; Cultura; Universidade; Conhecimento cidadão. ABSTRACT This text aims at discussing, fundamentally, the qualification of university students, based on the belief that the mechanisms of research and extension activities are privileged forms in that process. For such, it highlights the notion of knowledge as an effective stage in the construction of a conscious subject apt to adopt a critical view of reality and to discern things despite the constraints imposed by the coercive forces of culture. In the belief that universities are capable of operating that passage from ignorance to knowledge – which engenders conscious subjects – through the practice of investigation and extension activities, the text endeavours to demonstrate that the way to knowledge results from the effective possibility of holding back that levelling process, and that culture submits individuals. Thus, universities shall qualify students as subjects of knowledge, that is, as real citizens. Key words: Research; Extension activities; Culture; University; Knowledge as citizen. (shrink)

O presente trabalho se propõe a refletir acerca do sofrimento emergido em meio à grave crise sanitária instalada pela pandemia do novo coronavírus (SARS-COV-2), considerando as mudanças nas dinâmicas de vida da população como a adoção de medidas de distanciamento social, quarentena, uso de máscaras, dentre outras contingências que transformaram o cotidiano e o ritmo das existências contemporâneas. O crescente número de casos e mortes, as modificações nas rotinas de casa, trabalho e relações sociais vêm repercutindo na saúde mental das (...) pessoas e desencadeando vários sofrimentos, expressos nas queixas que chegam diariamente aos serviços de acolhimento psicológico.Considerando, assim, a experiência de escuta clínica das pessoas em sofrimento neste período, com o objetivo de refletir sobre os modos de vida e sofrimento que se desvelam em meio ao contexto pandêmico, recorremos ao pensamento do filósofo alemão Martin Heidegger para pensar o tédio e a técnica moderna como os sentidos e afetos que caracterizam e afinam as existências contemporâneas; bem como as suas repercussões nas experiências de sofrimento que se revelam em meio aos novos modos de existência assumidos durante a pandemia de covid-19. (shrink)

It is a common opinion that chance events cannot be understood in causal terms. Conversely, according to a causal view of chance, intersections between independent causal chains originate accidental events, called “coincidences.” The present paper takes into proper consideration this causal conception of chance and tries to shed new light on it. More precisely, starting from Hart and Honoré’s view of coincidental events, this paper furnishes a more detailed account on the nature of coincidences, according to which coincidental events are (...) hybrids constituted by ontic components, that is the intersections between independent causal chains, plus epistemic aspects; where by “epistemic” we mean what is related, in some sense, to knowledge: for example, access to information, but also expectations, relevance, significance, that is psychological aspects. In particular, this paper investigates the role of the epistemic aspects in our understanding of what coincidences are. In fact, although the independence between the causal lines involved plays a crucial role in understanding coincidental events, that condition results to be insufficient to give a satisfactory definition of coincidences. The main target of the present work is to show that the epistemic aspects of coincidences are, together with the independence between the intersecting causal chains, a constitutive part of coincidental phenomena. Many examples are offered throughout this paper to enforce this idea. This conception, despite—for example—Antoine Augustine Cournot and Jacques Monod’s view, entails that a pure objectivist view about coincidences is not tenable. (shrink)

Fiora Salis compares the fictional and the artifactual views of models. She argues that both accounts contain several deep insights concerning the nature of scientific models but they also face some difficult challenges. She then puts forward an account of the ontology of models intended to incorporate the benefits of both views avoiding their main difficulties. Her key idea is that models are human-made artifacts that are akin to literary works of fiction. In this view, models are complex objects (...) that are constituted by a model description and the model content generated within a game of make-believe. As per the fiction view, model descriptions are construed as props in a game of make-believe, where props are concrete objects that prescribe certain imaginings. As per the artifactual view, model descriptions are construed as concrete representational tools that enable and constrain a scientist’s cognitive processes and provide intersubjective epistemic access to their imaginings. (shrink)

What are theoretical models and how do they contribute to a scientific understanding of reality? In this chapter, I will argue that models are akin to fictional stories in that they are human-made artifacts created through the imaginative activities of scientists. And I will suggest that the sort of imagination involved in modeling is make-believe and that this is constrained in three main ways which, together, enable knowledge of reality. I will conclude by addressing recent criticisms against the fiction view (...) of models and the relevance of scientific imagination in modeling put forward by Weisberg and Knuuttila. (shrink)

Anaphoric deflationism is a kind of prosententialist account of the use of “true.” It holds that “true” is an expressive operator and not a predicate. In particular, “is true” is explained as a “prosentence.” Prosentences are, for sentences, the equivalent of what pronouns are for nouns: As pronouns refer to previously introduced nouns, so prosentences like “that’s true” inherit their semantic content from previously introduced sentences. So, if Jim says, “The candidate is going to win the election,” and Bill replies (...) “that’s true,” the real meaning of Bill’s statement is “It is true that the candidate is going to win the election.” This kind of prosententialist deflationism around the use of “true,” especially in Robert Brandom’s version, is an explanation given in terms of anaphora. The prosentence is an anaphoric dependent of the sentence providing its content. Båve (Philosophical Studies, 145, 297-310. 2009) argued that the anaphoric account is not as general as prosententialists claim, and that the analogy between prosentences and pronouns is explanatorily idle because it does not do any real explanatory work. The two criticisms are connected: The lack of unity within the anaphoric theory can be used to show its poor explanatory value. The plurality of uses of “is true” exceeds the anaphoric account indeed. Therefore, prosententialism is just a superficial re-description and the real work is done by means of more general semantic terms, namely “semantic equivalence and consequence” between “p” and ““p” is true.” I analyze Båve’s arguments and highlight that he fails to acknowledge the importance of a pragmatic and expressive dimension explained by the anaphoric account, a dimension that semantic “equivalence” and “consequence” are not capable of explaining. I then show that the anaphoric account can actually explain semantic equivalence and consequence, and this is crucial because equivalence and consequence do not explain anaphoric dependence. This reverses the allegation of generality: The anaphoric account is more general. Again, the cases typically used to defend prosententialism, if correctly described, show a unitary structure: They are all versions of lazy anaphoric dependence. Therefore, the unifying principle performing the explanation here is lazy anaphora. (shrink)

The paper investigates the epistemological and communicative competences the experts need to use and communicate evidence in the reasoning process leading to diagnosis. The diagnosis and diagnosis communication are presented as intertwined processes that should be jointly addressed in medical consultations, to empower patients’ compliance in illness management. The paper presents defeasible reasoning as specific to the diagnostic praxis, showing how this type of reasoning threatens effective diagnosis communication and entails that we should understand diagnostic evidence as defeasible as well. (...) It argues that metaphors might be effective communicative devices to let the patients understand the relevant defeasors in the diagnostic reasoning process, helping to improve effective diagnosis communication, and also encouraging a change in patients’ beliefs and attitudes on their own experience of illness and illness’ management. (shrink)

Stephen Turner’s anti-normativism is based on the idea that the normative can be explained away by social science. Exploiting the idea fostered by the sociology of scientific knowledge that reasons can be understood naturalistically as the causes of the beliefs of scientists and endorsing a non-normative conception of rationality, Turner has argued that normative accounts are better understood as “Good Bad Theories” (GBT). GBT are understood as false accounts that play a role in social coordination like magical or religious rituals (...) in primitive societies (e.g. Tabu and the like). According to Turner, “norms,” “obligations,” “reasons,” and “commitments” are like Tabu and can be explained away as GBT. Hence, Turner expected normative accounts to disappear completely in a fully disenchanted world. Turner focuses on the idea, widespread among philosophers, that the normative does not reduce to the causal: his main claim is that social science succeeds in the reduction of the normative in causal terms, overcoming normative/causal dualism. Furthermore, this success is presented as creating a serious challenge for normativism. By focusing on certain (supposedly normative) features of beliefs like those involved in belief change dynamics, I will point out some interesting implications and problems for Turner’s anti-normativism. (shrink)

Hilary Putnam spent much of his career criticizing the fact/value dichotomy, and this became apparent already during the phase when he defended internal realism. He later changed his epistemological and metaphysical view by endorsing natural realism, with the consequence of embracing alethic pluralism, the idea that truth works differently in various discourse domains. Despite these changes of mind in epistemology and in theory of truth, Putnam went on criticizing the fact/value dichotomy. However, alethic pluralism entails drawing distinctions among discourse domains, (...) especially between factual and nonfactual domains, and these distinctions are in tension with the rejection of the fact/value dichotomy, as this would in principle hinder factual domains as genuine. This issue raises, prima facie, some doubts about the effective compatibility of these views. (shrink)

Discursive pluralism, recently fostered by anti-representationalist views, by stating that not all assertions conform to a descriptive model of language, poses an interesting challenge to representationalism. Although in recent years alethic pluralism has become more and more popular as an interesting way out for this issue, the discussion also hosts other interesting minority approaches in the anti-representationalist camp. In particular, the late stage of contemporary expressivism offers a few relevant insights, going from Price's denunciation of “placement problems” to Brandom's inferentialism. (...) This paper attempts to show how these expressivist ideas combine well together, composing a unitary and metaphysically sober metaphilosophical framework. (shrink)

Anaphoric deflationism is a prosententialist account of the use of “true.” Prosentences are, for sentences, the equivalent of what pronouns are for nouns: as pronouns refer to previously introduced nouns, so prosentences like “that’s true” inherit their content from previously introduced sentences. This kind of deflationism concerning the use of “true” (especially in Brandom’s version) is an explanation in terms of anaphora; the prosentence depends anaphorically on the sentence providing its content. A relevant implication of this theory is that “true” (...) is not understood as a predicate and that truth is not a property. Primitivism, defended by Frege, Moore, and Davidson, is associated with two ideas: (1) that truth is a primitive and central trait of our conceptual system and (2) that truth, as such, cannot be defined. This second claim can be called “negative primitivism,” and it especially points out the facts about the “indefinability” of truth generally advocated by primitivists. In what follows, a connection is established between the deflationist’s rejection of the predicate and of the property and facts (and primitivist ideas) about the indefinability of truth. This connection establishes a common framework to lend further explanatory power to both options. According to the resulting view, this indefinability can explain the appeal and soundness of a deflationist dismissal of predicates and properties dealing with truth. (shrink)

This paper is a detailed and critical report of the debate between Rorty and Habermas (published in R.Brandom(ed.),"Rorty and His Critics", Blackwell, Oxford 2000) about the importance of truth and epistemic justification in communicative practices. They here present two different versions of the idea of communicative reason. I try to compare them and to evaluate their vices and virtues.

According to Millianism, the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent. According to anti-realism about fictional entities, there are no such entities. If there are no fictional entities, how can we explain the apparent meaningfulness of fictional names? Our best theory of fiction, Walton’s theory of make-believe, makes the same assumptions but lacks the theoretical resources to answer the question. In this paper, I propose a pragmatic solution in terms of two main dimensions of meaning, a subjective, psychological (...) dimension and an intersubjective, public dimension. The psychological dimension builds on the notion of mental files; the public dimension builds on Stalnaker’s notion of common ground. The account is coherent with two main theoretical principles, parsimony and uniformity. Furthermore, it satisfies three explanatory conditions posed by the intentionality of our thought and discourse about fiction, object-directedness, counterfictional imagining and intersubjective identification. (shrink)