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  1. I Know What I Need: Optimization of Bribery.Yu Yan Xiamen University & Shusen Qi - forthcoming - Journal of Business Ethics.
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  • I Know What I Need: Optimization of Bribery.Yu Yan & Shusen Qi - 2021 - Journal of Business Ethics 174 (2):311-332.
    Corruption has been a major obstacle to economic growth around the world. In this paper, we examine how firms interact with corrupt government officials either to minimize the impact of corruption on their operations or to maximize their benefit of paying a bribe. Our estimates show that firms know exactly what they need and use their limited resources to bribe only relevant government authorities. In other words, firms are rational bribers who know exactly what they need and optimize their bribes (...)
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  • The Ability and Willingness of Family Firms to Bribe: A Socioemotional Wealth Perspective.Shisong Jiang & Yijie Min - forthcoming - Journal of Business Ethics:1-18.
    Extant research concludes that family firms are less likely to bribe due to reputation concerns. However, such conclusions are, to a certain extent, inconsistent with the intuition and observation that some family firms can be aggressive bribers. This study employs a restricted-extended framework of socioemotional wealth model to reconcile this inconsistency. We propose family management, on the one hand, results in reputation preservation willingness; while on the other hand, results in an abuse of trust between family members and superior ability (...)
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  • Corruption, Bribery and Innovation in CEE: Where is the Link?Doren Chadee, Banjo Roxas & Alexandre Kouznetsov - 2021 - Journal of Business Ethics 174 (4):747-762.
    This study investigates the influence of formal and informal institutions on firm innovation in transitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe by explicitly differentiating between corruption and bribery as distinct informal institutions. We integrate institutional theory and legitimacy theory to explain that the failure of formal institutions creates an environment of corruption which encourages firms to use bribes to facilitate economic exchange. We test our hypotheses on the innovation performance of a sample of firms in 11 CEEs. The results show (...)
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