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  1. Functionalist Account of Truth with Special Reference to Mixed Conjunction.Sabeena P. Shereef & P. S. Sabeena - forthcoming - Phil Today.
    A theory of truth is an explanation of the nature of truth and set of rules that true things obey. A theory of truth is basically an attempt to enlighten on the nature of truth and formulate a set of laws that ‘true’ things follow. When we recall a memory, or analyze a statement, or appeal to evaluate within our brain, in fact, we are in quest for truth.Different theories of truth try to understand it from different perspectives. Attempts to (...)
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  2. Review of Wright & Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. [REVIEW]Andreas Stokke - forthcoming - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  3. Truth is One (No Need for Pluralism).Giorgio Volpe - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.
    In this paper, I discuss the currently most popular argument for alethic pluralism, maintaining that the so-called scope problem provides no compelling reason for abandoning the traditional view that truth is one and the same (substantive) property across the various regions of thought or discourse in which it is ascribed or denied to the things we think or say. I disarm the argument by showing that the scope problem does not arise for a number of non-deflationary, monistic views of truth (...)
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  4. A Quasi-Deflationary Solution to the Problems of Mixed Inferences and Mixed Compounds.Zhiyuan Zhang - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Truth pluralism is the view that there is more than one truth property. The strong version of it (i.e. strong pluralism) further contends that no truth property is shared by all true propositions. In this paper, I help strong pluralism solve two pressing problems concerning mixed discourse: the problem of mixed inferences (PI) and the problem of mixed compounds (PC). According to PI, strong pluralism is incompatible with the truth- preservation notion of validity; according to PC, strong pluralists cannot find (...)
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  5. The ambiguity of “true” in English, German, and Chinese.Kevin Reuter - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-20.
    Through a series of empirical studies involving native speakers of English, German, and Chinese, this paper reveals that the predicate “true” is inherently ambiguous in the empirical domain. Truth statements such as “It is true that Tom is at the party” seem to be ambivalent between two readings. On the first reading, the statement means “Reality is such that Tom is at the party.” On the second reading, the statement means “According to what X believes, Tom is at the party.” (...)
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  6. Tricky Truths: How Should Alethic Pluralism Accommodate Racial Truths?Ragnar van der Merwe & Phila Msimang - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (2):335-357.
    Some alethic pluralists maintain that there are two kinds of truths operant in our alethic discourse: a realist kind and an anti-realist kind. In this paper, we argue that such a binary conception cannot accommodate certain social truths, specifically truths about race. Most alethic pluralists surprisingly overlook the status of racial truths. Douglas Edwards is, however, an exception. In his version of alethic pluralism—Determination Pluralism—racial truths are superassertible (anti-realist) true rather than correspondence (realist) true. We argue that racial truths exhibit (...)
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  7. Alethic pluralism and truthmaker theory.Takeshi Akiba - 2023 - Theoria 89 (1):98-113.
    According to alethic pluralism, sentences belonging to different domains of discourse can be true by having different alethic (i.e., truth-constituting) properties. Against this pluralistic view, Jamin Asay has recently argued that pluralists' appeal to multiple alethic properties is ill-motivated because the main advantages of pluralism can already be obtained within the framework of standard truthmaker theory. In response to this objection, this paper argues that Asay's claim does not hold with respect to one of the central advantages of pluralism, namely, (...)
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  8. The Alethic Platitudes, Deflationism, and Adverbial Quantification.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):323-345.
    Alethic pluralists often claim that accommodating certain alethic platitudes motivates rejecting deflationism in favour of a pluralist inflationism about truth. Deflationists claim that the logical role of the truth predicate, viz providing something equivalent to variables for sentence-in-use positions and quantifiers governing them, is sufficient to account for the appeal to truth in the alethic platitudes. Surprisingly, however, most deflationists face an insufficiently acknowledged problem with respect to explaining how this mode of generalizing works. The standard substitutional or higher-order interpretations (...)
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  9. Edwards on truth pluralism.Matti Eklund - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1481-1493.
    I critically discuss Douglas Edwards' construal of the debate over truth, and his case for truth pluralism. Toward the end I present a constructive suggestion on Edwards' behalf. This suggestion avoids the problems I have presented, whatever in the end its fate.
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  10. Truth as none and many.Will Gamester - 2023 - Synthese 202 (6):1-25.
    Truth pluralists say that there are many ways to be true. Aaron Cotnoir (“Pluralism and Paradox” in: Pedersen and Wright (eds) Truth and pluralism: current debates, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) has suggested a “uniquely pluralist response to the liar”. The basic idea is to maintain that, if a sentence says of itself that it is not true in a certain way, then that sentence is not apt to be true in that way, but is instead apt to be true (...)
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  11. Truth and Its Uses: Deflationism and Alethic Pluralism.Tom Kaspers - 2023 - Synthese 202 (130):1-24.
    Deflationists believe that the question “What is truth?” should be answered not by means of a metaphysical inquiry into the nature of truth, but by figuring out what use we make of the concept of truth, and the word ‘true’, in practice. This article accepts this methodology, and it thereby rejects pluralism about truth that is driven by ontological considerations. However, it shows that there are practical considerations for a pluralism about truth, formulated at the level of use. The theory (...)
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  12. The metaphysics of truth: anti-deflationism and substantial pluralism.Gila Sher - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1494-1512.
    Two central themes of Douglas Edwards’s The Metaphysics of Truth are anti-deflationism and substantial pluralism. In Part I of this paper I discuss Edwards’s grounds for rejecting deflationism and suggest a few additional grounds. In Part II I discuss Edward's truth-pluralism and respond to his criticism of my correspondence-pluralism. While these pluralisms share significant features, their differences also raise several important questions.
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  13. Is Correspondence Truth One or Many?Joseph Ulatowski - 2023 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 79 (3):1003-1022.
    On the correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to fact. Criticisms of the correspondence theory of truth have argued that such a strict interpretation of the correspondence relation will not be able to account for the truth of statements about fiction or mathematics. This challenge has resulted in the introduction of more permissive correspondence relations, such as Austin’s correspondence as correlation or Tarski’s correspondence as reference satisfaction. Recently, some mediated correspondence theorists of (...)
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  14. Blindspots and brightspots for alethic pluralism.Chase B. Wrenn - 2023 - Synthese 202 (4):1-18.
    Alethic pluralists often claim that truth is not only relevant to normative evaluations, but inherently normative. I raise a problem for such versions of pluralism, based on the dual phenomena of “blindspots” and “brightspots.” If truth is inherently a kind of fitness for belief, then all true propositions should be fit for belief, and no false ones should be. Blindspots, however, are true propositions that can’t be the content of true beliefs. I argue that they aren’t fit for belief. Similarly, (...)
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  15. In defence of the villain: Edwards on deflationism and pluralism.Jeremy Wyatt - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1513-1537.
    In The Metaphysics of Truth, Doug Edwards offers a sustained case against deflationism about truth and in favour of his preferred pluralist theory of truth. Here, I take up three of the main components of that case. The first is Edwards' account of the distinctive metaphysical commitments of deflationism. His views about this issue have changed over the past few years, and I detail these changes as well as a concern for the views that he develops in the book. Second, (...)
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  16. Truth pluralism without domains.Will Gamester - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-18.
    Truth pluralists say that truth-bearers in different “discourses”, “domains”, “domains of discourse”, or “domains of inquiry” are apt to be true in different ways – for instance, that mathematical discourse or ethical discourse is apt to be true in a different way to ordinary descriptive or scientific discourse. Moreover, the notion of a “domain” is often explicitly employed in formulating pluralist theories of truth. Consequently, the notion of a “domain” is attracting increasing attention, both critical and constructive. I argue that (...)
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  17. Alethic Pluralism for Pragmatists.Tom Kaspers - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-19.
    Pragmatism and the correspondence theory of truth are longtime foes. Nevertheless, there is an argument to be made that pragmatists must embrace truth as correspondence. I show that there is a distinctive pragmatic utility to taking truth to be correspondence, and I argue that it would be inconsistent for pragmatists to accept the utility of the belief that truth is correspondence while resisting the premise that this belief is correct. -/- In order to show how pragmatists can embrace truth as (...)
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  18. A prolegomenon to the empirical cross‐linguistic study of truth.Masaharu Mizumoto - 2022 - Theoria 88 (6):1248-1273.
    In this paper, we propose and justify the cross‐linguistic study of the concept of truth through empirical studies of truth predicates, with results of such studies. We first conceptually explore the possibility of cross‐linguistic disagreement about truth purely due to linguistic norms governing truth predicates, which may imply a kind of pluralism about the concept of truth. We then consider the conditions under which we would be justified in inferring this sort of pluralism from the fact of such cross‐linguistic disagreement. (...)
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  19. Diaphonic pluralism: from truth pluralism to disagreement pluralism.Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-28.
    In this paper, I offer a pluralistic framework for disagreement and I develop a strategy to account for the varieties of disagreement on the basis of the varieties of the truth across different domains of discourse. Truth-pluralism is thus sufficient for delivering pluralism about disagreement—that is, diaphonic pluralism.
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  20. Global expressivism and alethic pluralism.Huw Price - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-55.
    This paper discusses the relation between Crispin Wright’s alethic pluralism and my global expressivism. I argue that on many topics Wright’s own view counts as expressivism in my sense, but that truth itself is a striking exception. Unlike me, Wright never seems to countenance an expressivist account of truth, though the materials needed are available to him in his approaches to other topics.
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  21. Kant’s Space of Theoretical Reason and Science: A Perspectival Reading.Lorenzo Spagnesi - 2022 - In Luigi Caranti & Alessandro Pinzani (eds.), Kant and the Problem of Morality: Rethinking the Contemporary World. New York, NY: Routledge Chapman & Hall. pp. 109-135.
    This paper aims to show how Kant’s account of theoretical reason can inform the contemporary debate over unity and pluralism of science. Although the unity of science thesis has been severely criticized in recent decades, I argue that pluralism as the sole epistemic principle guiding science is both too strong and too weak a principle. It is too strong because it does not account for the process of theory unification in science. It is too weak because it does not answer (...)
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  22. Truth and Norms: Normative Alethic Pluralism and Evaluative Disagreements.Andy Yu - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):928-931.
    Ferrari's book takes on the commendable project of developing a systematic account of truth, normativity, and disagreement, according to which truth plays a var.
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  23. Truth and Norms: Normative Alethic Pluralism and Evaluative Disagreements.Filippo Ferrari - 2021 - Lanham: Lexington Books.
    Truth and Norms develops a novel pluralistic view of the normative role that truth exerts on judgements. This view, labeled normative alethic pluralism, provides the best explanation of the variable normative significance that disagreement exhibits in different areas of discourse and is fully compatible with a minimalist conception of truth.
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  24. The Nature of Truth (Second edition).Michael Lynch, Jeremy Wyatt, Junyeol Kim & Nathan Kellen (eds.) - 2021 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  25. Putnam’s Alethic Pluralism and the Fact-Value Dichotomy.Pietro Salis - 2021 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 13 (2):1-16.
    Hilary Putnam spent much of his career criticizing the fact/value dichotomy, and this became apparent already during the phase when he defended internal realism. He later changed his epistemological and metaphysical view by endorsing natural realism, with the consequence of embracing alethic pluralism, the idea that truth works differently in various discourse domains. Despite these changes of mind in epistemology and in theory of truth, Putnam went on criticizing the fact/value dichotomy. However, alethic pluralism entails drawing distinctions among discourse domains, (...)
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  26. Truth Pluralism and Many-Valued Logic: Lesson from Suszko’s Thesis.Andrea Strollo - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):155-176.
    According to truth pluralism, sentences from different areas of discourse can be true in different ways. This view has been challenged to make sense of logical validity, understood as necessary truth preservation, when inferences involving different areas are considered. To solve this problem, a natural temptation is that of replicating the standard practice in many-valued logic by appealing to the notion of designated values. Such a simple approach, however, is usually considered a non-starter for strong versions of truth pluralism, since (...)
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  27. Alethic Pluralism, Logical Validity, and Natural Truth.Andrea Strollo - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):269-284.
    Alethic pluralism holds that there are many ways of being true. The view has been accused of being unable to do justice to the traditional account of logical validity, understood as necessary truth preservation. In this paper I reformulate the debate in terms of the naturalness of generic truth, and discuss some notable consequences of this more careful reformulation. I show not only that some alleged solutions, like the resort to plural quantification, are ineffective, but also that the problem is (...)
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  28. No Safe Haven for Truth Pluralists.Teemu Tauriainen - 2021 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 97:183-205.
    Truth pluralism offers the latest extension in the tradition of substantive theorizing about truth. While various forms of this thesis are available, most frameworks commit to domain reliance. According to domain reliance, various ways of being true, such as coherence and correspondence, are tied to discourse domains rather than individual sentences. From this follows that the truth of different types of sentences is accounted for by their domain membership. For example, sentences addressing ethical matters are true if they cohere and (...)
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  29. A Dilemma for Determination Pluralism (or Dualism).Ragnar van der Merwe - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (4):507-523.
    Douglas Edwards is arguably the most prominent contemporary advocate of moderate alethic pluralism. Significantly influenced by Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch, his work on the nature of truth has become widely discussed in the topical literature. Edwards labels his version of moderate alethic pluralism determination pluralism. At first blush, determination pluralism appears philosophically promising. The position deserves thoughtful consideration, particularly because of its capacity to accommodate the scope problem. I argue, however, that upon analysis the view is better understood as (...)
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  30. Inferentialist Truth Pluralism.Herman Veluwenkamp - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):107-121.
    Metasemantic inferentialismhas gained popularity in the last few decades. Traditionally, inferentialism is combined with a deflationary attitude towards semantic terms such as truth and reference, i.e., many inferentialists hold that when we use these semantic terms we do not purport to refer to substantive properties. This combination makes inferentialism attractive for philosophers who see themselves as antirealists. Although the attractions of combining inferentialism and deflationism are easy to see, deflationism is also a controversial position. For one, deflationists maintain that truth (...)
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  31. Alethic Pluralism, Deflationism, and Faultless Disagreement.Crispin Wright - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):432-448.
    One of the most important “folk” anti-realist thoughts about certain areas of our thought and discourse—basic taste, for instance, or comedy—is that their lack of objectivity crystallises in the possibility of “faultless disagreements”: situations where one party accepts P, another rejects P, and neither is guilty of any kind of mistake of substance or shortcoming of cognitive process. On close inspection, however, it proves challenging to make coherent sense of this idea, and a majority of theorists have come to reject (...)
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  32. Alethic Pluralism and the Value of Truth.Filippo Ferrari - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1):1–25.
    I have two objectives in this paper. The first is to investigate whether, and to what extent, truth is valuable. I do this by first isolating the value question from other normative questions. Second, I import into the debate about the nature of truth some key distinctions hailing from value theory. This will help us to clarify the sense in which truth is valuable. I then argue that there is significant variability in the value of truth in different areas of (...)
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  33. Introduction to the special issue “alethic pluralism and the normativity of truth”.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):309-310.
    In Truth and Objectivity, Crispin Wright argues that because truth is a distinctively normative property, it cannot be as metaphysically insubstantive as deflationists claim.1 This argument has been taken, together with the scope problem,2 as one of the main motivations for alethic pluralism.3 We offer a reconstruction of Wright’s Inflationary Argument (henceforth IA) aimed at highlighting what are the steps required to establish its inflationary conclusion. We argue that if a certain metaphysical and epistemological view of a given subject matter (...)
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  34. Shopping for Truth Pluralism.Will Gamester - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11351-11377.
    Truth pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between domains of discourse: while ordinary descriptive claims or those of the hard sciences might be true in virtue of corresponding to reality, those concerning ethics, mathematics, institutions might be true in some non-representational or “anti-realist” sense. Despite pluralism attracting increasing amounts of attention, the motivations for the view remain underdeveloped. This paper investigates whether pluralism is well-motivated on ontological grounds: that is, on the basis that different discourses are concerned with (...)
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  35. On Moderate Pluralism About Truth and Logic.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2020 - Philosophical Forum 51 (2):143–160.
    According to moderate truth pluralism, truth is both One and Many. There is a single truth property that applies across all truth‐apt domains of discourse, but instances of this property are grounded in different ways. Propositions concerning medium‐sized dry goods might be true in virtue of corresponding with reality while propositions pertaining to the law might be true in virtue of cohering with the body of law. Moderate truth pluralists must answer two questions concerning logic: (Q1) Which logic governs inferences (...)
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  36. Pluralism and Normativity in Truth and Logic.Gila Sher - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):337-350.
    In this paper I investigate how differences in approach to truth and logic (in particular, a deflationist vs. a substantivist approach to these fields) affect philosophers’ views concerning pluralism and normativity in these fields. My perspective on truth and logic is largely epistemic, focusing on the role of truth in knowledge (rather than on the use of the words “true” and “truth” in natural language), and my reference group includes Carnap (1934), Harman (1986), Horwich (1990), Wright (1992), Beall and Restall (...)
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  37. Alethic Pluralism and Logical Consequence.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2020 - In Martin Blicha & Igor Sedlar (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2019. College Publications. pp. 147-61.
    It has been argued that alethic pluralists -- who hold that there are several distinct truth properties -- face a problem when it comes to defining validity. Via consideration of the classical concept of logical consequence, and of strategies for defining validity in many-valued logics, this paper proposes two new kinds of solution to the problem.
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  38. Can Truth Pluralism Preserve Substantive Truth?真理の多元主義は実質性を保てるか.Yuki Suda - 2020 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 53 (1):1-24.
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  39. Book Review of The Metaphysics of Truth by Douglas Edwards. [REVIEW]Ragnar van der Merwe - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (4):555-574.
    Book Review The Metaphysics of Truth by Douglas Edwards Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. x + 210. ISBN 9780198758693. £45.00 ($56.00) (hardcover).
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  40. Alethic pluralism and truth-attributions.Chase Wrenn - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):311-324.
    The core of alethic pluralism is the idea that truth is a different property in some discourses from others. Orthodox pluralists such as Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch share three commitments that motivate their view. One is Ecumenicalism, the view that scientific and moral claims are both truth-apt. The second is Occasional Realism, the view that truth in science is a matter of justification-independent, accurate representation, while truth in ethics is a matter of ideal epistemic justifiability. The third is Normativism, (...)
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  41. Alethic Pluralism and Logical Form.Chase Wrenn - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 59 (2):249-265.
    According to strong pluralist theories of truth, ‘true’ designates different properties depending on which sentences it’s applied to. An influential objection to strong pluralism claims it can’t make sense of logically complex sentences whose components have different truth-properties. For example, if ‘true’ designates correspondents for ‘Tabby is a cat’, and it designates coherence for ‘Tabby is beautiful’, what does it designate for ‘Tabby is a beautiful cat’ (Tappolet 1997)? Will Gamester (2019) has proposed a novel pluralist theory meant to avoid (...)
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  42. Editorial introduction to ‘truth: concept meets property’.Jeremy Wyatt - 2020 - Synthese 198 (2):591-603.
  43. Ecumenical alethic pluralism.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):368-393.
    ABSTRACTEcumenical Alethic Pluralism is a novel kind of alethic pluralism. It is ecumenical in that it widens the scope of alethic pluralism by allowing for a normatively deflated truth property alongside a variety of normatively robust truth properties. We establish EAP by showing how Wright’s Inflationary Arguments fail in the domain of taste, once a relativist treatment of the metaphysics and epistemology of that domain is endorsed. EAP is highly significant to current debates on the nature of truth insofar as (...)
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  44. Logic, Logical Form, and the Disunity of Truth.Will Gamester - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):34-43.
    Monists say that the nature of truth is invariant, whichever sentence you consider; pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between different sets of sentences. The orthodoxy is that logic and logical form favour monism: there must be a single property that is preserved in any valid inference; and any truth-functional complex must be true in the same way as its components. The orthodoxy, I argue, is mistaken. Logic and logical form impose only structural constraints on a metaphysics of (...)
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  45. There is No Truth–Theory Like the Correspondence Theory.Rognvaldur Ingthorsson - 2019 - Discusiones Filosóficas 20 (34):15–41.
    I challenge the assumption that the pragmatist-, coherence-, identity- and deflationary theories of truth are essentially incompatible and rival views to the correspondence theory, without endorsing pluralism. With the exception of some versions of the identity theory, the alternative theories only appear to genuinely contradict the correspondence theory, either when they are wedded to a rejection of an objective reality, or when it is assumed that a ‘theory of truth’ is a theory of the function of the truth-predicate. I argue (...)
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  46. Review of Douglas Edwards, The Metaphysics of Truth. [REVIEW]Mark Jago - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):970–976.
    There has recently been a revival of interest in what truth is. For a long time, deflationism ruled the roost, telling us that there’s not much of metaphysical.
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  47. Does Logical Pluralism Imply, or Suggest, Truth Pluralism, or Vice Versa?Stewart Shapiro & Michael Lynch - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4925-4936.
    The answers to the questions in the title depend on the kind of pluralism one is talking about. We will focus here on our own views. The purpose of this article is to trace out some possible connections between these kinds of pluralism. We show how each of them might bear on the other, depending on how certain open questions are resolved.
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  48. Putting Pluralism in its Place.Jamin Asay - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):175–191.
    Pluralism about truth is the view that there are many properties, not just one, in virtue of which things are true. Pluralists hope to dodge the objections that face traditional monistic substantive views of truth, as well as those facing deflationary theories of truth. More specifically, pluralists hope to advance an explanatorily potent understanding of truth that can capture the subtleties of various realist and anti-realist domains of discourse, all while avoiding the scope problem. I offer a new objection to (...)
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  49. Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth and Logic, by Gila Sher: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp xviii + 370, £30. [REVIEW]Albert Atkin - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):838-838.
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  50. Postscript: Reply to McLeod.Lajos L. Brons - 2018 - In Bo Mou (ed.), Philosophy of Language, Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement. Brill. pp. 364-370.
    This is my reply to McLeod’s reply (2015a) to my (2015) paper commenting on his (2011) interpretation of Wang Chong 王充 as an alethic pluralist.
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