Chapter 8 argues against the view that the moral rightness of an act is not a reason to perform it, and our reasons are instead the features that make the act right. Philosophers typically defend this view by noting that it seems redundant to take rightness to be an additional reason, once it has been acknowledged that the right-making features are already reasons. The author shows that this argument dramatically overgeneralizes, ruling out all cases in which two or more reasons (...) are arranged in relationships of metaphysical constitution. She then proposes an alternative way of thinking about these metaphysical hierarchies: Rather than assuming that at most one of the facts in each hierarchy is the “real” reason, bearing all the normative weight, it should be accepted that these facts can all be genuine reasons, whose normative weight is shared in virtue of the metaphysical relationships between them. Some tests are offered that can be used to determine which facts occur in metaphysical hierarchies with shared weight, and it is argued that the fact that an act is morally right passes the tests. The author then explains what she takes to be some kernels of truth underlying the redundancy argument, arguing that these phenomena are pragmatic, not metaphysical. (shrink)

This essay examines a recent line of thought in aesthetics that challenges realist-leaning aesthetic theories. According to this line of thought, aesthetic diversity and disagreement are good, and our aesthetic judgments, responses, and attachments are deeply personal and even identity-constituting. These facts are further used to support anti-realist theories of aesthetic normativity. I aim to achieve two goals: (1) to disentangle arguments concerning diversity, disagreement, and personality; and (2) to offer realist-friendly replies to all three.

In his defence of emergence, David Elder-Vass assumes that my hermeneutic position represents a form of individualism. Although a common reading of my position, the claim that I am in individualist is incorrect; I, too, recognize the centrality of collective phenomena to social reality. In fact, there is a close convergence between emergence and the hermeneutic sociology I advocate. However, there also remains an important divide between us. Despite his care to avoid reification, Edler-Vass descends into ontological dualism, conceptualizing society (...) in terms of structure and agency. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 5, May 2022.

The mass killings, large-scale gang rape and large-scale expulsion of the Rohingyas from Myanmar constitute one of the most repugnant world events in recent years. This article addresses the question of whether armed humanitarian intervention would have been morally permissible to protect the Rohingyas. It approaches the question from the perspective of the jus ad bellum criteria of just war theory. This approach does not yield a definitive answer because knowing whether certain jus ad bellum conditions might have been satisfied (...) is difficult to judge without detailed knowledge of military intelligence assessments. Nevertheless, I argue that there was just cause for intervention according to both liberal and communitarian perspectives; that legitimate authority in the form of United Nations Security Council authorization would not have been morally necessary; that it is doubtful whether permissible intervention would have required humanitarian intent; that in late August 2017, intervention might well have been a last resort, but that morally relevant facts suggest intervention might have been disproportionate and lacked a reasonable chance of success, such that, all things considered, it would have perhaps been impermissible. -/- (Free access via third external link). (shrink)

The “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof, currently used in criminal trials, is notoriously vague and undermotivated. This paper discusses two popular strategies for justifying our choice of a particular precise interpretation of the standard: the “ratio-to-standard strategy” identifies a desired ratio of trial outcomes and then argues that a certain standard is the one that we can expect to produce our desired ratio, while the “utilities-to-standard strategy” identifies utilities for trial outcomes and then argues that a certain standard (...) maximizes expected utility. I argue that both strategies fail on their own terms, by requiring us to perform calculations that we simply cannot perform. No version of either strategy can be performed by jurors or legislators in our actual epistemic position, in which, since we do not know which of the defendants in our trial system are genuinely innocent and which are genuinely guilty, we cannot determine the extent to which our trial system tends to produce evidence that misleadingly incriminates the innocent or misleadingly exonerates the guilty. But we would need to determine this in order to perform the calculations required by any possible version of the ratio-to-standard or utilities-to-standard strategies. I then suggest some empirical reasons to be pessimistic about the evidence produced by our actual trial system. The upshot is that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard lacks a clear interpretation and rationale, nor do we have a promising way to identify an alternative. This is the trouble with standards of proof. (shrink)

Some philosophers think that if someone acts wrongly while falsely believing that her act is permissible, this moral mistake cannot excuse her wrongdoing. And some think that this is because it is morally blameworthy to fail to appreciate the moral significance of non‐moral facts of which one is aware, such that mistakenly believing that one's act is permissible when it is in fact wrong is itself morally blameworthy. Here I challenge the view that it is blameworthy to fail to appreciate (...) the moral significance of non‐moral facts of which one is aware. This view seems okay if we focus on examples of people mistakenly believing that their wrongful acts are permissible. But it is not remotely plausible when we consider other varieties of moral mistake – such as believing that one's action is required when it is in fact supererogatory, believing that one's action is wrong when it is in fact permissible, and believing false things about the moral properties of others’ actions and of merely possible actions. The upshot is that those who maintain that moral mistakes cannot excuse are sent back to the drawing board; we need a new explanation of why this would be the case. (shrink)

Contemporary accounts of early Mah y na Buddhist schools like the Madhyamaka and the Yog c ra tend to portray them as generally antithetical to the Abhidharma of non-Mah y na schools such as the Therav da and the Sarv stiv da. This paper attempts to locate early Yog c ra philosophical speculation firmly within the broader context of Abhidharma debates. Certain key Yog c ra concepts such as layavij na, vij apti-m trat and citta-m tra are discussed insofar as (...) they relate to pre-existing concepts and issues found in the Vaibh sika and Sautr ntika schools, with specific reference to the Abhidharmakośa and the corresponding bh sya of Vasubandhu. Finally, some remarks are made about the, benefits of approaching the history of religious ideas without the benefits and distortions of hindsight, particularly as this relates to the attribution of an idealistic position to the early Yog c ra literature. (shrink)

Karma and its consequences are a major theme in Buddhism. When discussing war and peace in a Buddhist context, it is important to distinguish Buddhist philosophy from the practice of Buddhists in historical and present fact. This is because Buddhist philosophy on the subject, especially in the teachings of the Buddha and the mainstream Mahāyāna teachings, so heavily emphasizes non‐violence. The advent of engaged Buddhism places the dilemma of Buddhist violence in a new context. In so far as it does (...) not compromise the non‐violent and non‐particularist ideals of Buddhism, engaged Buddhism is an ongoing experiment in reconciling Buddhism's ideals with the reality of Buddhist behavior, in translating Buddhist personal ethics into a social ethic, and in determining how far Buddhist non‐violence can be taken on the societal level. (shrink)

The discussion of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Γ is usually taken to include three ‘versions’ of the principle: an ontological, psychological, and logical one. In this article I develop an interpretation of Metaphysics Γ3 and a parallel text, De interpretatione 14, in order to show that these texts are concerned with two related but different principles: a version of the Principle of Identity, and a corollary to this, which concerns the ability to accept two ‘opposite’ items (...) at the same time. I argue that these principles must be considered separately in order to properly understand Aristotle’s remarks about PNC in Metaphysics Γ, and in order to defend his approach in these remarks against certain objections raised against the discussion in Metaphysics Γ by Jan Łukasiewicz in his "Über den Satz des Widerspruchs bei Aristoteles". The main result of my interpretation is to distinguish in the discussion of PNC in Metaphysics Γ three principles: one concerning linguistic items (words and statements), one concerning thoughts (δόξαι), and one concerning objects or states of affairs. (shrink)

One of my favorite bioethics quotes is nearing 50 years old:Let us not forget that progress is an optional goal, not an unconditional commitment, and that its tempo in particular, compulsive as it may become, has nothing sacred about it. Let us also remember that a slower progress in the conquest of disease would not threaten society, grievous as it is to those who have to deplore that their particular disease be not yet conquered, but that society would indeed be (...) threatened by the erosion of those moral values whose loss, possibly caused by too ruthless a pursuit of scientific progress, would make its most dazzling triumphs not worth having.Despite its age, this invocation seems to me increasingly relevant as time... (shrink)

Murray MacBeath, in his essay ``Time's Square'', describes a fictitious scenariowhere various physical observations made by the participants would, he claims, invitethe interpretation that time for them is two-dimensional. In the present paper, however, Iargue that such observations come close to underdetermining the hypothesis of time's twodimensionality;for a rival hypothesis - that, under certain circumstances, the observationscan be explained in terms of the familiar time dilation effects predicted by special relativity- almost fits the evidence as well. That is, under certain (...) (albeit artificial) circumstances theworld can already behave almost as though it were temporally two-dimensional. (shrink)

It has been asserted that preaching in the first half of the twenty-first century is in crisis by the authors of Engaging Preaching. This crisis has arisen, so say the authors, due in part to those who have been entrusted to preach the ‘oracles of God’ (1 Peter 4:11), having failed to faithfully proclaim the Word of the Lord. No longer do the words of ‘Thus saith the Lord’, regularly fill the halls of the sanctuary. Instead of a sure word (...) from the Bible, those in attendance are just as likely to give tips on self-fulfillment or achieving one’s dreams. By this practice, it seems there are a significant number of pulpit practitioners who neither trust in the authority or the sufficiency of the Word of God. The situation seems bleak, but there is a remedy to be applied to this situation. Carl F. H. Henry has left us a wealth of theological writings that speak to this very problem. This paper will argue as Henry has masterfully argued for the authority of Scripture, the preacher finds a sure footing for a pulpit practice that displays the authority and the sufficiency of the Bible. It will be argued that expositional preaching is the most natural response to a robust view of the authority and sufficiency of the Word of God. (shrink)

This paper looks at how the strategies of mediaand cultural studies can be applied to thehealth studies field. This relationship,however, has been met with resistance due to anumber of status debates. We argue theimportance of fostering links between these`disciplines' namely because the definition ofwhat constitutes `health' has been broadenedand is inscribed in most forms of popularmedia. Using the example of the `health andlifestyle' debate, we argue that the mediainforms cultural understandings aboutrequirements for living and is therefore acrucial area of analysis (...) for health studies(and cultural/media studies) students. We arealso concerned with analysing how the mediacontributes to the construction and regulationof `healthy' subjects making links with publichealth discourses and current debates in thefield of media and health. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 20 (2000) 127-150 [Access article in PDF] They Who Burned Themselves for Peace: Quaker and Buddhist Self-Immolators during the Vietnam War Sallie B. KingJames Madison UniversityNhat Chi Mai was a lay disciple of Thich Nhat Hanh and member of the Order of Interbeing, an Engaged Buddhist order founded by Nhat Hanh. On May 16, 1967, Vesak, the celebration of the birth of the Buddha, she burned herself (...) to death outside the Tu Nghiem Temple, a nunnery. An idealistic young student with much to live for, she sacrificed herself in an effort to bring the war to an end. In a letter to the U.S. government she wrote, I offer my body as a torch to dissipate the dark to waken love among men to give peace to Vietnam the one who burns herself for peace. 1In her farewell letter to Thich Nhat Hanh she wrote, "Thay, don't worry too much. We will have peace soon." 2On November 2, 1965, Norman Morrison, a devout Quaker and ardent pacifist, drove from Baltimore to Washington and burned himself to death at the Pentagon, at a spot estimated to be 40 to 100 feet from the window of Robert S. McNamara, then Secretary of Defense and one of the chief American prosecutors of the war. Shortly before his death, he wrote to his wife, "For weeks even months I have been praying only that I be shown what I must do. This morning with no warning I was shown.... Know that I love thee but must act...." 3 Morrison took his baby daughter, Emily, along with him and held her in his arms as he prepared for his act. Somehow--accounts differ as to how it happened--she was separated from her father before the flames engulfed him and she emerged entirely unharmed, though her clothing smelled strongly of the kerosene with which Morrison had soaked himself. 4There were others who burned themselves to death during the war in Vietnam. The venerable Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc was the first. On June 11, 1963, [End Page 127] at a downtown crossroads in Saigon, he sat in the lotus posture and, in a state of meditative control, burned himself to death in protest of the Diem regime's repression of the Buddhist religion. Many Vietnamese Buddhist monks and nuns followed his example; I do not know all their names, or exactly how many they were.In America, to my knowledge, eight people burned themselves to death during the war. Two were Quakers: Norman Morrison and Alice Herz. Roger LaPorte, a former Trappist seminarian who had become a Catholic worker, burned himself to death one week after Norman Morrison. The others were: Hiroko Hayasaki, a Japanese-American Buddhist; Erik Thoen, a student of Zen Buddhism; another university student, George Winne; a high school student, Ronald Brazee; and Florence Beaumont, described as a "housewife." A number of others attempted self-immolation but survived. 5In this paper I will focus upon the self-immolations of Norman Morrison and Nhat Chi Mai. I will also have a few comments on Thich Quang Duc. My remarks are intended, however, to have relevance to all the Buddhist and Quaker self-immolators. 6Let us now consider in more detail some of the features of the self-immolations of Norman Morrison and Nhat Chi Mai, and some of the issues they pose to the Quaker and Buddhist communities, respectively. Precipitating Events While neither act was the result of a moment's impulse, we still would do well to ask what events most proximately precipitated the two self-immolations. In Norman Morrison's case, the precipitating events were two. The morning of the day he immolated himself he read a report of the American bombing of a village in Vietnam. Paris Match had published an interview with a French priest, recuperating in a Saigon clinic, who had witnessed and survived the bombing raid. The priest said, "I have seen my faithful burned up in napalm.... I have seen... (shrink)

This new edition accords more attention to women's voices from the third world and to the urgent ethical and environmental concerns being addressed by women. It also provides a greatly expanded bibliography and a new Epilogue.

Open peer commentary on the article “Second-Order Science of Interdisciplinary Research: A Polyocular Framework for Wicked Problems” by Hugo F. Alrøe & Egon Noe. Upshot: The authors propose that a perspective is an autopoietic system. This commentary challenges the feasibility of this claim by pointing out the conceptual difficulties associated with such a proposal. But even granting that a perspective is, or can be, an autopoietic system, what sort of autopoietic system might best ground the authors’ concept of perspective? This (...) last question is also pursued here. (shrink)

This thesis is a translation, with notes and introduction, of the Commentary to the Hua-yan Dharma-Realm Meditation. This text is a commentary to the Dharma-Realm Meditation, which is incorporated into the former. The core text is by the first patriarch of the Hua-yan school of Buddhism in China, Du-shun (557-640); the commentary is by the fifth patriarch of the Hua-yan school, Zong-mi (780-841). The text is both philosophical and meditational in nature, and is a concise statement of the key doctrines (...) of the school. -/- The introduction to this text prepares the reader for the translation by providing the information and concepts necessary for an understanding of the text. This includes material on the translation of technical terms, a brief sketch of some Buddhist texts referred to by the authors, biographical information on the authors, historical and philosophical background to the Hua-yan school, a commentary on the literary and meditational aspects of the text, and a general summary of the text by chapters. (shrink)