(Part of a symposium on an OUP collection of Paul Russell's papers on free will and moral responsibility). Paul Russell’s The Limits of Free Will is more than the sum of its parts. Among other things, Limits offers readers a comprehensive look at Russell’s attack on the problematically idealized assumptions of the contemporary free will debate. This idealization, he argues, distorts the reality of our human predicament. Herein I pose a dilemma for Russell’s position, critical compatibilism. The dilemma illuminates the (...) tension between Russell’s critical and compatibilist commitments. The problem is not obviously insurmountable, and as a compatibilist who is sympathetic to the view, my aim is to spark further discussion. (shrink)

In large, impersonal moral orders many of us wish to maintain good will toward our fellow citizens only if we are reasonably sure they will maintain good will toward us. The mutual maintaining of good will, then, requires that we somehow communicate our intentions to one another. But how do we actually do this? The current paper argues that when we engage in moral responsibility practices—that is, when we express our reactive attitudes by blaming, praising, and resenting—we communicate a desire (...) to maintain good will to those in the community we are imbedded in. Participating in such practices alone will not get the job done, though, for expressions of our reactive attitudes are often what economists call cheap talk. But when we praise and blame in cases of moral diversity, expressions of our reactive attitudes act as costly signals capable of solving our social dilemma. (shrink)

P.F. Strawson’s compatibilism has had considerable influence. However, as Watson has argued in “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil”, his view appears to have a disturbing consequence: extreme evil exempts an agent from moral responsibility. This is a reductio of the view. Moreover, in some cases our emotional reaction to an evildoer’s history clashes with our emotional expressions of blame. Anyone’s actions can be explained by his or her history, however, and thereby can conflict with our present blame. Additionally, we (...) too might have been evil if our history had been like the unlucky evildoer’s. Thus, our emotional responses to the evildoer compromise our standing to blame them. Since Strawson’s view demarcates moral responsibility by moral emotional responses, his view appears to be self-defeating. In this paper, I defend the Strawsonian view from the reductio and self-defeat problems. I argue that two emotions, disgust and elevation, can be moral reactive attitudes in Strawson’s sense. First, moral disgust expresses neither blame nor exemption from responsibility. Instead, moral disgust presupposes blameworthiness but is instead a distinct response to the extreme wrongdoer. Secondly, moral disgust involves self-directed attitudes that explain away our apparent lack of standing to blame the evil agent. The structure of disgust as a reactive attitude is mirrored along the positive dimension by the emotion that Haidt has called “elevation”, a feeling of moral inspiration. I conclude by defending my view from objections about the moral appropriateness of disgust. (shrink)

This is a review of Daniel Dennett and Gregg D. Caruso's Just Deserts: Debating Free Will.

This book shows that the repeated announcements of the death of Hegel's philosophical system have been premature. Hegel's Philosophy of Freedom, Reality, and God brings to light accomplishments for which Hegel is seldom given credit: unique arguments for the reality of freedom, for the reality of knowledge, for the irrationality of egoism, and for the compatibility of key insights from traditional theism and naturalistic atheism. The book responds in a systematic manner to many of the major criticisms leveled at Hegel's (...) system, from Feuerbach and Kierkegaard to Heidegger and Charles Taylor. It provides detailed interpretations of Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit, large parts of his indispensable Science of Logic, and important parts of his Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Right. Unlike many academic books on Hegel, this one treats him very much as a 'live' thinker, whom we can learn from today. (shrink)

P.F. Strawson’s account of moral responsibility in “Freedom and Resentment” has been widely influential. In both that paper and in the contemporary literature, much attention has been paid to Strawson’s account of blame in terms of reactive attitudes like resentment and indignation. The Strawsonian view of praise in terms of gratitude has received comparatively little attention. Some, however, have noticed something puzzling about gratitude and accountability. We typically understand accountability in terms of moral demands and expectations. Yet gratitude does not (...) express or enforce moral demands or expectations. So, how is it a way to hold an agent accountable? In a more general manner, we might ask if there is even sense to be made of the idea that agents can be accountable—i.e., “on the hook”—in a positive way. In this paper, I clarify the relationship between gratitude and moral accountability. I suggest that accountability is a matter of engaging with others in a way that is basically concerned with their feelings and attitudes rather than solely a matter of moral demands. Expressions of gratitude are a paradigmatic form of this concerned engagement. I conclude by defending my view from the objection that it leads to an overly generous conception of holding accountable and suggest in reply that moral responsibility skeptics may not help themselves to as many moral emotions as they might have thought. (shrink)

This book provides a lucid commentary on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and on Hegel’s other major writings on ethics and politics. Since it is the only commentary in English that covers the Philosophy of Right almost section by section, from start to finish, and it also carries on an instructive dialogue with many of the other commentaries published in recent years, it will be very useful to students and to scholars who aren’t specialists in Hegel. Although Franco can’t, of course, (...) afford to go into great detail on all of the many issues that he deals with, his judiciousness and wide reading in Hegel enable him to clarify a remarkable number of them, especially in the domain of “ethical life”. His discussions of Hegel’s conceptions of the state and of war and international relations are especially well balanced, neither avoiding difficulties nor abandoning Hegel to his legions of critics. His treatments of Hegel’s earlier works—especially the Jena lectures and the relevant portions of the Phenomenology of Spirit—are also quite helpful. Only readers who have themselves attempted to reconcile these disparate and dense texts and to reconstruct some of Hegel’s major arguments in ordinary language will fully appreciate how much Franco has accomplished. (shrink)

Reconstructing Damon is the first comprehensive study of Damon, the most important theorist of music and poetic meter in ancient Athens, detailing his extensive influence, and providing the first systematic collection, translation, and critical examination of all ancient testimonia for him.

A common compatibilist view says that we are free and morally responsible in virtue of the ability to respond aptly to reasons. Many hold a version of this view despite disagreement about whether free will requires the ability to do otherwise. The canonical version of this view is reductive. It reduces the pertinent ability to a set of modal properties that are more obviously compatible with determinism, like dispositions. I argue that this and any reductive view of abilities faces a (...) significant challenge: it cannot adequately explain the freedom-grounding element of this ability. The problem has the form of a dilemma. This leaves reasons-responsive compatibilists with two options: abandon theories of free will grounded in abilities or abandon reductive theories of abilities. (shrink)

In this paper we show that being blameworthy for not blaming and being blameworthy for victim blaming are structurally similar. Each involve the two traditional contours of moral responsibility: a knowledge condition and a control condition. But interestingly, in these cases knowledge and control are importantly interrelated. Being in a relationship with another person affords us varying degrees of knowledge about them. This knowledge in turn affords agents in relationships varying degrees of influence over one another. Cases where an agent (...) is especially blameworthy for failing to blame a friend, a close colleague, or a spouse highlight this. The interdependence of these two conditions in interpersonal relationships sheds (partial) light on why victim blaming is morally wrong. We argue that victim blamers suffer from a kind of moral myopia by only focusing on what the victim could do, in virtue of their being in a relationship of some sort with their abuser, to avoid abuse. We focus specifically on cases where such moral myopia is fueled by misogynistic and hierarchical gender schema and scripts. (shrink)

Plato was among the first to give prominence to the apparent conflicts between philosophy, religion, and the arts, conflicts that are still alive in modern cultures. Philosophers often challenge the legitimacy of religion, in various ways; philosophy as an advocate of ethics challenges the arts as lacking a moral compass; and advocates of the arts and religion stage counterattacks against these challenges. However, Plato wasn’t only a critic of religion and the arts. He had his own preferred version of religion, (...) and his own practice of art, of which he was quite aware. And in modern times, Hegel presents a systematic account of the sciences, the arts, religion, and philosophy, as aspects of “Spirit,” which shows how all of them make indispensable contributions to freedom and thus, in fact, to the highest and most "real" reality. My goal in this talk is to show how, elaborating on Plato’s hints on these issues, Hegel not only resolves the disputes between the sciences, the arts, religion, and philosophy, but reveals a unified higher and more real reality that is composed of efforts within all of these cultural domains. (shrink)

Robert Williams objects that my interpretation of Hegel’s philosophical theology makes him an “Enlightenment naturalist.” In response, I explain how my book describes Hegel as decisively criticizing Enlightenment naturalism by showing that the finite and the natural must be sublated in the infinite. Second, I show that Hegel’s apparently paradoxical conception of the relation between humans and God makes sense when it is seen as part of the long tradition of rational mysticism, which includes Plato, Plotinus, Proclus, St. Augustine, and (...) Meister Eckhart. (shrink)

This book provides a lucid commentary on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and on Hegel’s other major writings on ethics and politics. Since it is the only commentary in English that covers the Philosophy of Right almost section by section, from start to finish, and it also carries on an instructive dialogue with many of the other commentaries published in recent years, it will be very useful to students and to scholars who aren’t specialists in Hegel. Although Franco can’t, of course, (...) afford to go into great detail on all of the many issues that he deals with, his judiciousness and wide reading in Hegel enable him to clarify a remarkable number of them, especially in the domain of “ethical life”. His discussions of Hegel’s conceptions of the state and of war and international relations are especially well balanced, neither avoiding difficulties nor abandoning Hegel to his legions of critics. His treatments of Hegel’s earlier works—especially the Jena lectures and the relevant portions of the Phenomenology of Spirit—are also quite helpful. Only readers who have themselves attempted to reconcile these disparate and dense texts and to reconstruct some of Hegel’s major arguments in ordinary language will fully appreciate how much Franco has accomplished. (shrink)

To judge from extant sources, after Homer until the late Hellenistic period no Greek man ever publicly stated that he loved his wife. By contrast, after Homer elite men often stated that they loved particular adolescent males. This essay explores possible reasons for these differences from more recent practice, and their progressive modification. Starting in the later fifth century, men might publicly state that they loved their dead wives. In New Comedy and then Hellenistic epigram, a young man might state (...) that he loved a girl. Only the Greek novel, from the late Hellenistic age, expresses complete heterosexual love, although the readership of this genre may have been female. (shrink)

Personal freedom, «living as you like», was a cardinal principal of Athens’ democracy and nearly always a daily reality for its citizens. Yet despite Athens’ ideologies and often extraordinary tolerance, what some consider significant violations of freedom also occurred; in particular, the Athenians reportedly prosecuted many intellectuals . All this has raised doubts about personal freedoms at Athens. Did these freedoms exist? Many deny it, including Isaiah Berlin in his famous essays On Liberty. Many modern democracies are guided by the (...) principle of the primacy of the individual over the state, and the paramount importance of protecting individual liberties. But among the Athenians the community came first. The thread linking Athenian violations of their deeply felt democratic ideology of «living as you like» was the priority of community interests. Drunkenness, wasting money, even doubting the gods were not regulated, if no one else was harmed. But the community came first. The Athenians punished those who harmed the polis. Private citizens were left free to live as they wished. (shrink)

_Plato's Dialectical Ethics,_ Gadamer's earliest work, has now been translated into English for the first time. This classic book, published in 1931 and reprinted in 1967 and 1982, is still important today. It is one of the most extensive and imaginative interpretations of Plato's _Philebus_ and an ideal introduction to Gadamer's thinking. It shows how his influential hermeneutics emerged from the application of his teacher Martin Heidegger's phenomenological method to classical texts and problems. The work consists of two chapters. The (...) first, which puts Socratic/Platonic dialectics and ethics in the context of Gadamer's thinking about how we come to shared understanding through conversation, helps to clarify the intentions and trajectory of all Gadamer's subsequent work. The second chapter, on the _Philebus, _will interest everyone who is concerned with the connection between Plato's discussions of ethics and those of Aristotle, and with the substantive issues of the relation between pleasure and reason that Plato explores and Gadamer interprets. This edition includes a new and useful introduction by the translator, Robert M. Wallace. (shrink)

This major work by the German philosopher Hans Blumenberg is a monumental rethinking of the significance of the Copernican revolution for our understanding of modernity. It provides an important corrective to the view of science as an autonomous enterprise and presents a new account of the history of interpretations of the significance of the heavens for man.Hans Blumenberg is Professor of Philosophy, emeritus, at the University of Munster in West Germany. This book is included in the series Studies in Contemporary (...) German Social Thought, edited by Thomas McCarthy. (shrink)

Despite the Athenians’ pronounced ideology of personal freedom , many scholars deny that they enjoyed either positive freedoms or negative freedoms, where the state could intervene as it wished, as against Sokrates for his religious views. The current essay argues that in their personal lives the Athenians were entirely free, except when speech or action materially harmed the community. A second ideology that community welfare superseded the wishes of any citizen was both universal and paramount – even for Plato’s Sokrates.

Evolution is littered with paraphyletic convergences: many roads lead to functional Romes. We propose here another example - an equivalence class structure factoring the broad realm of possible realizations of the Baars Global Workspace consciousness model. The construction suggests many different physiological systems can support rapidly shifting, sometimes highly tunable, temporary assemblages of interacting unconscious cognitive modules. The discovery implies various animal taxa exhibiting behaviors we broadly recognize as conscious are, in fact, simply expressing different forms of the same underlying (...) phenomenon. Mathematically, we find much slower, and even multiple simultaneous, versions of the basic structure can operate over very long timescales, a kind of paraconsciousness often ascribed to group phenomena. The variety of possibilities, a veritable rainbow, suggests minds today may be only a small surviving fraction of ancient evolutionary radiations - bush phylogenies of consciousness and paraconsciousness. Under this scenario, the resulting diversity was subsequently pruned by selection and chance extinction. Though few traces of the radiation may be found in the direct fossil record, exaptations and vestiges are scattered across the living mind. Humans, for instance, display an uncommonly profound synergism between individual consciousness and their embedding cultural heritages, enabling efficient Lamarkian adaptation. (shrink)

Personal freedom, «living as you like», was a cardinal principal of Athens’ democracy and nearly always a daily reality for its citizens. Yet despite Athens’ ideologies and often extraordinary tolerance, what some consider significant violations of freedom also occurred; in particular, the Athenians reportedly prosecuted many intellectuals . All this has raised doubts about personal freedoms at Athens. Did these freedoms exist? Many deny it, including Isaiah Berlin in his famous essays On Liberty. Many modern democracies are guided by the (...) principle of the primacy of the individual over the state, and the paramount importance of protecting individual liberties. But among the Athenians the community came first. The thread linking Athenian violations of their deeply felt democratic ideology of «living as you like» was the priority of community interests. Drunkenness, wasting money, even doubting the gods were not regulated, if no one else was harmed. But the community came first. The Athenians punished those who harmed the polis. Private citizens were left free to live as they wished. (shrink)

468 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 34:3 JULY 1996 right that this distinction need not be a problem for Kant's, or his own, account. Indeed, further discussion of this could be the basis for defending both empirical explanation and a more interpretive or phenomenological understanding of events. But Hudson does not provide this discussion, and without it the "thinkability" of the free agency description is weak. Hudson himself seems uncertain at times as to how much authority to grant to (...) this thinkability. He says, for example, in his Chapter 5 discussion of freedom, that "our first conception of freedom is a causality of reason through which we choose and act on some maxim or law" . Hudson's claim of adequacy for a descrip- tion that does not admit of explanatory certitude demands a more complete defense. This issue highlights, perhaps, the challenges of interpreting.. (shrink)

Evolution is littered with polyphyletic parallelism: many roads lead to functional Romes. We propose consciousness embodies one such example, and represent it here with an equivalence class structure that factors the broad realm of necessary conditions information theoretic realizations of Baars’ global workspace model. The construction suggests many different physiological systems can support rapidly shifting, highly tunable, and even simultaneous temporary assemblages of interacting unconscious cognitive modules. The discovery implies various animal taxa exhibiting behaviors we broadly recognize as conscious are, (...) in fact, expressing different forms of the same underlying phenomenon. The variety of possibilities suggests minds today may be only a small surviving fraction of ancient evolutionary radiations – bush phylogenies of consciousness pruned by selection and chance extinction. Although few traces of the radiations may be found in the fossil record, exaptations and vestiges are scattered across the living mind. (shrink)

Unlike the Senate of Republican Rome, this essay argues that councils were not the dominant or governing power in Greek oligarchies. Together with powerful officials and other powerful individuals, citizen assemblies mainly governed oligarchies, but admission to oligarchic assemblies was restricted by wealth. Before Solon, did the Areopagos Council govern oligarchic Athens? The principal source for this claim, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 2-8, at least assigns the early Areopagos a broad judicial competence. Where did Ath. Pol.’s notion come from, and what (...) is it worth? Although ‘some people’ or ‘most people’ believed that Solon established the Areopagos Council, Ath. Pol. rejected that notion, possibly because along with others, Ath. Pol. and Aristotle thought that Solon founded Athens’ democracy, while for fourth century conservatives the early Areopagos was non-democratic. In part the competence of Ath. Pol.’s pre-Solonian Areopagos derives from and expanded its Solonian competence in Ath. Pol. 8.4, so that for Ath. Pol. democratic Solon will have reduced the Areopagos’ powers. In part it derives from fourth century conservative propaganda. This evidence is inadequate to claim that the Areopagos Council governed oligarchic Athens. (shrink)

In De myst. 1.11–18, Andokides reports a series of four judicial denunciations, made before the Athenians on four separate occasions in 415 B.c., concerning profanations of the Eleusinian Mysteries. After statements from the slave Andromachos and the metic Teukros, ‘a third denunciation followed. The wife of Alkmaionides, who had also been the wife of Damon, a woman named Agariste, made a denunciation that in the house of Charmides beside the Olympieion, Alkibiades, Axiochos and Adeimantos celebrated mysteries. And at this denunciation (...) all these men fled’. A fourth denunciation was made by the slave Lydos. (shrink)

Many readers have suspected that Hegel---in arguing against Kant’s individualistic and critical way of approaching ethics and favoring instead an “ethical life” he associates with custom and habit---is in effect eliminating both individual judgment and any basis for criticism of corrupt or unjust communities. Most specialists reject this view of Hegel’s ethical theory, but they haven’t explained precisely how, on the contrary, ethical life preserves individual judgment and criticism within a new way of thinking about ethics. The goal of this (...) paper is to do that. (shrink)

Many readers have suspected that Hegel---in arguing against Kant’s individualistic and critical way of approaching ethics and favoring instead an “ethical life” he associates with custom and habit---is in effect eliminating both individual judgment and any basis for criticism of corrupt or unjust communities. Most specialists reject this view of Hegel’s ethical theory, but they haven’t explained precisely how, on the contrary, ethical life preserves individual judgment and criticism within a new way of thinking about ethics. The goal of this (...) paper is to do that. (shrink)