Moral Diversity and Moral Responsibility

Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (3):371-389 (2018)
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Abstract

In large, impersonal moral orders many of us wish to maintain good will toward our fellow citizens only if we are reasonably sure they will maintain good will toward us. The mutual maintaining of good will, then, requires that we somehow communicate our intentions to one another. But how do we actually do this? The current paper argues that when we engage in moral responsibility practices—that is, when we express our reactive attitudes by blaming, praising, and resenting—we communicate a desire to maintain good will to those in the community we are imbedded in. Participating in such practices alone will not get the job done, though, for expressions of our reactive attitudes are often what economists call cheap talk. But when we praise and blame in cases of moral diversity, expressions of our reactive attitudes act as costly signals capable of solving our social dilemma.

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Author Profiles

Brian Kogelmann
University of Maryland, College Park
Robert H. Wallace
California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo

Citations of this work

Scepticism about epistemic blame.Tim Smartt - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1813-1828.
Don't Burst My Blame Bubble.Hannah Tierney - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
The Communication Argument and the Pluralist Challenge.Shawn Tinghao Wang - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (5):384-399.

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References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Tyranny of the Ideal: Justice in a Diverse Society.Gerald F. Gaus - 2016 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Moral Grandstanding.Justin Tosi & Brandon Warmke - 2016 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 44 (3):197-217.

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