Hegel: Science of Logic

One is occasionally reminded of Foucault's proclamation in a 1970 interview that "perhaps, one day this century will be known as Deleuzian." Less often is one compelled to update and restart with a supplementary counter-proclamation of the mathematician, David Lindley: "the twenty-first century would be a Bayesian era..." The verb tenses of both are conspicuous. // To critically attend to what is today often feared and demonized, but also revered, deployed, and commonly referred to as algorithm(s), one cannot avoid the (...) mathematical and philosophical legacies of probability. // But attending to these probabilistic or Bayesian legacies must include an undeniable theological legacy in which they remain entangled. // We are not, today, discovering quirky theological metaphors in contemporary technics. It's the other way around. The technologies are mere metaphors of past theologies. (shrink)

This paper looks at dialectical inferences as they relate to Hegel’s modal metaphysics, closely examining the Actuality section of Hegel’s Science of Logic and positing a reading of Hegel’s modal actualism that engages with two strains of secondary commentary. Responding to commentators, we make the case that Hegel’s ‘das Logische’ avoids presupposing possibility’s being prior to actuality insofar as actuality and the derivation of possibility is considered as the in-itselfness of actuality, an implicit inner moment whereby actuality further determines itself. (...) Actuality is immediate yet derived as an identity from the logic of inner and outer. If actuality as immediacy is explicit/outer, then its opposition, its implicitness/innerness, has to be possibility in the logic of modality. In order to conceive of actuality as existence, and particularly as an emerging process, we must already conceive the problem of presupposing an alien form within the logic of actuality. (shrink)

I review Robert Pippin's "Hegel's Realm of Shadows" (University of Chicago Press 2018) for the Hegel Bulletin. A draft can be read on my website (see link below). Or download below. See also the appendix (philpapers link below).

Review of the Palgrave Hegel Handbook. Although the coverage of the volume is wide-ranging, this review focuses mostly on material relevant to Hegel's logic, epistemology, and metaphysics.

What does it mean to be a person? And in what way is this connected to our finitude, i.e. to the properly human aspect of our existence? By analyzing some of the core features of our form of life (personal identity, self-consciousness, freedom, autonomy, responsibility), Michael Quante answers these questions arguing that it is possible to be a person and lead an authentically human life only within social relationships of recognition: only in these relationships, it is possible to know oneself (...) and act autonomously and responsibly. Through a close examination of the philosophies of Fichte and Hegel, on the one hand, and of the most recent debates on analytical ethics, on the other, Quante thus lays the foundations for a pragmatistic anthropology, that is, for a conception focused on the active nature of human existence. The volume is a revised version of the Lectures given by Michael Quante in 2017 at the PhD Course in Philosophy at the University of Padova. (shrink)

One of the strongest arguments that ethical non-cognitivism uses in its own defense is that according to which knowledge and will structure themselves as different “directions of fit”: while knowledge, in order to be correct, implies that the mind has to fit the world, the will, in order to be effective, requires that the world has to fit the mind. Non-cognitivists thus believe that moral judgments are expression of will alone, and not of knowledge, and cannot therefore be considered true (...) or justifiable. At the end of the Science of Logic, in the pages devoted to the idea of the true and the idea of the good, Hegel analyzes in details this kind of argument and shows its groundlessness: for Hegel it is not possible to separate will from knowledge without falling into complex aporias. Aim of the contribution is to shed light on those pages, still little studied today, and thus outline a possible alternative to the non-cognitivist ethical model. (shrink)

The chapter on the Idea of the Good is a very important step in Hegel's Logic. In these pages, the German philosopher analyzes the fundaments of practical rationality through a reflection that today we would call "metaethical": by investigating the nature of the norms and ends that guide will and action in their interaction with reality, Hegel provides the "fundamental grammar" of his practical philosophy. The volume aims to reconstruct Hegel's texts, while showing their possible contributions to the contemporary ethical (...) debate on the problems of realism and cognitivism. (shrink)

The first part of the final section of Hegel's Science of Logic, the section on "The Idea", is titled "Life". Logic being the science of thought for Hegel, this section presents Hegel's account of the form of thought peculiar to thinking about living beings as living. Hegel's full account of this form of thought holds that a living being is (1) a functionally organized totality of members (2) that maintains itself in and through its environment (3) in the manner of (...) some particular species. I develop Hegel's account in critical conversation with Kant's more limited principle, in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, for judging about internally purposive "natural ends" as beings in which every part is both means and end to every other. I argue that Hegel's view rationally develops from attempting to think through Kant's principle, retaining what is valuable in Kant's insights without treating the life sciences with skepticism. (shrink)

This text aims to contrast the metaphysical beginnings of the philosophies of Hegel and Kierkegaard. For this task, the notion of Being Pure of the Hegel of Logic will be used in relation with the concept of Irony that Kierkegaard expresses in his Concept of irony. The need for this "contrast of beginnings" seeks to clarify, from a “metaphysical awakening”, the evident theoretical courtship that has so far distanced by the dominant historiographical traditions of continental philosophy.

Logiikan ja reaalifilosofian suhde on keskeisimpiä Hegelin filosofian herättämiä kysymyksiä. Hegelin mukaan hänen systeeminsä ensimmäinen osa eli logiikka ja toisen ja kolmannen osan muodostava reaalifilosofia vastaavat toisiaan. Hegelin tuotannossa on kuitenkin aineksia monenlaisille tulkinnoille tästä vastaavuudesta. -/- Yleensä ajatellaan, ettei Hegel ei tarjonnut tyydyttävää selitystä logiikan ja reaalifilosofian suhteesta. Jos otamme tämän tulkinnan lähtökohdaksi, on kysyttävä, miltä osin Hegelin lupaama vastaavuus ei toteudu. Toiseksi on kysyttävä vastaavuusvaatimuksen merkitystä Hegelin filosofialle ylipäänsä. Johtaako luopuminen logiikan ja reaalifilosofian vastaavuudesta absoluuttisen idealismin hylkäämiseen?

Features original articles by some of the most distinguished contemporary scholars of Hegel's thought, The most comprehensive collection of Hegel scholarship available in one volume, Examines Hegel's writing in a chronological order, from his very first published works to his very last, Includes chapters on the newly edited lecture series Hegel conducted in the 1820s Book jacket.

In this paper I expose Caligaris and Starostas argument on the logical character of the initial moments in Hegels and Marxs dialectics; I argue that the categories of Marxs theory of labor-value must be read in such a way that value, or substance of value, is taken non-substantially, arising only with the emergence of exchange value, or the value-form; Finally, I attempt to justify this reading from the standpoint of the idea of self-posited presuppositions, as developed by Slavoj Zizek.

This article introduces a cross-cultural comparative study on Hegel’s Western triad of Being-Nothing-Becoming and I-Ching (including Tao-Teh-Ching, TTK)’s Eastern triad of Yin-Yang-I (Change). The study exposes the similarities and differences between the two triads in three aspects: concept, internal motivation, and external manifestation. Results include: (1) Hegel’s “Tao” is not identical to that of the Yin-Yang paradigm; (2) Hegel’s envision of Becoming is intrinsically far away from the essence of I-Ching’s I.

I propose a new reading of Hegel’s discussion of modality in the ‘Actuality’ chapter of the Science of Logic. On this reading, the main purpose of the chapter is a critical engagement with Spinoza’s modal metaphysics. Hegel first reconstructs a rationalist line of thought — corresponding to the cosmological argument for the existence of God — that ultimately leads to Spinozist necessitarianism. He then presents a reductio argument against necessitarianism, contending that as a consequence of necessitarianism, no adequate explanatory accounts (...) of facts about finite reality can be given. (shrink)

What corresponds to the present-day ‘transcendental-pragmatic’ concept of ultimate grounding in Hegel is his claim to absoluteness of the logic. Hegel’s fundamental intuition is that of a ‘backward going grounding’ obtaining the initially unproved presuppositions, thereby ‘wrapping itself into a circle’ – the project of the self-grounding of logic, understood as the self-explication of logic by logical means. Yet this is not about one of the multiple ‘logics’ which as formal constructs cannot claim absoluteness. It is rather a fundamental logic (...) that only makes logical textures possible at all and so owns transcendental character. The non-contradiction-principle is an example for this. Es- sential is that it is ‘under-cover-effcient’ as soon as meaningful concepts are used. Self-explication of the fundamental logic then means explicating its implicit under-cover validity, in fact by means of the fundamental logic itself. As is shown this is the affair of dialectic which thereby is to be understood as ultimate grounding of the fundamental logic. This is analyzed in detail using the example of the being/non-being-dialectic. As is demonstrated each explication step generates a new implicit issue and therewith a new explication-discrepancy inducing an antinomical structure that anew forwards the explication procedure. So this is entirely determined by itself. Decisive for the ultimate grounding argumentation is that thereby an objectively verifyable procedure is found, which is apparently possible only in a Hegelian framework. In contrast the immediate evidence of a speech act claimed by the transcendental-pragmatic position has only private character, which is grounding-theoretically irrelevant. (shrink)

The objective here will be to take the subject (ego) and object (thing) that are held fixed, separate and in opposition to each other by the understanding and explicitly show them to be dialectically related in the dynamical movement of thinking. The dialectical movement of thought was explained by example in the propositional statement, S is P. The movement of the unified Concept as a whole, in which the fixed subject and object are considered as mere moments, constitutes the basic (...) underlying dynamic truth or reality. And the totality of the movements and moments in this dialectical relationship constitute the self-determining Concept. The thinking is involved in this dynamic movement of the Concept is called conceptual thinking. It is left to us to demonstrate that this thinking belongs to the Concept and not to the ego. We can understand this intuitively at this point by realizing that in the dialectical relationship of the propositional form, S is P, the object becomes as fluid and active as the subject or ego. Therefore it is not a mere egoic activity. (shrink)

This article challenges the prevailing interpretations of Hegel's account of the concept "contradiction" in the Science of Logic by arguing that it is concerned with the principle of Hegel's method rather than with the classical law of non-contradiction. I first consider Hegel's Doctrine of Essence in view of Kant's discussion of the concepts of reflection in the first Critique. On this basis, I examine Hegel's account of the logical principles based on the concepts "identity," "opposition," and "contradiction." Finally, I point (...) out how the principle Hegel derives from the concept of contradiction actually informs his own method. (shrink)

George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel has seldom been considered a major figure in the history of logic. His two texts on logic, both called The Science of Logic, both written in Hegel's characteristically dense and obscure language, are often considered more as works of metaphysics than logic. But in this highly readable book, John Burbidge sets out to reclaim Hegel's Science of Logic as logic and to get right at the heart of Hegel's thought. Burbidge examines the way Hegel moves from (...) concept to concept through every chapter of his work, and traces the origins of Hegel's effort to "think through the way thought thinks" to Plato, Kant, and Fichte. Having established the framework of Hegel's logical thought, Burbidge demonstrates how Hegel organized the rest of his system, including the Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of Spirit and his Lectures on World History, Art, Religion and Philosophy. A final section discusses English-language interpretations of Hegel's logic from the nineteenth through twentieth centuries. Burbidge's The Logic of Hegel's 'Logic' is written with an eye to the reader of general interests, avoiding as much as possible the use of Hegel's technical vocabulary. It is an excellent introduction to an otherwise very difficult text, and has recently appeared in an Iranian translation. (shrink)

This book constitutes a major advancement in the study of Hegelian philosophy by offering the first full commentary on the monumental The Science of Logic , Hegel's principal work which informs every other project Hegel ever undertook. The author has devised a system for diagramming every single logical transition that Hegel makes, many of which have never before been explored in English. This reveals a startling organizational subtlety in Hegel's work which heretofore has gone unnoticed. In the course of charting (...) Hegel's logical progress, the author provides a vigorous defence and thorough explication of unparalleled scale and scope. The book covers the entire range of subjects connected with The Science of Logic such as Being, Essence, Measure, Subjectivity and God, showing how Hegel used logic to make transitions from one category to the next. The book also mediates Hegel's confrontation with Kant, whose Critique of Pure Reason is Hegel's major competition in metaphysical systemization. Any student encountering The Science of Logic , perhaps the most difficult and by far the most rewarding of Hegel's philosophical works, will find in Carlson's book an invaluable companion to their study. (shrink)

Hegel's Doctrine of Essence is the central part of his Logic. The Doctrine of Essence is of central importance, since it is a critical description of traditional categories which functions also as the justification of Hegel's speculative understanding of essence. It is the most difficult text he ever penned, and due to his sudden death in 1831, Hegel never got to carry out its planned revision. This study takes an historical approach, giving flesh to Hegel's often forbiddingly abstract argument by (...) seeing it as a confrontation with his predecessors, especially Fichte and Schelling. Finally, the book shies away from an uninformative reiteration of the Logic's dialectical sequences, choosing instead to show how the Doctrine of Essence intersects with some perennial philosophical questions (above all, the relationship between freedom and determinism). (shrink)

This book shows that the repeated announcements of the death of Hegel's philosophical system have been premature. Hegel's Philosophy of Freedom, Reality, and God brings to light accomplishments for which Hegel is seldom given credit: unique arguments for the reality of freedom, for the reality of knowledge, for the irrationality of egoism, and for the compatibility of key insights from traditional theism and naturalistic atheism. The book responds in a systematic manner to many of the major criticisms leveled at Hegel's (...) system, from Feuerbach and Kierkegaard to Heidegger and Charles Taylor. It provides detailed interpretations of Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit, large parts of his indispensable Science of Logic, and important parts of his Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Right. Unlike many academic books on Hegel, this one treats him very much as a 'live' thinker, whom we can learn from today. (shrink)

To criticize a philosopher’s views properly a primary requirement is an accurate understanding of the questions he raises, the problems he acknowledges, and the procedures he follows. In the following study I attempt to identify the specific question of truth which Hegel addresses, the basis of the sort of skepticism posing a serious threat to its resolution, and finally a strategy he adopts. The specific question of truth for Hegel is a question of metaphysical truth or, in the Cartesian terms (...) which Hegel willingly employed, the question of the objectivity of thoughts. The sort of skepticism he has in mind is one which, based on certain purported conditions of human knowing, rejects the possibility of metaphysical truth. While Hegel’s strategy is to analyze those various conditions in an encyclopedic fashion, my concern in this paper is his analysis of the logical conditions of human knowing. (shrink)