In his recent book, the well-known Cypriote scholar K. Hadjioannou comes back to a disputed verse of Nonnus, Dionysiaca 13.432. For a long time the usual text has mentioned two obscure Cypriote heroes, Litros and Lapethos: Κνπριδας δ φλαγγας κσμεε Λτρος γνωρ | εχατης τε Λπηθος. Obviously the second is the legendary eponym of the town of Lapethus . But what are we to say of the first one, Litros? Hitherto the name is unknown, either for a figure or for (...) a city. Nevertheless we know something which is not very different, in the ancient name of Λδρα, Λδρα, previous designation of the modern city of Nicosia, which was for a few centuries the capital of a small kingdom in central Cyprus. Thus, independently, Pierre Chuvin in his study of the geography of Nonnus and the present writer in a detailed discussion of the name of Ledra, etc., both put forward the hypothesis that ‘Λτρος’ is nothing but a light distortion of Λδρος, which could simply be the eponymous hero of the city . As P. Chuvin observes: ‘Les deux formes sont pratiquement homophones: Lapéthos et Lèdros auraient été fabriqués de la même façon’. We thus think that the easy correction here is not misplaced. But now K. Hadjioannou objects that the poet did not allude to the town of Ledra and that the singular κσμεε cannot support two subjects. On the first point I would answer that the poet is not obliged to afford symmetrical allusions, on the second that the verb is here correctly in agreement with the nearest subject . And what does our Cypriote colleague propose? Another kind of correction by which the first hero completely disappears in favour of a new epithet of Lapethos, the text being; κσμεε λνγρς, γνωρ/εχατης τε Λπηθος. The idea is indeed ingenious, but does not convince: the rather negative adjective λνγρς. (shrink)

In this 1999 book Pierre Keller examines the distinctive contributions, and the respective limitations, of Husserl's and Heidegger's approach to fundamental elements of human experience. He shows how their accounts of time, meaning, and personal identity are embedded in important alternative conceptions of how experience may be significant for us, and discusses both how these conceptions are related to each other and how they fit into a wider philosophical context. His sophisticated and accessible account of the phenomenological philosophy of (...) Husserl and the existential phenomenology of Heidegger will be of wide interest to students and specialists in these areas, while analytic philosophers of mind will be interested by the detailed parallels which he draws with a number of concerns of the analytic philosophical tradition. (shrink)

The welfare state has come under severe pressure internationally, partly for the well-known reasons of slowing economic growth and declining confidence in the public sector. According to the influential social theorist Pierre Rosanvallon, however, there is also a deeper and less familiar reason for the crisis of the welfare state. He shows here that a fundamental practical and philosophical justification for traditional welfare policies--that all citizens share equal risks--has been undermined by social and intellectual change. If we wish to (...) achieve the goals of social solidarity and civic equality for which the welfare state was founded, Rosanvallon argues, we must radically rethink social programs. Rosanvallon begins by tracing the history of the welfare state and its founding premise that risks, especially the risks of illness and unemployment, are equally distributed and unpredictable. He shows that this idea has become untenable because of economic diversification and advances in statistical and risk analysis. It is truer than ever before--and far more susceptible to analysis--that some individuals will face much greater risks than others because of their jobs and lifestyle choices. Rosanvallon argues that social policies must be more narrowly targeted. And he draws on evidence from around the world, in particular France and the United States, to show that such programs as unemployment insurance and workfare could better reflect individual needs by, for example, making more explicit use of contracts between the providers and receivers of benefits. His arguments have broad implications for welfare programs everywhere and for our understanding of citizenship in modern democracies and economies. "For more than two decades Pierre Rosanvallon has been analyzing the development and the crisis of the 'welfare state,' combining precise, specific knowledge with philosophical and historical depth in a way that is rare among social policy analysts.... [A] subtle and informed book."--From the foreword by Nathan Glazer. (shrink)

The tuning-fork model of human social cognition, based on the discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) in the ventral premotor cortex of monkeys, involves the four following assumptions: (1) mirroring processes are processes of resonance or simulation. (2) They can be motor or non-motor. (3) Processes of motor mirroring (or action-mirroring), exemplified by the activity of MNs, constitute instances of third-person mindreading, whereby an observer represents the agent's intention. (4) Non-motor mirroring processes enable humans to represent others' emotions. After questioning all (...) four assumptions, I point out that MNs in an observer's brain could not synchronically resonate with MNs in an agent's brain unless they discharged in a single brain in two distinct tasks at different times. Finally, I sketch a conceptualist alternative to the resonance model according to which a brain mechanism active in both the execution and the perception of e.g., the act of grasping is the neural basis of the concept of e.g., grasping. (shrink)

These selections from Le système du monde, the classic ten-volume history of the physical sciences written by the great French physicist Pierre Duhem (1861-1916), focus on cosmology, Duhem's greatest interest. By reconsidering the work of such Arab and Christian scholars as Averroes, Avicenna, Gregory of Rimini, Albert of Saxony, Nicole Oresme, Duns Scotus, and William of Occam, Duhem demonstrated the sophistication of medieval science and cosmology.

Alva Noë’s version of the enactive conception in _Action in Perception_ is an important contribution to the study of visual perception. First, I argue, however, that it is unclear (at best) whether, as the enactivists claim, work on change blindness supports the denial of the existence of detailed visual representations. Second, I elaborate on what Noë calls the ‘puzzle of perceptual presence’. Thirdly, I question the enactivist account of perceptual constancy. Finally, I draw attention to the tensions between enactivism and (...) two trends in cognitive neuroscience: the two-visual systems model of human vision and the theory of internal forward models of action. (shrink)

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1986.

The main objective of this article is to capitalise on many years of research, and of practice, relating to the use of introspection in a research context, and thus to provide an initial outline description of introspection, while developing an introspection of introspection. After a description of the context of this research, I define the institutional conditions which would enable the renewal of introspection as a research methodology. Then I describe three aspects of introspective practice: 1) introspection as a process (...) of becoming aware, theorized through Husserl's model of consciousness modes; 2) introspection as recollection, through the model of retention and awakening in Husserl's theory of memory; 3) the use of universal descriptive categories for the description of all lived experiences, as a guide for skilled practice of introspection in research. Finally I examine the question of the validation of introspective data, suggesting a strong distinction between the ethical criterion and the epistemic criterion of truth. (shrink)

Ce livre a pour objet d’évaluer l’apport de la physique quantique à l’explication du phénomène de la conscience. Après un état des lieux d’ordre sémantique, philosophique et neurobiologique de la question de la relation entre cerveau et conscience, les principaux modèles « classiques » actuels de la conscience sont exposés. Nous montrons que ces modèles laissent en suspens deux questions importantes : a) celle d’expliquer la synchronisation quasi-instantanée de régions éloignées du cerveau qui semble nécessaire à la constitution de percepts (...) conscients; b) celle du fossé explicatif qui existe entre l’expérience subjective, relevant de ce que le sujet est capable de ressentir de façon privée, et la description de ses corrélats neurophysiologiques dans le langage de la science, à la troisième personne – comment ces derniers « donnent-ils lieu » à l’expérience subjective?Les approches quantiques de la conscience plus récentes sont alors exposées de façon détaillée. Nous examinons dans quelle mesure elles peuvent contribuer à répondre à ces questions et proposer une représentation unificatrice intégrant les deux aspects psychique et physiologique du phénomène de conscience. (shrink)

I pursue here three related aims. First, I criticise some of the metaphysical claims made on behalf of the so-called `enactive' approach to visual experience. Secondly, I explain why the enactive view of visual experience is hard to square with the evidence in favour of the two-visual-systems model of human vision. Finally, I explore one possible way to develop the `pre-emptive perception' framework and explain why, contrary to first appearances, some of the fundamental discoveries of brain mechanisms, whose function might (...) be to underlie pre-emptive perception, do not really support the enactive approach to visual experience. (shrink)

Un aphorisme hante la philosophie occidentale. celui d'Héraclite, qui veut que " la Nature aime à se voiler ". Près de vingt-cinq siècles durant, ces quelques petits mots ont successivement signifié: que tout ce qui naît tend à mourir; que la Nature s'enveloppe dans des formes sensibles et dans des mythes; qu'elle cache en elle des vertus occultes ; mais également que l'Etre est originellement dans un état de contraction et de non-déploiement ; ou bien encore qu'il se dévoile en (...) se voilant. Ainsi cet aphorisme aura-t-il servi à expliquer les difficultés de la science de la nature, à justifier l'exégèse allégorique des textes bibliques ou à défendre le paganisme, à critiquer la violence faite à la nature par la technique et la mécanisation du monde, à expliquer enfin l'angoisse qu'inspire à l'homme moderne son être-au-monde. La même formule, illustrée par l'image du voile d'Isis et déployée par Pierre Hadot dans l'histoire de l'Occident, aura justifié, par suite de contresens créateurs, l'attitude prométhéenne - l'homme doit se rendre maître et possesseur de la Nature - comme l'attitude orphique - nul ne peut soulever le voile des mystères de la Nature, sinon le poète et l'artiste. Elle n'aura jamais cessé de tracer des perspectives nouvelles sur la réalité et de révéler les attitudes les plus diverses à l'égard de la Nature. Par là, elle confirme le propos de Nietzsche : " Une bonne sentence est trop dure à la dent du temps et tous les millénaires n'arrivent pas à la consommer, bien qu'elle serve à tout moment de nourriture. ". (shrink)

As a naturalistically inclined philosopher, I reject the thesis that meaning is intrinsically normative. I consider the deflationary proposal that meaning is not normative at all and I find it unacceptable. I argue from the difficulties met by the deflationary proposal in favor of the teleosemantic view that the normativity of meaning arises from biological functions.

There are presently three broad approaches the project of naturalizing intentionality: a purely informational approach (Dretske and Fodor), a purely teleological approach (Millikan and Papineau), and a mixed informationally-based teleological approach (Dretske again). I will argue that the last teleosemantic theory offers the most promising approach. I also think, however, that the most explicit version of a pure teleosemantic theory of content, namely Millikan’s admirable theory, faces a pair of objections. My goal in this paper is to spell out Millikan’s (...) pure teleosemantic theory; then to present two objections; and finally to ask the question whether a teleosemantic framework can be saved from the objections. (shrink)

In our critical review of Doing without Concepts, we argue that although the heterogeneity hypothesis (according to which exemplars, prototypes and theories are natural kinds that should replace ‘concept’) may end fruitless debates in the psychology of concepts, Edouard Machery did not anticipate one consequence of his suggestion: Definitions now acquire a new status as another one of the bodies of information replacing ‘concept’. In order to support our hypothesis, we invoke dual-process models to suggest that prototypes, exemplars and theories (...) are ‘Type 1’ concepts (automatic, implicit) and definitions ‘Type 2’ concepts (controlled, explicit). In the context of this argument, we suggest that one must better distinguish between Type 1 theories (e.g., Bayesian causal nets) and Type 2 theories (e.g., scientific) that explicitly control definitions. (shrink)

Apparue il y a une dizaine d’années dans le vocabulaire des relations internationales, la « diplomatie scientifique » reste mal connue, une erreur fréquente étant de la confondre avec la coopération scientifique internationale. Prenant appui sur des exemples puisés dans l’histoire et dans l’actualité des relations internationales, ce texte peut être lu comme une introduction générale à la diplomatie scientifique. Celle-ci appartient au champ des politiques publiques et recouvre des pratiques variées, identifiées à partir des grands objectifs poursuivis par les (...) États qui s’y engagent : attirer, coopérer, influencer. (shrink)

Apparue il y a une dizaine d’années dans le vocabulaire des relations internationales, la « diplomatie scientifique » reste mal connue, une erreur fréquente étant de la confondre avec la coopération scientifique internationale. Prenant appui sur des exemples puisés dans l’histoire et dans l’actualité des relations internationales, ce texte peut être lu comme une introduction générale à la diplomatie scientifique. Celle-ci appartient au champ des politiques publiques et recouvre des pratiques variées, identifiées à partir des grands objectifs poursuivis par les (...) États qui s’y engagent : attirer, coopérer, influencer. (shrink)

Even though the concept of right is not empirical, Kant does not deduce right in a transcendental manner. If in conformity with the rational principles of transcendental philosophy, we try to understand why this is so, the answer may be found in an analogy with aesthetic reflection. Indeed, aesthetic reflection might contain the transcendental ground of violence in civil society.

Even though the concept of right is not empirical, Kant does not deduce right in a transcendental manner. If in conformity with the rational principles of transcendental philosophy, we try to understand why this is so, the answer may be found in an analogy with aesthetic reflection. Indeed, aesthetic reflection might contain the transcendental ground of violence in civil society.