This paper is intended to link the notion of bon sens with the Greek notion of noûs, that exposes the role played by the first notion in the thought of Pierre Duhem and explains the concept of noûs in the thought of Aristotle. Later, it attempts to carry out the explanation of the link that can have both notions.

Duhem attempted to find a middle way between two positions he regarded as extremes, the conventionalism of Poincaré and the scientific realism of the majority of his scientific colleagues. He argued that conventionalism exaggerated the arbitrariness of scientific formulations, but that belief in atoms and electrons erred in the opposite direction by attributing too much logical force to explanatory theories. The instrumentalist sympathies so apparent in Duhem's writings on the history of astronomy are only partially counterbalanced by his view that (...) science is progressing toward a natural classification of the world. (shrink)

It is widely believed that the development of the general theory of relativity coincided with a shift in Einstein’s philosophy of science from a kind of Machian positivism to a form of scientific realism. This article criticizes that view, arguing that a kind of realism was present from the start but that Einstein was skeptical all along about some of the bolder metaphysical and epistemological claims made on behalf of what we now would call scientific realism. If we read Einstein’s (...) philosophy of science in its proper late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century philosophical context, we find that a kind of Duhemian under determinationist holism and conventionalism was more important to Einstein than either positivism or realism. And, reading his philosophy of science in its proper scientific. (shrink)

Although Pierre Duhem is well known for his conventionalist outlook and, in particular, for his critique of crucial experiments outlined in his thesis on the empirical indeterminacy of theory, he also contributed to the scholarship on the psychological profiles of scientists by revising Pascal’s famous distinction between the subtle mind and the geometric mind. For Duhem, the ideal scientist is the one who combines the defining qualities of both types of intellect. As a physicist, Duhem made important theoretical contributions to (...) the field of thermodynamics as well as to the then-nascent physical chemistry. Due to his rejection of atomism and his unrelenting critique of Maxwell’s electrodynamics, however, in his later years, Duhem’s work was surpassed and abandoned by the dominant tendencies of physics of the time. In this essay, I will discuss whether Duhem himself can be understood through the lens of his own account of the scientist’s psychological profile. More specifically, I examine whether the subtle mind – to which he seems to assign greater cognitive value – in fact plays a key role in Duhem’s critique of the English School, or if his preference for the axiomatic structure of theoretical physics shows a greater affinity with the geometric mind. (shrink)

Die Korrespondenz der beiden Physiker und Wissenschaftshistoriker Ernst Mach und Pierre Duhem ist weitgehend, vielleicht mit Ausnahme nur eines Briefes, erhalten. Neben der Dokumentation dieser historischen Zeugnisse setzt sich der Autor in diesem Aufsatz zum Ziel, die jeweiligen Motive, die Mach resp. Duhem zur Beschäftigung mit Wissenschaftsgeschichte führten und die damit verbundenen Modelle der Wissenschaftsgeschichtsentwicklung beider gegeneinander abzugrenzen. Dazu wurden insb. die in der bisher vorliegenden Sekundärliteratur zu Mach und Duhem überhaupt nicht berücksichtigte Buchbesprechung der Machschen Mechanik durch Duhem sowie (...) die ergänzenden Bemerkungen zu Duhem in späteren Auflagen der Werke und in der Korrespondenz Machs herangezogen, die eine recht detaillierte wechselseitige Kritik ihrer Methodik beinhalten. Den Abschluß meiner Betrachtungen bildet der Versuch einer Sondierung dessen, was in Duhems resp. Machs historischen Betrachtungsweisen über die nicht in Frage stehende Bedeutung als Meilensteine der Wissenschaftsgeschichtsschreibung hinaus noch heute von Relevanz ist.The preserved part of the hitherto unpublished Duhem-Mach correspondence, kept in the Archives de l'Académie des Sciences, Paris, and in the Ernst Mach Institut of the Fraunhofer Society, Freiburg im Breisgau, is documented and commented upon. Biographical, methodological, and philosophical analogies and differences between the points of view of Pierre Duhem and Ernst Mach are discussed, and a critical evaluation is given of their impact as historians of science. (shrink)

From 1873 to 1878, the American physicist Josiah Willard Gibbs offered to the scientific community three great articles that proved to be a milestone for the science of thermodynamics. On the other hand, between 1886 and 1896, the French physicist Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem translated thermodynamics into the language of Lagrange’s analytical mechanics. At the same time, he expanded its scope to include thermal phenomena, electromagnetic phenomena, and all kinds of irreversible processes. Duhem formulated a version of thermodynamics characterized by (...) the conceptual unification of mechanics, physics, and chemistry. Overall, the work of both physicists on thermodynamics is tremendous, full of axioms, theorems, corollaries, proofs, and hundreds of equations. Therefore, it would be a utopian aim to provide a short analysis of their work. Instead, the present study will attempt to give a brief outline of the main tools and concepts used by the two physicists. I will argue that each scientist approaches thermodynamics in a new and unique way, which reveals their scientific styles as reflected in their personalities, the writing styles, their behavior toward publicity, and their inclination for publication. Finally, I will examine the influence of their theories on the development of chemical thermodynamics. (shrink)

The first part of this paper consists of an exposition of the views expressed by Pierre Duhem in his Aim and Structure of Physical Theory concerning the philosophy and historiography of mathematics. The second part provides a critique of these views, pointing to the conclusion that they are in need of reformulation. In the concluding third part, it is suggested that a number of the most important claims made by Duhem concerning physical theory, e.g., those relating to the Newtonian method, (...) the limited falsifiability of theories, and the restricted role of logic, can be meaningfully applied to mathematics. (shrink)

This article provides an overview of the historical and philosophical context from which originated G. Bachelard's concept of "phenomenotechnique". It analyzes why phenomenotechnique is crucial for science studies. By incorporating the concept of phenomenotechnique into Hacking's and Galison's models of science, I argue that we can avoid the radicalism of both while also preventing the analysis of scientific practices from collapsing into the interpretive frames mandated by social constructivists.

Since the revival of historicist philosophy of science in the 1960s many philosophers have acknowledged a debt to Duhem. But Duhem’s opinions are imperfectly understood and, as McMullin has shown in his (1970) and (1979), there are many strands in the current revival of historicism. We consider here Duhem’s views on the role of history in the appraisal of scientific theories. However, there is no single text offering Duhem’s views on the subject; rather, they are revealed during their application to (...) various historical and contemporary cases. Duhem’s most sustained examination of a contemporary case is his critique of Maxwell’s science and scientific methodology.Duhem’s critique of Maxwell is not a set of isolated or incidental dicta, but the expression of Duhem’s mature thought over the last quarter-century of his life, ranging from (at least) 1893 to his death in 1916. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe idea of a special role of the scientist in modern society was proposed by Max Weber in his lecture ‘Science as a Vocation’. Weber saw the scientific community as an entity possessing th...

One of the important challenges in the philosophy of mathematics is to account for the semantics of sentences that express mathematical propositions while simultaneously explaining our access to their contents. This is Benacerraf’s Dilemma. In this dissertation, I argue that cognitive science furnishes new tools by means of which we can make progress on this problem. The foundation of the solution, I argue, must be an ontologically realist, albeit non-platonist, conception of mathematical reality. The semantic portion of the problem can (...) be addressed by accepting a Chomskyan conception of natural languages and a matching internalist, mentalist and nativist view of semantics. A helpful perspective on the epistemic aspect of the puzzle can be gained by translating Kurt G ̈odel’s neo-Kantian conception of the nature of mathematics and its objects into modern, cognitive terms. (shrink)

Discutindo acerca das centenas de detecções de planetas extrassolares, que supostamente aconteceram desde 1989 e que ele considera (incorretamente) como instâncias de observações, Peter Kosso disse, justamente, que segundo os parâmetros de Bas van Fraassen esses objetos celestes seriam observáveis. Ora, tais astros poderiam sem dúvida ser observados diretamente (sem a necessidade de instrumentos), nas condições apropriadas. Mas, acrescenta Kosso, “esse tipo de epistemologia externalista, que permite que a justificação se baseie em informação que não temos a disposição (nós não (...) estamos em condição de ver planetas extrassolares a olho nu [atualmente]), não ajuda a decidir quais particulares afirmações científicas garantem a crença” (Kosso 2006, 225, nota 1). Van Fraassen provavelmente incorre em uma petição de princípio não muito diferente daquelas que ele muitas vezes desmascarou em textos de autores realistas, quando apela para o fato de o objeto detectado ser observável, para atribuir o estatuto de ‘observação’ a uma certa detecção. O ponto é, mais uma vez, entender o que vale como observação, particularmente quando isso envolve o uso de algum instrumento. Endossar aquilo que Otávio Bueno chama de ‘padrão internalista’ parece garantir solidez à qualificação de determinadas ações como observações. Uma das principais consequências dessa adoção é que tal critério, não operando nenhuma distinção relevante entre detecções ‘diretas’ e detecções mediadas por instrumentos, permite que a linha que separa observáveis e inobserváveis seja traçada de maneira diferente de como van Fraassen acredita que deveria ser, abarcando, entre os observáveis, mais (tipos de) entidades do que esse parece estar disposto a admitir. (shrink)