Broadly speaking, an entity has moral status if and only if it or its interest matters morally for its own sake. Some philosophers, who think of moral status in terms of duties and rights owed to an entity, allow that moral status can come in degrees, with only some beings having status of the highest degree – that is, full moral status (FMS). We critically review the competing accounts of what qualifies one for FMS. Some accounts demand cognitive sophistication, which (...) excludes many children, while others are inclusive of children but fail by (a) putting children morally on a par with most animals (experiencing subject of a life), (b) invoking criteria of dubious moral relevance (potentiality, membership in a biological species), or (c) not securing impartial moral status (special relationships). We end with our own account, which attempts to rectify such problems, addressing specifically the moral status of children. (shrink)

This paper argues that self-awareness emerges in organisms whose brains have a sufficiently integrated, complex ability for associative learning and memory. Continual sensory input of information related to the organism leads to the formation of a set of associations that may be termed an organismal “self-image”. After providing the basic mechanistic basis for the emergence of an organismal self-image, this paper proceeds to go through a representative list of behaviors associated with self-awareness, and shows how associative memory and learning, combined (...) with an organismal self-image, leads to the emergence of these various behaviors. This paper also discusses various tautologies that invariably emerge when discussing self-awareness. We continue with various speculations on manipulating self-awareness, and discuss how concepts from set and logic theory may provide a useful set of tools for understanding the emergence of higher cognitive functions in complex organisms. (shrink)

In Ethics and the A Priori Michael Smith discusses two types of claims that invoke the term ‘should.’ The first type invokes the ‘should’ of instrumental reason and the second type invokes the should of full practical reason . I argue that these are not mutually exhaustive categories. There is a third type of should-claim that does not fall into either category, such as when we say to someone who is going to smoke, ‘You should smoke low tar cigarettes.’ This (...) third type of should-claim aims, in a sense, at damage control. By comparing it to shouldFPR-claims, I show that shouldFPR-claims cannot be, contrary to what Smith suggests, even partly based on defects of character such as an agent’s irrational anger. Smith also claims that what I shouldFPR do is determined by the strongest desire my fully rational self would have, where a necessary condition of being fully rational is having no false beliefs and all relevant true beliefs. I point out that on such a view the connection between shouldFPR-claims and criticizability is lost and the connection between shouldFPR-claims and the agent’s abilities is lost. I sketch out an alternative view of shouldFPR-claims that retains these connections and on which the shouldFPR is constrained by the beliefs it is reasonable to require that agent to have. (shrink)

This article discusses what is involved in having full moral status, as opposed to a lesser degree of moral status and surveys different views of the grounds of moral status as well as the arguments for attributing a particular degree of moral status on the basis of those grounds.

Why does a baby who is otherwise cognitively similar to an animal such as a dog nevertheless have a higher moral status? We explain the difference in moral status as follows: the baby can, while a dog cannot, participate as a rearee in what we call “person-rearing relationships,” which can transform metaphysically and evaluatively the baby’s activities. The capacity to engage in these transformed activities has the same type of value as the very capacities (i.e., intellectual or emotional sophistication) that (...) explain unimpaired adult humans’ high moral status. We attempt to extend this account to individuals with severe cognitive impairments. (shrink)

Taste as Experience puts the pleasure of food at the center of human experience. It shows how the sense of taste informs our preferences for and relationship to nature, pushes us toward ethical practices of consumption, and impresses upon us the importance of aesthetics. Eating is often dismissed as a necessary aspect of survival, and our personal enjoyment of food is considered a quirk. Nicola Perullo sees food as the only portion of the world we take in on a (...) daily basis, constituting our first and most significant encounter with the earth. Perullo has long observed people's food practices and has listened to their food experiences. He draws on years of research to explain the complex meanings behind our food choices and the thinking that accompanies our gustatory actions. He also considers our indifference toward food as a force influencing us as much as engagement. For Perullo, taste is value and wisdom. It cannot be reduced to mere chemical or cultural factors but embodies the quality and quantity of our earthly experience. (shrink)

Sometimes physicians lie to third-party payers in order to grant their patients treatment they would otherwise not receive. This strategy, commonly known as gaming the system, is generally condemned for three reasons. First, it may hurt the patient for the sake of whom gaming was intended. Second, it may hurt other patients. Third, it offends contractual and distributive justice. Hence, gaming is considered to be immoral behavior. This article is an attempt to show that, on the contrary, gaming may sometimes (...) be a physician's duty. Under specific circumstances, gaming may be necessary from the viewpoint of the internal morality of medicine. Moreover, the objections against gaming are examples of what we call the idealistic fallacy, that is, the fallacy of passing judgments in a nonideal world according to ideal standards. Hence, the objections are inconclusive. Gaming is sometimes justified, and may even be required in the name of beneficence. (shrink)

Trente et un penseurs, parmi lesquels Jacques Derrida, Françoise Héritier, Edgar Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy, Michel Onfray ou encore Jacques Rancière, pour comprendre les errements et les raisons d'espérer d'une planète convulsée. Dix-neuf entretiens et débats avec les intellectuels les plus engagés dans la réflexion sur le temps présent dressent un état des lieux des questions qui taraudent notre modernité. Issu du Théâtre des idées, cycle de rencontres intellectuelles du Festival d'Avignon (2004-2012), ces dialogues singuliers s'attachent à faire vivre l'esprit critique, (...) cette faculté de juger, de soumettre la réalité sociale, artistique ou politique au tamis du jugement argumenté, qu'il soit sérieux ou ironique, virulent ou tempéré. De très actuelles "résistances intellectuelles" qui esquissent ce que pourrait être un service public des idées, c'est-à-dire un accès direct, libre et partagé à l'intellectualité. (shrink)

We discuss applications of our account of moral status grounded in person-rearing relationships: which individuals have higher moral status or not, and why? We cover three classes of cases: (1) cases involving incomplete realization of the capacity to care, including whether infants or fetuses have this incomplete capacity; (2) cases in which higher moral status rests in part on what is required for the being to flourish; (3) hypothetical cases in which cognitive enhancements could, e.g., help dogs achieve human-like cognitive (...) capacities. We thereby show that our account does not have the counterintuitive implications alleged by DeGrazia and other critics. (shrink)

The debate on animal research has entered a new phase, involving a reevaluation of the moral status of animals, a detailed examination of the biological and philosophical meaning of animal pain and suffering, and a closer examination of the benefits of different types of knowledge. We need a clearer understanding of the ethical issues in animal research to provide the groundwork for public policy.

Si, aujourd'hui, la démocratie fait, encore et toujours, question, peu d'oeuvres comparables à celles de Cornelius Castoriadis (1922-1997) et de Claude Lefort (1924-2010) permettent de circonscrire avec plus de profondeur et de radicalité ce questionnement. Sous les regards de la philosophie, de la sociologie, de l'histoire et de la science politique, cet ouvrage propose d'interroger le travail de réflexion entrepris par ces deux grandes figures de la philosophie politique contemporaine à la fois en commun, dans le cadre de Socialisme ou (...) Barbarie, puis de manière indépendante par la suite. Pour l'essentiel, le travail de Castoriadis et de Lefort aura principalement consisté à redonner sens à la notion de démocratie, que l'on ne doit pas entendre uniquement en tant que régime et institution politique, ou même en tant que réalité sociologique, mais bien plutôt en tant qu'expérience par laquelle les hommes s'emploient à transformer les conditions de leur existence commune. Si les convergences entre ces auteurs sont profondes, des différences se marquent aussi entre une pensée de la démocratie comme auto-institution explicite de la société et une conception de l'agir démocratique soucieuse de mettre avant tout l'accent sur le fait de la division sociale, et suggérant davantage de contester le pouvoir, en revendiquant contre lui des droits, qu'à chercher à en démocratiser l'exercice effectif Pour autant, l'un comme l'autre invitent à envisager la perspective de l'émancipation à la manière d'un processus conflictuel dont il est impossible de connaître le terme et qui n'a d'autre fondement que le désir de liberté. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to address Rorty’s critique of Dewey’s notion of experience and to reaffirm a view in which the call to experience is indispensable for a genuinely contingent philosophy. In the first part, I analyze Rorty’s critique of Dewey and show its inconsistency. In the second part, I draw a comparison between their aesthetic views and argue that a true aesthetic experience must consist in the cultivation and creative transfiguration of situational resistances. In the third part, (...) using Jane Addams as an example, I illustrate how at Hull House the resistances provided by the situation were transfigured into original and meaningful aesthetic experiences that touched people’s lives and allowed for a meaningful and intelligent reconstruction. (shrink)

Cet article est consacré au problème du rapport entre l’entrelacement des genres (συμπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν) et le logos dans le Sophiste. Après avoir brièvement présenté le problème, je discute, dans la première partie, différentes solutions proposées par les commentateurs. Je cherche à montrer qu’aucune de ces solutions n’est pleinement satisfaisante. Dans la deuxième partie, je propose une nouvelle solution au problème de la συμπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν fondée sur une distinction entre deux types de logos, le logos dialectique et le logos (...) doxique. Dans la troisième partie, je cherche à justifier textuellement cette solution en recourant à la fois au texte du Sophiste lui-même et à la dernière partie du Théétète. Dans ma conclusion, je suggère que la distinction entre logos dialectique et logos doxique correspond à une différence qui traverse toute l’œuvre de Platon, à savoir la différence entre connaissance et opinion. / This paper deals with the problem of the συμπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν in the Sophist. In the first part, after a brief presentation of this problem, I discuss different solutions which have been proposed in the recent literature. I try to show that none of them is entirely satisfying. In the second part, I propose and explain a new solution based on a distinction between two types of logos : dialectical logos and doxastic logos. In the third part, I try to justify this solution on the basis of some passages of the Sophist and of the final part of the Theaetetus. To conclude, I suggest that the distinction between dialectical logos and doxasticlogos matches the difference between knowledge and belief made by Plato in his dialogues. (shrink)

"Philosophe polémiste, souvent apostrophé par ses commentateurs, Zénon d'Elée fait l'objet depuis l'antiquité d'un " procès de parole " sans précédent dans l'histoire des idées : Cruel Zénon, Palamède d'Elée, Amphotéroglôsse... Invectives, louanges et blâmes prolifèrent autour de Zénon d'Elée, dessinant en creux la réception d'une pensée atypique, toujours fortement investie. C'est le récit de ce traitement singulier que, de surnom en surnom, ce livre entreprend de retracer.".

On reconnait en Castoriadis l'un des principaux penseurs politiques alternatifs contemporains, toujours actuel. Mais on connaît sans doute moins le lien étroit qui existe entre ses analyses politiques et ses prises de position philosophiques. Or, elles s'éclairent réciproquement. Le refus de subordonner la raison pratique à la raison théorique permet à Castoriadis de penser l'idée de création. Sa rupture avec Marx, auquel il reproche son ontologie déterministe, l'amène à repenser l'émancipation politique et sociale à partir de la notion d'imaginaire créateur. (...) Pour bien comprendre cette notion, il faut la confronter avec les conceptions de l'imagination défendues notamment par la phénoménologie, particulièrement Sartre et Husserl. Elle débouche sur le concept de chaos, dont il ressort que l'action humaine repose sur un désordre pour une part irréductible, ce qui explique qu'on ne puisse fonder celle-ci, pas plus que la démocratie, en référence à une légitimité indiscutable. Cherchant à tisser un lien entre la pensée, l'oeuvre et la vie d'un homme engagé dans son temps, ce livre trace un parcours à travers les thèmes centraux de la pensée philosophique et politique de Castoriadis, qu'il met en rapport avec d'autres approches contemporaines : Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Claude Lefort, Richard Rorty, Vincent Descombes, ou encore Michel Foucault à propos de l'éthique du sujet. Un chapitre est également consacré à la place de l'exil dans la vie et la pensée de Castoriadis. (shrink)

O carte de cugetări, în care se întâlnește tradiția ortodoxă a Răsăritului creștin cu gândirea filosofică occidentală. „Simulez viața, ca să par la fel cu cei ce trăiesc. Îi ascult ce discută, pentru a ști cum discută oamenii. Dar de fiecare dată rămân mut de uimire. De când am început să cred în Dumnezeu am uitat atât de multe încât sunt mai aproape de extratereștri decât de oamenii fără zei, «oamenii naturali», «bunii sălbatici».”.

This work proposes a philosophical analysis of the ideal of authenticity, first by presenting and discussing the works of Charles Taylor and Charles Larmore, then by developing some more personal analysis of conformism and what the author calls experiences of authenticity.

In Plato's Sophist, a mysterious Eleatic Stranger, the main character of the dialogue, undertakes a systematic definition of the philosopher's fiercest rival, the sophist. His hunt for a definition of the sophist, however, is interrupted by an attempt to refute the ontology of Parmenides. The philosophical significance of this refutation and its exact relationship to the sought-after definition remains a matter of great scholarly dispute. This book, by means of a running commentary on the dialogue, argues that the oft-neglected distinction (...) between dialectic and appearances is not only the key to solving this and other exegetical conundrums, but also reveals the unity and originality of Plato's argument in the Sophist. (shrink)

We think we know how to appreciate wine—trained connoisseurs take dainty sips in sterile rooms and provide ratings based on objective knowledge and technical expertise. In Epistenology, Nicola Perullo vigorously challenges this approach, arguing that it is the enjoyment of drinking wine as an active and participatory experience that matters. Perullo argues that wine comes to life not in the abstract space of the professional tasting but in the real world of shared experiences; wines can change in these encounters, (...) and drinkers along with them. Just as a winemaker is not simply a producer but a nurturer, a wine is fully known only through an encounter among a group of drinkers in a specific place and time. Wine is not an object to analyze but an experience to make, creatively opening up new perceptual possibilities for settings, cuisines, and companions. The result of more than twenty years of research and practical engagement, Epistenology presents a new paradigm for the enjoyment of wine and through it a philosophy based on participatory and relational knowledge. This model suggests a profound shift—not knowledge about but with wine. Interweaving philosophical arguments with personal reflections and literary examples, this book is a journey with wine that shows how it makes life more creative and free. (shrink)