This chapter examines naturalistic accounts of mental disorder: accounts that define disorder as biological dysfunction. There are three such accounts: an eliminativist account ; a forward-looking or goal-contribution account and a backward-looking or evolutionary account. I argue first, and contra Szasz, that biological functions can be attributed at a mental level. But our mental architecture might simultaneously support many different ways of attributing function claims, which might undermine a strong naturalism about mental disorder. Second, I argue that Boorse's forward-looking account (...) of disorder as dysfunction is not value-free. Third, I argue that Wakefield's backward-looking account does not accurately map onto our disorder judgments or medical purposes. I conclude that whilst Boorse's forward-looking account of disorder as dysfunction tracks medical usage better than Wakefield's evolutionary account, a truly value-free account of mental disorder cannot be sustained. (shrink)

We read commentaries on our feature article ‘The ethics of consent during labour and birth: episiotomies’1 with gratitude and interest. Nearly all commenting authors agree that consent for in-labour procedures is necessary and ideally given at the point of intervening. Both Shalowitz & Ralston and Stirrat note that this is already required by professional statements and guidelines in the USA2 and UK3, respectively, but also note that practice does not yet conform. The Americans authors helpfully emphasise the importance of multilevel (...) institutional measures for closing this gap, including consent policies and reporting mechanisms, as well as ongoing education.2 The UK writer seconds the role for education within wider shared decision-making and informed choice approaches, and generously commends our paper for close study by all maternity care providers. Others add a cautionary note. Lee applauds all our recommendations, but notes our proposals cannot fully secure autonomy because of, among others, epistemic injustice and other power differentials.4 Kumar-Hazard and Dahlen worry that opt-out consent is equal to substitute decision-making; weakens women’s rights; and is open to abuse.5 Nelson and Clough object to our willlingness to work within a flawed conceptual framework, which ought to be challenged.6 We agree that there are limits to what our proposal can do. It cannot rectify unequal distributions of epistemic credibilities, either in general or in any particular interaction. Risk communication is never neutral;7 “even the most well-meaning healthcare professionals could unwittingly wield influence over birthing women’s …. (shrink)

The policies of the European Union concerning the development of biofuels can be termed a lock-in. Biofuels were initially hailed as a green, sustainability technology. However evidence to the contrary quickly emerged. The European Commission proposed to alter its policies to accommodate for these effects but met with fierce resistance from a considerable number of member states who have an economic interest in these first generation biofuels. In this paper I argue that such a lock-in might have been avoided if (...) an experimental approach to governance had been adopted. Existing approaches such as anticipation and niche management either do not reduce uncertainty sufficiently or fail to explicitly address conflicts between values motivating political and economic support for new technologies. In this paper, I suggest to apply an experimental framework to the development of sustainable biobased technologies. Such an approach builds on insights from adaptive management and transition management in that it has the stimulation of learning effects at its core. I argue that these learning effects should occur on the actual impacts of new technologies, on the institutionalisation of new technologies and most specifically on the norms and values that underly policies supporting new technologies. This approach can be relevant for other emerging technologies. (shrink)

The approach of responsible research and innovation has been proposed to support the introduction of technologies that touch upon socially sensitive issues. RRI is intended to help designers and manufacturers of new technologies identify and accommodate public concerns when developing a new technology by engaging with a wide range of relevant actors in an interactive, transparent process. However what this approach amounts to exactly remains elusive as of yet, i.e. it is unclear what its contribution to the societal embedding of (...) new technologies should consists of exactly. The transition to a sustainable bio-economy that uses biomass as its main resource is a complicated trajectory involving many actors and touching upon societally sensitive issues such as the use of genetic modification. In this paper we pose the question in what way RRI can stimulate the development and diffusion of a sustainable bio-economy in The Netherlands and Europe. We claim that for the further development and diffusion of the bio-economy, trust among actors in the relevant value-chain is a prerequisite. RRI can play a pivotal part in the bio-economy by providing conditions for trustworthiness of actors and by enhancing trusting relationships. This can be achieved through instruments such as personal relationships, third person guarantors, institutions and the communication of values. From the application of RRI to the context of the bio-economy, lessons can be drawn for other socially intricate technological trajectories. (shrink)

Genetic engineering techniques (e.g., CRISPR-Cas) have led to an increase in biotechnological developments, possibly leading to uncertain risks. The European Union aims to anticipate these by embedding the Precautionary Principle in its regulation for risk management. This principle revolves around taking preventive action in the face of uncertainty and provides guidelines to take precautionary measures when dealing with important values such as health or environmental safety. However, when dealing with ‘new’ technologies, it can be hard for risk managers to estimate (...) the societal or environmental consequences of a biotechnology that might arise once introduced or embedded in society due to that these sometimes do not comply with the established norms within risk assessment. When there is insufficient knowledge, stakeholders active in early developmental stages (e.g., researchers) could provide necessary knowledge by conducting research specifically devoted to what these unknown risks could entail. In theory, the Safe-by-Design (SbD) approach could enable such a controlled learning environment to gradually identify what these uncertain risks are, to which we refer as responsible learning. In this paper, we argue that three conditions need to be present to enable such an environment: (1) regulatory flexibility, (2) co-responsibility between researchers and regulators, and (3) openness towards all stakeholders. If one of these conditions would not be present, the SbD approach cannot be implemented to its fullest potential, thereby limiting an environment for responsible learning and possibly leaving current policy behind to anticipate uncertain risks. (shrink)

Engaging civil society actors as knowledgeable dialogue partners in the development and governance of emerging technologies is a new challenge. The starting point of this paper is the observation that the design and orchestration of current organized interaction events shows limitations, particularly in the articulation of issues and in learning how to address the indeterminacies that go with emerging technologies. This paper uses Dewey’s notion of ‘publics’ and ‘reflective inquiry’ to outline ways of doing better and to develop requirements for (...) a more productive involvement of civil society actors. By studying four novel spaces for interaction in the domain of nanotechnology, this paper examines whether and how elements of Dewey’s thought are visible and under what conditions. One of the main findings is that, in our society, special efforts are needed in order for technology developers and civil society actors to engage in a joint inquiry on emerging nanotechnology. Third persons, like social scientists and philosophers, play a role in this respect in addition to external input such as empirically informed scenarios and somewhat protected spaces. (shrink)

AbstractBackgroundEthical challenges constitute an inseparable part of daily decision-making processes in all areas of healthcare. In prehospital emergency medicine, decision-making commonly takes place in everyday life, under time pressure, with limited information about a patient and with few possibilities of consultation with colleagues. This paper explores the ethical challenges experienced by prehospital emergency personnel. MethodsThe study was grounded in the tradition of action research related to interventions in health care. Ethical challenges were explored in three focus groups, each attended by (...) emergency medical technicians, paramedics, and prehospital anaesthesiologists. The participants, 15 in total, were recruited through an internal information network of the emergency services. Focus groups were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim.ResultsThe participants described ethical challenges arising when clinical guidelines, legal requirements, and clinicians’ professional and personal value systems conflicted and complicated decision-making processes. The challenges centred around treatment at the end of life, intoxicated and non-compliant patients, children as patients—and their guardians, and the collaboration with relatives in various capacities. Other challenges concerned guarding the safety of oneself, colleagues and bystanders, prioritising scarce resources, and staying loyal to colleagues with different value systems. Finally, challenges arose when summoned to situations where other professionals had failed to make a decision or take action when attending to patients whose legitimate needs were not met by the appropriate medical or social services, and when working alongside representatives of authorities with different roles, responsibilities and tasks.ConclusionFrom the perspective of the prehospital emergency personnel, ethical challenges arise in three interrelated contexts: when caring for patients, in the prehospital emergency unit, and during external collaboration. Value conflicts may be identified within these contexts as well as across them. A proposed model of analysis integrating the above contexts can assist in shedding light on ethical challenges and value conflicts in other health care settings. The model emphasises that ethical challenges are experienced from a particular professional perspective, in the context of the task at hand, and in a particular, the organisational setting that includes work schedules, medical guidelines, legal requirements, as well as professional and personal value systems. (shrink)

Respect for autonomy is problematic in relation to public health programmes such as vaccination, as the success of such programmes depends on widespread compliance. European countries have different policies for dealing with objectors to vaccination programmes. In some countries compliance is compulsory, while in others objectors are exempted or allowed to enter the programme under specific conditions. In this paper I argue that the objectors should not be treated as a homogenous group as is done in the above-mentioned policies. Objectors (...) have different arguments for not participating in vaccination programmes. Considering the value of respect for autonomy, some but not all of these arguments need to be accommodated by authorities. The concept of 'narrative autonomy' provides criteria to distinguish between tenable and untenable claims to the right to refuse vaccination. Narrative autonomy understands autonomy as essentially linked to identity, as this provides the moral framework with which we assess our first-order preferences. The above-mentioned concept of autonomy is derived from the concept of narrative identity as described by Marya Schechtman. She suggests that the application of the Articulation Constraint and the Reality Constraint enables us to establish the validity of personal narratives. Additionally, form and content features of identity, as proposed by Anthony Laden, will be used as criteria to establish the compatibility of the defectors' arguments with shared scientific and political values. Such compatibility is essential to accommodate respect for autonomy in the context of public health. (shrink)

Is the mammalian embryo/fetus a part of the organism that gestates it? According to the containment view, the fetus is not a part of, but merely contained within or surrounded by, the gestating organism. According to the parthood view, the fetus is a part of the gestating organism. This paper proceeds in two stages. First, I argue that the containment view is the received view; that it is generally assumed without good reason; and that it needs substantial support if it (...) is to be taken seriously. Second, I argue that the parthood view derives considerable support from a range of biological and physiological considerations. I tentatively conclude in favour of the parthood view, and end by identifying some of the interesting questions it raises. (shrink)

A 2017 Nature report was widely touted as hailing the arrival of the artificial womb. But the scientists involved claim their technology is merely an improvement in neonatal care. This raises an under-considered question: what differentiates neonatal incubation from artificial womb technology? Considering the nature of gestation—or metaphysics of pregnancy—(a) identifies more profound differences between fetuses and neonates/babies than their location (in or outside the maternal body) alone: fetuses and neonates have different physiological and physical characteristics; (b) characterizes birth as (...) a physiological, mereological and topological transformation as well as a (morally relevant) change of location; and (c) delivers a clear distinction between neonatal incubation and ectogestation: the former supports neonatal physiology; the latter preserves fetal physiology. This allows a detailed conceptual classification of ectogenetive and ectogestative technologies according to which the 2017 system is not just improved neonatal incubation, but genuine ectogestation. But it is not an artificial womb, which is a term that is better put to rest. The analysis reveals that any ethical discussion involving ectogestation must always involve considerations of possible risks to the mother as well as her autonomy and rights. It also adds a third and potentially important dimension to debates in reproductive ethics: the physiological transition from fetus/gestateling to baby/neonate. (shrink)

Several nation states have reasons to halt the import of genetically modified organisms. The current international trend towards a regime of free trade makes such bans problematic. Whether a nation state is deemed justified in banning a certain product is strongly connected to discussions about what are acceptable criteria for proof of risk. The determination of these criteria hinges upon considerations of individual and national autonomy. This paper compares two different points of view in the debate: the WTO opposed to (...) the UN. A distinction between internal and external autonomy explains the differences in approach between the UN and the WTO. The conclusion is reached that adequate respect for autonomy requires a certain amount of flexibility in the criteria for proof of risk. (shrink)

Alasdair MacIntyre's account of tradition-based rationality has been the subject of much discussion, as well as the object of some recent charges of inconsistency. The author considers arguments by Jennifer Herdt, Peter Mehl, and John Haldane which attempt to show that MacIntyre's account of rationality is, in some way, inconsistent. It is argued that the various charges of inconsistency brought against MacIntyre by these critics can be understood as variations on two general types of criticism: (1) that MacIntyre's account of (...) tradition-based rationality presents a picture of rationality with inconsistent internal elements, and (2) that MacIntyre, in the act of presenting his picture of rationality, makes the sort of claims to which his own account of rationality denies legitimacy, and thus MacIntyre's account is self-referentially incoherent. In response to criticisms of the first sort, it is argued that MacIntyre can further clarify or develop his position to take the current criticisms into account without altering the fundamental aspects of his picture of rationality. In response to the charge of self-referential incoherence, it is argued that the charge rests on a mistaken understanding of MacIntyre's position and of the nature of justification. In dealing with these arguments, the author hopes to not only vindicate MacIntyre's account of rationality against the charges of some of its recent critics, but also to shed some light on the nature of arguments both for and against relativism and historicism. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPrevious work has shown that a stooped posture may activate negative mood. Extending this work, the present experiments examine how stooped body posture influences recovery from pre-existing negative mood. In Experiment 1, participants were randomly assigned to receive either a negative or neutral mood induction, after which participants were instructed to take either a stooped, straight, or control posture while writing down their thoughts. Stooped posture led to less mood recovery in the negative mood condition, and more negative mood in (...) the neutral mood condition. Furthermore, stooped posture led to more negative thoughts overall compared to straight or control postures. In Experiment 2, all participants underwent a negative mood induction, after which half received cognitive reappraisal instructions and half received no instructions. Mood-congruent cognitions were assessed through autobiographical memory recall. Again, stooped position led to less mood recovery. Notably, this was independent of regulation instruction. These findings demonstrate for the first time that posture plays an important role in recovering from negative mood. (shrink)

Technological developments often bring about new risks. Informed consent has been proposed as a means to legitimize the imposition of technological risks. This principle was first introduced in medical practice to assure the autonomy of the patient.The introduction of IC in the field of technological practice raises questions about the comparability of the type of informed consent. To what extent are thepossibilities to include laypeople in making decisions regarding risks similar in the technological field to giving informed consent in the (...) medical field and whatdoes this imply for the design and implementation of IC in the technological field? Medical and the technological practice are clearly alike in that both fieldsare characterized by highly specialized, technical knowledge which can be quite inaccessible to the average layperson. However, a fundamental difference ariseswith regard to the aim, knowledge of risks and exclusiveness of the practices in each field. The differences in aim imply that the necessity for each practice isperceived differently by laypeople, thus leading them to assess the respective risks differently. The differences in knowledge of risks arise from the variabilityin the ways that can be used to describe a given risk. Definition of risk in medical practice is more homogenous in this respect than the risk definition intechnological fields. Futhermore, medical practice tends to be more exclusive, leading laypeople immersed in that practice to necessarily embrace most of thefundamental underlying that practice. These differences result in divergent recommendations for the implementation of informed consent in the technological field, basically: there is a need for more extensive procedure and for less decisive authority for the individual. (shrink)

The literature on health and diseases is usually presented as an opposition between naturalism and normativism. This article argues that such a picture is too simplistic: there is not one opposition between naturalism and normativism, but many. I distinguish four different domains where naturalist and normativist claims can be contrasted: (1) ordinary usage, (2) conceptually clean versions of “health” and “disease,” (3) the operationalization of dysfunction, and (4) the justification for that operationalization. In the process I present new arguments in (...) response to Schwartz (2007) and Hausman (2012) and expose a link between the arguments made by Schwartz (2007) and Kingma (2010). Distinguishing naturalist claims at these four domains will allow us to make progress by (1) providing more nuanced, intermediate positions about a possible role for values in health and disease; and (2) assisting in the addressing of relativistic worries about the value-ladenness of health and disease. (shrink)

Christopher Boorse's Bio Statistical Theory (BST) defines health as the absence of disease, and disease as the adverse departure from normal species functioning. This paper presents a two-pronged problem for this account. First I demonstrate that, in order to accurately account for dynamic physiological functions, Boorse's account of normal function needs to be modified to index functions against situations. I then demonstrate that if functions are indexed against situations, the BST can no longer account for diseases that result from specific (...) environmental factors. The BST is impaled on either horn of this dilemma and therefore must be dismissed. (shrink)

Discussion about a dignified death has almost exclusively been applied to palliative care and people dying of cancer. As populations are getting older in the western world and living with chronic illnesses affecting their everyday lives, it is relevant to broaden the definition of palliative care to include other groups of people. The aim of the study was to explore the views on dignity at the end of life of 12 elderly people living in two nursing homes in Sweden. A (...) hermeneutic approach was used to interpret the material, which was gathered during semi-structured interviews. A total of 39 interviews were transcribed. The analysis revealed three themes: (1) the unrecognizable body; (2) fragility and dependency; and (3) inner strength and a sense of coherence. (shrink)

Cancer screening programmes cause harm to individuals via overdiagnosis and overtreatment, even where they confer population-level benefit. Screening thus appears to violate the principle of non-maleficence, since it entails medically unnecessary harm to individuals. Can consent to screening programmes negate the moral significance of this harm? In therapeutic medical contexts, consent is used as a means of rendering medical harm morally permissible. However, in this paper, I argue that it is unclear that the model of consent used within therapeutic medicine (...) can be applied unproblematically to preventive medicine. Invitation to screening changes the pragmatic norms and expectations of the patient–doctor encounter such that two key principles of consent may be violated. First, the pragmatics of a medical invitation are such that patients may fail to be adequately informed, since patients appear to assume medical invitations are made with their best interests in mind, even where information to the contrary is outlined. Second, screening invitations may place pressure on patients; in the context of a medical encounter, to make an invitation to screening may constitute an inducement to accept. In order to be sure that a patient’s consent to a screening invitation is valid, we must make clear to patients that their decision to accept screening may be shaped not only by how information about screening is presented, but by the pragmatic form of the invitation itself. (shrink)

What is the metaphysical relationship between the fetus/embryo and the pregnant organism? In this paper I apply a substance metaphysics view developed by Barry Smith and Berit Brogaard to argue, on the basis of topological connectedness, that fetuses/embryos are Lady-Parts: part of the maternal organism up until birth. This leaves two options. Either mammalian organisms begin at birth, or we revise our conception of organisms such that mammalian organisms can be part of other mammals. The first option has some advantages: (...) it is numerically neat; aligns with an intuitive picture of organisms as physically distinct individuals; and ties ‘coming into existence’ to a suitably recognisable and important event: birth. But it denies that the fetus survives birth, or that human organisms existed prior to their birth. The second option allows us to recognise that human organisms exist prior to and survive their birth, but at a cost: it leaves the question of when an organism comes into existence unanswered, and demands potentially far-reaching conceptual revision across a range of domains. (shrink)

This article argues that language provides instructions for the interpretive work of the addressee. The result of this interpretive process is the establishment of linguistic meaning. On this assumption, the article aims at explaining how meaning is established on the basis of the category of mood in Spanish. It is often assumed that the meaning of mood in Spanish is explainable in terms of assertion vs. non-assertion. Contrary to this, we shall claim that assertion belongs to the level of subordination. (...) Instead of the assertion theory, it is suggested that mood may be explained with reference to the notion of factuality. This claim is tested by means of an analysis of mood in complementizer phrases. (shrink)

When did we begin to exist? Barry Smith and Berit Brogaard argue that a new human organism comes into existence neither earlier nor later than the moment of gastrulation: 16 days after conception. Several critics have responded that the onset of the organism must happen earlier; closer to conception. This article makes a radically different claim: if we accept Smith and Brogaard’s ontological commitments, then human organisms start, on average, roughly nine months after conception. The main point of contention is (...) whether the fetus is or is not part of the maternal organism. Smith and Brogaard argue that it is not; I demonstrate that it is. This claim in combination with Smith and Brogaard’s own criteria commits to the view that human organisms begin, precisely, at birth. (shrink)

In recent discussions about whether the use of a love pill to enhance love in our romantic relationships is desirable, one argument centres on the question whether this love pill would secure the final value we attribute to love. Sven Nyholm argues that it would not, because one thing we desire for its own sake is to be at the origin of the love others feel for us. In a reply, Hichem Naar argues against Nyholm that a love pill does (...) not need to be incompatible with the final value we attribute to love and that a love pill can have a facilitating role in the creation and sustainment of loving attachment. I think Naar is right but does not address Nyholm's worry completely. I will argue that Naar and Nyholm are speaking of different ends for which the love pill is used as a means, and that whether the love pill would fail or not fail to secure the final value we attribute to love, depends on this particular end. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive overview of current developments in the field of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI). Divided into three parts, the book first presents reflections on the concept of RI from various angles: how did it come about, who is involved and how might in be applied in various contexts, such as the academic environment or in developing countries. The second part discusses the actual application of RRI to technology development: for climate engineering, water management and energy technology (...) along with a general discussion on how to integrate RRI in innovation trajectories. The last part offers a closer look at the application of RRI to the business context. This part offers lessons from comparable concepts such as social and sustainability innovation as well as insights from two case-studies, one in the food sector and the other in data management. As a whole, the book contributes to the ongoing development of the framework of RRI by giving an overview of the state-of-the art research, presenting the lessons learned from several case studies, and showing the way for future application of RI in other fields and cultural contexts, such as industry and developing countries. (shrink)

The United Network for Organ Sharing , the national organisation responsible for transplantable organ distribution in the United States, recently condemned the direct solicitation of organs in situations “where no personal bond exists between the patient and the donor or donor family”.1 UNOS worries that “such appeals, although well-intentioned, compromise the principle of fairness” or worse, “may divert organs from patients with critical need to those who are less ill.”.

Mammals are usually considered unproblematic as biological individuals. This article contends the opposite. Once we consider pregnancy, criteria for biological individuality are not easily applicab...

The point of departure in this article is the Danish debate about democracyin schools. This article presents a first step in a study of how the relationshipbetween democracy and education can be understood. A juxtaposition of thetwo concepts requires, first of all, an analysis of how the concept of democracyis used in the educational debate. In this article three models of democracy areapplied as an analytical framework: a liberal model (Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Rawls,Dworkin), a communitarian model (MacIntyre, Sandel, Nussbaum) and (...) a communicative/deliberativemodel (Walzer, Benhabib, Taylor, Habermas). Numerous contradictions and tensionsbetween concepts of democracy and education can be found in such a juxtaposition,depending on which conception of democracy one chooses to apply. In this articleI discuss which conception affords us the most meaningful concept of democraticteaching. As an introduction, a brief historical overview of the interplay betweendemocracy and education in Danish school is provided. (shrink)

In the unfolding debate on the prospects, challenges and viability of the imminent transition towards a ‘Bio-Based Society’ or ‘Bio-based Economy’—i.e. the replacement of fossil fuels by biomass as a basic resource for the production of energy, materials and food, ‘big’ concepts tend to play an important role, such as, for instance, ‘sustainability’, ‘global justice’ and ‘naturalness’. The latter concept is, perhaps, the most challenging and intriguing one. In public debates concerning biotechnological interactions with the natural environment, the use of (...) terms such as ‘nature’ and ‘naturalness’ is both inevitable and hazardous . Indeed, various conflicting interpretations of naturalness play a role on both sides of the current debate. This paper aims to analyse and critically assess the role of ‘nature-speak’ in the BBS transition. We will begin with a concise overview of the vicissitudes of the nature-concept so far, focussing on how modern science and technology have challenged and affected our understanding of what nature is. Subsequently, we describe how ‘naturalness’ functions in the unfolding BBS debate. Finally, we will focus on a particular case study, namely the production of rubber with the help of natural latex coming from dandelion plants rather than from rubber trees. On the one hand, this is presented as a more natural and nature-friendly way of producing rubber. On the other hand, it is a sophisticated process, involving high technology and primarily focussed on competitiveness on the global market. To what extent or in what sense can dandelion latex be regarded as more natural? And what can we learn from this case study when it comes to addressing naturalness in the broader conceptual and bio-political arena? (shrink)

In, I argued that Boorse's biostatistical theory of health is unable to accommodate diseases that are the normal result of harmful environments. Hausman disagrees: if the BST compares normal dispositional function against the whole population or reference class, rather than against organisms in similar circumstances as I proposed, then my challenge can be avoided. In this paper, I argue that Hausman's response fails: his proposal cannot accommodate a series of common physiological processes, such as sleep and those involved in reproduction. (...) In the course of this argument, I also offer a detailed discussion of the concept of functional efficiency, and reveal a link between the problem of environments and that of reference classes. 1 Introduction2 Kingma on Boorse3 Hausman on Kingma4 Response to Hausman5 Three Possible Replies5.1 Reference classes5.2 Temporary pathologies5.3 Adequacy of function6 Concluding Discussion. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to show that there are many phenomena that pertain to the construction of truth-conditional compounds that follow characteristic patterns, and whose explanation requires appealing to knowledge structures organized in specific ways. We review a number of phenomena, ranging from non-homogenous modification and privative modification to polysemy and co-predication that indicate that knowledge structures do play a role in obtaining truth-conditions. After that, we show that several extant accounts that invoke rich lexical meanings to (...) explain such phenomena face problems related to inflexibility and lack of predictive power. We review different ways in which one might react to such problems as regards lexical meanings: go richer, go moderately richer, go thinner, and go moderately thinner. On the face of it, it looks like moderate positions are unstable, given the apparent lack of a clear cutoff point between the semantic and the conceptual, but also that a very thin view and a very rich view may turn out to be indistinguishable in the long run. As far as we can see, the most pressing open questions concern this last issue: can there be a principled semantic/world knowledge distinction? Where could it be drawn: at some upper level (e.g. enriched qualia structures) or at some basic level (e.g. constraints)? How do parsimony considerations affect these two different approaches? A thin meanings approach postulates intermediate representations whose role is not clear in the interpretive process, while a rich meanings approach to lexical meaning seems to duplicate representations: the same representations that are stored in the lexicon would form part of conceptual representations. Both types of parsimony problems would be solved by assuming a direct relation between word forms and (parts of) conceptual or world knowledge, leading to a view that has been attributed to Chomsky (e.g. by Katz 1980) in which there is just syntax and encyclopedic knowledge. (shrink)

Eberhard Gieseler lehrte von 1874 bis 1914 Physik und Landmaschinenkunde an der Landwirtschaftlichen Akademie Bonn-Poppelsdorf, daneben Meteorologie und Erdbau. Als Erster in Bonn machte er Röntgenaufnahmen, die die Ärzte benutzten. Mit Geschick warb er durch populärwissenschaftliche Vorträge für die Verbreitung physikalischer Kenntnisse, dabei benutzte er wie in seinen Vorlesungen oft selbst erdachte Apparate. Er erfand eine graphische Darstellung, die die Klimaverhältnisse an einem Ort für jeden Tag über einen langen Zeitraum überschaubar macht. Vor allem setzte er sich durch Aufsätze, eigene (...) Erfindungen, wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen und technische Ausbildung der zukünftigen Landwirte für die Einführung und Verbesserung der Landmaschinen in Deutschland ein.Eberhard Gieseler taught physics and agricultural machinery, and also meterorology and earthworks, from 1874 until 1914 at the Landwirtschaftliche Akademie in Bonn-Poppelsdorf. He was the first person in Bonn who made Röntgenograms which were of use to physicians. He strove through popular scientific lectures for the spreading of physical knowledge, often using—as in his academic lectures—apparatus which he had invented himself. He devised a graphical method by means of which the climatic conditions at a location for each day over a long period could be clearly seen. Above all, in his publications, inventions, scientific research, and technical education of future farmers, he advocated the introduction and improvement of agricultural machinery in Germany. (shrink)

This paper critically analyses ‘the paradox of autonomy and consent in maternity care’. It argues that maternity care has certain features that increase the need for explicit attention to, and respect for, both autonomy and rigorous informed consent processes. And, moreover, that the resulting need is considerably greater than in almost all other areas of medicine. These features are as follows: (1) maternity care involves particularly socially sensitive body parts that are regularly implicated in consent‐centred procedures, as well as in (...) unconsented interventions, in ordinary, non‐medical life; and (2) much of maternity care (especially intervening in childbirth) is medically unique, in that it harms one patient (the mother) not primarily for the promotion of her own health but for the benefit of another (the baby). The apt comparison, within medicine, is therefore with non‐therapeutic research and transplantation medicine—both of which have elevated consent requirements characterized by very rigorous consent processes. At the same time—and this delivers the titular paradox—the importance of autonomy and consent in maternity care is at particular risk of being denied or disregarded. Jointly, these considerations make a very strong case for change: attention to and respect for autonomy and consent should be (1) core values; (2) key points of practical attention in the years ahead; and (3) central quality indicators in maternity care. (shrink)

Ectogestation—that is, ‘artificial’ or extramammalian pregnancy—may soon be within technological reach. This confronts us with questions about the correct moral and legal attitude towards the subjects of this technology, which are called ‘gestatelings’. Colgrove argues that gestatelings are a kind of newborn, and consequently should have the same moral and legal protections as newborns. This paper responds that both claims are unsupported by his arguments, which equivocate on two understandings of the term ‘newborn’. Questions about the appropriate moral and legal (...) status of gestatelings are therefore left unanswered, but in the course of attempting to answer them, we are well advised to continue using the term gestateling. (shrink)

Whether it is morally permissible to compel women to undergo a caesarean section is a topic of longstanding debate. Despite plenty of arguments against the moral permissibility of a forced caesarean section, the question keeps cropping up. This paper seeks to scrutinise a particular moral argument in favour of compulsion: the appeal to parental obligation. We present what we take to be a distillation of the basic form of this argument. We then argue that, in the absence of an exhaustive (...) theory of parental obligation, the question of whether a labouring woman is morally obliged to undergo emergency surgery—and especially the further question of it is morally permissible for third parties to compel this—cannot be answered via ready-made theory. We propose that the most viable option for settling both questions is by analogy. We follow earlier writers in presenting an analogous case—that of fathers being compelled to undergo non-consensual invasive surgery to save their children—but expand the analogy by considering objections that appeal to the ownership of the fetus. We offer two lines of response: the parthood view of pregnancy and chimaera dad. We argue that it is clear in the analogous case that compulsion cannot be justified. We also offer this analogy as a useful tool for assessing whether mothers have a moral duty to undergo caesarean sections, both in general and in particular cases, even if such a duty is insufficient to warrant compulsion. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the question of how to argue about morality and ethics in relation to a severe and deadly hereditary disease. It is inspired by the uneasiness I have felt on a number of occasions when “right and wrong” is being discussed by persons at risk, professionals and in particular when discussed by outsiders. This task is not an easy one and the article tries to lay out more groundwork than it arrives at conclusions. Below follows a (...) brief introduction to my framework and some of the concepts that are important for my way of outlining the arguments that follow. Then I take a closer look at genetic knowledge, responsibility and decision making, because these seem to be important issues in my field of study. I have added ignorance to the list in order to discuss a further aspect of dealing with hereditary disease. Interestingly, ignorance (understood both as being ignorant of and ignoring) seems to be commonly applicable to describing persons living at risk for Huntington’s Disease (HD). So what does everyday conduct of life look like from an “ignorance” perspective? And how can we discuss and argue about morality and ethics taking these seemingly diverse ways of living at risk into account? Posing this question, I hope to contribute to new reflections on possibilities and constraints in people’s lives with HD as well as in research and to open up new ways of discussing “right and wrong”. (shrink)

This article is a revised version of a talk given in lieu of the Ph.D. dissertation: "Huntington´s Disease in Everyday Life. Knowledge, Ignorance and Genetic Risk". The dissertation evolves around the analysis of modern living with risk for a late onset genetic disorder. Here, three aspects of everyday lives faced with Huntington´s Disease (HD) are discussed. First, HD is one aspect of everyday living along with a variety of other aspects. The importance of risk is analysed as personal and changing (...) in changing circumstances. Second, genetic knowledge and technology are not solid universals, but situated and changing, and of varying importance in lives at risk. Last, the ethical rationalities of everyday living, research and clinical practice concerned with a hereditary condition are discussed as complex and contradictory in and across structures of social practice. (shrink)

This paper offers a detailed reconstruction of an exhibition about the biggest protest rally of the GDR, which took place on November 4, 1989 in Berlin. Drawing from archival sources, as well as interviews, I will outline the exhibition’s design and the intentions of its creators. Subsequently, I will establish correlations with like‑minded, as well as antagonistic efforts to musealise the events later termed the “peaceful revolution”. Their comparison will allow some conclusions about the becoming of the dominant politics of (...) memory today. By pointing to their gaps and blind spots, I want to advocate a more nuanced memory of this decisive period in German history. (shrink)

Group representations need not reduce to triadic conflict roles, although we infer group membership from them. A conceptual primitive of as one solidary, bounded unity or clique may motivate and facilitate reasoning about cooperative group interactions in context with and without intergroup conflict and may also be necessary for representing which agents would replace one another in a triadic conflict.