Cooperation is fundamentally moderated by the form of relationship between the actors involved, as is normative resource distribution. We argue that possessions are likely treated differently across different types of cooperative relationships. Whereas Boyer's computational model might in principle account for this, the theory would benefit from a specification of how different cooperative contexts can shape the representation of ownership.

Behavioral genetics typically finds that the so-called shared environment contributes little or nothing to explaining within-population variation on most traits. If true, this has important implications for where not to look for good targets of interventions: Namely all things that are within the normal range of variation from one rearing environment to the next in that population.

We applaud Boyer & Petersen for the advancement of an ultimate explanation of the dynamics of folk-economic beliefs and the political actions linked to them. To our mind, however, key inference systems regulating societal interaction and resource distribution evolved for more core relations than those of proportionate exchange, and situational factors are not the only constraints on how such systems produce economic beliefs.

Group representations need not reduce to triadic conflict roles, although we infer group membership from them. A conceptual primitive of as one solidary, bounded unity or clique may motivate and facilitate reasoning about cooperative group interactions in context with and without intergroup conflict and may also be necessary for representing which agents would replace one another in a triadic conflict.