This article looks at the broadest implications of public acceptance of AI. A distinction is drawn between “conscious” belief in a technology, and “organic” belief where the technology is incorporated into an unconscious world model. The extent to which we feel threatened by AI's apparent denial of “spirit” is considered, along with a discussion of how people react to this threat. It is proposed that organic acceptance of AI models would lead to a rebirth of popular spiritual concepts as paradoxical (...) as the “New Age” ideas that have their roots in the theories of physics. Finally the relevance of this speculation is discussed in terms of how it could impinge upon public acceptability of AI technology. (shrink)

German classicist's monumental study of the origins of European thought in Greek literature and philosophy. Brilliant, widely influential. Includes "Homer's View of Man," "The Olympian Gods," "The Rise of the Individual in the Early Greek Lyric," "Pindar's Hymn to Zeus," "Myth and Reality in Greek Tragedy," and "Aristophanes and Aesthetic Criticism.".

English summary: Snell's magnum opus The Discovery of the Mind was in 1946 important for the reorientation of the postwar generation wrote DIE ZEIT upon Bruno Snell's 90th birthday in 1986. His continuously expanded compilations, dealing with studies on the formation of the European spirit by the Greeks, have since been translated into many world languages. Sixty years after their, first publication they have not lost inspiration. For his student Walter Jens, The Discovery of the Mind is the (...) work of a Hellenist, who is also an excellent writer. German description: Snells Hauptwerk Die Entdeckung des Geistes war 1946 wichtig fur die Neuorientierung der Nachkriegsgeneration, befand DIE ZEIT zu Bruno Snells 90. Geburtstag 1986. Seine in diesem Buch zusammengestellten und immer wieder erweiterten Studien zur Entstehung des europaischen Geistes bei den Griechen sind seither in alle Weltsprachen ubersetzt worden. Sie haben auch sechzig Jahre nach ihrer Erstveroffentlichung nichts von ihrer Inspiration verloren. Fur seinen Schuler Walter Jens ist Die Entdeckung des Geistes das Buch eines Grazisten, der ein vorzuglicher Schriftsteller ist. Die hier vorliegende 9. Auflage ist gegenuber der 8. Auflage unverandert. (shrink)

This paper examines the pressures leading two very different Early Modern philosophers, Descartes and Locke, to invoke two ways in which thought is directed at objects. According to both philosophers, I argue, the same idea can simultaneously count as “of” two different objects—in two different senses of the phrase ‘idea of’. One kind of intentional directedness is invoked in answering the question What is it to think that thus-and-so? The other kind is invoked in answering the question What accounts for (...) the success of our proper methods of inquiry? For Descartes as well as Locke, the two kinds of “ofness” come apart as a result of strong rationalist commitments. However, I will suggest that even if we reject such commitments, we go wrong if we assume that a single kind of intentional directedness suffices to address both questions. (shrink)

Surveys Western literature and thought to reveal the evolution of the ideals of sincerity and authenticity.

European thought begins with the Greeks. Scientific and philosophic thinking--the pursuit of truth and the grasping of unchanging principles of life--is a historical development, an achievement; and, as Bruno Snell writes in The Discovery of the Mind, nothing less than a revolution. The Greeks did not take mental resources already at their disposal and merely map out new subjects for discussion and investigation. In poetry, drama, and philosophy they in fact discovered the human mind. The stages in man's gradual (...) understanding of himself are revealed in the course of ancient literature from Homer to Virgil. A rational view of the nature of man slowly established itself in the creations of epic and lyric poetry, tragedy and literary criticism, pre-Socratic thought, and early Greek ethics all the way to the discovery of humanitas and the spiritual landscape of Virgil's Arcadia. The Discovery of the Mind is a landmark work in tracing this evolution of consciousness--one of the distinguishing characteristics of the history of man. (shrink)

A decade in the making, the _Handbook i_s the definitive contemporary exposition of interpersonal psychoanalysis. It provides an authoritative overview of development, psychopathology, and treatment as conceptualized from the interpersonal viewpoint.

This paper contrasts two versions of a pragmatist critique of deflationism about truth. According to the critique, understanding the practice of factual discourse requires understanding a role played in that practice by speakers’ use of the concept of truth. Huw Price takes this role to lie in the expression of attitudes of approval and disapproval toward other speakers’ assertions. Proceeding from Robert Brandom’s analysis of assertion, I defend an alternative account of truth’s role in terms of the acknowledgement and disacknowledgement (...) of communicative authority. I explain why this account fails to yield Price’s key anti-deflationary conclusion, namely that engaging in factual discourse requires holding that false assertions are ipso facto normatively incorrect. (shrink)

Deflationists about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality. I argue that a parallel approach is available in the case of logical consequence. Just as deflationism about truth offers an alternative to accounts of truth's nature in terms of correspondence or justification, deflationism about consequence promises an alternative to model-theoretic or proof-theoretic accounts of consequence's nature. I then (...) argue, against considerations put forward by Field and Beall, that Curry's paradox no more rules out deflationism about consequence than the liar paradox rules out deflationism about truth. (shrink)

Brandom's "inferentialism"—his theory that contentfulness consists in being governed by inferential norms—proves dubiously compatible with his own deflationary approach to intentional objectivity. This is because a deflationist argument, adapted from the case of truth to that of correct inference, undermines the criterion of adequacy Brandom employs in motivating inferentialism. Once that constraint is abandoned, moreover, the very constitutive-explanatory availability of Brandom's inferential norms becomes suspect. Yet Brandom intertwines inferentialism with a separate explanatory project, one that in explaining the pragmatic significance (...) of meaning-attributions does yield a convincing construal of the claim that the concept of meaning is normative. (shrink)

German classicist's monumental study of the origins of European thought in Greek literature and philosophy.

This book, collecting his most important papers in the form in which they were originally published, can be seen as a companion to that one.

The concept of responsibility for health is a significant feature of health discourse and public health policy, but application of the concept is poorly understood. This paper offers an analysis of the concept in two ways. Following an examination of the use of the word ‘responsibility’ in the nursing and wider health literature using three examples, the concept of ‘responsibility for health’ as fulfilling a social function is discussed with reference to policy documents from the UK. The philosophical literature on (...) moral responsibility is introduced, and in considering two versions, reactive attitudes and accountability, it is argued that in application both can be regarded, though with different emphasis, as being constituted in three parts: a responsible agent; having obligations ; and being susceptible to being held responsible if he fails to meet them. The three‐stage model is consistent with the examples of the word responsibility in use, but application to the social function model causes a number of problems for healthcare practice, especially for the reactive attitudes account. Apart from considerable problems in stating what exactly the obligations are and how they can be justified; and how blame might justly be apportioned and by whom, the very ideas of obligation and blame are in conflict within healthcare systems and professional nursing practice which have foundations deeply embedded in the notion of the supremacy of personal autonomy. It is concluded that current application of the concept of responsibility for health is conceptually incoherent, and if it is to retain its place in health policy and discourse, urgent remedy is required. (shrink)

This paper starts by introducing a tripartite conception of responsibility for health consisting of a moral agent having moral responsibilities and being held responsible, that is blamed, for failing to meet them and proceeds to a brief discussion of the nature of the blame, noting difficulties in agency and obligation when the concept is applied to health‐threatening behaviours. Insights about the obligations that we hold people to and the extent of their moral agency are revealed by interrogating our blaming behavior, (...) and to facilitate this, my own blaming attitudes and actions are analysed in respect of an imagined adult son who seeks thrills by jumping from a pier into the sea, an activity common around coastlines and intended to be analogous in varying degrees to a range of health‐threatening behaviours. I consider my responses to this imagined act in relation to some features of moralism, the excess of morality, concluding that blame can be justified when it is proportionate and within interpersonal relationships. There is evidence that some nurses hold negative blaming attitudes towards groups of patients considered to have caused or contributed to their illness, but this is not justified, not only because of impaired agency, but also because if there is responsibility for health, associated obligations are owed to those who share our lives, and it is those people who are entitled to hold individuals responsible. Nurses who hold negative blaming attitudes towards groups of patients are invited to identify the status of moral agency, the precise natures of their (failed) obligations, and of the patient–nurse relationship. It is concluded that reflection on these matters and the difference between justified blame and moralism demonstrates that blaming behaviour in the context of professional health care is built on nothing stronger than prejudice. (shrink)

Huw Price proposes a strategy for dissolving ontological puzzles through a pragmatist account of our conceptual activity. Here I consider the proper place for conceptual content in Price’s pragmatism. Price himself rules out any explanatory role for content, just as he rules out any explanatory role for representational notions such as reference and truth. I argue that the cases are disanalogous and that he offers no good reasons for avoiding explanatory appeal to content. Furthermore, I argue that doing so is (...) incompatible with his pragmatist project. (shrink)

Despite having worked in higher education for over twenty years, I am still, first and foremost, a practicing nurse. My employer requires me to be a nurse and my regulator regards what I do as nursing. My practice is regulated by the Code and informed by nursing ethics. If I am nurse, practicing nursing, does that mean that my students are my patients? This paper considers how the relationship that I have with my students can be informed by the ethics (...) of the nurse/patient relationship. After some initial theoretical preparation concerning argument from analogy, the paper identifies some areas for comparison between the two relationships. Areas of similarity and difference identify two areas of concern: Nurse education and educators regularly engage in coercion and surveillance in an attempt to increase student success, both of which would be considered outside nursing ethics. It is concluded that these coercive practices are not conducive to an environment where character is cultivated. Despite current financial and workforce pressures, nurse lecturers and more especially their managers would do well to return to the professional ethics of nursing to question and guide their practice. (shrink)

The revisionary approach to semantic paradox is commonly thought to have a somewhat uncomfortable corollary, viz. that, on pain of triviality, we cannot affirm that all valid arguments preserve truth (Beall2007, Beall2009, Field2008, Field2009). We show that the standard arguments for this conclusion all break down once (i) the structural rule of contraction is restricted and (ii) how the premises can be aggregated---so that they can be said to jointly entail a given conclusion---is appropriately understood. In addition, we briefly rehearse (...) some reasons for restricting structural contraction. (shrink)

Four real-life dilemma cases collected from Hong Kong managers were included, along with two other cases previously used by Weber (1991), in an instrument designed to assess ethical reasoning capacity. This was completed by 86 part-time post-graduate students, all of whom were managers with at least four years working experience. Respondents'' measured ethical reasoning capacity appeared to be at least as high as comparable samples in the U.S.A. The mean ethical reasoning stage varied between cases. Contrary to expectations, the unfamiliarityper (...) se of a case did not affect ethical reasoning which instead tended toward higher measured stages when issues of public hazard or environmental pollution were introduced, and toward lower measured stages where personal or family finances were at stake. Two methodological points were made signalling the need for caution in research of this kind. First, because of reservations about the adequacy of the standard Kohlbergian model of ethical reasoning development, a scoring guide based on a revised Kohlbergian model of ethical reasoning was used to analyze the replies, rendering comparisons with other samples inexact. Second, the possible phenomenon of quasi Stage Five reasoning renders problematic the identification of true Stage Five ethical reasoning. (shrink)

Projects that challenge students to practice service leadership for civic improvement can address the aim of developing civic-mindedness in undergraduates. We conducted two qualitative studies. First, we investigated the learning experiences of four teams of undergraduate business students, who undertook semester-long course-embedded service-learning projects in partnership with four Hong Kong-based social enterprises. The students described five modes of civic engagement as project purposes, mentioned applying six types of service leadership practice for civic improvement, and described eight types of developmental outcome (...) within the domain of civic-mindedness. Comparisons suggested that besides relational support through training and guidance, empowering infrastructure, opportunities to exercise autonomy, and opportunities to demonstrate competence, three project-related features that varied between projects were important in fostering civic-mindedness. These were direct contact with grassroots-based beneficiaries; the experience of making a tangible difference; and linking the campus with the wider community. A second qualitative study indicated that course-embedded team projects with these features that were undertaken in mixed teams that included freshman and senior year business students fostered civic-mindedness for both categories of student. (shrink)

Based on specific documentary evidence, historian Lionel Jensen reveals how 16th- and 17th-century Western missionaries used translations of the ancient RU ...

This article discusses various metaphorical texts where the authors construct or ‘make up’ their own sources. Such data contrast with the kinds of examples usually found in studies of metaphor, where the source is typically one that is ‘pre-given’. From a discourse perspective, it becomes interesting to ask under what circumstances a speaker/writer would attempt to create a brand new source instead of simply drawing upon pre-existing entities and events. The article shows that constructed sources tend to be used when (...) the goal is the clarification of complex concepts. The complexity of the target concepts means that existing events and entities often lack the right structure that can easily be mapped onto the target, whereas the construction of their own sources allows the authors to have structures that are homologous with that of the target. (shrink)

Can we ever experimentally disentangle phenomenal consciousness from the cognitive accessibility inherent to conscious reports? In this commentary, we suggest that (1) Block's notion of phenomenal consciousness remains intractably entangled with the need to obtain subjective reports about it; and (2) many experimental paradigms suggest that the intuitive notion of a rich but non-reportable phenomenal world is, to a large extent illusory – in a sense that requires clarification.

“Curry’s paradox”, as the term is used by philosophers today, refers to a wide variety of paradoxes of self-reference or circularity that trace their modern ancestry to Curry (1942b) and Löb (1955). The common characteristic of these so-called Curry paradoxes is the way they exploit a notion of implication, entailment or consequence, either in the form of a connective or in the form of a predicate. Curry’s paradox arises in a number of different domains. Like Russell’s paradox, it can take (...) the form of a paradox of set theory or the theory of properties. But it can also take the form of a semantic paradox, closely akin to the Liar paradox. Curry’s paradox differs from both Russell’s paradox and the Liar paradox in that it doesn’t essentially involve the notion of negation. Common truth-theoretic versions involve a sentence that says of itself that if it is true then an arbitrarily chosen claim is true, or—to use a more sinister instance—says of itself that if it is true then every falsity is true. The paradox is that the existence of such a sentence appears to imply the truth of the arbitrarily chosen claim, or—in the more sinister instance—of every falsity. In this entry, we show how the various Curry paradoxes can be constructed, examine the space of available solutions, and explain some ways Curry’s paradox is significant and poses distinctive challenges. (shrink)

Locke's claims about the "inadequacy" of substance-ideas can only be understood once it is recognized that the "sort" represented by such an idea is not wholly determined by the idea's descriptive content. The key to his compromise between classificatory conventionalism and essentialism is his injunction to "perfect" the abstract ideas that serve as "nominal essences." This injunction promotes the pursuit of collections of perceptible qualities that approach ever closer to singling out things that possess some shared explanatory-level constitution. It is (...) in view of this norm regulating natural-historical inquiry that a substance-idea represents a sort for which some such constitution serves as the "real essence," i.e. as that on which all the sort's characteristic "properties" depend. (shrink)

Rejecting structural contraction has been proposed as a strategy for escaping semantic paradoxes. The challenge for its advocates has been to make intuitive sense of how contraction might fail. I offer a way of doing so, based on a “naive” interpretation of the relation between structure and logical vocabulary in a sequent proof system. The naive interpretation of structure motivates the most common way of blaming Curry-style paradoxes on illicit contraction. By contrast, the naive interpretation will not as easily motivate (...) one recent noncontractive approach to the Liar paradox. (shrink)

Each of the three essays constituting the dissertation's body explores a theoretical approach to conceptual content, as well as to particular kinds of concepts. A concluding chapter defends a distinction between two varieties of intentionality. ;Chapter 1 identifies a distinctive model of intentionality in Locke's discussion of our "ideas of the sorts of substances." Properly understood, his doctrine of the "inadequacy" of substance-ideas reveals that the sort represented by such an idea isn't settled by the idea's descriptive content. The key (...) to his compromise between classificatory conventionalism and essentialism is an injunction to "rectify" each substance-idea, one that reflects a norm governing natural-historical inquiry. Interestingly, Locke regards the resulting picture of the natural kinds represented by substance-ideas as compatible with his descriptivist account of how the extensions of substance-names are fixed. ;Chapter 2 examines Gupta and Belnap's theory of "circular concepts," which likewise appeals to a semantic "revision rule." Besides promising to explain semantic paradox when applied to the concept of truth, their theory significantly liberalizes the framework of truth conditional semantics. I criticize the rationale behind that liberalization by investigating the significance attributed to the revision rule, and propose invoking pragmatic ideas to do justice to some of the theory's motivating intuitions. ;Chapter 3 first argues that Brandom's appeal to normatively characterized linguistic practice subserves two approaches to content: one expressivist and the other reductionist. The criterion of adequacy motivating his "inferentialist" reduction of contentfulness, I then argue, is one he should dismiss in view of his deflationism about truth. Moreover, Brandom fails to vindicate the priority of attributions of inferential norms over attributions of propositional content. This criticism doesn't affect the expressivist elucidation of intentional concepts resulting from Brandom's normative-pragmatic description of assertional practice. ;My conclusion draws on this elucidation to defend a distinction prefigured in my construal of Locke as divorcing the aboutness of substance-ideas from assessments of truth. I argue that we should distinguish between a "representational" kind of intentionality whose attribution subserves explanations of successful inductive and explanatory practices, and a "semantic" kind whose attribution makes explicit normative features of the essentially communicative practice of assertion. (shrink)

Although research in ecopsychology commonly identifies the value of spiritual experiences in nature for psychological well-being and environmental behaviour, previous research has not compared the outcomes of these experiences in natural and human-built settings. In the present study, the relationship between self-reported mystical experiences in natural and human-built environments for psychological well-being and environmental behaviour was investigated. A sample of 305 participants completed an amended version of Hood's Mysticism Scale, a measure of psychological well-being, and brief environmental behaviour scale. Correlations (...) indicated that mystical experiences in natural and in human-built environments both significantly predicted psychological well-being, but only mystical experiences in natural settings predicted environmental behaviour. This study suggests that mystical experiences in natural and human-built environments may be related to different outcomes. (shrink)

Abstract:This paper reports a phenomenological sub-study of a larger project investigating the way Hong Kong Chinese staff tackled their own ethical dilemmas at work. A special analysis was conducted of eight dilemma cases arising from a request by a boss or superior authority to do something regarded as ethically wrong. In reports of most such cases, staff expressed feelings of contractual or interpersonally based obligation to obey. They sought to save face and preserve harmony in their relationship with authority by (...) choosing between “little potato” obedience, token obedience, and undercover disobedience. Only where no such obligation existed was face in relation to authority unimportant, and open disobedience chosen. In Kohlbergian terms, ethical reasoning at the conventional stages (three and four) predominated in dilemmas of obedience. Findings imply that if corruption were to originate at the top, codes of conduct recently introduced into Hong Kong may be of limited effect in stalling it. (shrink)

There is a standard objection against purported explanations of how a language L can express the notion of being a true sentence of L. According to this objection, such explanations avoid one paradox (the Liar) only to succumb to another of the same kind. Even if L can contain its own truth predicate, we can identify another notion it cannot express, on pain of contradiction via Liar-like reasoning. This paper seeks to undermine such ‘revenge’ by arguing that it presupposes a (...) dubious assumption about the linguistic expression of concepts. Successful revenge would require that there be a notion other than truth that plays the same role with respect to concept-expression that truth is naturally thought to play before we are confronted with the Liar paradox. (shrink)

According to commitment accounts of assertion, asserting is committing oneself to something’s being the case, where such commitment is understood in terms of norms governing a social practice. I elaborate and compare two version of such accounts, liability accounts (associated with C.S. Peirce) and dialectical norm accounts (associated with Robert Brandom), concluding that the latter are more defensible. I argue that both versions of commitment account possess a potential advantage over rival normative accounts of assertion in that they needn’t presuppose (...) any notion of an assertion’s correctness. Additionally, I show how dialectical norm accounts can explain relations between assertion and truth. After setting forth objections that have been raised against commitment accounts, I argue that responses are available on behalf of dialectical norm accounts. Finally, I propose that a liberalized dialectical norm account can illuminate phenomena sometimes seen as supporting truth relativism. (shrink)

Nursing codes of ethics and conduct are features of professional practice across the world, and in the UK, the regulator has recently consulted on and published a new code. Initially part of a professionalising agenda, nursing codes have recently come to represent a managerialist and disciplinary agenda and nursing can no longer be regarded as a self‐regulating profession. This paper argues that codes of ethics and codes of conduct are significantly different in form and function similar to the difference between (...) ethics and law in everyday life. Some codes successfully integrate these two functions within the same document, while others, principally the UK Code, conflate them resulting in an ambiguous document unable to fulfil its functions effectively. The paper analyses the differences between ethical‐codes and conduct‐codes by discussing titles, authorship, level, scope for disagreement, consequences of transgression, language and finally and possibly most importantly agent‐centeredness. It is argued that conduct‐codes cannot require nurses to be compassionate because compassion involves an emotional response. The concept of kindness provides a plausible alternative for conduct‐codes as it is possible to understand it solely in terms of acts. But if kindness is required in conduct‐codes, investigation and possible censure follows from its absence. Using examples it is argued that there are at last five possible accounts of the absence of kindness. As well as being potentially problematic for disciplinary panels, difficulty in understanding the features of blameworthy absence of kindness may challenge UK nurses who, following a recently introduced revalidation procedure, are required to reflect on their practice in relation to The Code. It is concluded that closer attention to metaethical concerns by code writers will better support the functions of their issuing organisations. (shrink)

: McDowell opposes the view that the intentionality of language and thought remains mysterious unless it can be understood ‘from outside the conceptual order’. While he thinks the demand for such a ‘sideways-on’ understanding can be the result of ‘scientistic prejudice’, he points to Sellars's thought as exhibiting a different source: a distortion of our perspective ‘from within the conceptual order’. The distortion involves a failure on Sellars's part to see how descriptions from within the conceptual order can present expressions (...) and mental acts as related to extra-conceptual objects (a failure in turn explained by his failure to see how such relations could have normative import). In this paper, I argue that Sellars's thought suffers from no such distortion. If that is right, McDowell's examination of Sellars has not uncovered a disorder whose treatment might help relieve the desire for a sideways-on view. (shrink)

According to Gupta and Belnap, the “extensional behavior” of ‘true’ matches that of a circularly defined predicate. Besides promising to explain semantic paradoxicality, their general theory of circular predicates significantly liberalizes the framework of truth-conditional semantics. The authors’ discussions of the rationale behind that liberalization invoke two distinct senses in which a circular predicate’s semantic behavior is explained by a “revision rule” carrying hypothetical information about its extension. Neither attempted explanation succeeds. Their theory may however be modified to employ a (...) relativized notion of extension. The resulting contextualist semantics for ‘true’ construes circularity as a pragmatic phenomenon. (shrink)