In 1938, four years before his death, Collingwood characterized his life as “in the main an attempt to bring about a rapprochement between philosophy and history”. Collingwood's success in this matter has been a subject of much debate. The majority of his critics have argued, following the leadership of T. A. Knox, that the alleged rapprochement was a failure. In the early writings, such as Religion and Philosophy and Speculum Mentis, it is simply obscure. In An Essay on Philosophical Method (...) it emerges more clearly but with a definite bias in favour of philosophy. Sometime between 1936 and 1938, however, Collingwood underwent a radical conversion to the historicist doctrine, typical of the thought of Croce, that philosophy is a branch of history. The result, according to the Knox thesis, was an explicit repudiation, in the Autobiography and An Essay on Metaphysics, of Collingwood's earlier belief in the priority and autonomy of philosophy. (shrink)

"A modern philosopher's profound and eloquent inquiry into the depths of human nature. Rich in insight and immediately relevant to our contemporary world, here is a striking challenge for man to confront the demons within himself."--Back cover.

This work combines two early pamphlets by F. H. Bradley (1846–1924), the foremost philosopher of the British Idealist movement. The first essay, published in 1874, deals with the nature of professional history, and foreshadows some of Bradley's later ideas in metaphysics. He argues that history cannot be subjected to scientific scrutiny because it is not directly available to the senses, meaning that all history writing is inevitably subjective. Though not widely discussed at the time of publication, the pamphlet was influential (...) on historian and philosopher R. G. Collingwood. The second pamphlet is Bradley's critique of Henry Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick was the first to propose the paradox of hedonism, which is the idea in ethics that pleasure can only be acquired indirectly. Published in 1877, this work is divided into three parts, treating Sidgwick's definitions, arguments, and his view of ethical science. (shrink)

One of the central problems in philosophy since Kant has been that of the possibility of a science of human culture. Dilthey, Croce and Collingwood devoted their energies to this task, in an atmosphere marked by an intense hostility between positivists, who represented the tradition of naturalism and historicists, who represented the tradition of humanism. The positivists, led by Comte, Buckle, Mill and Taine, argued for a science of man modelled on the prevailing methods of the natural sciences. Typical of (...) this approach was the attempt by the English historian T. H. Buckle:to accomplish for the history of man something equivalent, or at all events analogous, to what has been effected by other inquiries for the different branches of the natural sciences. (shrink)

(1977). Technology and the crisis of rationality : Reflections on the death and rebirth of dialogue. World Futures: Vol. 15, Ethics and World Order, pp. 261-287.

The essays collected together in this volume originated with a symposium which addressed a variety of issues associated with the publications of Professor W.H. Dray in the philosophy of history. In this expanded version of the original symposium, to which Professor Dray has provided a critical response, a group of prominent philosophers and historians address the central questions posed by contemporary philosophy of history - such as, the logic and methodology of historical explanation, the selection and uses of evidence, the (...) fact/value relationship, the nature of historical causation, the question of conflicting interpretations and their possible resolution, the idea of history as a school of practical wisdom, and the question whether history has any discernable pattern or meaning. These issues are approached from the experience of both historians and philosophers and represent an important increment to the long-standing and continuing debates concerning the nature and aims of the practice and philosophy of history. (shrink)

Although it is generally acknowledged that the coming of age of analytical philosophy of history as a flourishing enterprise in contemporary philosophical circles is due chiefly to the pioneering work of R.G. Collingwood, what Collingwood had to say about history in particular and the scientific study of it has sometimes been obscured by a concern with larger questions, such as whether Collingwood’s writings can be viewed as a single system or as successive but ultimately incompatible attempts at elaborating such a (...) system, whether and to what extent he was an old-fashioned idealist, and whether his thought did or did not undergo a radical conversion from idealism to historicism. In History as Re-Enactment, W. H. Dray attempts to re-examine Collingwood’s philosophy of history with a view to clarifying precisely what his contribution to this field amounts to, and where it fits in Collingwood’s lifelong attempt to achieve a rapprochement between philosophy and history. (shrink)