De Franse schrijver en denker Albert Camus (1913-1960) was een van de voornaamste intellectuele stemmen van de twintigste eeuw. Zijn vertolking van de ervaringen van absurditeit en revolte in essays, romans en toneelstukken vonden brede weerklank in het naoorlogse Europa en daarbuiten. Camus’ scepsis ten aanzien van de grote ideologieën, zijn gevecht met het nihilisme en zijn onvermoeibare verdediging van het leven en de menselijkheid zijn nog altijd voor velen een bron van inspiratie. Dit boek geeft een beknopt overzicht van (...) het leven en de belangrijkste werken van Camus. Maar vooral wordt de ontwikkeling van zijn denken van absurditeit naar revolte geschetst in een historische en literair-wijsgerige context. Daarbij komt ook de vraag naar de overkoepelende eenheid van zijn werk aan bod. (shrink)

Codes of governance have mushroomed in contexts operating under a single, dominant institutional logic, such as publicly listed corporations. These codes act as institutional prescriptions that help spread best practices throughout industries. More recently, in some countries, specific codes have been developed for hybrid organizations that integrate multiple, conflicting institutional logics simultaneously, such as cooperative enterprises. Drawing on an extensive set of qualitative data, we ask how such institutional prescriptions may (fail to) address governance challenges in organizations with multiple, conflicting (...) institutional demands. In doing so, we extend current literature on governance of hybrid organizations, which has so far focused on individual and organizational levels, to include institutional-level strategies. While governance codes are often inspired by deontological ethics to solve issues in a single institutional logic, we find that governance codes for hybrid organizations should not prioritize a single institutional logic, nor follow a deontological approach to improving governance, but should, on a more pragmatist take, remain open to continuous learning. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Śmierć, nieśmiertelność, sens życia. Egzystencjalny wymiar filozofii Ludwiga Wittgensteina [Death, Immortality, the Meaning of Life: The Existential Dimension of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophy], by Ireneusz Ziemiński.

After the unexpected death of Professor Józef Kałuża at the age of 74 on the 26th of July 2003, not only Polish neuropathology but also Polish philosophy of medical investigations lost one of its most renowned minds. Beginning in 1949, Professor Kałuża studied medical sciences for five years at the Medical Faculty of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow. He did his Ph.D. thesis in neuropathology in the Department of Neuropathology of the Polish Academy of Science. In 1962 he received a (...) Rockefeller Foundation scholarship and spent one year at the National Institutes of Health. In 1981 Professor Kaluza was promoted to a tenured professorship in neuropathology. He is the author of more than 110 articles published in medical periodicals and coauthor of many chapters in medical handbooks. (shrink)

Where you have freedom, the meaning of the word increases, where the word is meaningful, you presuppose freedom." Józef Tischner.

After the unexpected death of Professor Józef Kałuża at the age of 74 on the 26th of July 2003, not only Polish neuropathology but also Polish philosophy of medical investigations lost one of its most renowned minds. Beginning in 1949, Professor Kałuża studied medical sciences for five years at the Medical Faculty of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow. He did his Ph.D. thesis in neuropathology in the Department of Neuropathology of the Polish Academy of Science. In 1962 he received a (...) Rockefeller Foundation scholarship and spent one year at the National Institutes of Health. In 1981 Professor Kaluza was promoted to a tenured professorship in neuropathology. He is the author of more than 110 articles published in medical periodicals and coauthor of many chapters in medical handbooks. (shrink)

The problem of history in Nietzsche’s second Unfashionable Observation is best approached through that which it is supposed to serve: life, more specifically human life. I argue that Nietzsche presents an oblique but nevertheless complete articulation of the nature of the human soul as consisting of two basic parts, of desiring (the unhistorical) and memory (the historical): of a multiplicity of desires that struggle for domination over the others, and which express themselves in more complex ways through memory-based structures such (...) as conscience. I then discuss some implications of this conception. First, I interpret the significance of the useful kinds of history: rather than being different modes of historical science, they are much more basic modes of practical relating to the matters of our world (especially to other humans and their ways of life) that are external to us both temporally and spatially. Second, I discuss the particular kinds of desires which underpin the three useful kinds of history. Third, I interpret the problem of scientific history as arising from a turning of the normal human structures of meaningfulness against themselves, and as resulting in two specific kinds of psychic damage: to our capacity for growth and self-cultivation, and to our will to do so at all. Finally, I show the importance of the erotic-historic soul for the questions of right and wrong methods of self-knowledge and for the meaning of the imperative “sei du selbst!” that we find in Schopenhauer as Educator. (shrink)

In relation to material reality only direct perception as sensual perception gives unbiased, reliable cognisance. Therefore, this cognisance is irremovably receptive. A subject does not add anything of himself to the object. Thinking does not play any role in such a cognisance, because object is before any thinking. According to Jacobi sensual cognisance consists of this what is given, a certain perceived content, and of a feeling assuring the existence of what is given, e.g. a belief. These two elements are (...) inseparable. A foundation of this approach has been prepared for Jacobi by Thomas Reid, however, it was finalised thanks to critical reference to David Hume concerning that second, not perceptive element of cognisance. (shrink)

Part One of the ERDs addresses the balance Catholic health care institutions must strike between their mission to carry out the healing ministry of Christ and the demands of the US health care system. Divided into two sections, the commentary begins by proposing revisions to the Part One introduction focusing on enhanced application of Catholic social teaching principles and a renewed call for robust conscience and religious liberty protections. It then proposes additions to the Part One directives designed to help (...) Catholic health care respond with integrity to the many contemporarychallenges it faces, and to more full live out its mission and identity. (shrink)

The biblical book of Job contains more extensive discussion of the cosmos and God’s role in it than any other book in the Bible with the possible exception of Psalms. The main issue of the book is God’s justice towards the sorely tried protagonist, Job. The major distinction between the book of Job and the thinking of the general ancient Near Eastern culture is the role of God’s justice and wisdom in the operations of the cosmos. This paper will focus (...) on the key passages about the cosmos in Job in order to define the specific message of the book concerning the relations of God and men to the world, and determine how the book of Job views a control of the world in the overall context of the book. First, we will consider the context and structure of the book. Then the passages about the cosmos and creation themselves will be summarized in an attempt to determine what they are communicating, especially in regard to God’s control of the world. Finally, we will draw conclusions about the overall role that biblical creation imagery plays in the drama of Job. (shrink)

This comparative essay about two kinds of interpersonal-centric humanism is dedicated to the memory of professor Janusz Kuczyński and his conception of dialogical universalism as a metaphilosophy, and shows Immanuel Kant’s thought as a ceaseless source of inspiration for all anti-conservatives and universalists. Kant’s philosophy gave man an unforgettable sense of freedom, because it not only posed the imperative of building a pan-human community of all rational beings, but also revealed the above-natural sense of the human species’ imposition of purposefulness (...) upon itself, and the realisation of this purposefulness in the form of a republican federation of free states dedicated to co-creating eternal peace. Kantian ethics did not reach beyond the obligations people had towards one another, hence it was functionally anthropological and uninfluenced by religion, which re-situated philosophy with regard to scientific cognition and religious experience, giving rise to a metaphysics of anthropological responsibility for the condition of the spiritual freedom this ethic propounded. Kant revealed the existence of a metaphysical difference in the sphere of being—between the determinism of nature and the moral kingdom of freedom—without direct reference to the transcendental source of these two essentially different worlds. Kant was the first to set morality rooted in the autonomy and unanimous will of all rational beings—or true humanity—against legal and religious legalism. Kant laid weight on the processual character of man’s self-education to social life through the sense of commitment to self-improvement for the benefit of the solidary co-existence of all rational beings that he developed in himself as a rational being. Thus created freedom is founded on the selflesness of goodness and represents a new quality of being that only manifests itself and evolves in community, interpersonalcentrically. It is a universalistic approach capable of gradually neutralising the human inclination towards radical evil.My attempt to compare these two interpersonalcentric humanism conceptions aims to add some substance to this very delicate element in Kuczyński’s universalism as a metaphilosophy construct. (shrink)

I argue that on Aristotle’s account practical thinking is thinking whose origin (archē) is a desire that has as its object the very thing that one reasons about how to promote. This feature distinguishes practical from productive reasoning since in the latter the desire that initiates it is not (unless incidentally) a desire for the object that one productively reasons about. The feature has several interesting consequences: (a) there is only a contingent relationship between the desire that one practically reasons (...) about how to satisfy and the action one decides on; (b) practical thinking and action cannot be separated from the agent, whereas productive thinking and production can be outsourced to someone else. The view has consequences also for the distinction between action and production. Finally, I illustrate the usefulness and correctness of my account of practical thinking by using it to shed new light on Aristotle’s claim that the virtuous agent must decide on her virtuous actions ‘for themselves’. (shrink)

The unique value of Mickiewicz’s “Vision” is its included image of the structure of the supernatural order. The poet described is as an infinite, continually spreading space, spherical in shape and filled with a luminous divine element penetrating everything most easily, in the middle of which there is an eternally sinking well that emits out that element. The well emitting the luminous transparent matter is God Himself. Contrary to Christian dogmas He is obviously de-anthropomorphised but not de-animated, as also in (...) that form He means the source of life and love. In ecstasy, the experiencing individual adopted godly attributes: he united with the material-spiritual being that continually came out of God, and he found himself in the centre of the universe where he was given the ability of receiving all its movements and signals, and at the same time — the privilege of being everywhere. According to Mickiewicz’s “Vision”, eternal life has an active and creative nature - it is characterised by supply of the animating love element, endless development and growth, the grace of eternal watching the transcendental reality, excellent contact with Creator, and the gift of creation. The second fragment of the “Vision” reveals valuable information on the nature of extrasensory perception. It is absolute, free from any difficulties, prompt and insensible; it is perfect perception. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the widely held view that Aristotle's vicious agent is a principled follower of a wrong conception of the good whose soul, just like the soul of the virtuous agent, is marked by harmony between his reason and non-rational desires is an exegetical mistake. Rather, Aristotle holds – consistently and throughout the Nicomachean Ethics – that the vicious agent lacks any real principles of action and that his soul lacks unity and harmony even more than (...) the soul of the uncontrolled agent. (shrink)

This book consists of the edited proceedings of a debate among Jurgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, and Leszek Kolakowski that was held in Warsaw in May of 1995. It includes also commentary from those in attendance, including extensive remarks by Ernest Gellner. The debate marked the fortieth anniversary of the foundation of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, and focussed primarily on topics related to historicism and cultural relativism.

The paper defends three claims about Aristotle’s theory of uncontrolled actions (akrasia) in NE 7.3. First, I argue that the first part of NE 7.3 contains the description of the overall state of mind of the agent while she acts without control. Aristotle’s solution to the problem of uncontrolled action lies in the analogy between the uncontrolled agent and people who are drunk, mad, or asleep. This analogy is interpreted as meaning that the uncontrolled agent, while acting without control, is (...) still in possession of her knowledge but she is unable to use it as knowledge due to the temporary disablement of her reason by appetite. Due to this disablement, the uncontrolled agent is temporarily unable to be motivated to act by her knowledge and acts merely on her appetite. Second, I argue that the second part of NE 7.3 provides an analysis of the particular mental state from which the uncontrolled action issues. Its central passage is a description of the uncontrolled agent’s state of mind before the uncontrolled action and not, as it has been traditionally understood, a description of her state of mind during the uncontrolled action. Third, I argue that, on Aristotle’s view, the transition from the state before the uncontrolled action to the state in which the agent already acts without control does not involve any psychological state that would constitute the agent’s choice to abandon her decision and give in to her desires but proceeds on a purely physiological level. (shrink)

I defend two main theses. First, I argue that Aristotle’s account of voluntary action focuses on the conditions under which one is the cause of one’s actions in virtue of being (qua) the individual one is. Aristotle contrasts voluntary action not only with involuntary action but also with cases in which one acts (or does something) due to one’s nature (for example, in virtue of being a member of a certain species) rather than due to one’s own desires (i.e. qua (...) individual). An action can be attributed to one qua individual in two distinct ways depending on whether one is a rational or a non-rational animal. One is responsible for one’s action in both cases, but only in the former case is one also responsible for being the sort of individual that performs it. Aristotle also distinguishes two ways in which an action can be compelled while still being an action of the agent. In the first case, one is compelled by (physically) external forces or circumstances to act against one’s internal impulse. In the second case, one is compelled to act on (internal) impulses that are fixed by one’s nature against one’s own individual impulse. This latter kind of compelled action is only possible in the case of rational agents. Secondly, I argue that Aristotle’s conception of what it is to be a cause of an action inevitably brings in certain normative features which support evaluative judgments and the practice of praise and blame. On Aristotle’s view, any goal-directed behavior that is properly attributable to an individual is (normally) subject to standards that pertain to behavior of that sort. At the most basic level, these standards establish what counts as a successful realization of the goal that one aims at. Thus even in the case of non-rational animals (or children), one can judge the success of what they are doing and encourage (or discourage) similar behavior by praise or blame. These standards are applicable to one’s conduct simply insofar as one is the controlling origin (or efficient cause) of one’s action qua individual. In the case of rational agents the practice of praise and blame can involve a further normative layer since they can be praised or blamed not only for acting in a certain way so as to encourage or discourage them with a view to the future, but also for being – and having become – individuals of a certain sort. Nevertheless, the applicability of such evaluative judgments and of praise and blame is still warranted by one’s being the controlling origin of one’s actions qua the individual one is (in this case, qua rational individual). (shrink)

: This paper provides an analysis of the first decade of bioethics development in Slovakia (1990-1999), together with an overview of the most important bioethical issues entering the scene of public debate and scholarly ethical analysis.

Auf die im Jahre 1938 entwickelte allgemeine Gleichung derMendel Gesetze bezugnehmend, die die Vererbung als Ausdruck desNewtonschen Binoms hält, sucht der Verfasser dieselbe auf die Geschlechtsvererbung anzuwenden, indem er, sich des transformiertenPascal'schen arithmetischen Dreiecks bedienend, zum Schluss kommt, dass die ungeschlechtliche Vermehrung, vom rein biometrischen Standpunkt aus betrachtet, als Beispiel der Zero-Potenz in dem Kreuzungsrange angesehen werden könnte, d.h. eine komplette Konsolidierung und Homozygotie, bei alledem vielleicht sekundär aus der früher durchgemachten geschlechtlichen Vermehrung entstanden, darstellte.Die geschlechtliche Vermehrung müsste sodann etwa (...) für ein Beispiel des Binoms, wenn auch von nicht reiner, aber deformierter oder verkümmerter Form, von einer Kreuzungspotenzn=1 angesehen werden, und zwar vom Typus .Zudem wird ein weiterer Versuch gemacht, von demselben Standpunkt aus, auch einige kompliziertere Geschlechtserscheinungen zu analysieren, wie die des Geschlechtspolymorphismus , des Hermaphroditismus , so wie auch die oft in den natürlichen Populationen beobachtbaren Verschiebungen in der üblichen Zahlproportion 1 ∶ 1 der Geschlechter .In relation to the general equation of the laws ofMendel, given by the author in 1938, as forming the expression ofNewton's binomial, the author analyses the possibilities of application of this equation to the phenomena of sex inheritance and, while usingPascal's transformed arithmetical triangle, comes to the conclusion that the asexual propagation might be taken, from the purely biometrical point of view, as an instance of Zero-power of the crosses, which would mean a complete consolidation or homozygoty of germ material, acquired, it is true, as a secondary achievement from the previous sexual propagation.The latter, again, ought to be considered as an instance ofNewton's binomial of the cross power ofn=1 of a rather irregular, disfigured type of .Then, the author is making an attempt of analysing, from this point of view, a few more complicated cases from this field of inquiry, such as sexual polymorphism , hermaphroditism and finally the fluctuations in the number proportions of sexes, found in natural populations. (shrink)

Gegenüber den Ansichten vonJ. Gross , der den Mendelismus für die Stütze der selektionsdarwinistischen Evolutionserklärung halten will, stellt der Verfasser die Argumente zusammen, die beweisen können, dass, im- Grunde genommen, beide Lehren identifiziert sein sollten, da sie mit gleichem Begriffe der allerkleinsten, von einander unabhängigen, hauptsächlich äusserlichen, unbestimmten und meistens nur geringere Lebensbedeutung zeigenden Varianten operieren, deren Ursachen, nachDarwin, öfters unbekannt, das Entstehen sogar zufällig bleiben, d.h. dass sie vollständig den Regeln der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung unterworfen sein müssen, was-im Mendelismus – gleichfalls (...) in dem freien Zusammentreffen und dem Kombinieren der mendelnden Merkmale sein Ausdruck findet, was inbezug auf die sich abspielenden Interaktionen der Genallele, und zwar in Folgte der Anteilnahme von immer zwei Elternseiten, mit allgemeiner Gleichung desNewtonschen Binoms ausgedruckt werden kann, wie das der Verfasser im Jahre 1938 entwickelte.Der alte Vorwurf somit, der seit langem dem Darwinismus gemacht wurde, es habe eine allzugrosse Bedeutung den zufälligen Variationen beigemessen, sollte, im Grunde genommen, von dem Standpunkte der Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie für ein Argument zugunsten ebengleich des Darwinismus, als des Mendelismus angeführt werden. Umso mehr, wenn es gelingen könnte die Ansicht vonTh. H. Morgan zu bestätigen, dass die Entwickelung eines jeden beliebigen Merkmals, bloss kraft seines Anwachsens, die Chancen für die weitere Entwickelung desselben in der eingenom-. menen Richtung vergrössert.Zugleich wird jedoch ein deutlicher Vorbehalt gemacht, dass die erschlossene Identifizierung einstweilen nur die microevolutiven Vorgänge betreffen könnte, keineswegs aber die natürliche Zuchtwahllehre, die vor allem die Dynamik der Populationsänderungen behandelt.En s'opposant aux points de vue exprimés parJ. Gross que la doctrine mendélienne aurait pu être considérée comme le support de celle du sélectionisme darwinien, l'auteur avance des preuves que tous les deux devraient au fond s'identifier, parce qu'elles basent leurs déductions sur les variantes minimes, en majeure partie concernant les traits extérieurs, très souvent d'une importance vitale insignifiante, en même temps peu définies et réciproquement indépendantes, l'origine desquelles, selonDarwin, reste d'ordinaire inconnue, l'apparition même étant imprévue et fortuite, ce qui signifie, qu'elles doivent être assujetties complètement aux règles, requisitions et conséquences de la théorie de probabilité, tandis que dans le mendélisme la même chose se manifeste également dans les associations en majeure partie libres et indépendantes des caractères semblables, qui représentent les interactions combinatoires géniques entre les paires allélomorphiques, qui grâce à la participation de pas plus que deux partenaires parentals s'expriment dans une équation générale du binôme newtonien .De cette manière, l'objection faite jadis contre la doctrine darwinienne d'avoir assigné un poids trop grand au hasard des variations indéfinies, doit être au fond considérée, au point de vue de la théorie de probabilité, plutôt comme l'argument de l'appui en faveur de cette doctrine, aussi bien naturellement que du mendélisme même, lui aussi étant une expression de cette théorie. Cela d'autant plus s'il était possible de confirmer les idées deTh. H. Morgan , selon lequel le développement d'un trait quelconque, une fois commencé, acquiert, par la seule apparition, plus de chances pour son progrès consécutif dans le même endroit.Néanmoins, toute réserve est prise par l'auteur au fait, que cette identification déduite ne saurait être attribuée pour le moment du moins, qu'aux phénomènes microévolutifs et qu'elle ne pourrait jamais être appliquée à la théorie de la sélection naturelle, cette denière concernant avant tout les facteurs impliqués dans la dynamique des changements quantitatifs des populations. (shrink)

Oogenesis being performed in the ovary shows two different kinds of nuclei in the nursing cells. The above mentioned nuclei are transferred and incorporated into the nuclei of developing eggs, which become sexually differentiated and showWolanski's methyl-green reaction. The sex determination is, therefore, cytologically progamic and genotypical. The spawned eggs in the jelly strings appear first of identical shape and are all coated from the very beginning with grainy bonellian pigment, but afterwards, being reared in free water cultures in the (...) absence of females, they differentiate into distinctly different male and female larvae. The numerical ratio of the sexually differentiated larvae is discussed. The true chromosomes in gamogenesis as well as in somatic cells have not been found. L'oogénèse qui a lieu dans l'ovaire montre deux sortes de noyaux dans les cellules nourricières. Les noyaux mentionnés ci-dessus sont transportés dans les noyaux des ovules en voie de développement qui se différencient sexuellement et montrent la réaction deWolanski au vert de méthyle. Le déterminisme du sexe est, par conséquent progamique et génotypique, du point de vue cytologique. Les ovules déposés en gelée sont d'abord de forme identique et sont tous recouverts, dès le début, du pigment granulé de boneliéne, mais, élevés par la suite, dans des cultures en eau courante, en l'absence des femelles, ils se différencient distinctement en larves mâles et femelles. La proportion numérique des larves différenciées sexuellement est discutée. Dans la gamétogénèse, comme dans les cellules somatiques, les vrais chromosomes restent introuvables. Während der Oogenese, die sich im Eierstock abspielt, zeigen sich zwei differente Kerntypen in den Nährzellen. Diese Kerne werden allmählich in die Kerne des sich entwickelnden Eies übertragen und dort inkorporiert. Das Ei wird dadurch geschlechtlich differenziert und zeigt dann dieWolanski's Methyl-grün Reaktion. Die sexuelle Determination ist somit progam und genotypic. Die in schnurartigen Gallerten abgelegten Eier sind am Beginn von gleicher Form und Grösse, so wie von Anfang an mit Körnchen des Pigmentes Bonellein bekleidet. In freien Wasserkulturen,ohne Weibchen, entwickeln sie sich in deutlich differenzierte männliche und weibliche Larven. Das numerische Verhältniss der geschlechtlich differenten Larven wird diskutiert. Echte Chromosomen sind weder bei der Gamogenese noch in somatischen Zellen gefunden worden. (shrink)

Gegenüber den Ansichten vonCharles Richet , sowie auch die gegensätzliche, die von E.Meyerson , bei Seite lassend, hebt der Verfasser hervor, dass gerade auf dem Gebiete der Biologie vollständig identische Gebilde, Merkmale oder Erscheinungen, so zu sagen mit mathematischer Notwendigkeit, auftreten müssen, falls die Verterbung der Merkmale, die sich auf dem Wege der geschlechtlichen Fortpflanzung abspielt und derMendel-Gesetzen unterworfen ist, auf das Verfahren desNewton'schen Binoms zurückzuführen ist. Die entwickelte Reihe dieses letzteren — in deren Gliedern vertreten — stellt dann ein (...) zusammengesetztes Beispiel einer eigenartigen biologischen Multiplizierung dar, die die Entstehung der natürlichen homogenen Gruppen von sogenannten Binomionen verursacht.Jede einzelne derselben setz sich bekanntlich aus vollständig identischen Individuen zusammen, die in durch die binomische Regel festgesetzten, genau bestimmten Häufigkeiten auftreten und lauter aus dem Verfahren der Multiplizierung der teilnehmenden Elementen in allen gegebenen Gliedern jeder beliebigen Reihe herrühren können.Die eventuelle Entstehung etwaiger kleinsten individuellen Differenzen in auf solche Weise entstandenen vollständig identischen Gebilden ist als Folge der allmählichen Vertiefung unseres Erkenntnissverfahrens, bzw. diagnostischer Analyse zu deuten, in welcher mit immer kleiner und kleiner werdenden — materiellen oder energetischen — Einheiten gearbeitet wird.Zum Schluss, sich auf wenige hauptsächlich beiläufig ausgewählte Beispiele aus den Gebieten der Astronomie, der Chemie, der Embryologie, der Anthropologie, der Soziologie, der Logik und der Philosophie stützend, sucht der Verfasser zu beweisen, dass in der modernen Wissenschaft überhaupt eine allgemeine Tendenz herrscht die Schlüsse auf die Wechselwirkung der Factoren, bzw. auf den Prinzip der Komplexität , als einer grundsetzlichen Eigenschaft jeder wissenschaftlichen Methode, zurückzuführen.While refuting the standpoint taken byCharles Richet and simultaneously setting aside the contrary view ofEmil Meyerson , the author argues that in biology the perfectly identical creatures, features or phenomena must occur, so to say by virtue of mathematical necessity, if the inheritance of features through the course of sexual propagation, governed by the laws ofMendel, is proceeding according to the rules ofNewton's binomial. Then the expanded series of the latter brings us the expression of some sort of biological multiplication, which — in their successive terms — leads to the origin of natural groups of so called binomions , each of which being composed of identical individuals, appearing in the exactly definite frequencies, issuing from the very procedure of multiplication of the factors, partaking in those series in any given term.Again, the possibility of ascertaining the eventual, if any, individualising differencies in the identical so originated beings is explained by the author as being actually due to the gradual deepening of our diagnosing analysis, by the use of which the more and more minute units, material or energetic ones, are introduced.Finally, referring to the few, mostly incidentally chosen, examples taken from astronomy, chemistry, embryology, anthropology, sociology, logic and philosophy, the author calls the attention to the fact that the modern science shows a general tendency towards the foundation of its conclusions on the interaction of factors and on the use of the general “principle of complexity” as an obligatory course of very scientific methodology. (shrink)

Von der Prämisse ausgehend, dass die zentrale, wenn auch am grössten umstrittene, wenngleich am wenigsten aufgeklärte Frage des ganzen Evolutionsproblems sich auf die Art und Weise des ersten Entstehen der evoluirenden Merkmale bezieht, bringt der Verfasser eine allgemeine Klassifikation der Evolutionstheorien auf die autogenetische und statistische dar, indem jedoch die ersten mit schwer greifbaren Faktoren allzusehr überlastet zu sein scheinen, die zweiten aber mit der Notwendigkeit der Annahme einer unumgänglich dissipativen Irreversibilität der progressiven Entwicklung zu rechnen haben, die jedoch mit (...) keinen uns bekannten Evolutionsbeweisen bestätigt werden kann. Infolgedessen hebt der Verfasser ein dritter-eigener-Evolutionsgedanke hervor, und zwar in kombinatorischer Fassung, den er auf der Tatsache zu gründen sucht, dass erstens jeweilige Evolution vor allem eine Übertragung der sich mehr und mehr komplizierenden Zusammensetzungen der Eigenschaften von einer Geheration auf die andere darstellt, und zwar, zweitens, so, dass diese Übertragung einer vom Verfasser im Jahre 1938 aufgestellten allgemeinen Gleichung derMendel Gesetze gehorcht und Ausdruck einesNewtonschen Binomierens mit ununterbrochen wachsenden Koeffizienten der Kreuzungspotenz darstellt.Ferner, in einem Entwurf der historischen Entwicklung dieser Anschauung, sucht er,Johannsen's Stellung gegenüber, im Altertum an dieHeraclitische Mannigfaltigkeit-Einheits-Lehre anzuknüpfen, insbesondere aber sie mit demAnaxagorasschen Begriff von Homoiomerien in Zusammenhang zu bringen, die, in neueren Zeiten, lassen sich unmittelbar an den Mendelismus und denJohannsenschen Genbegriff anschliessen, um weiter, über diePearson's undPhilipchenko's allgemeine Gleichungen, zum Verfassers eigenen Begriff der genotypischen Binomionen zu gelangen. Das allmähliche kombinatorisch zustandekommende Kompliziertwerden derselben soll uns den Verlauf der sich abspielenden organismischen Evolution schematisch oder eigentlich symbolisch veranschaulichen.Endlich, sich über die rein theoretische Möglichkeit einer Annahme der noph weiteren, hinzukommenden und übergeordneten, Evolutionsfactoren überlegend, die auf diese oder jene Weise seine auf die natürliche Kombinatorik totalisierende, ordnende und zugleich auch inbezug auf die allgemeine Evolution richtende Einflüsse ausüben könnten, kommt der Verfasser zum Schluss, dass der wissenschaftliche Erkenntniswert solcher, dazu biologisch ziemlich geheimnisvoller Factoren, für die exacte Evolutionsuntersuchungen einstweilen recht gering bleiben müsste.En tenant compte du fait que le problème central, en même temps le plus controversé et obscur de l'évolution concerne la question de la première origine des caractères évolutifs, l'auteur émet, sous ce point de vue, une classification générale des théories de l'évolution, en les divisant en autogénétistes et statistiques, les premières étant surchargées par l'objection d'opérer avec des facteurs peu concrets et peu saisissables tandis que les secondes sont forcées d'admettre l'irréversibilité dissipative du développement progressif, qui cependant n'a pu être confirmée par aucune des évidences rapportées en faveur de l'évolution.En conséquence, l'auteur propose et soumet à une discussion un peu élargie une troisième possibilité-la sienne: celle de la conception de l'évolution notamment basée sur les processus combinatoires, en l'appuyant sur les faits incontestables, que chaque évolution consiste, avant tout, en une transmission ininterrompue de traits se compliquant de plus en plus à travers les générations successives, bien que les combinaisons impliquées soient gouvernées par l'équation générale des lois deMendel, établie par l'auteur en 1938, et faisant une expression des opérations du binôme newtonien, les indices de puissance duquel croissent graduellement.Dans une esquisse historique du développement préalable de cette conception, l'auteur retrace ses racines dans la philosophie grecque, en descendant jusqu'à la thèse deHeraclitedes alliages des multiplicités dans l'unité des choses et la retrouve avant tout dans la conception des homoïomeries d'Anaxagore, ce qui s'attache, dans les temps nouveaux, de la manière la plus immédiate, au mendélisme, à la conception du gène, émis parJohannsen, et aboutit, par l'intermédiaire des équations produites parPearson etPhilipchenko, à la notion des binomions introduits par lui-même pour déterminer les groupes seuls homogènes au cours de l'évolution progressive. Or, les complications combinatoires, graduelles mais croissantes, de ces combinaisons les plus naturelles constitueraient une suite schématique ou plutôt symbolique de l'évolution accomplissante.Enfin, en réfléchissant sur la possibilité théorique d'admission des facteurs totalitaires en surplus, ordonnant le jeu combinatoire bien qu'aussi directeurs par rapport aux tendences générales de l'évolution organique, l'auteur aboutit à la conclusion que la valeur explorative de tels facteurs, du reste bien mystérieux, pour les recherches précises du procédé de l'évolution serait cependant très restreinte. (shrink)

I argue that, for Aristotle, virtue of character is a state of the non-rational part of the soul that makes one prone to making and acting on decisions in virtue of that part’s standing in the right relation to (correct) reason, namely, a relation that qualifies the agent as a true self-lover. In effect, this central feature of virtue of character is nothing else than love of practical wisdom. As I argue, it not only explains how reason can hold direct (...) authority over non-rational desires but also why Aristotle defines virtue of character as hexis prohairetikē. (shrink)

The paper addresses the following question: why do human beings, on Aristotle’s view, have an innate tendency to badness, that is, to developing desires that go beyond, and often against, their natural needs? Given Aristotle’s teleological assumptions (including the thesis that nature does nothing in vain), such tendency should not be present. I argue that the culprit is to be found in the workings of rationality. In particular, it is the presence of theoretical reason that necessitates the limitless nature of (...) human non-rational desires. (shrink)

Aristotle tells us that in order to develop virtue, one needs to come to love and hate the right sorts of things. However, his description of the virtuous person clearly privileges love to hate. It is love rather than hate that is the main driving force of a good life. It is because of her love of knowledge, truth and beauty that the virtuous person organizes her life in a certain way and pursues these rather than other things (such as (...) pleasure). When hate comes into the picture, it is merely an unavoidable consequence of loving those noble and beautiful things. The virtuous person hates things that are contrary to her values, but does not concentrate on them, much less constructs her life in the pursuit of their destruction. But why privilege love over hate in this way? Why could not a good (happy) and virtuous life be a life driven primarily by hate (in particular, one aimed at eradicating what one (correctly) considers shameful and evil)? Without appealing to any consequences or harmful effects that hate might have on other People, the paper gives two answers to this question. First, allowing hate (rather than love) to dominate one’s life would undermine the right relationship between the two parts of the soul (the rational and the non-rational one) that Aristotle recognizes. Virtue involves establishing the right kind of internal ordering of one’s soul and this cannot be done if one’s soul is dominated by hate. Second, hate has negative cognitive effects insofar as it renders one insensitive to the beauty of human nature and behavior and actively precludes one from acquiring knowledge and understanding. Accordingly, if a good life is a life that involves virtue and knowledge, a life fueled by hate cannot but fall short of that ideal. (shrink)