The article analyses two first Schelling's works devoted to philosophy of identity: "Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie" from 1801 and dialogue "Bruno oder über das göttliche und natürliche Prinzip der Dinge" from 1820. In the first one the absolute mind is presented as absolute qualitative identity of object and subject, as absolutely simple and not diverse substance. The form of being of absolute identity is cognition, which realises as infinite constitution of object. Particular things as potencies are quantitative difference between (...) that which is subjective and that which is objective. According to dialogue Bruno, idea as true and eternal reality is unity of what is real and ideal, finite and unfinite. On the other hand, finite things contain their opposite (lack of unity) of their components. (shrink)

Poznanie jest formą bytu absolutnego rozumu jako indyferencji podmiotu i przedmiotu i dokonuje się poprzez nieskończone ustanawianie podmiotu i przedmiotu, jako że wszelka wiedza może się artykułować w określaniu, ograniczaniu. W poznaniu to, co nieskończone, staje się obiektywne w tym, co skończone. Drugą zasadą wyróżniania rzeczy jednostkowych obok samopoznania absolutu jest świadomość ludzka, która w systemie identyczności nie jest prawomocnie wyprowadzona z samopoznania absolutu.

Christentum ist primär ein innerer Zustand des Einzelnen. Des Galuben, die Frömmigkeit, die Gerechtigkeit trägt der Mensch in sich. Allerdings, um ein wahrhaft Gläubiger zu sein, muß einer Handlungen unternehmen, er muß in der harten Schule des Lebens exerzieren. Interessenlosigkeit ist ein Grundzug der Frömmigkeit. Der Gerechte unternimmt Handlungen nicht in der Absicht, etwas dadurch zu erreichen; er läßt sich von keinem Interesse leiten, er handelt ohne "warum". Der Mensch reines Herzenz vermocht, das Gute zu lieben und es in der (...) Welt zu äußern. (shrink)

In relation to material reality only direct perception as sensual perception gives unbiased, reliable cognisance. Therefore, this cognisance is irremovably receptive. A subject does not add anything of himself to the object. Thinking does not play any role in such a cognisance, because object is before any thinking. According to Jacobi sensual cognisance consists of this what is given, a certain perceived content, and of a feeling assuring the existence of what is given, e.g. a belief. These two elements are (...) inseparable. A foundation of this approach has been prepared for Jacobi by Thomas Reid, however, it was finalised thanks to critical reference to David Hume concerning that second, not perceptive element of cognisance. (shrink)

OF SOME INTERPRETATIONS OF ECKHART’S CONCEPTION OF GOD The article shows that popular understanding of Eckhart’s God as a personal God is not confirmed by the analysis of Eckhart’s texts, but adopted from the most common concept of God. The article presents three of such interpretations.