A characterization of epistemic rationality, or epistemic justification, is typically taken to require a process of conceptual clarification, and is seen as comprising the core of a theory of (epistemic) rationality. I propose to explicate the concept of rationality. -/- It is essential, I argue, that the normativity of rationality, and the purpose, or goal, for which the particular theory of rationality is being proposed, is taken into account when explicating the concept of rationality. My position thus amounts to an (...) instrumentalist position about theories of epistemic rationality. Since there are different purposes, or goals, for which theories of rationality are proposed, the method of explication leaves room for different characterizations of rationality. I focus on two such (kinds of) purposes: first, the purpose of guiding the formation (or maintenance) of doxastic states and, second, the purpose of assessing (the formation or maintenance of) doxastic states. I conclude by outlining a pluralistic picture concerning rationality. (shrink)

Theories of discourse bring to realism new ideas about how knowledge develops and how representations of reality are influenced. We gain an understanding of the conceptual aspect of social life and the processes by which meaning is produced. This collection reflects the growing interest realist critics have shown towards forms of discourse theory and deconstruction. The diverse range of contributions address such issues as the work of Derrida and deconstruction, discourse theory, Eurocentrism and poststructuralism. What unites all of the contributions (...) is a sense that it is essential to provide a realist alternative to the hitherto dominance of social constructionism, hermeneutics and postmodernism, over many of the issues discussed. By developing a realist perspective the different authors attempt to embed discourse within the structured nature of the reality of the world. Realism can situate language, discourse and ideology within context specific, or 'causally efficacious' circumstances. Realism can help to uncover issues of power, representation, and subjectivity and how discursive and other social practices produce real effects. This can help us understand the manner in which social structures are reproduced through various forms of ideology and discourse. And by knowing this, we can start to address questions concerning human emancipation and how the world is to be transformed. (shrink)

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

This title presents a comprehensive guide to interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) which is an increasingly popular approach to qualitative inquiry taught to undergraduate and postgraduate students today.

" Here Jonathan Lear argues that irony is one of the tools we use to live seriously, to get the hang of becoming human.

RESUMO: Partindo de avaliações retrospectivas de Horkheimer sobre seu percurso intelectual, procuramos mostrar que tanto Schopenhauer quanto Marx constituem uma influência permanente na obra do fundador da teoria crítica: com efeito, a maior evidência de um dos dois autores em certo momento da trajetória de Horkheimer não implica o desaparecimento do outro, mas antes o pressupõe como fundamento, ainda que latente. É que, embora estabeleça uma interlocução com cada um deles considerado isoladamente, o determinante, a nosso ver, é a leitura (...) conjugada que Horkheimer realiza de ambos: por incompatíveis que pareçam, as esperanças de racionalização e emancipação sociais inspiradas em Marx e o pessimismo de Schopenhauer relacionam-se intrinsecamente, donde resultam um materialismo necessariamente pessimista e um pessimismo necessariamente materialista. Pretendemos evidenciar, porém, que, em virtude do modo pelo qual Horkheimer dialoga com a tradição filosófica, bem como em razão de mudanças de configuração histórica e, por conseguinte, teórica, a relação entre o pessimismo de Schopenhauer e o anseio emancipatório animado por Marx assume aspectos diversos e nuançados no decurso de sua obra. ABSTRACT: Starting from Horkheimer's retrospective evaluations on his intellectual trajectory, we try to show that both Schopenhauer and Marx are a permanent influence in his work: indeed, the major evidence of one of the two authors at one point in Horkheimer's trajectory does not imply the disappearance of the other one, but rather presupposes him as a basis, even though latent. For although Horkheimer dialogues with each of them separately, what is determining, in our view, is the combined reading that he performs of both: the social rationalization and the emancipation hopes inspired by Marx and the Schopenhauer's pessimism, even though they may seem incompatible, are intrinsically connected, so that there are a necessarily pessimistic materialism and a necessarily materialist pessimism. We intend to evidence, however, that because of the way Horkheimer dialogues with the philosophical tradition and because of the historical and therefore theoretical changes, the relationship between Schopenhauer's pessimism and the aspiration to emancipation inspired by Marx takes on different aspects and nuances in the course of his work. (shrink)

Intensely discussed in the philosophy of science in the 20th and 21st centuries, the themes of realism and anti-realism pervade Feyerabend’s work. However, discerning the author’s position on these subjects poses a problem for scholars. One sign of this is that they attribute to Feyerabend the adherence to (or the rejection of) different conceptions of realism and anti-realism. Despite the divergences, however, scholars approach the topic in a similar way, detecting elements of Feyerabend’s realist and anti-realist positions that are incompatible (...) with each other and that follow one another in the course of his work. Although such studies are of great value, we propose to explore another approach, which also seems pertinent. Examining Feyerabend’s writings, we seek to discern conditions that make it possible for the author to assume, without contradiction, realist and anti-realist positions. Finally, we seek to infer from Feyerabend’s conception of science features of the realism prescribed by the author as well as features of the realism proscribed by him. (shrink)

In this book Jonathan Adler offers a strengthened version of evidentialism, arguing that the ethics of belief should be rooted in the concept of belief--that...

Scholars point out contradictions in Nietzsche’s philosophy. An example would be his po itions on science, object of praise and criticism. If so, Nietzsche would make contradictory remarks about a domain that, on principle, seeks to rid itself of contradictions. From the perspective of Nietzschean philosophy, would attributing contradiction to it mean an objection? Would Nietzsche’s praise and criticism of science be incompatible? After trying to answer these questions, we will aim to show that the philosopher’s considerations on science reveal (...) a way of proceeding that he not only claims for himself but also prescribes to scientific thought: the art of nuance. (shrink)

Resumo: Partindo da análise de O Anticristo, investigamos a função que Nietzsche atribui à ciência, entendida como forma de inverdade, em relação a outras formas de inverdade, como o cristianismo. Primeiro, buscamos mostrar que, nesse escrito, o autor estabelece a incompatibilidade entre ciência e cristianismo atribuindo-lhes características específicas e inconciliáveis. Depois, evidenciamos que qualificativos como “falsa”, “errônea”, “fictícia” e “mentirosa”, aplicados em tom pejorativo à concepção religiosa de mundo em O Anticristo, determinam igualmente, em outros escritos, o conhecimento científico. Ora, (...) se as concepções de mundo cristã e científica têm características semelhantes, por que Nietzsche recorre à ciência para rejeitar o cristianismo?: Starting from the analysis of The Antichrist, we investigate the function that Nietzsche attributes to science, understood as a form of untruth, in relation to other forms of untruth, such as Christianity. First, we seek to show that, in this writing, the author establishes the incompatibility between science and Christianity by assigning them specific and irreconcilable characteristics. Then, we show that qualifications such as “false”, “erroneous”, “fictitious” and “lying”, applied in a derogatory way to the religious conception of the world in The Antichrist, also determine, in other writings, scientific knowledge. Now, if the Christian and scientific worldviews have similar characteristics, why does Nietzsche turn to science to reject Christianity? (shrink)

Resumo Estabelecida em Assim falava Zaratustra, a associação dos conceitos de vida, valor e vontade de potência se revela rica em consequências para o pensamento de Nietzsche. Nosso objetivo é investigar como essas noções operam na sintomatologia nietzschiana, procedimento que consiste em avaliar o valor dos valores, tomando-os como sinais de vida ascendente ou decadente. Esperamos mostrar que um modo de estimar valores só é considerado superior se traduz uma afirmação da concepção nietzschiana de vida ascendente. Por fim, contamos sustentar (...) que esse critério para avaliar o valor dos valores implica, ele mesmo, valores, o que o torna injusto.The association of notions of life, value and will to power established in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra reveals a great amount of consequences to the author’s philosophy. In this paper we propose to investigate how these concepts constitute a necessary condition for the Nietzschean symptomatology, which is a procedure that evaluates the value of the values, considering them as signs of an ascending or declining life. Furthermore, we attempt to demonstrate that the values may solely be regarded as superior and ascending if they translate an affirmation of the Nietzschean conception of ascending life. Finally, this study will support the idea that the criterion to evaluate the values itself implies other values, which renders it unjust. (shrink)

The Oxford Translation of Aristotle was originally published in 12 volumes between 1912 and 1954. It is universally recognized as the standard English version of Aristotle. This revised edition contains the substance of the original Translation, slightly emended in light of recent scholarship three of the original versions have been replaced by new translations and a new and enlarged selection of Fragments has been added. The aim of the translation remains the same: to make the surviving works of Aristotle readily (...) accessible to English speaking readers. (shrink)

This anthology looks at the early sages of Western philosophy and science who paved the way for Plato and Aristotle and their successors. Democritus's atomic theory of matter, Zeno's dazzling "proofs" that motion is impossible, Pythagorean insights into mathematics, Heraclitus's haunting and enigmatic epigrams-all form part of a revolution in human thought that relied on reasoning, forged the first scientific vocabulary, and laid the foundations of Western philosophy. Jonathan Barnes has painstakingly brought together the surviving Presocratic fragments in their (...) original contexts, utilizing the latest research and a major new papyrus of Empedocles. Translated and edited by Jonathan Barnes. (shrink)

Trata-se de apontar neste artigo que em Heidegger há dois caminhos diferentes para se investigar a questão do niilismo, que não são necessariamente excludentes, mas que por se localizarem em pontos diferentes em relação à sua virada (Kehre) de pensamento, acaba sempre gerando o questionamento de se estamos frente ao mesmo projeto ou não. Procuraremos demarcar a discussão e mostrar que seja tomada como uma empreitada de longo prazo ou não, o niilismo enquanto relacionado ao nada, na visão dos filósofos (...) da Escola de Kyoto, em especial Nishitani, não pode ser superado. Por consequência, passamos a investigação da proposta de superação do niilismo e buscamos os antecessores de sua discussão sobre a Vacuidade em Nagarjuna. (shrink)

Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Timothy Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interpreted as the credences of an ideal agent. From this and his assumption that evidential probabilities cannot be interpreted as the actual credences of human (...) agents either, he concludes that no interpretation of evidential probabilities in terms of credence is adequate. I argue to the contrary. My overarching aim is to show on behalf of Bayesians how one can still interpret evidential probabilities in terms of ideally rational credence and how one can maintain a tight connection between evidential probabilities and ideally rational credence even if the former cannot be interpreted in terms of the latter. By achieving this aim I illuminate the limits and prospects of Bayesianism. (shrink)

From mitochondria to meerkats, the natural world is full of spectacular examples of social behaviour. In the early 1960s W. D. Hamilton changed the way we think about how such behaviour evolves. He introduced three key innovations - now known as Hamilton's rule, kin selection, and inclusive fitness - and his pioneering work kick-started a research program now known as social evolution theory. This is a book about the philosophical foundations and future prospects of that program. [Note: only the Introduction (...) is available to download.]. (shrink)

In debates about animal sentience, the precautionary principle is often invoked. The idea is that when the evidence of sentience is inconclusive, we should “give the animal the benefit of the doubt” or “err on the side of caution” in formulating animal protection legislation. Yet there remains confusion as to whether it is appropriate to apply the precautionary principle in this context, and, if so, what “applying the precautionary principle” means in practice regarding the burden of proof for animal sentience. (...) Here I construct a version of the precautionary principle tailored to the question of animal sentience together with a practical framework for implementing it. I explain and defend the key features of this framework, argue that it is well-aligned with current practice in animal welfare science, and consider and reject a number of influential counterarguments to the use of precautionary reasoning in this area. (shrink)

O avanço tecnológico envolve e faz parte do cotidiano de todas as pessoas, e a sua influência pode ser direta ou indireta. O que se faz são up-grades com o propósito de conseguir participar deste universo digital. As Tecnologia de Informação e Comunicação (TIC) tem provocado alterações na humanidade, no modo de viver, de se relacionar, aprender, pensar e ensinar. Propõe-se um estudo bibliográfico, baseado em duas grandes obras de Pierre Lévy, um dos grandes pensadores da era da informação: O (...) que é virtual? (2011) e Cibercultura (2010). O artigo está estruturado do seguinte modo: discute a definição de virtual segundo o ponto de vista de Lévy; apresenta a inteligência coletiva e sua influência na sociedade; e enfoca uma nova proposta de aprendizagem, que possibilita o aprendizado por intermédio das atividades sociais e profissionais dos indivíduos. Portanto, a virtualização, além de ser a base de dados e informações, quebra as barreiras do tempo e do espaço, aproxima professores e alunos e lhes fornece ferramentas para a construção do conhecimento, colocando-os nesse produtivo processo de ensino e aprendizagem. (shrink)

Não apenas uma vez Nietzsche escreve que o mundo, junto com tudo que nele há, é tão somente vontade de poder. Por meio dessa teoria ele pensa os diversos níveis da existência, indo desde elementos ínfimos e simples até estruturas complexas, com elevado grau de refinamento. Tudo não passa, segundo esse filósofo, do desenrolar de forças em jogo agonístico por um algo a mais de poder. Neste artigo nós analisamos alguns aspectos da teoria da vontade de poder para mostrar como (...) Nietzsche faz uso de um mesmo arranjo conceitual para qualificar toda a existência. Assim, tanto o microscópico quanto o macroscópico, tanto o orgânico quanto o inorgânico, são tomados como exemplos de entes que, não obstante suas diferenças, são todos vontades de poder. (shrink)

Practical Reality is a lucid original study of the relation between the reasons why we do things and the reasons why we should. Jonathan Dancy maintains that current philosophical orthodoxy bowdlerizes this relation, making it impossible to understand how anyone can act for a good reason. By giving a fresh account of values and reasons, he finds a place for normativity in philosophy of mind and action, and strengthens the connection between these areas and ethics.

Sentience is the capacity to have feelings, such as feelings of pain, pleasure, hunger, thirst, warmth, joy, comfort and excitement. It is not simply the capacity to feel pain, but feelings of pain, distress or harm, broadly understood, have a special significance for animal welfare law. Drawing on over 300 scientific studies, we evaluate the evidence of sentience in two groups of invertebrate animals: the cephalopod molluscs or, for short, cephalopods (including octopods, squid and cuttlefish) and the decapod crustaceans or, (...) for short, decapods (including crabs, lobsters and crayfish). We also evaluate the potential welfare implications of current commercial practices involving these animals. (shrink)

Are there key respects in which character and character defects are voluntary? Can agents with serious vices be rational agents? Jonathan Jacobs answers in the affirmative. Moral character is shaped through voluntary habits, including the ways we habituate ourselves, Jacobs believes. Just as individuals can voluntarily lead unhappy lives without making unhappiness an end, so can they degrade their ethical characters through voluntary action that does not have establishment of vice as its end. Choosing Character presents an account of (...) ethical disability, expanding the domain of responsibility and explicating the role of character in ethical cognition. Jacobs contends that agents become ethically disabled voluntarily when their habits impair their ability to properly appreciate ethical considerations. Such agents are rational, responsible individuals who are yet incapable of virtuous action. The view develops and modifies Aristotelian claims concerning the fixity of character. Jacobs' interpretation is developed in contrast to the overlooked work of Maimonides, who also used Aristotelian resources but argued for the possibility of character change. The notion of ethical disability has profound ramifications for ethics and for current debates about blame and punishment. (shrink)

In the wake of the Scientific Revolution, the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the complete demolition of traditional structures of authority, scientific thought, and belief by the new philosophy and the philosophes, including Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau. The Radical Enlightenment played a part in this revolutionary process, which effectively overthrew all justification for monarchy, aristocracy, and ecclesiastical power, as well as man's dominance over woman, theological dominance of education, and slavery. Despite the present day interest in the revolutions of (...) the eighteenth century, the origins and rise of the Radical Enlightenment have received limited scholarly attention. The greatest obstacle to the movement finding its proper place in modern historical writing is its international scope: the Racial Enlightenment was not French, British, German, Italian, Jewish or Dutch, but all of these at the same time. In this wide-ranging volume, Jonathan Israel offers a novel interpretation of the Radical Enlightenment down to La Mettie and Diderot, two of its key exponents. Particular emphasis is placed on the pivotal role of Spinoza and the widespread underground international philosophical movement known before 1750 as Spinozism. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo tem por intenção mostrar que o conceito de angústia da psicanálise de Freud consegue avançar apenas na investigação de uma angústia do ser, ou seja, trata da angústia do homem enquanto um ente do mundo. Em contrapartida, procuraremos mostrar que o estudo das angústias impensáveis por parte de Winnicott se preocupa com a questão de como o homem chega a ser um ente no mundo. O resultado da distinção paradigmática entre as duas teorias psicanalíticas para a angústia (...) pode ser iluminada quando se toma como apoio a fenomenologia existencial de Martin Heidegger. Palavras-chaves: Angústia, castração, fenomenologia existencial, Winnicott: This article is intended to show that the concept of anxiety by Freud's psychoanalysis can only be developed in the investigation of an anxiety of being, i.e., it deals with the anxiety of man as a being in the world. In contrast, we aim to demonstrate that the study of unthinkable anxiety by Winnicott is concerned with the question of how man comes to be a being in the world. The result of the pragmatic distinction between the two psychoanalytic theories of anxiety may be elucidated by taking Martin Heidegger's existential phenomenology as a support. Keywords: Anxiety, castration, existential phenomenology, Winnicott. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar que a moralidade para Freud está determinada por um aparelho psíquico que tem por função justamente reprimir a única coisa que no homem apontaria para uma liberdade de ação, a saber: o desejo. O problema é que se todos os homens decidissem realizar todos os seus desejos, não haveria, para Freud, a possibilidade da civilização. Não haveria espaço nas teorias psicanalíticas para se pensar uma moralidade não determinada filogeneticamente? Tentarei apresentar como contraponto uma possibilidade (...) de resposta a essa questão com a teoria psicanalítica de Winnicott. (shrink)

Pretende-se mostrar, a partir do pensamento de Keiji Nishitani, os pressupostos para a discussão sobre o “vazio-saber” e que passa pela questão do niilismo e da vacuidade em sua filosofia. O problema do niilismo em Nishitani, diferente da perspectiva adotada pelos filósofos ocidentais, não está ligada à ideia de que o Eu frente ao Nada perde seus fundamentos e sua existência, deixando de ter sentido. Pelo contrário, é no encontro com o Nada que o homem pode descobrir e entrar em (...) contato com sua verdadeira essência, uma vez que, é nesse encontro que sua existência se revela. Isso só seria possível caso o Eu realizasse um processo de auto abertura, um salto para dentro da Vacuidade, para que aí sua verdadeira face se revele e ele possa encontrar seu verdadeiro ser. Pretende-se desenvolver esses desdobramentos ao longo do artigo. (shrink)

Conditional sentences are among the most intriguing and puzzling features of language, and analysis of their meaning and function has important implications for, and uses in, many areas of philosophy. Jonathan Bennett, one of the world's leading experts, distils many years' work and teaching into this Philosophical Guide to Conditionals, the fullest and most authoritative treatment of the subject. An ideal introduction for undergraduates with a philosophical grounding, it also offers a rich source of illumination and stimulation for graduate (...) students and professional philosophers. (shrink)

In the newly-discovered “On Principles and Matter”—we can definitely ascertain by Porphyry—the author concludes that there must be two principles responsible for all beings, or at least all sensible beings: God (the active cause) and matter (the passive cause). In large part this agrees with Atticus’ position, which the text also quotes, and which we also know Porphyry engaged with vigorously, from Proclus’ Timaeus Commentary. However there is a something odd about this text’s Porphyry: we seem to have a positive (...) argument for much of Antiochus’ framework of two principles, while in Proclus’ testimony we have a negative argument for the very same position. In this paper I analyze in detail the positive argument for the two principles given in “On Principles”, and I consider the degree to which Porphyry may be supplying a dialectical argument at this point in the text, before eventually criticizing the same view elsewhere (as in Proclus’ testimony). I also consider other points of contact for the text’s two-principles framework with Porphyry’s other extant works and show some consequences for Porphyry’s overall position. (shrink)

What makes fast, cumulative cultural evolution work? Where did it come from? Why is it the sole preserve of humans? We set out a self-assembly hypothesis: cultural evolution evolved culturally. We present an evolutionary account that shows this hypothesis to be coherent, plausible, and worthy of further investigation. It has the following steps: (0) in common with other animals, early hominins had significant capacity for social learning; (1) knowledge and skills learned by offspring from their parents began to spread because (...) bearers had more offspring, a process we call CS1 (or Cultural Selection 1); (2) CS1 shaped attentional learning biases; (3) these attentional biases were augmented by explicit learning biases (judgements about what should be copied from whom). Explicit learning biases enabled (4) the high-fidelity, exclusive copying required for fast cultural accumulation of knowledge and skills by a process we call CS2 (or Cultural Selection 2), and (5) the emergence of cognitive processes such as imitation, mindreading and metacognition – ‘cognitive gadgets’ specialised for cultural learning. This self-assembly hypothesis is consistent with archaeological evidence that the stone tools used by early hominins were not dependent on fast, cumulative cultural evolution, and suggests new priorities for research on ‘animal culture’. (shrink)

The adaptation-by-binding account and the arousal-biased competition model suggest that emotional arousal increases binding effects for transient links between stimuli and responses. Two highly-powered, pre-registered experiments tested whether transient stimulus-response bindings are stronger for high versus low arousing stimuli. Emotional words were presented in a sequential prime-probe design in which stimulus relation, response relation, and stimulus arousal were orthogonally manipulated. In Experiment 1 (N = 101), words with high and low arousal levels were presented individually in prime and probe displays. (...) In Experiment 2 (N = 170), a high arousing affective word was presented simultaneously with a neutral word during the prime display; in the subsequent probe display, either the arousing or the neutral word repeated or a different high versus low arousal word was shown. Data from both experiments did not demonstrate a modulation of SRBR effects by stimulus arousal and SRBR effects were of equal magnitude for word stimuli of high and low arousal levels. These null results are not in line with binding accounts that hypothesise a modulatory influence of emotional arousal on perception-action binding. (shrink)

But if, with Jonathan Lear, we scrutinize these thinkers' attempts to explain human behavior in terms of a higher principle--whether happiness or death--the ...

There is no agreement on whether any invertebrates are conscious and no agreement on a methodology that could settle the issue. How can the debate move forward? I distinguish three broad types of approach: theory-heavy, theory-neutral and theory-light. Theory-heavy and theory-neutral approaches face serious problems, motivating a middle path: the theory-light approach. At the core of the theory-light approach is a minimal commitment about the relation between phenomenal consciousness and cognition that is compatible with many specific theories of consciousness: the (...) hypothesis that phenomenally conscious perception of a stimulus facilitates, relative to unconscious perception, a cluster of cognitive abilities in relation to that stimulus. This “facilitation hypothesis” can productively guide inquiry into invertebrate consciousness. What is needed? At this stage, not more theory, and not more undirected data gathering. What is needed is a systematic search for consciousness-linked cognitive abilities, their relationships to each other, and their sensitivity to masking. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs Margaret Cavendish’s theory of the metaphysics of artifacts. It situates her anti-mechanist account of artifactual production and the art-nature distinction against a background of Aristotelian, Scholastic, and mechanist theories. Within this broad context, it considers what Cavendish thinks artisans can actually do, grounding her terminological stipulation that there is no genuine generation in nature in a commitment to natural and artistic production as the mere rearrangement of bodies. Bodies themselves are identified, in a conceptually Ockhamist manner, with (...) their figures, so that the resulting theory of mere rearrangement is Scholastically respectable. The paper also offers literal interpretations, focused narrowly on the philosophical content of her theories of art and artifacts, of her claims that art concerns only “nature’s sporting or playing actions”, that its products are “deformed and defective”, and that they are “at best …mixt or hermaphroditical.". (shrink)

Liberalism without Perfection offers an introduction to the debate between liberal perfectionism and political liberalism. This book is a new account and defence of Rawlsian political liberalism, one of the most discussed, but widely misunderstood and criticized theories in contemporary political theory.

How does consciousness vary across the animal kingdom? Are some animals ‘more conscious’ than others? This article presents a multidimensional framework for understanding interspecies variation in states of consciousness. The framework distinguishes five key dimensions of variation: perceptual richness, evaluative richness, integration at a time, integration across time, and self-consciousness. For each dimension, existing experiments that bear on it are reviewed and future experiments are suggested. By assessing a given species against each dimension, we can construct a consciousness profile for (...) that species. On this framework, there is no single scale along which species can be ranked as more or less conscious. Rather, each species has its own distinctive consciousness profile. (shrink)