Should we regard Jennifer Lackey’s ‘Creationist Teacher’ as understanding evolution, even though she does not, given her religious convictions, believe its central claims? We think this question raises a range of important and unexplored questions about the relationship between understanding, factivity and belief. Our aim will be to diagnose this case in a principled way, and in doing so, to make some progress toward appreciating what objectual understanding—i.e., understanding a subject matter or body of information—demands of us. Here is the (...) plan. After some ground clearing in §1, §2 outlines and motivates a plausible working model—moderate factivity—for characterising the sense in which objectual understanding should be regarded as factive. §3 shows how the datum that we can understand false theories can, despite initial suggestions to the contrary, be assimilated straightforwardly within the moderate factivity model. §4 highlights how the inverse kind of case to that explored in §3—viz., a variant of Lackey’s creationist teacher case—poses special problems for moderate factivity. With reference to recent work on moral understanding by Hills, §5 proposes a solution to the problem, and §6 attempts to diagnose why it is that we might originally have been led to draw the wrong conclusion. (shrink)

Frankfurt-style examples (FSEs) cast doubt on the initially plausible claim that an ability to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility. Following the lead of Peter van Inwagen and others, I argue that if we are careful in distinguishing events by causal origins, then we see that FSEs fail to show that one may be morally responsible for x, yet have no alternatives to x. I provide reasons for a fine-grained causal origins approach to events apart from the context of (...) moral responsibility, and respond to the objection that moral responsibility depends on abstract entities other than events. In response to John Martin Fischer and others, I argue that the alternatives available in recent FSEs are robust enough for moral responsibility. If one thinks that the ability to do otherwise is a necessary condition for moral responsibility, the FSEs give no reason to relinquish this belief. (shrink)

In this book, James Gordon Finlayson examines the Habermas-Rawls debate in context and considers its wider implications. He traces their dispute from its inception in their earliest works to the 1995 exchange and its aftermath, as well as its legacy in contemporary debates. Finlayson discusses Rawls’s Political Liberalism and Habermas’s Between Facts and Norms, considering them as the essential background to the dispute and using them to lay out their different conceptions of justice, politics, democratic legitimacy, individual rights, and (...) the normative authority of law. He gives a detailed analysis and assessment of their contributions, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of their different approaches to political theory, conceptions of democracy, and accounts of religion and public reason, and he reflects on the ongoing significance of the debate. The Habermas-Rawls Debate is an authoritative account of the crucial intersection of two major political theorists and an explication of why their dispute continues to matter. (shrink)

Was Descartes a Cartesian Dualist? In this controversial study, Gordon Baker and Katherine J. Morris argue that, despite the general consensus within philosophy, Descartes was neither a proponent of dualism nor guilty of the many crimes of which he has been accused by twentieth century philosophers. In lively and engaging prose, Baker and Morris present a radical revision of the ways in which Descartes' work has been interpreted. Descartes emerges with both his historical importance assured and his philosophical importance (...) redeemed. (shrink)

Gordon Graham presents a bold new account of Wittgenstein's philosophy, which argues for its relevance to the study of religion and aims to revitalize the philosophy of 'true religion'. He uses Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy to argue in favour of the idea that 'true religion' is to be understood as human participation in divine life.

The most discussed and most significant issue on the religious scene today is whether it is possible, or even desirable, to believe in God. Mr. Kaufman's valuable study does not offer a doctrine of God, but instead explores why God is a problem for many moderns, the dimensions of that problem, and the inner logic of the notion of God as it has developed in Western culture. His object is to determine the function or significance of talk about God: how (...) the concept of God is generated in human experience; the special problems in turn generated by this concept (for example, the intelligibility of the idea of transcendence, the problem of theodicy) and how they are met; and under what circumstances the idea of God is credible or important or even indispensable. He does not try to prove God's existence or nonexistence, but elucidates what the concept of God means and the important human needs it fulfills. Four of the eleven essays have been previously published, at least in part; seven are completely new. (shrink)

Many naive realists endorse a negative disjunctivist strategy in order to deal with the challenge presented by the possibility of phenomenologically indistinguishable halucination. In the first part of this paper I argue that this approach is methodologically inconsistent because it undercuts the phenomenological motivation that underlies the the appeal of naive realism. In the second part of the paper I develop an alternative to the negative disjunctivist account along broadly Meinongian lines. In the last section of this paper I consider (...) and evaluate a somewhat similar but rival view of hallucination developed by Mark Johnston. (shrink)

CHAPTER ONE Simple cognition Ockham's epistemology is founded upon the primacy of individual cognition. As coming first in the order of knowing, ...

The purpose of this book is expressed in its title. It is an essay, an attempt to explore the ways in which the medieval outlook on the world was changing and giving place to the fourteenth century to new consessions that were ultimately to bring its supersession. It is not a survey, still less a textbook, but rather a delineation of what seem to me to have been the areas of fundamental change. It is, therefore, one individual's interpretation, much though (...) it owes to others. (shrink)

The broad aim of this paper is to track the evolution of adult literacy policy in the UK across three decades, highlighting convergences between policy phases and the promotion of democratic learning spaces. It is anchored onto the argument that, although it is generally accepted that democratic learning spaces are perceived as beneficial to adult literacy learners, policy has often deterred its promotion and, therefore, implementation. The paper identifies three block phases of adult literacy development: the seventies to mid-eighties, the (...) mid-eighties to mid-nineties and the mid-nineties to the Moser Committees. The features of each of these phases are highlighted to map out convergences and divergences to the ethos of democratic learning spaces. The paper argues that, with the evolution of policy in adult literacy, the ethos of democratic learning space continuously diminished, such that as policy evolved year on year, the principle of democratic learning space found itself at counterpoint to policy. We draw on two theoretical frameworks, the NLS view of literacy and Bourdieu’s capital framework to explain these divergences and conclude that the dominant perception of literacy and the prioritised capital in the context of policy appear to limit the vestiges of democratic learning spaces. Keywords: Adult literacy, policy, democratic learning spaces, cultural dissonance, human capital, social capital. (shrink)

In recent years, discussions of Buddhist ethics have increasingly drawn upon the concepts and tools of modern ethical theory, not only to compare Buddhist perspectives with Western moral theories, but also to assess the meta-ethical implications of Buddhist texts and their philosophical context. Philosophers aiming to defend the Madhyamaka framework in particular – its ethics and soteriology along with its logic and epistemology – have recently attempted to explain its combination of moral commitment and philosophical scepticism by appealing to various (...) forms of meta-ethical anti-realism. This paper argues that those attempts do not succeed, even in their own terms. Their emphasis on universal compassion, among other features of their approaches, is difficult to explain normatively so long as it is embedded within an anti-realist framework. Soteriological values – such as enlightenment and liberation – also seem to require a realist account of their normativity. Though many Buddhist philosophers disagree, there is at least one form of Buddhist philosophy, that of the Yogācāra school, that can be interpreted as articulating a meta-ethical realism of the kind that the broader Mahāyāna tradition (if not other Buddhist traditions as well) seems to require. To a greater extent than stressing common anti-realist themes would allow, the paper argues that finding common ground, where Western moral realism and Buddhist moral realism can coalesce and jointly vindicate a repertoire of shared ethical concepts, may also facilitate the efforts of those engaged in comparative ethical theory. (shrink)

It is difficult to generalize about ethical values in the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition, let alone in Buddhist philosophy more generally. One author identifies seventeen distinct ethical approaches in the Mahāyāna scholarly traditions alone (i.e., not including various folk traditions).1 Nonetheless, in comparative studies in the history of ethics, there is increasing recognition that several different Buddhist traditions have stressed a foundational role for universalist altruism that was largely absent from ancient Greek eudaimonism and perhaps even absent-qua foundational-from most other premodern (...) traditions of moral reflection in the West, including much of the Christian tradition.2 In particular, ancient and .. (shrink)

Current discussions of “evidentialism” seem to presuppose essentially traditional theistic conceptions and formulations. For many theologians. however, these have become problematic because of (a) the rise of a new consciousness of the significance of religiouspluralism; (b) the emergence of theories about the ways in which our symbolic frames of orientation shape all our experiencing and thinking; (c) a growing awareness that significant responsibility for some of the major evils of the twentieth century must be laid to ourreligious traditions. Since recent (...) discussion of “evidentialism” continues to employ traditional symbols and concepts without sensitivity to these matters, it has not attracted much interest among contemporary theologians. (shrink)

Scientific evolutionary/ecological thinking is the basis for today's understanding that we are now in an ecological crisis. Religions, however, often resist reordering their thinking in light of scientific ideas, and this presents difficulties in trying to develop a viable global ecological ethic. In both the West and Asia religiomoral ecological concerns continue to be formulated largely in terms of traditional concepts rather than in more global terms, as scientific thinking about ecological matters might encourage them to do. The majority of (...) this article is devoted to the kind of reformulation of Western Christian conceptions of God, humanity, and the relation between them that is necessary to address this problem. The question is then raised whether similar critical thinking about religiomoral issues raised by today's evolutionary/ecological scientific thinking is going on in Asian religions and whether it would be too presumptuous (in view of our colonial history) for us Westerners to ask for such rethinking. This leads to a final question: Without such transformations in religious traditions East and West, is the development of a truly global ecological ethic really feasible? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy of Music Education Review 13.1 (2005) 95-98 [Access article in PDF] Response to Frede V. Nielsen's "Didactology as a Field of Theory and Research in Music Education" Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon Northwestern University Let me begin by acknowledging what is about to become obvious: I am not a musicologist, music educator, or a philosopher of music education. I am, however, a philosopher of education and a devoted student of (...) music, so I found Frede Nielsen's paper both intriguing and rewarding. It is intriguing because it positions the theoretical study of music education—what he calls "didactology"—in relation to the practice of teaching music and exemplifies, if you will, the practice of didactology. As a philosopher, and one who has worked at philosophy of science as well as philosophy of education, I became intrigued by the conceptual ground-clearing and ground-construction that Nielsen undertakes in his paper.I found the paper rewarding for two reasons. First, it is about music—at least I think it is about music, and music is about my favorite topic. Like many good works on aesthetic subjects, it seems to offer another way into a beloved yet ultimately mystifying domain and, thus, another glimpse into the unfathomable. Second, the paper offers a complex and rigorous analysis. I had fun wading through its parts and beginning to view them in relation to one another. I think that I have begun to understand not only the difference between didactics and didactology but also something about the contribution the latter might make.So to begin these remarks, let me offer a brief overview of some key points in the paper. I will then go on to raise a question or two with the hope that these will prompt Nielsen to further elaborate his ideas.To begin, Nielsen separates the topic of music pedagogy into two parts—the [End Page 95] normative and the descriptive. He defends both the study of theory and the study of practice as useful for understanding the subject of music pedagogy. He then defines the term "didactology" as "the theory of didactics, especially the theory of the content, aim, and rationale of education," and he defines "didactics" as planning and decision-making related to the practice of teaching. He tells us that didactology, though theoretical, is related to practice, that while it is descriptive rather than prescriptive it assumes values, that it "implies a view of science and the subject—the subject of music and the music itself." A didactological statement is a scientific statement and its truth is judged according to criteria for scientific truth. In summary, according to Nielsen: It is the task of and the object area of didactology in relation to the subject of music to describe, analyze, problematize, and develop intended, actual, or possible issues concerning music education as well as its conditions with special regard to the content, aims, and rationale of the education. Can the didactology of music be an independent science? The answer seems to be yes. As an illustration of the claim, Neilsen presents us with four levels of didactological reflection. The four levels, from top to bottom, are, fourth, reality (natura)—the "inner" and "outer" aspects—which refers to the experiences of hearing/understanding and performing the music; third, the musical phenomena (ars)—the music itself (the musical phenomena include, it seems, the social and existential contexts in which the music occurs); second, the theory that offers a disciplined or systematic explanation of the musical phenomena (scientia), that is, musicology (the theory envisions the musicology—the explanation of the musical phenomena—in relation to, for example, the theory and practice of teaching the music itself); and first, the didactic practices and didactological principles (didactica) that serve as the basis for determining "the content, aim, and rationale of teaching and learning music."Now despite the elegance of the typology here, I find myself wondering about two things. First, what is the subject of Nielsen's analysis? He tells us that... (shrink)

In the article, Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon asks, Did Plato have a philosophy of listening, and if so, what was it? Listening is the counterpart of speaking in a dialogue, and it is no less important. Indeed, learning from the dialogue is less likely to occur as people participate unless listening as well as speaking takes place. Haroutunian-Gordon defines a philosophy of listening as a set of beliefs that fall into four categories: (1) the aim of listening; (2) the nature (...) of listening; (3) the role of the listener; and (4) the relation between the listener and the speaker. The beliefs, as they fall into these four categories, have implications for one another, and, because they are logically related, constitute a philosophy of listening. In the article, Haroutunian-Gordon argues that Plato had a philosophy of listening and describes its components. (shrink)

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION I If for no other reason, Gregory of Rimini would be distinguished for having escaped the oblivion which has engulfed the majority of his contemporaries. For centuries he has been known by the titles of Tortor ...

Idealist philosophers have traditionally tried to defend their views by appealing to the claim that nonmental reality is inconceivable. A standard response to this inconceivability claim is to try to show that it is only plausible if one blurs the fundamental distinction between consciousness and its object. I try to rehabilitate the idealistic argument by presenting an alternative formulation of the idealist’s basic inconceivability claim. Rather than suggesting that all objects are inconceivable apart from consciousness, I suggest that it is (...) impossible to conceive of any such object as genuinely existent. This thesis is lent credence by the fact that only in reflective self-consciousness is existence a phenomenological datum. Not only is it the case that we are not ever aware of an object as existing, we do not have a clear understanding of what it would be like to have such an awareness. If this is true, then we have reason to believe that while consciousness exists, the objects of consciousness cannot exist. (shrink)

This book focuses on major educational philosophies impacting Western education and makes sense of past and current trends placed in historical context. This third edition is updated with the swift changes taking place in education and looks at postmodernism as it has continued to develop during the past fifty years.

This article has two parts, as the title suggests. The first sketches what I call biohistorical naturalism, a naturalistic position in which it is emphasized that the historicocultural development of our humanity, particularly our becoming linguistic/symbolical beings, is as central to our humanness as the biological evolutionary development that preceded (and continues to accompany) it. Apart from such a biohistorical emphasis (or its equivalent), naturalistic positions cannot give adequate accounts of human religiousness. The second part suggests that, although it would (...) not be consistent with biohistorical naturalism to continue thinking of God in the traditional supernaturalistic way as “the Creator,” it would be quite appropriate to understand God as the ongoing creativity (of truly novel realities) manifest in the long history of the universe, particularly in the evolution of life on Earth. (shrink)

The anthropocentric orientation of traditional understandings of Christian faith and life, further accentuated by the existentialist terms in which theology was articulated in mid‐century by Tillich and others, produced theologies no longer appropriate in today's world of evolutionary and ecological thinking about human existence and its embeddedness in the web of life on planet Earth. This problem can be addressed with the help of several new concepts that enable us to understand both humanity‐in‐the‐world and God in ways in keeping with (...) these present conceptions, thus providing a more intelligible and illuminating way of understanding Christian faith and life today. (shrink)

In contrast to the most common view, I argue that one can consistently affirm that fundamental moral principles are objective and invariable, and yet are dependent on God. I explore and reject appealing to divine simplicity as a basis for affirming this conjunction. Rather, I develop the thesis that God is identical to the Good (the Identity View or IV) and argue that the IV does not fall to the criticisms of simplicity. I then consider a divine will theory (DWT) (...) that claims moral principles are grounded in God’s will. When the IV is conjoined with a DWT, there is reason to affirm an objective, theistically based ethics. The IV and DWT proposed here are models and while I attempt to increase their plausibility, I do not argue for their truth. The IV conjoined with a moral theory such as DWT explains the dependence of moral principles on God, while allowing for objectivity since morality is rooted in the eternal unchanging standard of the Good. (shrink)

Gordon H Bell; Industrial Culture and the School: some conceptual and practical issues in the schools-industry debate [1], Journal of Philosophy of Education, V.

This introduction outlines why the author assembled a community of scholars with the task not of commenting on Jane Anna Gordon’s work on creolizing political theory but instead placing it in dialogue with their own. The idea is that the value of theory depends also on the extent to which it could be engaged as a communicative practice with other theories dedicated to a shared concern. In this case, it is scholars committed to thought devoted to concerns of dignity, (...) freedom, and liberation as well as the critical question of the ultimate value of doing theoretical work. (shrink)

Entire moral philosophies have been rejected for ruling out the possibility of failure. This “fallibility constraint” (also sometimes called the “error constraint”) cannot be justified by appealing either to Wittgensteinian considerations about rules or to the moral importance of alternate possibilities. I propose instead that support for such a constraint in ethics can be found in the Strawsonian reactive attitudes. I then use the constraint to reveal hidden weaknesses in contemporary contstitutivist strategies to ground moral normativity such as Christine Korsgaard’s, (...) and also to reveal hidden strengths in historical accounts of morality such as Bishop Butler’s. We will have reason to reject any moral theory that makes constitutivism’s mistake, but only because we have reason not to reject the fallibility constraint itself. The way this ethical fallibility can be justified suggests a general principle that could be used to justify fallibility constraints in other normative domains such as practical reason, epistemology, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This chapter explores the potential alternatives to the dominant philosophy, policy and practice. Informed by sociological and critical educational frames that recognise the political, social and economic factors that conspire to marginalise learners, it offers a transformative approach to adult literacy whilst locating the model in an underpinning philosophy. Rich empirical data from practice is probed to offer a justification to the recognition accorded the model. The analysis argues that a different value position to the dominant curriculum could yield a (...) different approach to practice. This is illustrated with transformative and emancipatory literacy, which derives its values from a libertarian, equality and justice base. We expose how changes to policy and practice would inform and shape the literacy curriculum and indeed pedagogy, a central driver, we also suggest, being adult education/literacy dis-entangling itself from neo-liberal fusion and creating critical space for contextualised and emancipatory learning. Keywords: emancipatory learning empirical research literacy practice sociology of education transformative literacy. (shrink)

The study draws on life history, literacy studies and ethnographic approaches to exploring social practices as a frame to explore the narratives of two UK adult literacy learners, who provide a description of the value or otherwise of their engagement with a transformative curriculum and pedagogical approach. Whilst one of the learners reveals his frustration at the lack of transformative opportunities in his learning programme, the other offers illustration of how transformative learning can be encouraged and how it can actually (...) transform the life of its beneficiaries. In essence, both case studies highlight some requirements of transformative learning. Bourdieu’s concepts of field, capitals and habitus are applied; the critical elements of these concepts essentially being tools for consciousness raising and increasing the flow of capitals, including linguistic capital, which challenge the notion of spoilt identities based on neoliberal individual accountability which fails to address the structures and hierarchies of power. (shrink)

This chapter draws on empirical research, which includes rich data from interviews with members of a policy development committee to identify the underpinning value positions that drove the Moser Report, one of the major policy initiatives in the field of adult literacy in the past decade. Moving from the central Skills for Life policy to previous and subsequent policies, we argue that this period saw the consolidation of the influence of the instrumental/human capital value position in adult literacy. Literacy is (...) thus expressed, for example, as ‘functional’ skills and driven by the premise of a ‘knowledge economy’. Within this philosophical stance one of the most significant duties given to education is to provide a flexible, adaptable and skilled workforce to make countries competitive in the globalised economy. It focuses on education for work positions and education as a commodity and pays no regard to issues of economic, political and social equality. (shrink)

With this understanding, children are better able to anticipate the behavior of others and to attune their own behavior accordingly. In mentally retarded children with Down's syndrome, attainment of such competence is delayed, but it is generally acquired by the time they reach the mental age of 4, as measured by tests of nonverbal intelligence. Thus from a developmental perspective, attainment of the mental age of 4 appears to be of profound significance for acquisition of what we shall call psychological (...) competence : possession of the skills and resources people routinely call on in the.. (shrink)