Authors
Gordon Knight
University of Iowa (PhD)
Abstract
Many naive realists endorse a negative disjunctivist strategy in order to deal with the challenge presented by the possibility of phenomenologically indistinguishable halucination. In the first part of this paper I argue that this approach is methodologically inconsistent because it undercuts the phenomenological motivation that underlies the the appeal of naive realism. In the second part of the paper I develop an alternative to the negative disjunctivist account along broadly Meinongian lines. In the last section of this paper I consider and evaluate a somewhat similar but rival view of hallucination developed by Mark Johnston.
Keywords disjunctivism  naive realism  perception  hallucination  non-existent objects  Meinong  direct realism
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-013-9304-4
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References found in this work BETA

Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Nonexistent Objects.Terence Parsons - 1980 - Yale University Press.
The Problem of Perception.A. D. Smith - 2002 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Naïve Realism, Seeing Stars, and Perceiving the Past.Alex Moran - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):202-232.
Some Hallucinations Are Experiences of the Past.Michael Barkasi - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):454-488.
The Tractability of the Debate on Relationalism.Roberta Locatelli - 2021 - In Louise Richardson & Heather Logue (eds.), Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 85-106.

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