How can a business institution function as an ethical institution within a wider system if the context of the wider system is inherently unethical? If the primary goal of an institution, no matter how ethical it sets out to be, is to function successfully within a market system, how can it reconcile making a profit and keeping its ethical goals intact? While it has been argued that some ethical businesses do exist, e.g., Johnson and Johnson, the argument I would like (...) to put forth is that no matter how ethical a business institution is, or how ethical its goals are, its capacity to act in an ethical manner is restricted by the wider system in which it must operate, the market system. Unless there is a fundamental change in the notion of the market system itself, the capacity for individual businesses to act in an ethical manner will always be restricted. My argument is divided into two parts. The first part is to show the inherent bias towards unethical outcomes that is inherent in the market system. The second part is to suggest how to reorient the general economic framework in order to make ethical institutions more possible. The question then becomes, how to define economic behavior in terms other than competition for profit. (shrink)

This article compares the work of Jakob von Uexkull and Charles S. Peirce to elucidate two contrasting yet connected images of ecosemiotics. The intent is not simply to oppose their work, but to explore a tension which has implications for the ethical dimension of this emerging discipline. Uexkull’s functional cycle is associated with the image of a circle, which, while emphasizing the integration of organism and environment, is shown to invoke solipsism, and an overly deterministic depiction of ecological (...) relations. Peirce’s drawing of a labyrinth is taken to represent a maze, which, while exemplifying the evolutionary play of ecosystems, may entail a level of unpredictability that is catastrophically chaotic. The root of these diverging depictions is identified with the role of subjectivity in engendering semiotic relations in the work of both Uexkull and Peirce. Where the more regressive aspects of Uexkull’s theoretical biology are mitigated by a teleological interpretation of life’s underlying causality, orientating agency within Peirce’s work depends upon attention to the idea of the self in his philosophy of signs. In conclusion, Eduardo Kohn’s conception of an ‘ecology of selves’ is cited, and the status of the organism as a living symbol of its environment is reaffirmed. (shrink)

We hypothesize that threat of dehydration provided selection pressure for the evolutionary emergence and persistence of the anterior communicating artery (ACoA – the inter‐arterial connection that completes the Circle of Willis) in early amniotes.The ACoA is a hemodynamically insignificant artery, but, as we argue in this paper, its privileged position outside the blood‐brain barrier gives it a crucial sensing function for the osmolarity of the blood against the background of the rest of the brain, which efficiently protects itself from (...) dehydration. Till now, the questions of why the ACoA evolved, and what its physiological function is, have remained unsatisfactorily answered. The traditional view—that the ACoA serves as a collateral source of vascularization in case of arterial stenosis—is anthropocentric, and not in accordance with principles of natural selection that apply more generally. Diseases underlying arterial stenosis are associated with aging and the human lifestyle, so this cannot explain why the ACoA formed hundreds of millions of years ago and persisted in amniotes to this day.The peculiar hemodynamic properties of the ACoA could be selected traits that allowed for more efficient forebrain detection of dehydration and complex behavioral responses to water loss, a major advantage in the survival of early amniotes. This hypothesis also explains insufficient hydration often seen in elderly humans. (shrink)

We hypothesize that threat of dehydration provided selection pressure for the evolutionary emergence and persistence of the anterior communicating artery (ACoA – the inter‐arterial connection that completes the Circle of Willis) in early amniotes.The ACoA is a hemodynamically insignificant artery, but, as we argue in this paper, its privileged position outside the blood‐brain barrier gives it a crucial sensing function for the osmolarity of the blood against the background of the rest of the brain, which efficiently protects itself from (...) dehydration. Till now, the questions of why the ACoA evolved, and what its physiological function is, have remained unsatisfactorily answered. The traditional view—that the ACoA serves as a collateral source of vascularization in case of arterial stenosis—is anthropocentric, and not in accordance with principles of natural selection that apply more generally. Diseases underlying arterial stenosis are associated with aging and the human lifestyle, so this cannot explain why the ACoA formed hundreds of millions of years ago and persisted in amniotes to this day.The peculiar hemodynamic properties of the ACoA could be selected traits that allowed for more efficient forebrain detection of dehydration and complex behavioral responses to water loss, a major advantage in the survival of early amniotes. This hypothesis also explains insufficient hydration often seen in elderly humans. (shrink)

Foucault rejects the subject as a center, i.e. as a transparent self-conscious being, who gives meaning to his actions. However, ideas about subjects that think and will autonomously go on functioning within modern culture. Discourses on subjectivity call for an archeological and genealogical explanation. This compels Foucault to resort increasingly to subjectivity: as product and target of power, but also as a source of resistance and as an agent. After all, Foucault defines power as ‘actions about actions’. In the end, (...) Foucault started to circumscribe the teleology of his philosophical ethos as the production of new forms of subjectivity, in terms of freedom and autonomy. Concern is more with a continuous circling transgression, apprehending subjectivity as an aimless self-negation, than it is about a return of the subject. (shrink)

Person reidentification aims to recognize a specific pedestrian from uncrossed surveillance camera views. Most re-id methods perform the retrieval task by comparing the similarity of pedestrian features extracted from deep learning models. Therefore, learning a discriminative feature is critical for person reidentification. Many works supervise the model learning with one or more loss functions to obtain the discriminability of features. Softmax loss is one of the widely used loss functions in re-id. However, traditional softmax loss inherently focuses on the feature (...) separability and fails to consider the compactness of within-class features. To further improve the accuracy of re-id, many efforts are conducted to shrink within-class discrepancy as well as between-class similarity. In this paper, we propose a circle-based ratio loss for person re-identification. Concretely, we normalize the learned features and classification weights to map these vectors in the hypersphere. Then we take the ratio of the maximal intraclass distance and the minimal interclass distance as an objective loss, so the between-class separability and within-class compactness can be optimized simultaneously during the training stage. Finally, with the joint training of an improved softmax loss and the ratio loss, the deep model could mine discriminative pedestrian information and learn robust features for the re-id task. Comprehensive experiments on three re-id benchmark datasets are carried out to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. Specially, 83.12% mAP on Market-1501, 71.66% mAP on DukeMTMC-reID, and 66.26%/63.24% mAP on CUHK03 labeled/detected are achieved, respectively. (shrink)

The article examines the main ideological content of the work of the community of scientists and philosophers, which entered the history of philosophy under the name “The Vienna Circle”. Representatives of this association viewed their main methodological task in the logical analysis of the language of science in order to eliminate metaphysical – pseudoscientific – concepts. They investigated the structure of scientific theories, the functions of the theory – explanation and prediction, the processes of justification, confirmation and refutation of (...) theories. Their results were widely recognized, set down essential influence on scientific problems as well as style of philosophical and academic studies, and are still included in textbooks on the philosophy of science. The members of the Vienna Circle created the first holistic concept of science, which gave impetus to subsequent developments in the philosophy of science and served as example for the construction of similar concepts. The socio-ideological prerequisite of this philosophical movement was the task of creating a new scientific view of the world, opposing philosophical pessimism and anti-scientism. This worldview, however, was not naive-scientististic, but presented a synthetic project at the intersection of natural science, philosophy, art and social pedagogy. (shrink)

Rationality and reason are topics so fraught for feminists that any useful reflection on them requires some prior exploration of the difficulties they have caused. One of those difficulties for feminists and, I suspect, for others in the margins of modernity, is the rhetoric of reason – the ways reason is bandied about as a qualification differentially bestowed on different types of person. Rhetorically, it functions in different ways depending on whether it is being denied or affirmed. In this paper, (...) I want to explore these rhetorics of reason as they are considered in the work of two feminist philosophers. I shall draw on their work for some suggestions about how to think about rationality, and begin to use those suggestions to develop a constructive account that withstands the rhetorical temptations. (shrink)

Looking for an adequate explication of the concept of a biological function, several authors have proposed to link function to design. Unfortunately, known explications of biological design in turn refer to functions. The concept of general design I will introduce here breaks up this circle. I specify design with respect to its ontogenetic role. This allows function to be based on design without making reference to the history of the design, or to the phylogeny of an organism, while retaining (...) the normative aspect of function ascriptions. The concept is applicable to the function and design of technical artifacts as well. Several problems well known with other definitions can be overcome by this approach. (shrink)

Hermeneutics, or the theory of interpretation, is an extremely important branch of epistemology that has, in the past twenty years, been receiving an increasing amount of attention. There is now a fairly extensive body of rather daunting literature in the field, most of it originating in the European phenomenological tradition. Dimensions of the Hermeneutic Circle is intended to give readers who are philosophically sophisticated but not yet conversant with hermeneutics a comprehensive overview of the history and concerns of the (...) discipline. It shows how the development of hermeneutics in the past two centuries coincided with a gradual increase in our appreciation of the subtleties and many variations of the hermeneutic circle. It also makes explicity some of the more important ways in which the hermeneutic circle can be seen to function in the practices of the natural sciences, thus bridging the methodological gap between the Geisteswissenschaften and the natural sciences. The book is illustrated with forty diagrams representing the variation of the hermeneutic circle, further reinforcing the clarity of exposition. It will therefore be appropriate as core text for graduate or senior courses on hermeneutics or literary theory, and as supplementary text for courses in the philosophy of science, historiography, and aesthetics. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article is about three bodies of visual work that raise questions of cultural belonging, hybridity, and memory. I use languages of printmaking, drawing, photography, and poetry to creatively trace processes of memory of place and meanings we make with it. In Migrant Universe, drawings function as rearrangeable continua of maps, landscapes, and portraits of memory and identity. Catalogue of Silence, an installation of photographs, an essay, and poems about the state of cultural institutions in my native city of (...) Sarajevo, is an elegy for what has been irretrievably lost as well as a testament of hope that the city will rebound and be, as it was in the past, a fertile ground for new ways of cultural thriving. In Beginnings and Endings, a series of etchings, images culled from science, explosion traces, and comic book speech bubbles are placed on liquid and unsteady ground, invaded by fungi, functioning as icons of precarity: the loss and the promise of it. In this precipitous moment in human history, in American history, what can we learn about our survival as a species, and a global civilization, from the stories of migrants, seeds, and mushrooms? (shrink)

Teleological theories are often dismissed in the study of animal behaviour, because of both the anthropomorphic element, and the paradox of retro-causation. Instead, emergent properties of animal systems, such as those which drive behaviour and decision making, are generally deemed to be non-purposeful. Nonetheless, organisms’ interactions with the environment, including sensory processing, have long been subject to biological study, and the resulting models include Jakob von Uexküll’s functional circle (part of his ‘Umwelt Theory’). The functional circle (...) is modelled on an assumption of three- dimensional space containing matter and energy, and one-dimensional, linear time. Moreover, the function of such models relies upon feedback within biological systems, and generally assume that the functional feedback loops close. I argue that this is impossible, because a feedback loop cannot go back intime to close itself, and so whilst it may approximate closure in space, it does not close in the dimension of time. To address this problem, I propose a conceptual model where time is treated as having a three- dimensional structure, and is measured in terms of past, future, and subjective present, termed the ‘period,’ ‘present’ and ‘phase,’ respectively. Space and matter, meanwhile, occur as a two- dimensional intersect, in which three-dimensional emergent properties which occur ion time are embedded. The model relies on functional helices rather than circles, and the loops of each helix (unlike circular loops) never achieve closure. I explain how this therefore results in a biological system, based on both feedback and anticipatory probabilities, which is both autopoietic and teleological. I also provide examples of how the concept can be applied, using foraging behaviour as an example. I further propose the theoretical origin of such a system is ‘timing’ and ‘rhythm,’ both of which I argue have their origins in single cellular organisms’ chemotaxis and the associated gradient descent search. (shrink)

Realists about color, be they dispositionalists or physicalists, agree on the truth of the following claim: (R) x is red iff x is disposed to look red under standard conditions. The disagreement is only about whether to identify the colors with the relevant dispositions, or with their categorical bases. This is a question about the representational content of color experience: What kind of properties do color experiences ascribe to objects? It has been argued (for instance by Boghossian and Velleman, 1991) (...) that truths like (R) cannot be used in an account of the colors as they would result in ‚circular’, and therefore empty, contents. It has also been argued (for instance by Harman, 1996) that switching to an account of color in terms of a functional account of color sensations would result in a circular, and therefore empty, account. In this paper, I defend a realist account of color in terms of a (non-reductive) functional account of color sensations. Such an account of sensations has been suggested by Pagin (2000), and it can be applied to color sensations without the resulting account of the colors themselves being circular or empty. I argue that the so-called transparency of experience does not provide any argument against such an account. I also argue that on such an account, the issue of physicalism vs. dispositionalism boils down to the question of the modal profile of the color concepts. (shrink)

The standard version of the story of Russell's theory of types gives legitimately precedence to the vicious circle principle, but it fails to appreciate the significance of the doctrine of incomplete symbols and of the ultimate universalist perspective of Russell's logic. It is what the Author tries to do. This enables him to resolve the apparent contradiction which exists in "Principles" between the ontological commitment of the theory itself with respect to individuals, propositions, and functions, and the inventory of (...) the world, according to which there are only individuals and elementary facts. (shrink)

Brain functions are stochastic processes without intentionality whereas mind emerges from brain functions as a Hegelian “change from quantity”, that is, on the order of 1012 profusely interconnected neurons, “into a new quality”: the collective phenomenon of the brain's self-experience. This self-referential and self-observing quality we have in mind is capable of (recursively) observing its self-observations, i.e., interpreting change that is meaningful in relation to itself. The notion of self-interpretation embodies the idea of a “hermeneutic circle”, that is, (in (...) interpretation theory) the treatment of the whole in relation to its parts. (shrink)

Traditionally, certified public accountants (CPAs) have served a unique role in the world of commerce and the profession of accounting. They perform an attest function and thereby serve as the chief providers of relevant, high quality accounting information to the decision making public. CPAs are licensed practitioners, who as expert independent accountants express opinions about an entity'sfinancial statements. Their license provides them with the exclusive right to perform this attest function. This monoploy relies on the concept of independence that is (...) the normative standard of accountancy. It is this perceived independence of auditors which provides credibility, reliability and trust in the financial accounting information upon which stakeholders depend to make informed decisions. Now, however, we see the environment in which CPAs operate undergoing rapid change. Both the globalization of business operations and technological advances have radically changed how and where accountants work and the speed at which things happen. The very nature of accounting information services is evolving; moving from a concentration on audits to an increasing reliance on consulting and assurance services. New ethical issues have been raised by this confluence of changes in the accounting environment. Noteworthy is that the application of the principle of independence by CPAs has been called into question by no other than the SEC. Are those stakeholders who depend upon the independence of CPAs at risk? The influence of insiders has significantly increased as accounting firms perform multiple tasks for the same clients. This paper discusses the different groups who can potentially impair the independence of auditors and the steps that are being taken to enhance the "independence" of the auditors. (shrink)

This article distinguishes between Machian empiricism and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle and associated philosophers. Mach's natural philosophy was a first order attempt to reform and reorganize physics, not a second order reconstruction of the "language" of physics. Mach's elements were not sense data but realistic events in the natural world and in minds, and Mach admitted unobserved elements as part of his world view. Mach's critique of metaphysics was far more subtle and concerned the elimination of (...) sensory visual imagery from natural science, leaving only concrete elements and functions, very much an inspiration to the young Einstein and Heisenberg and a useful engine of theory construction in physics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 63.3 (2002) 521-537 [Access article in PDF] Two Routes "to Concreteness" in the Work of the Bakhtin Circle Craig Brandist In 1918 the young Georg Lukács published an obituary of the last major Baden School neo-Kantian Emil Lask in which the latter's varied work was commended for being "underlain by an essential common drive [Drang]: the drive to concreteness." 1 This "drive" (...) was especially problematic, however, in the work of thinkers overtly committed to neo-Kantianism, a doctrine that was in its own time a byword for abstruseness and academic abstraction. Just how concrete could a neo-Kantian idealism become without abandoning its core insistence that the world is "produced" by indwelling categories of mind? Lask pursued this problem with a thoroughness unmatched by any other German neo-Kantian, and in doing so he became an important influence on, among others, Lukács, Max Weber, and Martin Heidegger. This article discusses the prevalence of the same "drive" in the varied work of those Russian champions of neo-Kantianism, the Bakhtin Circle, where "concreteness" is invoked so frequently that it almost begins to take on the character of a mantra. The case of the Bakhtin Circle is especially illustrative because the "drive to concreteness," which all members of the Circle shared, resulted in a significant difference of opinion about the extent to which the central theses of neo-Kantianism can be salvaged. Like Lask, Bakhtin was particularly keen to maintain the core of neo-Kantian ideas, while Voloshinov and, following behind him, Medvedev, were much less averse to breaking with the central project of German idealism itself. In each case the Brentanian notion of intentionality, the doctrine that consciousness is always consciousness of something, plays a central role. Consciousness exists in acts directed towards objects, existent or otherwise, that are given to consciousness. Brentano and his followers were invariably anti-Kantian, and they were extremely hostile to the central tenet of neo-Kantian idealism, that objects of consciousness are "produced" from categories dwelling in a transcendental [End Page 521] "consciousness in general" (Bewusstsein überhaupt). While it is far from certain that Brentanian and Kantian principles are incompatible at every level, there is no doubt that any attempt to integrate the notion of intentionality into neo-Kantianism was going to threaten the basis of neo-Kantianism as such. 2 As Gabriel Motzkin notes, Lask's attempt to carry such a project through to its logical conclusion ultimately led to "the destruction of the neo-Kantian empire from within." 3 The Bakhtinian project led in precisely this direction, and this article examines the way in which the work of the Circle shows distinct and ultimately incompatible responses to the crisis of the "empire." Revising neo-Kantianism: Ernst Cassirer and Emil Lask The abstract, or what Bakhtin terms the "theoretist," character of neo-Kantianism derived from two fundamental and interrelated features. The first was a principled opposition to all distinctions between cognition and perception, and the second was an identification of subjectivity with the system of objectifying functions that have their true being in cultural documents. According to neo-Kantian principles, nothing is "given" and everything is posited in an act of subjective spontaneity: objects are constituted from transcendental categories dwelling in "pure consciousness." Summing up the philosophical project of Hermann Cohen, the leader of the Marburg School, Ernst Cassirer noted that "any appeal to a merely given should fall aside; in place of every supposed foundation in things there should enter the pure foundations of thinking, of willing, of artistic and religious consciousness." 4Though seeking to broaden his own enquiry beyond the "trichotomy of the Kantian Critiques," Cassirer, the last major Marburg neo-Kantian, remained wedded to the neo-Kantian project of deriving the transcendental preconditions of the "formations" in which the "objective spirit... consists and exists" and dealt only with a universal subject devoid of practical limitations. 5 Cassirer drew close to phenomenology in the 1920s, when he embarked on his great project The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, presenting... (shrink)

Philosophy is considered a very difficult field of knowledge and yet probably no other field of knowledge is as confused and muddle-headed as philosophy. As one of the oldest fields of knowledge of the human race it has existed for several thousand years. Yet, incredibly, in all these several thousand years, it has not been able to clarify what its objectives, methods, characteristics, or functions really are. Even today philosophers are still discussing fundamental questions, such as "What is philosophy?" and (...) "What does philosophy study?" In comparison with the flourishing prospects of science, philosophy appears to be in quite a depression. Even though it is philosophy that has given birth to science and nurtured science, in modern times the sciences have gradually joined hands with one another in what appeared to be an attempt to drive philosophy out of the hall of knowledge. Some soft-hearted scientists and philosophers who have been influenced quite deeply by science have made attempts to transform philosophy in accordance with the outlook of science in the hope that philosophy will therefore continue to exist within the boundaries of human wisdom; yet whether we are talking about driving philosophy out or using science to reform philosophy, the results come back to the same thing, which is the repudiation of the value of philosophy to exist in that is still in the process of growing and maturing, and is forever young. (shrink)

In Squaring the Circle in Descartes’ Meditations, Stephen Wagner aims to show that Descartes’ project in the Meditations is best understood as a ‘strong validation of reason’ i.e., as proving in a non-circular way that human reason is a reliable, truth-conducive faculty. For such an enterprise to qualify as a ‘strong’ validation, Wagner contends, skeptical doubt must be given its strongest force. The most stringent doubt available in the Meditations is the deceiving God. To rule out the possibility that (...) an omnipotent God created humans so that their best functioning cognitive faculties provide misleading information about what the world is like, Descartes must prove that a non-deceiving God exists. Furthermore, only a non-circular proof will count as a ‘validation.’ Wagner spells out the requirements of non-circularity as involving a proof for God’s existence that is not deductive, does not simply achieve a clear and distinct perception of God’s existence, and proceeds on the basis of perceptions that remain true even when the reasons underlying them are not attended to any longer by the meditator. (shrink)

Abstract - Evolutionary, ecological and ethical studies are, at the same time, specific scientific disciplines and, from an historical point of view, structurally linked domains of research. In a context of environmental crisis, the need is increasingly emerging for a connecting epistemological framework able to express a common or convergent tendency of thought and practice aimed at building, among other things, an environmental policy management respectful of the planet’s biodiversity and its evolutionary potential. -/- Evolutionary biology, ecology and ethics: at (...) first glance, three different objects of research, three different worldviews and three different scientific communities. In reality, there are both structural and historical links between these disciplines. First, some topics are obviously common across the board. Second, the emerging need for environmental policy management has gradually but radically changed the relationship between these disciplines. Over the last decades in particular, there has emerged a need for an interconnecting meta-paradigm that integrates more strictly evolutionary studies, biodiversity studies and the ethical frameworks that are most appropriate for allowing a lasting co-evolution between natural and social systems. Today such a need is more than a mere luxury, it is an epistemological and practical necessity. -/- In short, the authors of this volume address some of the foundational themes that interconnect evolutionary studies, ecology and ethics. Here they have chosen to analyze a topic using one of these specific disciplines as a kind of epistemological platform with specific links to topics from one or both of the remaining disciplines. Michael Ruse’s chapter, for instance, elucidates some of the structural links between Darwinismand ethics. Ruse analyzes the Evolutionism vs. Creationism debate, emphasizing the risks run by scientists when they ideologize the scientific content of their studies. In the case of the contributions of Jean Gayon and Jean-Marc Drouin, which respectively deal with the disciplines of evolutionary biology and ecology, some central connections have been developed between these two disciplines, while reserving the option to consider in detail their topic in order to discover essential features ormeanings. Gayon analyzes the multilayered meanings of “chance” in evolutionary studies and the methodological implications that accompany such disparatemeanings. Froma similar analytical perspective, Drouin’s contribution focuses on the identification and critical evaluation of the different conceptions of time in ecology. Chance and time, factors of evolution in species and ecological systems, play a very important function in both disciplines, and these chapters help to capture their polysemous structure and development. Bryan Norton’s chapter, on adaptive environmental management, is set within an epistemological context where the Darwinian paradigm, ecological knowledge and ethical frameworks meet to give rise to practical, conservationist policies. In his contribution, Patrick Blandin pleads for the necessity of an eco-evolutionary ethics capable of fully encompassing humanity’s responsibility in the future determination of the biosphere’s evolutionary paths. Our value systems must recognize the predominant place that humanity has taken in the evolutionary history of the planet, and integrate the ethical ramifications of scientific advances in evolutionary and ecological studies. The chapter by J. Baird Callicott introduces us to a metaphorical ecological reversion with direct consequences for our moral conduct. If ecology showed that ecosystems are not organisms, recognizing organisms as a kind of ecosystem could be the basis for a new post-modern ecological ethics that lays the foundation for a better moral integration of humans with the environment. The contributions of Robin Attfield and Tom Regan delve into some of the classical issues in environmental ethics, situating them within a broader ecological and evolutionary context. Attfield’s chapter tackles the confrontation between individualistic and ecologically holistic perspectives, their different approaches to the issue of intrinsic value, and their tangled relation to monism and pluralism. Regan’s contribution ponders the criteria that allow individual beings, human and non-human, to own moral rights, the role of the struggle for existence in the relationship between species, and the logical difficulties involved in attributing intrinsic value to collective entities (species, ecosystems). Catherine Larrère’s chapter discusses the opposition between two environmental and ethical worldviews with very different philosophical centers of gravity: nature and technology. These opposing perspectives have direct consequences not only for the perception of the problems at hand and for what entities are deemed morally significant, but also for the proposed solutions. -/- To set out some foundational events in the history of evolutionary biology, ecology and environmental ethics is a first necessary step towards a clarification of their major epistemological orientations. On the basis of this inevitably nonexhaustive history, it will be possible to better position the work of the different contributors, and to build a meta-paradigm, i.e. a connecting epistemological framework resulting from one common or convergent tendency of thought and practice shared by different disciplines. (shrink)

John Venn has the “uneasy suspicion” that the stagnation in mathematical logic between J. H. Lambert and George Boole was due to Kant’s “disastrous effect on logical method,” namely the “strictest preservation [of logic] from mathematical encroachment.” Kant’s actual position is more nuanced, however. In this chapter, I tease out the nuances by examining his use of Leonhard Euler’s circles and comparing it with Euler’s own use. I do so in light of the developments in logical calculus from G. W. (...) Leibniz to Lambert and Gottfried Ploucquet. While Kant is evidently open to using mathematical tools in logic, his main concern is to clarify what mathematical tools can be used to achieve. For without such clarification, all efforts at introducing mathematical tools into logic would be blind if not complete waste of time. In the end, Kant would stress, the means provided by formal logic at best help us to express and order what we already know in some sense. No matter how much mathematical notations may enhance the precision of this function of formal logic, it does not change the fact that no truths can, strictly speaking, be revealed or established by means of those notations. (shrink)

Abstract In a context of human demographic, technological and economic pressure on natural systems, we face some demanding challenges. We must decide 1) whether to “preserve” nature for its own sake or to “conserve” nature because nature is essentially a reservoir of goods that are functional to humanity’s wellbeing; 2) to choose ways of life that respect the biodiversity and evolutionary potential of the planet; and, to allow all this to come to fruition, 3) to clearly define the role (...) of scientific expertise in a democratic society, recognizing the importance of biospheric equilibrium. In fact, in socio-scientific controversies, which are characterized by complex linkages between some life and environmental sciences objects and economic, political and ethical issues, a posture of transparent, impartial commitment is appearing, more and more, as a deontological necessity. (shrink)

My purpose in this paper is to look at Cassirer's relation to critical philosophy from a new perspective. Most discussions concerning Cassirer's Kantianism have so far centered on his relation to neo-Kantianism and the Marburg school. My focus will not be on neo-Kantianism but on Cassirer's notion of a "critique of culture." In an often cited paragraph from the introduction to The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer says that his aim is to broaden Kant's critical approach to all various forms (...) of culture, to language as well as myth and art, and thus to transform the "critique of reason" into the "critique of culture." I will explore Cassirer's concept of the "critique of culture" and suggest that it can best be understood by placing it in the context of early twentieth century German philosophy. More precisely, I will aim to show that Cassirer's critique can be seen as an effort to find a middle path between Lebensphilosophie and the positivism of the Vienna Circle. (shrink)

In his biography of Emil Artin, Richard Brauer describes the years from 1931–1941 as a time when “Artin spoke through his students and through the members of his mathematical circle” rather than through written publications. This paper explores these seemingly quiet years when Artin immigrated to America and disseminated ideas about algebraic number theory during this time in his collaboration with George Whaples, a young American mathematician who had just completed his Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin. The main (...) result of their work is the use of the product formula for valuations to come up with an axiomatic characterization of both algebraic number fields and algebraic function fields with a finite field of constants. These two families of fields are exactly the fields for which class field theory is known to hold. We situate their mathematical work in the broader context of algebraic number theory and their lives within the broader historical context. (shrink)

The Cobb-Douglas regression, a statistical technique developed to estimate what economists called a 'production function', was introduced in the late 1920s. For several years, only economist Paul Douglas and a few collaborators used the technique, while vigorously defending it against numerous critics. By the 1950s, however, several economists beyond Douglas's circle were using the technique, and by the 1970s, Douglas's regression, and more sophisticated procedures inspired by it, had become standard parts of the empirical economist's toolkit. This volume is (...) the story of the Cobb-Douglas regression from its introduction to its acceptance as general-purpose research tool. The story intersects with the histories of several important empirical research programs in twentieth century economics, and vividly portrays the challenges of empirical economic research during that era. Fundamentally, this work represents a case study of how a controversial, innovative research tool comes to be widely accepted by a community of scholars. (shrink)

In this report we develop the basic properties of a set of functions analogous to the circular and hyperbolic functions, but based on L p circles. The resulting identities may simplify analysis in L p spaces in much the way that the circular functions do in Euclidean space. In any case, they are a pleasing example of mathematical generalization.

The quantum transition probability assignment is an equiareal transformation from the annulus of symplectic spinorial amplitudes to the disk of complex state vectors, which makes it equivalent to the equiareal projection of Archimedes. The latter corresponds to a symplectic synchronization method, which applies to the quantum phase space in view of Weyl’s quantization approach involving an Abelian group of unitary ray rotations. We show that Archimedes’ method of synchronization, in terms of a measure-preserving transformation to an equiareal disk, imposes the (...) integrality of the quantum of action, and requires the extension of the classical moment map from the real line to the circle. Additionally, the same synchronization method is encoded in the structure of the Heisenberg group, viewed as a principal bundle with a connection, whose curvature and anholonomy is expressed in terms of area bounding loops in relation to the underlying Abelian shadow on a symplectic plane. In this manner, we show that the geometric phase pertains to the minimal synchronized area \ of the 2-d symplectic Abelian shadow of the symplectic ball, modulo \. The integrality condition naturally leads to the consideration of modular commutative observables pertaining to the role of the discrete Heisenberg group. We prove that the structural transition from non-commutativity to modular commutativity in accordance to Weyl’s group-theoretic commutation relations takes place via universal factorization through the discrete Heisenberg group. In this way, we derive a homology-theoretic formulation of the synchronization method in terms of the area-bounding cells of the modular lattice \ in relation to any Abelian symplectic shadow. Thus, we finally obtain the physical interpretation of the analytic representation of quantum states as theta functions corresponding to the sections of a complex line bundle with an integral symplectic structure. (shrink)

In the Greek/Indian period, it is noticeable that different radii were used in connection with the chord. This manner continued in the Indian period with the sine, i.e. different sine tables existed. But throughout the Arabic-Islamic period, there was stability in the radius (for the sine). At the time of al-Batt new terms were introduced, not as functions of angles but as lengths, and again different tables for the same term. Here these terms were not bounded to the circle, (...) and the term miqythe radiusfunctions al-Waf’s time, there was an advancement by introducing the new terms as functions of angles, and they were immediately bounded to the circle, and instead of having two circles in the same figure, a kind of unity appeared, and again there was stability in the value of r, and therefore only one table for each function, and thus the new functions started to appear more abstract than practical as the sine did before, and this unity remained fixed in the modern times. (shrink)

The paper hypothesizes the possibility of applying the mathematical construction of the Taylor series in the semantic space. Then symbolic forms, like some spiritual functions that display the immanent in semantic space and are explicated in the form of verbal constructions, can be tried to decompose into a Taylor series. The first terms of the Taylor series of thinking functions carry basic meanings that are conjectured by secondary forms, tertiary, etc., as in the case of the usual Taylor series, where (...) the first term of the series is a constant, the second term is linear, determined by the first derivative of the function, the third is quadratic, otherwise acceleration. The paper shows that all of the above can be found in the paradigms of thinking called Foucault epistems. The world in ancient philosophy seemed unchangeable or cyclical, which refers us to the concept of a constant or the first term of the Taylor series of the function of thinking. With the advent of Christianity, the circle of time turned into a straight line, the concept of evolution appeared. This stage was completed by Galileo, who introduced the idea of speed into the paradigm of thinking, which completed the formation of the second, linear term of the Taylor series of the thinking function. The third term of the series appeared in Newton's theory and entered the next episteme with the idea of acceleration. Deductively, one can continue the decomposition of the thinking function into a Taylor series and imagine the appearance of a member of the series responsible for the third derivative. (shrink)

With reference to recently proposed theoretical models accounting for reduction in terms of a unified dynamics governing all physical processes, we analyze the problem of working out a worldview accommodating our knowledge about natural phenomena. We stress the relevant conceptual differences between the considered models and standard quantum mechanics. In spite of the fact that both theories describe systems within a genuine Hilbert space framework, the peculiar features of the spontaneous reduction models limit drastically the states which are dynamically stable. (...) This fact by itself allows one to work out an interpretation of the formalism which makes it possible to give a satisfactory description of the world in terms of the values taken by an appropriately defined mass density function in ordinary configuration space. A topology based on this function and which is radically different from the one characterizing the Hilbert space is introduced, and in terms of it the idea of similarity of macroscopic situations is precisely defined. Finally, the formalism and the interpretation are shown to yield a natural criterion for establishing the psychophysical parallelism. The conclusion is that, within the considered theories and at the nonrelativistic level, one can satisfy all sensible requirements for a completely satisfactory macro-objective description of reality. (shrink)

ObjectiveIn this study we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate whether motor imagery of handwriting and circle drawing activates a similar handwriting network as writing and drawing itself.MethodsEighteen healthy right-handed participants wrote the German word “Wellen” and drew continuously circles in a sitting and lying position to capture kinematic handwriting parameters such as velocity, pressure and regularity of hand movements. Afterward, they performed the same tasks during fMRI in a MI and an executed condition.ResultsThe kinematic analysis revealed (...) a general correlation of handwriting parameters during sitting and lying except of pen pressure during drawing. Writing compared to imagined writing was accompanied by an increased activity of the ipsilateral cerebellum and the contralateral sensorimotor cortex. Executed compared to imagined drawing revealed elevated activity of a fronto–parieto-temporal network. By contrasting writing and drawing directly, executed writing induced an enhanced activation of the left somatosensory and premotor area. The comparison of the MI of these tasks revealed a higher involvement of occipital activation during imagined writing.ConclusionThe kinematic results pointed to a high comparability of writing in a vertical and horizontal position. Overall, we observed highly overlapping cortical activity except of a higher involvement of motor control areas during motor execution. The sparse difference between writing and drawing can be explained by highly automatized writing in healthy individuals. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with answering the question, what is the central argument of Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing that brings its opening ontological approach to the subject of first philosophy to its ultimate theological goal and conclusion? This dissertation contends that it is the function of the fundamental scientific first principles of metaphysics, and in particular the fundamental primary notion necessary, to provide the intelligible link that Avicenna employs to demonstrate the existence and true-nature of the divine necessary existence (...) in itself on the basis of his doctrine of being. This conclusion is pursued through a systematic and cumulative line of inquiry that begins in Part I with Avicenna’s logical–cum–epistemological doctrine of conceptualization and assent, the heuristic order of the basic scientific questions, and his theory of a demonstrative science. The thesis then moves from the wider concentric circles concerned with logical matters into a series of narrowing concentric circles pertaining to the scientific order of the MH. Part II presents a close analysis of the Metaphysics of the Healing’s novel reception and reorganization of Aristotelian metaphysics according to Avicenna’s theory of demonstrative science, which consists in a subject, scientific first principles, and objects of inquiry that includes the species, proper accidents, and the science’s ultimate goal which is the aitiological–cum–theological inquiry into the causes of being. Part III transitions into a still narrower set of concentric circles that provide a detailed explication of the formal and material aspects of the scientific first principles of the Metaphysics of the Healing. Finally, the main argument of the thesis reaches the central point and question of the dissertation in Part IV, which establishes the fundamentality of the primary notion the necessary in the ontology, aitiology, and theology of the Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing. Part IV concludes that the principal function of the fundamental primary notion the necessary is to provide the intelligible link that connects Avicenna’s doctrine of being with the divine necessary existence in itself. (shrink)

The Cobb-Douglas regression, a statistical technique developed to estimate what economists called a 'production function', was introduced in the late 1920s. For several years, only economist Paul Douglas and a few collaborators used the technique, while vigorously defending it against numerous critics. By the 1950s, however, several economists beyond Douglas's circle were using the technique, and by the 1970s, Douglas's regression, and more sophisticated procedures inspired by it, had become standard parts of the empirical economist's toolkit. This volume is (...) the story of the Cobb-Douglas regression from its introduction to its acceptance as general-purpose research tool. The story intersects with the histories of several important empirical research programs in twentieth century economics, and vividly portrays the challenges of empirical economic research during that era. Fundamentally, this work represents a case study of how a controversial, innovative research tool comes to be widely accepted by a community of scholars. (shrink)

The philosophical roots of Malinowski's functionalism are in the academic circles of Krakow, where three figures seem to have exerted a particularly strong influence: Pawlicki, Straszewski, and Heinrich. The predominant trend in philosophy at that time was empiriocriticism, as developed by Mach and Avenarius. Also important were F. A. Lange's interpretation of Marburg neo-Kantianism. It should be noted that the historical philosophy field was extremely broad and diverse. Functionalism, a philosophically open concept, cannot be subordinated to any one philosophical system, (...) although the "openness" of functionalism is not absolute but complemented by its "closedness" to certain other philosophies. Praxism pervades functionalist theory and even creates its foundation. Malinowski approach is entirely scientific, but functionalism is never just empirical. Malinowski realized that pure experience is as impossible as pure reasoning. (shrink)

Carl Jung's work played an important role in shaping modern psychology. Through a thorough exploration of Jung's psychological ideas and the ancient beliefs of shamanistic cultures, this unique investigation unveils startling parallels between the two. As different as they may seem at first glance, these two branches of human paradigm and belief have amazing similarities in structure and function. Interspersed with the writings of Jung, this fascinating account traces the forces and patterns of symbolism common to shamanism and depth psychology. (...) By studying these parallels, it is possible to get a glimpse into major aspects of the human psyche and understand the universality of psychic events in time and space. (shrink)

One of the most important discourses in contemporary religious studies is the definition of the essence and role of religious education and the problem of its coexistence with the secular. On this occasion in the circle of researchers there are diverse, sometimes opposite, points of view. The following headings of the reception of expediency of the implementation of religious education are as follows: 1) the emphasis on the current legislation on the separation of church from the state, in particular (...) the laws of Ukraine "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" and "On Education"; 2) comparison of foreign experience in implementation of the implementation of religious education in the practice of social life, comparative analysis of the positions of supporters and opponents of religious education; 3) outline the problems of religious and spiritual education in the context of the formation of state-church relations, the complexity of incorporation of the religious component into the system of secular education, their demarcation; 4) the relevance of the distinction and delineation of religious and religious studies, the specificity of their functional orientation. (shrink)

Let g E(m, n)=o mean that n is the Gödel-number of the shortest derivation from E of an equation of the form (m)=k. Hao Wang suggests that the condition for general recursiveness mn(g E(m, n)=o) can be proved constructively if one can find a speedfunction s s, with s(m) bounding the number of steps for getting a value of (m), such that mn s(m) s.t. g E(m, n)=o. This idea, he thinks, yields a constructivist notion of an effectively computable function, (...) one that doesn't get us into a vicious circle since we intuitively know, to begin with, that certain proofs are constructive and certain functions effectively computable. This paper gives a broad possibility proof for the existence of such classes of effectively computable functions, with Wang's idea of effective computability generalized along a number of dimensions. (shrink)

This paper seeks to add a new facet to the definition (s) of fascism, that amorphous social, cultural, political, and aesthetic conception that has inspired no small degree of controversy over the years since the defeat of the Nazis—indeed, even since the ascension of Mussolini. I argue that the conception of “decadence” by ruling or vanguard party circles, and the expression of a need for such decadence to be purged for the health of the society, is a central tenet of (...) fascist or crypto-fascist ideology in either its rise to power or renewed consolidation of power. In this view, “fascim”, does not necessarily mean the Nazis, and “decadence” need not signify a circumscribed artistic definition, connoting a certain circle of late-nineteenth-century painters in poets, especially in France. Though I regard period-circumscribed views of fascism and decadence as informative, I hope to offer a new framework in which the two concepts, seen in perpetual, relation to each other, break historical bonds and tell us about deeper, transhistorical political trends. In doing so, we may be better equipped to guard against the renewed emergence of crypto-fascist ideology by taking this rhetoric of a “purgation of decadence,” wherever it comes from, as a serious warning. Thus I will use historical cases outside of the standard Hitler-Mussolini axis that I view to exhibit overtly fascist tendencies, such as Khmer Rouge Cambodia and Cultural Revolution Maoist China, and I will make normative claims about current ideological currents that, while certainly not neo-Nazi, may also contain fascist or crypto-fascist tendencies. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to determine the place of Marxism in Polish literary studies of the 20th century. The starting point is Czesław Miłosz’s comment on the identity of Marxism and structuralism; the absence of the term ‘Marxism’ in the names of Polish workers’ parties and pro-Marxist academic discourse. Referring to political history, I suggest an explanation of this state of affairs, revealing the function of Marxism under different names in philosophical texts from the beginning of the 20th century. (...) To support my argument, I draw on documents from the newly discovered archive of Dawid Hopensztand. I use this archive to reconstruct his social biography and justify the main thesis about the permanent presence of Marxism in the works of such thinkers as Leszek Kołakowski, Zygmunt Bauman, and even Czesław Miłosz. (shrink)

Learning and adaptation are central problems to both edusemiotics, or semiotics of education, and biosemiotics. Bildung, as an especially human way or form of learning, and evolution as the main form of adaptation for many biologists after Darwin are often regarded as mutually exclusive concepts even though human beings are undeniably one biological species among others. In this article I will try to build a bridge between the biosemiotical, edusemiotical and Bildung-theoretical stances. Central to this discussion is biosemiotician Kalevi Kull (...) and some of his recent publications where he considers adaptation, evolution and learning. The primary theoretical resource that I utilize here, in addition to the general Greimassian, edusemiotical and Bildungtheoretical starting points, is perceptual control theory (PCT) to which I compare the Uexkullian conception of functional circle. (shrink)

In the work of Lorenz we find an initial phase of great concordance with Uexkülls theory of animals’ surrounding-world, followed by a progressive distance and by the occurrence of more and more critical statements. The moment of greater cohesion between Lorenz and Uexküll is represented by the work Der Kumpan, which is focused on the concept of companion, functional circles, social Umwelt. The great change in Lorenz’ evaluation of Uexküll is marked by the conference of 1948 Referat über Jakob (...) von Uexküll, where Lorenz highlights the vitalist position of Uexküll. In the works of the years after World War II, the influence of the Estonian Biologist greatly diminishes, even though Lorenz continues to express his admiration for particular studies and concepts of Uexküll. References to Uexküll’s work are less and far in between, while the difference is highlighted between the uexküllian theoretical frame and Lorenz’s one. The two main critical lines of argument developed by Lorenz in this process are the biological and the epistemological one: on the biological side Lorenz heavily criticizes Uexküll’s vitalism and his faith in harmonizing forces and supernatural factors. On the epistemological side, Lorenz, arguing from the point of view of the critical realism, accuses Uexküll of postulating the separateness of all living beings, a separateness which is due to the Kantian idea that every subject of knowledge and action is imprisoned in the transcendental circle of its representations and attitudes. (shrink)

In the work of Lorenz we find an initial phase of great concordance with Uexkülls theory of animals’ surrounding-world (Umweltlehre), followed by a progressive distance and by the occurrence of more and more critical statements. The moment of greater cohesion between Lorenz and Uexküll is represented by the work Der Kumpan, which is focused on the concept of companion, functional circles, social Umwelt. The great change in Lorenz’ evaluation of Uexküll is marked by the conference of 1948 Referat über (...) Jakob von Uexküll, where Lorenz highlights the vitalist position of Uexküll. In the works of the years after World War II, the influence of the Estonian Biologist greatly diminishes, even though Lorenz continues to express his admiration for particular studies and concepts of Uexküll. References to Uexküll’s work are less and far in between, while the difference is highlighted between the uexküllian theoretical frame (vitalistic) and Lorenz’s one (Darwinian and evolutionist). The two main critical lines of argument developed by Lorenz in this process are the biological and the epistemological one: on the biological side Lorenz heavily criticizes Uexküll’s vitalism and his faith in harmonizing forces and supernatural factors (which leads to concepts such as the perfect fusion of all biological species in their environment and the absence of rudimentary organs). On the epistemological side, Lorenz, arguing from the point of view of the critical realism, accuses Uexküll of postulating the separateness of all living beings, a separateness which is due to the Kantian idea that every subject of knowledge and action is imprisoned in the transcendental circle of its representations and attitudes. (shrink)

The analysis of social communication in other-than-human animals poses several theoretical challenges due to the complexity of individual and extra-individual variables. Some previous studies have found a valuable solution in Uexküll’s work by expanding and adapting its usage for the study of communication in a heurtistic manner. An Umwelt analysis provides a theoretical toolbox, which allows researchers to take an emic perspective on the lives and phenomenal world of other animals. However, Umwelt and its elaborations do not allow for a (...) clear distinction between acts of perception and communication and seem to ignore factors that escape the specific communication contexts under analysis. Thus, moving away from the existing linear and cyclical approaches to communication, we propose a complementary approach to the study of social communication by combining Barnlund’s transactional model of communication with Umwelt theory and the functional circle more specifically. Our elaborated model conceives social communication as the process of creating meaning through the interaction of two subjects and emphasizes the role of species-specific and individual features in its creation. Our goal is to re-evaluate the research on social communication of other-than-human animals by advocating for the theoretical and empirical potential of Umwelt, especially pertaining to animals with complex Umwelten. Our model offers a valuable solution to the analysis of intraspecies communication that accounts for the role of private and public cues as well as the subjects’ specific behaviors, messages, and context in the creation of meaning. (shrink)

The present essay aims at integrating different concepts of meaning developed in semiotics, biology, and cognitive science, in a way that permits the formulation of issues involving evolution and development. The concept of sign in semiotics, just like the notion of representation in cognitive science, have either been used too broadly, or outright rejected. My earlier work on the notions of iconicity and pictoriality has forced me to spell out the taken-forgranted meaning of the sign concept, both in the Saussurean (...) and the Peircean tradition. My work with the evolution and development of semiotic resources such as language, gesture, and pictures has proved the need of having recourse to a more specified concept of sign. To define the sign, I take as point of departure the notion of semiotic function (by Piaget), and the notion of appresentation (by Husserl). In the first part of this essay, I compare cognitive science and semiotics, in particular as far as the parallel concepts of representation and sign are concerned. The second part is concerned with what is probably the most important attempt to integrate cognitive science and semiotics that has been presented so far, The Symbolic Species, by Terrence Deacon. I criticize Deacon’s use of notions such as iconicity, indexicality, and symbolicity. I choose to separate the sign concept from the notions of iconicity, indexicality, and symbolicity, which only in combination with the sign give rise to icons, indices, and symbols, but which, beyond that, have other, more elemental, uses in the world of perception. In the third part, I discuss some ideas about meaning in biosemiotics, which I show not to involve signs in the sense characterised earlier in the essay. Instead, they use meaning in the general sense of selection and organisation, which is a more elementary sense of meaning. Although I admit that there is a possible interpretation of Peirce, which could be taken to correspond to Uexküll’s idea of functional circle, and to meaning as function described by Emmeche and Hoffmeyer, I claim thatthis is a different sense of meaning than the one embodied in the sign concept. Finally, I suggest that more thresholds of meaning than proposed, for instanceby Kull, are necessary to accommodate the differences between meaning (in the broad sense) and sign (as specified in the Piaget–Husserl tradition). (shrink)

The application of the polluter-pays principle in environmental policy depends on answers to the philosophical questions about what is good or detrimental with respect to nature. Science and the economy constitute a functional circle of “observing” nature’s unity as well as its utility. Based on a concept of nature as a system of causally related objects or - complementary to this - as a bunch of “resources,” however, the human interest and responsibility in nature do not seem to (...) be properly observed. Subjecting nature to human subjectivity may have been an adaptation in the wrong direction, since, if humanity is taken as the measure, there is no measure for humanity. A practical philosophy of nature should start from the assumption that science’s missing unity and the economy’s missing goodness are equivalent shortcomings in a complenlentary way. On the one hand, philosophy should engage in the problem-oriented reintegration of the sciences by establishing nuclei of interdisciplinary cooperation. We are relatingourselves to nature in a responsible way only when approaching nature as our own nature. On the other hand, while our technological faculties have reached a very high level of reliability and differentiation, we are definitely much less successful in recognizing goodness in economic “goods.” This calls for demand education with respect to how human needs are to be brought to bear as demands on nature, ahuman relation to nature as well as natural relations between human beings, again depending on answers to philosophical questions. In the history of ideas, nature has declined from “the nature of things and beings” to “the things and beings of nature,” or from being to beings. We will, however, never be able to judge what is good or bad with respect to nature if we do not from the outset start - pragmatically-with a normative concept of nature. (shrink)

Biosemiotics deals with the processes of signs in all dimensions of nature. Semiosis is the primary form of intelligence. Intelligent behaviour becomes immediately understandable in this approach because semiosis combines causality with the triadic structure of the semiotic sign. Intelligence is a process created in a given context. In the course of evolution organisms have learned to create increasingly sophisticated internal representations of external state. Semiosis is the precursor of the emergence of a feature we consider intelligence. Biosemiotics also draws (...) attention to the distributed intelligence, which relies on external semiotic scaffoldings as much as on the subject’s abilities and knowledge. (shrink)

The organism against its environment. The organism against other organisms, competing and struggling for life. Antagonism and confrontment as the only possible relation in nature. The tendency to anthropomorphize nature and explain it using concepts and facts from the human sphere. A stroll through the worlds of Uexküll and Merleau-Ponty in the search of alternative knowledge that allow us to understand relation from another point of view. A counterpoint and identification of common tonalities between the research programs from both thinkers (...) as a way to demonstrate the possibilities of a more fruitful approach. Umwelt as a generative system of meaningful relations in which its participants are not mutually exclusive, but express a melody that include them all. (shrink)