Argues the eschatological longing of bodily obsession. Impact of culture and religiosity on use of the body; Views of feminist Judith Butler on gender performativity; Theory of gender transformation; Relation among gender, transformation and God.

Part and parcel of the eschatology of the three Abrahamic faiths is the belief that sin and evil will be eliminated upon the consummation of God’s kingdom on earth. Not only do these beliefs affirm that God will ultimately “deal” with the problem of sin and evil, but that sin and evil will be no more. I refer to this eschatological belief as “the elimination of evil” (EOE). The EOE has important implications for how one understands the ontology of (...) time. In this paper, I contribute to this discussion by arguing that ontologies of time that affirm the concrete existence of past moments are incompatible with the EOE. I also argue that solutions based on theories of hypertime, such as those posited by Tyron Goldschmidt and Samuel Lebens, also fail to solve the problems posed to those ontologies of time affirming the concrete existence of the past. I conclude that the ontology of time that best facilitates the EOE is presentism. (shrink)

This essay examines the relevance of eschatological themes to the political theory of Michael Walzer. A distinctive eschatological hope is identified, which functions as a guide to thought throughout Walzer's writings, even though he seldom expresses it (and sometimes denies it). This analysis of Walzer's work demonstrates that eschatology is relevant to the contemporary discussion of justice, and conversely, that contemporary political theory can be a guide for the construction and evaluation of theological doctrines of eschatology. Any (...) class='Hi'>eschatology that enters into political debate in a modern, pluralistic society like the United States, however, must have at least one important characteristic: it must be informed by a profound sense of limitation. (shrink)

This paper argues that the eschatological dimension of religion is distinct from other fundamental dimensions, including moral grounding, the ontological basis of reality, and the constitution of persons. It responds in particular to Tibor Horvath's conception of the category of ultimate reality. It also argues that eschatological hereafters imply something akin to an higher-time A-series, in that the hereafter can be conceived as a temporal order beyond currently existing time.

An abiding puzzle in the Phaedo is the transition in the text from initial pessimism about the possibility of wisdom during human life to a more optimistic view. Prominent interpretations posit different kinds or degrees of wisdom at issue in the two sets of passages. By contrast, I argue that the pessimistic view rests on the implicit premise that the soul cannot be completely purified during human life—a premise which arises from an initial conception of impurity and its cause. In (...) developing his eschatology, Socrates refines this conception and rejects the implicit premise. Because the embodied soul can be completely purified, it can achieve philosophical wisdom as well. (shrink)

Traditional eschatology clashes with the theory of entropy. Trying to bridge the gap, Robert John Russell assumes that theology and science are based on contradictory, yet equally valid, metaphysical assumptions, each one capable of questioning and impacting the other. The author doubts that Russell's proposal will convince empirically oriented scientists and attempts to provide a viable alternative. Historical‐critical analysis suggests that biblical future expectations were redemptive responses to changing human needs. Apocalyptic visions were occasioned by heavy suffering in postexilic (...) times. Interpreted in realistic terms, they have since proved to be untenable. The expectation of a new creation without evil, suffering, and death is not constitutive for the substantive content of the biblical message as such. Biblical future expectations must be reconceptualized in terms of best contemporary insight and in line with a dynamic reading of the biblical witness as God's vision of comprehensive optimal well‐being that operates like a shifting horizon and opens up ever new vistas, challenges, and opportunities. (shrink)

Apocalyptic thinking has a long religious and political tradition, but what place does it occupy within the temporal universe of contemporary capitalism? In this essay, we use the figure of the eschaton to draw out the loaded and ambiguous character of the future as it emerges through the condition of indebtedness. This entails a departure from political economy accounts of capitalist futurity, which stress the structural logic of financial speculation, in favour of an existential account that begins instead with the (...) cosmology of money and debt. We argue that finance capital’s fixation on the future has produced a very specific form of apocalyptic imagination, characteristic of financial society and built on a libidinal economy of leverage. Rather than offering an ecstatic end to the global process of financialization, financial eschatologies bind the contemporary subject to debt and indebtedness to the very end: an endless apocalypse, premised on the ends of finance itself. (shrink)

The present work sets out to examine the intersection between Igbo eschatology and environmentalism. It seeks to determine how the tenets of Igbo eschatology impact on environmental conservation. The approach is conversational. Given that the work centers on a particular cultural area, an ethnic nationality in West Africa with unique cultural symbols, the paper also employs the tool of hermeneutics. It is discovered that the Igbo eschatology is characteristically this-worldly, cyclic and perceives human existence as continuous given (...) the possibility of reincarnation. Accordingly, it impacts a sense of permanence or semi-immortality on the evanescent earthly existence thus rendering the optimism or motivation which environmentalism, a futuristic endeavor, demands. This is unlike an otherworldly, linear and terminal eschatology which forecloses the possibility of continuous existence and demotivates for the care of the environment. Secondly, given the animistic and this-worldly orientation, the symbolic presence of the eschata such as the ancestors and spirits in the mundane world elevates the status and compels respect and care for nature or the environment. The paper therefore submits that the Igbo eschatology is pro-environmentalism. (shrink)

Eschatology is the study of end things—death and what lies beyond. Nearly all religions tackle the topic in one way or another. Theologians debate the different concepts of death, interment rituals, funeral rituals, final judgment, and the afterlife. Traditional African religions are no exception. -/- However, among scholars, the subject of African eschatology has lacked consistency and a coherent view. African Eschatology presents the concepts of end things as they are viewed in Africa as a whole but (...) focuses especially on the perspective of the Igbo culture of southern Nigeria, using it as a lens through which to examine African religious beliefs more generally. -/- Author Aloysius N. Ezeoba explains that Igbo culture perceives death not as an ultimate end but as a transition to another stage of existence. Judgment is passed by the living, by deceased ancestors, and by deities, for only through successful judgment may the Igbo rejoin their family members in a peaceful afterlife. The profound impact of death on the behavior of the living is unmistakable. -/- African Eschatology fills the gap that presently exists in the scholarly exploration of African traditional religions. It thus serves as a guide for both enculturation and inter-religious studies and communication. (shrink)

In this paper, I review evidence which strongly supports the claim that life will eventually be extinguished from the universe. I then examine the ethical implications of this evidence, focusing, in particular, on the question whether it is a bad thing that life will eventually die out.

Paul Tillich's eternal now is the ground from which all things emerge and perish in each and every moment. A Tillichean eschatology involves the gathering of all things finite into the eternity of the present moment, into God. Salvation is present moment. But is the “eternal now” enough? This essay offers biblical and theological critiques of Tillich's present eschatology and posits an eschatology that combines Tillich's “eternal now” with Wolfhart Pannenberg's “end‐oriented eschatology.” The result is an (...) eschatology that recognizes the eternal now in which all things (including all time) belong to God yet with an eye toward the God‐given possibilities of the next moment, the future. The end of being is not cessation; rather, it is the fulfillment of time, the consummation of all things. (shrink)

In this essay, I show how Thomas Aquinas circumscribes epistemological questions concerning both the possibility and character of our knowledge of God within a larger eschatological framework that acknowledges the beatific vision as the ultimate good that we desire as well as the ultimate end for which we were created. Thus, knowledge of God is possible and actual on Aquinas's view because it is eternally rather than merely temporally indexed—that is, properly attributable to the blessed in heaven and only derivatively (...) attributable to persons of faith. I further argue that interpreting Aquinas's account of faith in the light of his account of the beatific vision allows us to carve out polemical space for the theologically realist claim that there can be and in fact is objectivity in our knowledge of God, whether that knowledge comes through faith (in this life) or the beatific vision (in the next life). (shrink)

Along 19th and 20th centuries, art became a sort of new religion, sometimes coexisting peacefully with the institutional one, sometimes trying to provide what the institutional religion was not able to provide any more. Nowadays, art has adopted many of the solutions, topics and theories that theology has handled since it was born. Arthur C. Danto treats art as a reality whose history is over (and so, a escathological reality) and also as a metaxological (metaxy=between) reality dwelling between two realms. (...) Thus, we cannot decide by pure perceptive means whether something is art or not. This consideration has important consequences for art theory. (shrink)

In the last years of his life, between 1292 and 1298, the Franciscan Peter of John Olivi wrote a series of short devotional texts, known as Opuscula, aimed at the religious edification of the laity. Olivi's perspective was strongly eschatological: in his opinion, the imminence of the end of time made lay religious experience more authentic than that of the clergy, which would eventually oppose the final evangelical renewal.Among the twelve surviving Opuscula, the most eschatologically oriented is titled Remedia contra (...) temptationes spirituales. The Remedia are characterized by a cautious and rigorous judgment on spiritual gifts, such as visions and raptures. According to Olivi, these phenomena are particularly... (shrink)

The fundamental insight that N. Berdyaev obtains in his historiosophical reflections is that history is antinomic and the historical process is catastrophic since it has to end, because “the world cannot exist eternally”. In its global, empirical (objective) dimension, history resembles an absurd comedy “in which nothing ever succeeds”. The idea of history as a long duration (long duree) and permanent progress misses its essence. According to Berdyaev, such history is meaningless, and it has to end. Its true meaning is (...) revealed only in “its end” and “before the face of eternity”. Terrestrial history does not have its epilogue and the final solution in historical time but in celestial history when the boundaries between the immanent and the transcendent world disappear. History is the path to another and different, sublime and spiritual (noumenal) world that lies beyond the boundaries of everything historical. The destiny of man, which lies at the heart of history, assumes a meta-historical goal and a trans-historical solution to the destiny of history in a different, eternal time. To summarize, history has an eschatological meaning. Although there is an unsolvable tragic conflict between the individual human destiny and the destiny of humanity as a whole within the framework of history, Berdyaev, following the entire tradition of Russian religious philosophy, is convinced that the overcoming of that contradiction on the historical level is possible with love as the salvation and the main driving force of the soul and the source of all the spiritual creation of man. (shrink)

Teyyar eschatology, as a doctrine of the ultimate destiny of mankind, is deeply rooted in the concept of the ultimate goal, which is regarded as a true result, though it emerges as a tool designed to fill some of the emptiness created by humanity in the course of natural science practice. Teillard felt that the deplorable state of modern mankind was the result of his neglect of eschatology, his inability to adapt to the needs of his activities, and (...) his lack of courage in further design. "A lighter skyscraper of hope is being constructed," G. Grespi notes. The belief that the Earth is exhausting its limited resources necessarily leads to the thought of the destruction of the Earth. (shrink)

Heidegger's Eschatology is a ground-breaking account of Heidegger's early engagement with theology, from his beginnings as an anti-Modernist Catholic to his turn towards an undogmatic Protestantism and finally to a resolutely a-theistic philosophical method.

Abstract This is a study of the figure of the ?last God? as it appears in Martin Heidegger's Beiträge zur Philosophie. In what sense is this figure related to philosophy of religion as traditionally understood? It is certainly closely related to the question of the relation of time and eternity. Heidegger's earliest accounts of the relation between time and eternity are examined, and Heidegger's reflections in the Beitrage are examined in the context of the accusation of ?theosophy? which Heidegger levels (...) against the most prominent of the ancient thinkers of time and eternity, namely Plotinus. (shrink)

Traditional utilitarianism, when applied, implies a surprising prediction about the future, viz., that all experience of pleasure and pain must end once and for all, or infinitely dwindle. Not only is this implication surprising, it should render utilitarianism unacceptable to persons who hold any of the following theses: that evaluative propositions may not imply descriptive, factual propositions; that evaluative propositions may not imply contingent factual propositions about the future; that there will always exist beings who experience pleasure or pain.

One of the great Jewish intellectuals of the twentieth century, Taubes published only this one book during his life, and here the English translation finally becomes available.

The world in which we find ourselves is religiously ambiguous. It is possible for different people to experience it both religiously and non-religiously; and to hold beliefs which arise from and feed into each of these ways of experiencing. A religious man may report that in moments of prayer he is conscious of existing in the unseen presence of God, and is aware - sometimes at least - that his whole life and the entire history of the world is taking (...) place within the ambience of the divine purpose. But on the other hand the majority of people in our modern world do not participate in that form of experience and are instead conscious of their own and others' lives as purely natural phenomena, so that their own experience leads them at least implicitly to reject the idea of a transcendent divine presence and purpose. If they are philosophically minded, they may well think that the believer's talk is the expression of what Richard Hare has called a blik , a way of feeling and thinking about the world which expresses itself in pseudo-assertions, pseudo because they are neither verifiable nor falsifiable and are therefore factually empty. 1 The religious man speaks of God as a living reality in whose presence we are, and of a divine purpose which gives ultimate meaning to our lives. But is not the world the same whether or not we suppose it to exist in God's presence; and is not the course of history the same whether or not we describe it as fulfilling God's purposes? Is not the religious description thus merely a gratuitous embellishment, a logical fifth wheel, an optional language-game which may assuage some psychological need of the speaker but which involves no claims of substance concerning the objective nature or structure of the universe? Must not the central religious use of language then be accounted a non-cognitive use, whose function is not to assert alleged facts but to express a speaker's, or a community of speakers', emotions within the framework of a factually contentless blik , ‘slant’, or ‘onlook’? (shrink)

This paper argues that eschatology is defined by a combination of sacred cosmogonic power and moral requirement. Moralizing religion is this combination, which claims to ground a distinctive kind of possibility (possible hereafter states). Eschatology has certain features that hold in all of its forms, with variations in whether the hereafter is conceived as a timeless and body-less eternity, or a more temporal and concrete existence. The paradigm for this analysis is found in Soren Kierkegaard's depiction of faith (...) in Fear and Trembling. (shrink)

Novello, Henry The word 'eschatology' means doctrine about the eschata or 'last things.' In the neo-Scholastic manual style of theology that dominated Catholic theology before the twentieth century, eschatology was the doctrine of those things that awaited the individual person beyond death, as well as those things that awaited the whole of humanity at the end of time. The teaching on the last things appeared as an appendix at the end of dogmatic theology where it led a rather (...) barren existence as instruction on what comes 'after' the pilgrim life, with the result that it had little critical and transforming effect upon the state of the present world. Since the manual style of eschatology treated the last things as objects, Yves Congar described it as a 'physical' style of eschatology. Dermot Lane makes a further noteworthy observation when he criticizes the physical style of eschatology for appearing 'to claim too much' and seeming 'far too certain on matters of detail.' In no sense should eschatology be regarded as providing factual information about the details of our future existence. (shrink)

Recently, there have been a number of responses to Ted Sider’s argument in “Hell and Vagueness,” which challenges the consistency of a popular view of hell with God’s justice. After presenting an interpretation of the original argument, I critically examine the reply to it by Trent Dougherty and Ted Poston. I conclude that we should be suspicious of the success of their overall approach, both because it requires the truth of controversial metaphysical theses and because it does not ultimately address (...) the heart of the worry that Sider’s argument is built on. Ultimately, I present and offer a limited defense of a new response to Sider, built on a picture of consignment to hell based on having committed mortal sins that are unforgiven by God. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Eschatology, Sacred and Profane* PHILIP MERLAN LET ME BEGINthis paper with a double motto. The first is from a German poet, C. F. Meyer. It reads in my own translation: "We hosts of the dead ones--more numerous are we--than you who tread the earth and you who sail the sea." The second is a piece of statistical information for the correctness of which, however, I cannot vouchsafe. It (...) reads: "From the time when man first appeared, 77 billion people have been born. Thus, today's population of about 3 billion represents only 4 per cent of all men ever born" (Universitas 6 [1964], p. 423). With these two mottoes in mind let me proceed. Kant is one of the great representatives of the belief both in a goal to history and in progress. As he sees it, this goal is one world-wide society living under one law, which law coincides with the demands of morality, or as we could also say, in which legality and morality at least do not conflict. Kant is convinced that nature will by-and-by compel man to establish this world-wide society characterized, among other things, by eternal peace. Thus, Kant is an optimist with regard to the future. Yet, he is profoundly pessimistic with regard to the past. For him, history is one long chain of sufferings inflicted on man by man; and on the whole he has a very dim view of man's nature. The synthesis of his pessimism with his optimism is contained in a remarkable sentence which we find in one of his last writings--1793, when Kant was 69. The title is On the Adage--This May be Right in Theory, But Is Inapplicable to Practical Purposes, and here he says: When one contemplates the evil which in the course of history man has inflicted on man, one would be inclined to give up in despair. But there is one thought on the thinking of which our mind will cheer up. It is the thought: things will improve in the future. This kind of cheer will be entirely benevolent and unselfish, for this improvement will take place after we * I am indebted for the posthumous edition of this paper of my late husband Philip Merlan to Professor Frederick Sontag of Pomona College. My husband prepared this paper for, and read it to, various philosophical groups. In the course of these readings, he made numerous pencil additions. Thus, what Professor Sontag has done, is to change the tone to suit a printed presentation and to work the additions into the text as the logic of the arguments and notes seemed to dictate. Franciszka Merlan. [193] 194 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY have been buried for a long, long time. We ourselves will not be able to harvest what we ourselves have helped to plant. (WW8, 273-13) In whose name did Kant speak? Who are the altruists who feel cheered up by the prospect of a goal which they themselves will not live to reach? No easy answer can be found in Kant's writings. However it would not be surprising if Kant, a Rousseauian in so many respects, retained some of Rousseau's belief in the innate goodness of man (in spite of his pietistic heritage which encourages him to see man as thoroughly corrupt). Thus, he expects everybody to be capable of this altruistic attitude. We all do then cheer up when we think of the prospects for mankind. This means that our altruism permits us in some way to participate in mankind's bright future, to reach the goal, if I may say so, in hope and expectation, though not physically. For Kant the problem of history was never in the center of his own interest, nor would he have admitted that it is of central importance for man. Hegel's attitude is quite different. Man's participation in history is Hegel's main topic. At this point let me remind you briefly of Hegel's fundamental ideas. The enlightenment and romanticism produced two highly characteristic interpretations of religion. According to the former, the kernel of every religion is morality. According to the latter, the... (shrink)

There is a tension in the Dionysian corpus between the resolute negativity of the Mystical Theology and Divine Names, on the one hand, and the affirmative confidence of the hierarchical treatises. Where the former works insist that God is entirely beyond created symbols, the latter speaks of "mediation" of the divine (CH XIII.4) and "a correlation between visible signs and invisible reality" (CH XV.5). Whereas the debate surrounding the Corpus tends to exaggerate one of these poles at the expense of (...) the other, I argue that the tension between them is best understood by way of a distinctively eschatological reading. Although scholars including Paul Rorem claim that the Corpus Dionysiacum contains no eschatology, I argue that the Divine Names describes a gap that is unmistakably temporal between what we "now grasp" and the plenitude of knowledge that remains for the "time to come" (DN (I.4). Because Dionysius claims that union with God remains a matter for expectation and is thus reserved for eschatological fulfillment, the present practice of the church that he describes necessarily takes the form of a tentative attempt to speak and act without certain knowledge. The church may continue to hope that its visible signs are taken up into the divine life, but Dionysius is clear that this affirmation is necessarily uncertain. Yet, far from undermining the present practice of faithful life, Dionysius suggests that the temporal play of presence and absence describes the condition of sacrament itself. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 8, Page 1140-1173, October 2022. This article explores the complexities of Marcuse’s philosophical anthropology in light of Foucault’s criticisms of Marcuse and the Frankfurt School. While Marcuse’s theory of human nature is grounded upon a dialectical conception of essential human potentialities striving for realization, it secretes a radically plastic conception of life that undermines all anthropological essentialism. This fundamental tension between essentialist and plastic conceptions of human nature has significant implications for rethinking Marcuse’s (...) project and legacy. (shrink)