African Philosophy: Metaphysics

In this contribution, we will analyse the inquiry (ሐተታ, ḥāteta), written by Ethiopian scholar, Zera Yaqob, ዘርአ፡ያዕቆብ, Seed of Jacob (Sumner, 1976: 4, I). His philosophy resists a division into the basic disciplines customary in Western philosophy, his arguments, as we wish to propose with caution, combine metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology in a way that is almost impossible to separate. We will thus not be able to identify purely epistemological principles in his philosophy. However, since Zera Yaqob is deeply concerned (...) about truth, we still find profound philosophical insights about knowledge and being and their relationship to one another. We will finish our reconstruction of some of the main ideas of the inquiry, (ሐተታ, ḥāteta), with some rather critical notes on some of the hidden premises and their seemingly superioristic implications. (shrink)

I critically survey three different respects in which indigenous African philosophical ideas could influence psychology as a way of interpreting and treating the human mind. One involves the postulation of imperceptible agents, forces, and properties such as the living-dead, witchcraft, and destiny, which are salient features of indigenous sub-Saharan views of the nature of reality, including of the causes of mental illness. Along with this ontology is an epistemology of how to acquire knowledge of this imperceptible realm, with, say, divination (...) techniques employed to receive messages from the living-dead. Awareness of this worldview is essential when dealing with clients steeped in indigenous African cultures, and there could be reasons of epistemic and cultural justice for psychologists to engage with these philosophical perspectives when teaching. However, insofar as psychology is properly understood as an evidential enquiry grounded on empirically verifiable data, it would be difficult for it to accept these ontological and epistemological views. In contrast, the other two ways in which African philosophical ideas might affect psychology are on the face of it fully consistent with a scientific orientation and so are prima facie more relevant to intellectual understanding and therapeutic practice in at least a multicultural setting. A second characteristically African philosophical view is about the nature of a thing’s essence or identity, namely, that it is constituted by relational properties and not merely by intrinsic ones. Applied to the self, such a view entails that what it is to be a self is to have been in or be in relationship with other selves (and a broader society and environment), and that what it is to be a particular self as distinct from other selves is also to have been in or be in particular relationships with other selves. Western psychologists instead invariably take the self to be something inner, say, a chain of mental states such as preferences, values, experiences, and memories, with their empirical studies and theoretical reflections arguably having been biased by presuming this conception of personal identity. A third African philosophical view that might affect psychology concerns final values, such as how to understand what mental health and a good life more generally are and hence which interventions such as medication and therapy to adopt. Western psychologists usually conceive of values in individualist ways, prizing goods that make no essential reference to others, such as creativity, vitality, positive experiences, smooth function of an internal mechanism, autonomy, self-reliance, a true/strong/whole self, and self-realization––where the self, of course, is again presumed to be something internal. In contrast, the approach prominent amongst indigenous sub-Saharans is to highlight the importance of relationships with others when it comes to understanding the nature of mental health, meaning in life, flourishing, and related values. Here, too, the more African approach cannot be dismissed as ‘unscientific’ and should be given its due as a reasonable account of what most merits pursuit. (shrink)

Reprint of an article that first appeared in Synthesis Philosophica (2018).

Work on the conceptual amelioration of race concepts is usually negative or critical: it uncovers social features that contribute to racial hierarchies. Much less focus has been placed on how ameliorative accounts contribute to positive change. Using an account of race developed by Steve Biko during South African apartheid, I will argue that we can extract a novel account of positive amelioration in which racial categories can have normative or aspirational force, contributing to positive change.

In this chapter I critically discuss ideas from the under-explored indigenous African tradition of philosophy of religion. Salient in African thought are four major beliefs that on the face of it make good sense of the view that it is appropriate to be grateful and act gratefully to God for being alive. First, there is a theological belief in a personal God as the creator of all concrete objects in the universe, a globally under-recognized form of monotheism alongside the Abrahamic (...) faiths. Second, there is a force rather than object ontology, with a common view being that everything that exists is imbued with a certain quantity and quality of life-force or vital energy that has come from God. Third, there is a vitalist axiology, such that the greater the life-force, the more final value something has. Fourth, there is the claim that, of what is perceptible on Earth, human persons were given the greatest life-force, one that confers on them a dignity lacking in the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms. It naturally follows from these claims that human persons have reason to be grateful to God for having been created with a superlative, non-instrumental worth. I expound this position for a global audience and defend it from several ways of objecting to the idea that being given a dignity can provide reason to be thankful. (shrink)

Slightly modified reprint of an article first appearing in the journal _Synthesis Philosophica_ (2018).

This paper explores the role of African worldviews in biodiversity conservation and sustainable development. African worldviews recognise the interdependence and interconnectedness of human beings, animals, plants and the natural world. Although it is not always the case that what one does depends on what one thinks and believes, indigenous African people's ideas and beliefs about the human-nature relationship have influenced what they have done in and to nature. In African worldviews, the present generation has moral obligations to the ancestors and (...) future generations. It ought to preserve the environment, which is rich in biodiversity, for posterity. This paper insists that it is extremely urgent that every effort be made to document the knowledge of peasant farmers and indigenous people in general. This paper further stresses that indigenous environmental knowledge makes a big difference to sustaining diverse environments, and it is imperative to preserve such knowledge before it dies out. (shrink)

Up to now, a very large majority of work in the religious philosophy of life’s meaning has presumed a conception of God that is Abrahamic. In contrast, in this essay I critically discuss some of the desirable and undesirable facets of Traditional African Religion’s salient conceptions of God as they bear on meaning in life. Given an interest in a maximally meaningful life, and supposing meaning would come from fulfiling God’s purpose for us, would it be reasonable to prefer God (...) as characteristically conceived by African philosophers of religion to exist instead of the Abrahamic conception of God? At this stage of enquiry, I answer that, in respect of the range of people to whom God’s purpose would apply, a more African view of God would plausibly offer a greater meaning, but that, concerning what the content of God’s purpose would be, the Abrahamic view appears to offer a greater one. I conclude by reflecting on this mixed verdict and by suggesting respects in which non-purposive facets of the African and Abrahamic conceptions of God could also have implications for life’s meaning. (shrink)

Evil is an unpleasant reality which every cultural civilization grapples with. It is at the centre of the existentialist discourse, due to the fact that, in their view, it causes meaninglessness in human existence. In Yorùbá intellectual tradition, there are prescribed ways by which evil can be suppressed, including sacrifice (ẹbọ), good character (ìwà pẹ ̀lẹ ́) and inner head (Ori). However, these measures have certain fundamental implications when considered critically through the lens of existentialism. This is because, on a (...) closer examination, they are ultimately ineffective in the light of the reality of some higher forces, namely the Ajogun, headed by the Witches. These forces are believed to be irredeemably evil, because they have the power to render any of those measures impotent. This power, however, is believed to have been given to them by Olodumare. Accordingly, evil becomes what human beings cannot conquer, but have to live with. Consequently, we recommend, following Albert Camus, that human beings learn to live with the reality of evil, like the stone of Sisyphus. This is because any human attempt to take evil out of existence, by appealing to those measures, amounts only to Kierkegaardian “leap of faith”, which Albert Camus describes as a “philosophical suicide.” We substantiate the above claims by critically engaging some verses of Ifá which is believed to be the backdrop of Yorùbá philosophy. (shrink)

Truth and knowledge are essentially the dictates of some rationality or metaphysical ordainment. By sense experience man is capable of accounting for his past, contemplate his life and predict his future and all of reality, for traditional Africa, however (as is the case with most native societies), there is another mode of knowing beyond man’s immediate capacity in search of truth and reality. An analysis of this perception indicates that there is some metaphysical tinge to epistemology or knowledge claims—whether in (...) the spheres of justice, morality/ethics, religion, political authority, prosperity, law, or ontology/world-view. Put on a plain pedestal: Isn’t there an African mode of knowing? By the study among the Afemai-Etsako of Southern Nigeria, this article tersely adumbrates the scope and nature of knowledge and discovers that, beside the common routes to it (experience and reason), the gamut of knowledge among the traditional Africans also have several metaphysical strands reducible to creative determinism, reactive interference, and representativeness in timing and naming. (shrink)

African Philosophical Perspectives on the Meaning of Life The question of life’s meaning is a perennial one. It can be claimed that all other questions, whether philosophical, scientific, or religious, are attempts to offer some glimpse into the meaning—in this sense, purpose—of human existence. In philosophical circles, the question of life’s meaning has been given … Continue reading African Philosophical Perspectives on the Meaning of Life →.

This book focuses on African metaphysics and epistemology, and is an exercise in decoloniality. The authors describe their approach to "decoloniality" as an intellectual repudiation of coloniality, using the method of conversational thinking grounded in Ezumezu logic. Focusing specifically on both African metaphysics and African epistemology, the authors put forward theories formulated to stimulate fresh debates and extend the frontiers of learning in the field. They emphasize that this book is not a project in comparative philosophy, nor is it geared (...) towards making Africa/ns the object/subjects of philosophy. Rather, the book highlights and discusses philosophical insights that have been produced from the African perspective, which the authors argue must be further developed in order to achieve decoloniality in the field of philosophy more broadly. (shrink)

How can African philosophy of education contribute to contemporary debates in the context of complexities, dilemmas and uncertainties in African higher education? The capacity for self-reflection, self-evaluation and self-criticism enables African philosophy of higher education to examine and re-examine itself in the context of current issues in African higher education. The reflective capacity is in line with the Socratic dictum 'know thy self.' African Higher Education in the 21st Century: Epistemological, Ontological and Ethical Perspectives responds to the demands for reflection (...) and self-knowledge by drawing from ontology, epistemology and ethics in an attempt to address issues that affect African higher education as they connect with the past, present and future. (shrink)

The main aim of this book is to discuss fundamental developments on the question of being in Western and African philosophy using analytic metaphysics as a framework. It starts with the two orthodox responses to the question of being, namely, the subject-verb-object language view and the rheomodic language view. In the first view, being is conceived through the analysis of language structure, where it is represented by subjects, objects, and relations. In the second view, there are different variations; however, the (...) common idea is that the world's structure is revealed in the root verb of terms. This suggests a holistic and dynamic conception of being, where everything is in a continuous process of action. The book builds on analytic philosophy and explores metaphysical concepts such as space-time, modality, causation, indeterminism versus determinism, and mind and body. The book shows that in both Western and African thought, similarities in different studies confirm that philosophy is a universal activity, differences within a context and beyond confirm the perspectival nature of human knowledge as individuals attempt to interpret reality, and language influences the conceptualization of being in a particular area. One of the novel aspects is the development of visual and mathematical African models of space and time. (shrink)

In this article I critically discuss some recent English language books in African philosophy. Specifically, I expound and evaluate key claims from books published by sub-Saharan thinkers since 2017 that address epistemology, metaphysics, and value theory and that do so in ways of interest to an audience of at least Anglo-American-Australasian analytic philosophers. My aim is not to establish a definitive conclusion about these claims, but rather to facilitate cross-cultural engagement by highlighting their relevance particularly to many western philosophers and (...) by presenting challenges to these claims that such philosophers would be likely to mount. (shrink)

Our aims are to articulate some core philosophical positions characteristic of Traditional African Religion and to argue that they merit consideration as monotheist rivals to standard interpretations of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition. In particular, we address the topics of how God’s nature is conceived, how God’s will is meant to bear on human decision making, where one continues to exist upon the death of one’s body, and how long one is able to exist without a body. For each of these topics, (...) we note how Traditional African Religion posits claims that clash with mainstream Judaism, Christianity, and Islam and that, being prima facie plausible, indicate the need for systematic cross-cultural philosophical debate. (shrink)

This article theorizes the modernization dynamics of the Igbo world, using the Habermasian framework. Drawing on Habermas, it argues that Igbo modernity or, more precisely, the transformations associated with Igbo modernization, may be understood in terms of the “uncoupling” of systems from the Igbo lifeworld. Relatedly, it further argues that the crises and pathologies that attend modernity in Igboland owe largely to the “colonization” of the Igbo lifeworld by systems of modernity consequent upon this uncoupling. The article pays special attention (...) to the realm of the lifeworld because it is a neglected sphere in the scholarship on the Igbo experience of modernity. Besides, focusing on the Igbo lifeworld would provide the much-needed contextualized reading—one steeped in Africa—of Habermas’s important but rather rarefied theory of modernity. The significance of the article perhaps lies in this two-pronged engagement—the focus on lifeworld and the attempt to contextualize Habermas. (shrink)

Universally, the idea of needs arises from the limited nature of man. Arising from this limitation, the desires involved in being human are such that man is trapped in a world of needs, which are biological, psychological, social, political, economic and so on. But the understanding that defines and directs these needs depends on the context and culture where the human being functions. This chapter sets out to articulate the key issues that define the idea of needs in African thought. (...) To do this, it applies the instance of the idea of needs in Igbo thought as an illustration of meaning assigned to needs and the understanding that informs reactions to needs in African thought. It translates needs into three components, namely Required necessity, Required necessity that could be provided through an agent and Required necessity that should be provided by an agent. It then maps out Igbo proverbs on Lack, Care and Duty, and applies them to articulate the idea of needs in African thought. It will also articulate the social and political imperatives implied by this understanding. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The concept of vital force in African philosophy received its first full articulation in Placide Tempels’s Bantu Philosophy and has evolved over time from the ontological dimension of a universal actuation and energizing principle to an element of mind, notably in the work of Kwame Gyekye. In this essay, I present the concept of vital force and trace its evolution from the time of its first full articulation by Tempels up to its identification with spirit, or mind, in Gyekye’s (...) thought. I try to defend the thesis that the concept of vital force can ground the notion of mood that takes a pivotal position in the twenty-first century philosophy of consolationism. I adopt an analytical and constructive method in this paper. (shrink)

Franziska Dübgen and Stefan Skupien have written a much needed overview of Paulin Hountondji’s work. While Hountondji is quite well known for his critique of ethnophilosophy, his later intellectual work on scientific dependency and his political writings are not as well known to non-specialist Anglophone readers. This partially stems from the fact that while his later work on scientific dependency has been translated into English, it has been published in the form of short articles or through transcribed interviews, which makes (...) it difficult for a reader to situate it in relation to Hountondji’s work on ethnophilosophy. Moreover, the Anglophone reception of Hountondji’s explicit political writings has been hindered by the fact that many of them have not been translated into English, e.g. his 1973 book Libertés: Contribution à la Révolution Dahoméenne, which was written as a prescription of what needs to be done by the military regime in order to end neo-colonial dependency in Benin in the aftermath of the military coup led by Mathieu Kérékou in 1972, has still not been translated into English. Dübgen and Skupien have written a book that will contribute to remedying this neglect by contextualizing Hountondji’s work on scientific dependency and his political writings in relation to his better known writings on ethnophilosophy. (shrink)

The social nature of human beings and individualistic characterizing destiny of individuals is contradictory and call for philosophical interrogation. Segun Ogungbemi has unrepentantly argued that destiny is individualistic and neither connective nor collective. This paper critiques Segun Ogungbemi’s conception of destiny, instead, argues for connectiveness and collectiveness of destiny. It argues that destiny, as an individualistic phenomenon, challenges and raises the Yorùbá notion of corporate communal existence. The paper concludes that individuating destiny is not only a non-plausible conception; it is (...) also not tenable in any possible social world. (shrink)

The following pages engage a hermeneutic approach to African philosophy, focusing on the work of Tsenay Serequeberhan. At the heart of the discussion is the question of where to locate such an approach in the existing philosophical literature. Does this way of working render African philosophy a European enterprise? Giving an affirmative response, the writings of Paulin Hountondji, which draw upon Husserlian phenomenology, are taken up as an alternative response to questions raised here about the meaning and methods of hermeneutics. (...) Ultimately, however, this perspective is also set aside. Instead, suggestions are put forward for the markers around which a contemporary African metaphysics, which is both restorative and creative, might be pursued. (shrink)

Eschatology is the study of end things—death and what lies beyond. Nearly all religions tackle the topic in one way or another. Theologians debate the different concepts of death, interment rituals, funeral rituals, final judgment, and the afterlife. Traditional African religions are no exception. -/- However, among scholars, the subject of African eschatology has lacked consistency and a coherent view. African Eschatology presents the concepts of end things as they are viewed in Africa as a whole but focuses especially on (...) the perspective of the Igbo culture of southern Nigeria, using it as a lens through which to examine African religious beliefs more generally. -/- Author Aloysius N. Ezeoba explains that Igbo culture perceives death not as an ultimate end but as a transition to another stage of existence. Judgment is passed by the living, by deceased ancestors, and by deities, for only through successful judgment may the Igbo rejoin their family members in a peaceful afterlife. The profound impact of death on the behavior of the living is unmistakable. -/- African Eschatology fills the gap that presently exists in the scholarly exploration of African traditional religions. It thus serves as a guide for both enculturation and inter-religious studies and communication. (shrink)

The dominant view amongst contemporary Western philosophers about the essence of a natu­ ral object is that it is constituted by its intrinsic properties. The ontological approach salient in the African philosophical tradition, in contrast, accounts for a thing’s essence by appeal to its relational properties. The Afro­relational ontology is under­developed, with the primary aim of this article being to help rectify that weakness. Specifically, this article’s aims are: to articulate an African approach to understanding the essence of a concrete, (...) natural thing in terms of its relationships; to illustrate the Afro­relational approach with the examples of the self and of water; to contrast the Afro­relational characterization of the essence of the self and of water with a typically Western construal in terms of their intrinsic properties; and finally to provide an initial defence of the Afro­relational approach, both by responding to some objections facing it and by providing some new, positive reasons to take it seriously. (shrink)

The paper examines the loss of African identity within the modern/ contemporary era. African identity has been a recurrent theme in all domains of African studies, serving as a major intellectual concern of many African scholars. Debates on the reality of African Philosophy are anchored on the questions surrounding African identity giving rise to thoughts and contents of that philosophy. Despite the volumes already generated on the theme, the controversial circumstances that engendered the subject of African identity makes its intellectual (...) concern sustainable and almost inexhaustible. The question of African identity is basically an ontological question of the reality of Africa cum the being of an African. The series of infiltration and appraisals of Africa by foreign elements tend to plunge the continent into crises of identity. In addition to the various approaches to the subject, the nature-culture perspective presents the argument that if culture is ideally the product of a people’s nature, African culture represents the objective manifestation of the Africanity of the continent and its organic/holistic content. Such frame of thought embellished with philosophic tools provides further locus for a more feasible and stable definition of African identity as the holistic nature and character of being African. (shrink)

Some scholars read the black body as constructed by white consciousness or perceptions; Coates indicates, to the contrary, that violence against the black body and threats to black embodiment ground and make possible particular ideations of race and (white) American self-concepts. Coates takes an implicitly anti-Hegelian, anti-DuBoisian stance against any spirit or history that might redeem or affirm the black body as the grounding of black experience. Like repeated speech-acts, bodily violence is “world creating.” Although material treatment of bodies and (...) their conceptual signification are mutually reinforcing, Coates’s reversal of etiology signals a material foundation to concepts of race and to solutions to racial injustices. Only through the end of violence to the black body might white Americans change their ideation and achieve racial justice. (shrink)

Deconstructing Azawad -- The plundering of Mali, past and present -- The African trace -- The Sahelian specter -- The duty of violence -- Nyama, fratricide, and reconciliation -- What is to be done? -- Zongo, Sankara, and the Burkinabe revolution.

I articulate an African view of personhood that combines beauty and goodness–aesthetic and moral features. I discuss the idea of communalism, which provides the social and moral values and belief system that give meaning to this view of personhood. I use ideas from some African ethnic traditions, or some people’s account of these traditions, as examples to illustrate this view. The similarities in these examples from different ethnic traditions indicate that it is reasonable to characterize this view as a common (...) theme that may plausibly represent many African cultures. This essay does not seek to provide an anthropological descriptive view, but a plausible philosophical stance on how we ought to understand the idea of personhood in African cultures. I do not suggest that all African cultures or traditions have exactly the same view or that they hold this view in the same way, extent or degree. Obviously, there may be minor differences that do not alter the essence of the view. Many of the authors quoted in this paper who have written on African philosophy use the phrase, ‘African culture’, ‘African tradition’, ‘African view’ or ‘African society’. Thus, it has become commonplace in African philosophical circles that when the prefix ‘African’ is used in the literature on African philosophy, it does not imply that Africa is a monolith or that its traditions are static. There is a recognition that some traditions have changed or are changing. The use of ‘African tradition’ usually indicates a generalizing theoretical abstraction about some enduring and dominant similar themes or ideas in many African traditions. It is also meant to contrast ‘African’ with ‘Western’ traditions, and to also respond to Western critiques of Africa as a group. It is used in a similar way in which the prefix ‘Western’ is used in the literature. This notion of ‘Western’, which is replete in the literature, does not suggest the West is a monolith, but rather, a reference to some similar dominant themes in Western thought. (shrink)

In this article, I offer concrete suggestions about which topics, texts, positions, arguments and authors from the African philosophical tradition one could usefully put into conversation with ones from the Western, especially the Anglo-American. In particular, I focus on materials that would make for revealing and productive contrasts between the two traditions. My aim is not to argue that one should teach by creating critical dialogue between African and Western philosophers, but rather is to provide strategic advice, supposing that is (...) a sensible goal to adopt. (shrink)

An original and constructive African though system with universal reach. Existence and consolation transcends the ethno-philosophies the dominated in the post-colonial period. While the African experience might lead one to say human life is pointless, the author argues that meaning comes in the form of consolation and is rooted in mood.

It is almost impossible to conceive of a people without culture for this would mean that such people do not experience or have any knowledge about the world. Culture determines the perspective or purview through which the world around a people is understood. It shapes their values, practices, behaviours, beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, and conduct. There are variations in the way Africans view the world but within these variations, several common themes are evidently visible giving room for unity in diversity. Some (...) of these themes include the notions of motherhood, respect for constituted authority, belief in the sanctity of human life, life in the hereafter, dignity in labour, moral uprightness, need for inter-subjective living, and close-knittedness with nature. The goal of this paper is bipartite in nature. It argues on the one hand that these cultural practices which are deeply rooted in African worldview, when extended globally would contribute to global harmony. On the other hand, it observes at the same time that this present age and civilisation have lost touch with the cultural practices that are fundamental to the unity and harmony of Africa and by extension, the world, hence, the need for a reawakening of African cultural practices that are germane to global harmony. The paper intends to achieve this by cashing in on the numerous values in the practice of kinship in Africa that encourage shared values and discourage cultural prejudices as kinship is conceived to extend beyond one’s immediate family to the community and embracing the whole of humanity. However, in a paper of this length, one cannot obviously fully explore how each of the aforementioned themes will influence global harmony. Consequently, focus is here only directed on a few. (shrink)